{ "id": 5204047, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harris", "decision_date": "1992-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201490\u20140480", "first_page": "876", "last_page": "882", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 876" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2681170 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499212 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 N.E.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3442189 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3585720 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508250 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294736 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2542553 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 81", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1774920 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2932686 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0401-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 804, "char_count": 15667, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.092790689336664e-08, "percentile": 0.46738110986393416 }, "sha256": "659174c0016217d9f08c496371fa487e559bcefcf06ded673792ae9fc66ee6dc", "simhash": "1:a2e3e0cc17688455", "word_count": 2609 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:19.187731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HENRY LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found the defendant, Dennis Harris, guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed violence. Post trial the trial court vacated the judgments of guilt with respect to those counts pertaining to armed robbery and armed violence. After determining that the death penalty should not be imposed, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of 75 years. The defendant appeals, presenting two issues for our review: whether his right to an impartial jury was violated and whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence.\nConcerning the first issue he raises for review, defendant contends that his right to an impartial jury was violated because the trial couit improperly refused to excuse potential juror George O\u2019Neill for cause, thereby forcing defendant ultimately to exhaust his peremptory challenges and, thus, to accept the twelfth juror to be seated, juror George Holt, although Mr. Holt was, in the words of the defendant, \u201cacquainted with law enforcement officials.\u201d\nThe right to a jury trial guarantees to one accused of a crime a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors, and the failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. (People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.) The right to a trial by an impartial tribunal is so basic that a violation of the right requires a reversal. (Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.) This issue cannot be disposed of by the harmless-error rule. (Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.) Peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension but are, rather, creatures of State law, and a State may determine their number, their purpose, and the manner of their exercise. (Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273; People v. Gleash (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 598, 568 N.E.2d 348.) The loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. (Ross, 487 U.S. 81, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273.) Peremptory challenges are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. (Ross, 487 U.S. 81, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273.) As long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the sixth amendment was violated. Ross, 487 U.S. 81, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273.\nThe purpose of examination upon voir dire is to filter out prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to be impartial. (People v. Johnson (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 713, 575 N.E.2d 1247.) A person is not competent to sit as a juror if his state of mind is such that a party will not receive a fair and impartial trial with him as a member of the jury. (Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401, 298 N.E.2d 705.) In voir dire the trial judge is afforded broad discretion (People v. Johnson (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 952, 516 N.E.2d 343), and reversal of a conviction will not occur unless there has been an abuse of discretion that denies a defendant an impartial trial (Gleash, 209 Ill. App. 3d 598, 568 N.E.2d 348). Moreover, the trial court\u2019s determination of whether prospective jurors would be fair and impartial should not be set aside unless that determination was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Gleash, 209 Ill. App. 3d 598, 568 N.E.2d 348.\nIn the instant case, as we have indicated, the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to excuse potential juror George O\u2019Neill for cause, whereupon the defendant removed him by the use of a peremptory challenge. Later, after the defendant had used his last peremptory challenge and had moved unsuccessfully for additional peremptory challenges, George Holt was examined as a potential juror. When the court asked Mr. Holt, \u201cDo you have any close friends or relatives employed by a police agency?\u201d Mr. Holt answered, \u201cFriends.\u201d Asked further by the court, \u201cWould that cause you to put greater or less weight on the testimony of a police officer, if one testifies?\u201d Mr. Holt responded, \u201cNo.\u201d Asked by the court, \u201cWill you treat the testimony of a police officer by the same standards as you would any other witness in this case?\u201d Mr. Holt answered, \u201cYes.\u201d Later the defense inquired of Mr. Holt, \u201c[Y]ou have indicated that you had some friends who were police officers. And who might they be?