{ "id": 5203107, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARBARA CARABALLO, a/k/a Bobbie Caraballe and Barbara Cockrell, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Caraballo", "decision_date": "1992-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20141328", "first_page": "685", "last_page": "690", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 685" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3180210 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3569467 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480180 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5283121 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555329 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5221499 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-54" }, { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3187960 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555014 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256676 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550107 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624913 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576546 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989 Ill. Laws 3295", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1989 Ill. Laws 2681", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1989 Ill. Laws 1893", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 10967, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.623805320239528e-07, "percentile": 0.6877192454077439 }, "sha256": "0524d3e90400af65582f9c73656aafdfdd49540abafc9022459f592a0cf67b2b", "simhash": "1:0b9626c5ea087f7c", "word_count": 1855 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:19.187731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARBARA CARABALLO, a/k/a Bobbie Caraballe and Barbara Cockrell, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Barbara Caraballo, was found guilty at a bench trial of four counts of delivering cocaine in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1100 et seq.). She was thereafter sentenced to concurrent terms of 6, 10 and 24 years\u2019 imprisonment. This appeal is limited solely to the 24-year sentence, imposed under section 401 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401), for defendant\u2019s delivery of 970.9 grams of cocaine.\nDefendant argues that the super Class X statute mandating a sentence of \u201cnot less than 15 years and not more than 60 years with respect to 900 grams or more of *** cocaine\u201d was not in effect at the time of her arrest. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(a)(2)(D).) Alternatively, defendant argues that, if the statute was in effect, the trial judge failed to consider relevant mitigating circumstances when he imposed the 24-year sentence on defendant. We affirm.\nDefendant was arrested on April 24, 1990, and indicted on four counts of delivering cocaine. Count I, which is of concern in this appeal, was based on her delivery of over 900 grams of cocaine on April 24, 1990. Following a bench trial at which 12 witnesses testified, defendant was found guilty of all four counts. On November 5, 1990, the trial judge imposed a sentence on defendant which included a 24-year sentence of imprisonment on count I.\nWe will first address defendant\u2019s argument that she was improperly sentenced under the Act since the relevant portion was effectively repealed by the Illinois General Assembly in 1989. The problem here lies in the fact that there are two different versions of section 401 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401 (\u201cManufacture or delivery unauthorized by Act \u2014 Penalties\u201d)) in the 1989 Illinois Revised Statutes. Version I of section 401 was amended by Public Act 86 \u2014 266 (1989 Ill. Laws 1893), which passed the legislature on June 19, 1989, and Public Act 86 \u2014 442 (1989 Ill. Laws 2681), which passed the legislature on June 15, 1989. Version I includes subparagraph 401(a)(2)(D), which allows a trial judge to impose a sentence of \u201cnot less than 15 years and not more than 60 years with respect to 900 grams or more of any substance containing cocaine, or any analog thereof.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56V2, par. 401(a)(2)(D) (amended by Pub. Acts 86 \u2014 266, eff. Jan. 1, 1990; 86 \u2014 442, eff. Jan. 1, 1990) (Version I).) Version II of section 401 is based on Public Act 86 \u2014 604 (1989 Ill. Laws 3295), which passed the legislature on June 27, 1989. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56V2, par. 1401 (amended by Pub. Act 86 \u2014 604, eff. Jan. 1, 1990) (Version II).) Version II does not contain a section similar to section 401(a)(2)(D) of Version I. The effective date for both Versions I and II was January 1, 1990.\nDefendant argues that, since there are two conflicting versions of section 401, the version last acted on by the legislature \u2014 Version II \u2014 controls. She therefore contends that the trial judge\u2019s reliance on section 401(a)(2)(D) of Version I was without statutory authority. We disagree.\nOur analysis of these conflicting versions of section 401 is guided by section 6 of the Statute on Statutes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1, par. 1105), which states in pertinent part:\n\u201cTwo or more Acts which relate to same subject matter and which are enacted by the same General Assembly shall be construed together in such manner as to give full effect to each Act except in case of an irreconcilable conflict. In case of an irreconcilable conflict the Act last acted upon by the General Assembly is controlling to the extent of such conflict. * * *\nAn irreconcilable conflict between 2 or more Acts which amend the same section of an Act exists only if the amendatory Acts make inconsistent changes in the section as it theretofore existed.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1, par. 1105.\nSee Illinois v. Mikusch (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 242, 254; People v. Frye (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 853, 859-60.\nThe general rule is that, when an act is amended so as to read as it is repeated in the amendatory act, portions of the old law not repeated are deemed repealed. (County of Cook v. Renaissance Arcade & Bookstore (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 123, 149-50; see Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a78(d) (\u201cA bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely the sections amended\u201d).) However, courts will strive to find harmony between legislative acts so as to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. For example, our supreme court has stated that, \u201c[i]f the two enactments are capable of being construed so that both may stand, the court should so construe them.