\u201d Mr. Holt responded, \u201cJust friends of mine in Carbondale, Shiplett, and Reno, couple of the guys over there. That\u2019s all.\u201d Asked further by the defense, \u201cAnd have you ever talked about this case, to your recollection, or Mr. Harris in any way with either Jerry Reno or Chuck Shiplett, or any of the others?\u201d Mr. Holt answered, \u201cNo, no.\u201d\nThe defense subsequently asked the court to remove Mr. Holt for cause, stating:\n\u201cYour Honor, I think that Mr. Holt\u2019s familiarity with members of the police force, including Police Lieutenant Reno, is a problem which may prejudice Mr. Holt against my client, and I would ask that the Court remove Mr. Holt for cause or that in the alternative I be granted an additional peremptory challenge based on the Court\u2019s earlier rulings to remove Mr. Holt.\u201d\nThe court ruled that \u201c[cjause definitely has not been established, and the Court\u2019s [sic] previously ruled on your request for additional peremptory challenges.\u201d The court earlier had also denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider its refusal to remove George O\u2019Neill for cause. We note parenthetically that neither Officer Shiplett nor Officer Reno testified at the defendant\u2019s trial.\nIn his brief defendant asserts that he \u201cwas forced to accept George Holt, who was well-acquainted with several police officers, including an officer who was a State\u2019s witness, as a juror. Thus, this Court must reverse Mr. Harris\u2019 conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.\u201d Defendant does not name this witness. In his reply brief he states that Mr. Holt was acquainted with police officers who were \u201cpotential State\u2019s witnesses.\u201d Defendant urges that George Holt \u201cwould likely be biased in favor of law enforcement officials,\u201d maintaining that the trial court\u2019s refusal to excuse George O\u2019Neill for cause prejudiced him, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.\nThe defendant discusses in detail George O\u2019Neill\u2019s responses during voir dire in an effort to show that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse Mr. O\u2019Neill for cause. However, because reversible error \u201cresults not from the defendant\u2019s exhaustion of his peremptory challenges, but rather from the end result of an unfair jury\u201d (Gleash, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 607, 568 N.E.2d at 354; see Ross, 487 U.S. 81, 101 L. Ed. 2d 80, 108 S. Ct. 2273), we look to the composition of the jury that was actually impaneled and that returned the verdict of guilt. The defendant voices no objection concerning the competence of any juror seated other than George Holt. We have examined all of the questions posed to Mr. Holt and the answers he gave during voir dire. In light of the trial court\u2019s opportunity to evaluate Mr. Holt\u2019s responses and to assess his candor (see Johnson, 162 Ill. App. 3d 952, 516 N.E.2d 343), as well as the nature of his responses as revealed by the record, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s determination that George Holt would be fair and impartial was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse George Holt for cause, and, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertions, it cannot be said that he was denied the right to trial by an impartial tribunal.\nWith respect to the other issue the defendant raises for review, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 75 years\u2019 imprisonment because he had not intended to kill the victim, because he has significant rehabilitative potential, and because the trial court considered an improper aggravating factor, namely, deterrence of others. He asks us to reduce his sentence to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment or to vacate the sentence and to remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing.\nThe defendant killed the victim, Jason Jackson, in the course of an armed robbery of four employees of Jeremiah\u2019s Restaurant in Carbondale as they walked to a nearby bank to deposit the restaurant\u2019s receipts at about 2:30 a.m. on October 14, 1989. When the defendant fled on foot immediately after taking the deposit bags from the employees, the victim ran after him, mistakenly believing the defendant\u2019s weapon was a cap gun. When the defendant fell while running from the scene, the victim overtook him. The defendant shot him at close range three times in rapid succession, one bullet penetrating his heart. The 21-year-old victim died almost immediately.\nIn imposing sentence in this case, the trial court concluded that there were no statutory factors present in mitigation and that there were two factors present in aggravation: the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.1, 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2.) In pronouncing. sentence, the court expressed the belief that the defendant is eligible for an extended-term sentence on the basis of \u201cthe aggravating factors in this case and the evidence in this case, the prior record of this Defendant, and the Court\u2019s independent assessment of all of these elements.\u201d Present as a factor in aggravation with respect to the imposition of an extended term, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20142 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20142), was the defendant\u2019s prior conviction for the offense of residential burglary within 10 years of the instant conviction. As we have said, the trial court sentenced the defendant to confinement for a term of 75 years.