\u201d (People v. Ullrich (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 477, 483; see United Citizens v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989 (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 332, 339 (statutes which are in apparent conflict should be construed as harmonious insofar as reasonably possible).) We further note that, when we determine the intent of the legislature as to a particular act or amendment, we are not confined to its literal language, but may consider its history and subsequent amendments. In re Pronger (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 512, 520.\nAt first, the two versions of section 401 of the Act appear to be incongruous. However, upon a reading of both versions and the relevant public acts, it is apparent that the legislature hastily passed the latter, Version II. The fifth sentence of Version II incorrectly refers to section 401.2, as that section had been repealed by the earlier public acts which were the basis for Version I (Pub. Acts 86 \u2014 266, 86 \u2014 442). Version I repealed section 401.2, which contained the relevant super Class X sentencing language at issue in this case, and incorporated that exact language into the body of amended section 401. Version II was passed eight days later and specifically prefaced the detailed sentencing section by stating \u201c[e]xcept as provided in section 401.2.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401.) The fact that Version II explicitly, although incorrectly, referred to section 401.2 is evidence that the legislature intended to keep the super Class X sentencing features within section 401. Further evidence of this is found in the recently amended version of section 401. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 561/2, par. 1401.) The 1991 version contains super Class X sentencing language identical to that found in Version I (1989). We conclude that Versions I and II of section 401 of the 1989 statutes can be read together so as to uphold the trial judge\u2019s use of the super Class X sentencing feature of Version I (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(a)(2)(D) (as amended by Pub. Acts 86 \u2014 266, eff. Jan. 1, 1990; 86 \u2014 442, eff. Jan. 1, 1990)).\nWe trust that, in the future, the legislature will use more care when amending the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 561/2, par. 1100 et seq.). We agree with Justice Steigmann\u2019s special concurrence in People v. Liberman (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 639, 651-54, where he noted that, in the past 41/2 years, the legislature passed 27 substantive amendments to the Act. Justice Steigmann expressed deep concern about such a \u201clegislative frenzy\u201d and the confusion that it entails. He noted the \u201cconfusion and uncertainty these frequent changes engender in the prosecutors and police who have the duty of enforcing the drug laws.\u201d (228 Ill. App. 3d at 653.) We join Justice Steigmann in urging \u201ccalm deliberation\u201d over future amendments to the Act.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court committed reversible error by not giving proper weight to certain mitigating evidence when he sentenced her to 24 years\u2019 imprisonment for delivering over 900 grams of cocaine. Defendant argues that the trial judge did not adequately consider her age (51 years), her medical condition (prior diagnoses of breast cancer, uterine cancer and high blood pressure), her lack of a criminal record and her contention that she was entrapped.\nSentencing is a matter for the trial court\u2019s discretion; we will not disturb a sentencing decision absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. O\u2019Neal (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297-98; People v. Garcia (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 350, 352.\nThe 24-year sentence, which the trial court imposed upon defendant for delivering 970.9 grams of cocaine, fell within the statutory range of 15 to 60 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56%, par. 1401(a)(2)(D) (as amended by Pub. Acts 86 \u2014 266, eff. Jan. 1, 1990; 86 \u2014 442, eff. Jan 1, 1990).) In comments from the bench, the trial judge stated that defendant engaged in three separate cocaine transactions within one week even though she was concerned about the consequences of criminal behavior on her family. The trial judge stated that he did not believe defendant\u2019s testimony and that defendant failed to show any genuine expression of \u201cremorse for having delivered substantial amounts of cocaine into the community, except that she has been caught and must go to prison.\u201d He found that defendant has shown an \u201cability to deliver controled [sic] substances in substantial quantities on short notice\u201d and no ability to reform herself. The trial judge then stated:\n\u201cRather than showing true remorse [for] delivering cocaine into the community, she views herself in some respect as the victim in this matter. I find that totally unwarranted. I find that her repeated delivery of controlled substances establishes the severity of her danger to the community. I find that she does not demonstrate the likelihood of rehabilitation and she is a serious threat to the community.\u201d\nThe sentencing judge need not set forth on the record each factor considered. (People v. Meeks (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 524, 534.) Where mitigating evidence is presented, as defendant alleges here, a court of review will presume that the judge considered it, absent some indication to the contrary. (People v. Sawyer (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 383, 387, aff\u2019d (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 184.) Our review of the record and the sentencing hearing transcript leads us to conclude that the trial judge carefully weighed the evidence in mitigation and aggravation. We cannot agree with defendant\u2019s assertion that, in this case, the imposition of a 24-year sentence for the delivery of 970.9 grams of cocaine was an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLAREN and DUNN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marc Kadish, of Chieago-Kent College of Law, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARBARA CARABALLO, a/k/a Bobbie Caraballe and Barbara Cockrell, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20141328\nOpinion filed July 21, 1992.\nMarc Kadish, of Chieago-Kent College of Law, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0685-01", "first_page_order": 705, "last_page_order": 710 }