\nThe imposing of punishment is one of the most important and sensitive of judicial responsibilities, and we, as a reviewing court, must give great weight to the judgment of the trial court. (People v. Generally (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 668, 525 N.E.2d 106.) Its decision concerning sentencing is entitled to great deference. (People v. Plantinga (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 512, 477 N.E.2d 1299.) The imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion, and absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered upon review. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(7) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143.2(a)(7)) provides that deterrence of others is a factor to be accorded weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment. (People v. Simmons (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 492, 485 N.E.2d 1135.) In the exercise of its discretion a court may logically give reasonable consideration to the need for deterrence as a factor in the imposition of a sentence. (People v. Cameron (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 998, 546 N.E.2d 259.) Deterrence, punishment, the nature of the crime, and the protection of the public are to be considered equally with the rehabilitation of the offender in the fixing of sentences. Generally, 170 Ill. App. 3d 668, 525 N.E.2d 106.\nIn the instant case, Mary Ellen Hall, a rehabilitation specialist, testified on defendant\u2019s behalf that, after visiting him twice, she had indicated in the conclusion of her report that she felt he has\n\u201c \u2018excellent potential to benefit from rehabilitation services. He needs one-on-one assistance in identifying a vocational objective. Test results indicate once a vocational objective has been identified, training should be feasible to pursue in his chosen area, especially areas of mechanical orientation. It should also be indicated vocational options take into consideration the apparent attention span deficit noted during testing as well as vocational interviews.\u2019 \u201d\nOn cross-examination the witness was asked, \u201cAnd in fact, you indicated to me, didn\u2019t you, that in your opinion that Mr. Harris displayed excellent potential to benefit from rehabilitation services, and you indicated to me, didn\u2019t you, that\u2019s the standard answer every rehabilitation specialist gives because you\u2019re optimistic people; isn\u2019t that right?\u201d The witness answered that she could not speak for every rehabilitation professional but that \u201cthat\u2019s what I would give.\u201d Also testifying on defendant\u2019s behalf was Dr. James Bordieri, an associate professor at the Rehabilitation Institute at Southern Illinois University, who had seen the defendant on three occasions. On the basis of test results, the witness found the defendant to be in the low range of average intelligence. He stated that the defendant had developed skills as a short-order cook and in keeping records or doing inventory. The witness expressed the opinion that \u201cthese skills would allow him future rehabilitation potential.\u201d\nThe defendant argues that the trial court ignored \u201can important mitigating factor,\u201d that he had not intended to kill the victim. While there is nothing in the record to suggest that when the defendant planned the armed robbery he intended to kill anyone, there is evidence that he shot the victim in the belief that the victim could identify him because a cloth concealing defendant\u2019s nose and mouth during the robbery had fallen.\nAlthough the defendant was but 23 years of age at the time he committed this offense, he had by that time already engaged in extensive criminal conduct and was on mandatory supervised release, or parole, with respect to sentences for residential burglary, aggravated unlawful restraint, and unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant had entered a plea of guilty to all of those offenses in April of 1986.\nAs was said in Perruquet:\n\u201c[T]he trial judge is normally in a better position to determine the punishment to be imposed than the courts of review. [Citations.] A reasoned judgment as to the proper sentence to be imposed *** depends upon many factors, including the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. [Citation.] The trial judge, in the course of the trial and the sentencing hearing, has an opportunity to consider these factors \u2018which is superior to that afforded by the cold record in this court.\u2019[Citation.]\u201d (Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.)\nRecognizing the great deference to which the decision of the trial court is entitled and considering all of the circumstances reflected by the record here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing this sentence. Despite the defendant\u2019s assertions to the contrary, it was not error for the trial court to consider deterrence of others as an aggravating factor. Nor does the record indicate that the rehabilitation of the defendant was not given appropriate consideration together with other elements to be considered in the fixing of a sentence. Further, whatever the defendant\u2019s intent may have been concerning the victim, the record here is such that, even if he did not intend to kill Jason Jackson, the court did not abuse its discretion in the imposition of sentence.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDENHERSH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HENRY LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Charles Grace, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENNIS HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201490\u20140480\nOpinion filed July 30, 1992.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nCharles Grace, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro (Kenneth R. Boyle, Stephen E. Norris, and Gerry R. Arnold, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0876-01", "first_page_order": 896, "last_page_order": 902 }