{ "id": 5202869, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Willis", "decision_date": "1992-07-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20142794", "first_page": "1056", "last_page": "1061", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 1056" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "280 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 3d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2911481 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643488 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294529 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2535657 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0379-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 570, "char_count": 10530, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1563380722196545 }, "sha256": "b5af29bb2028de3261a9e2d76d4497aa1f268ab2a6c662697351650cca585b2e", "simhash": "1:ac2398ec7459f2f3", "word_count": 1703 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:19.187731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant George Willis was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed, but the cause was remanded for resentencing because the trial court imposed the sentence based on the aggravating factor that defendant\u2019s conduct resulted in the taking of a life. (People v. Willis (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 379, 569 N.E.2d 113.) Following a new sentencing hearing, defendant was again sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant challenges the sentence on the following bases: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by improperly holding defendant to a higher standard of rehabilitation than is required by law; (2) the court\u2019s finding that mitigating factors were not present was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the court had no grounds to impose the same sentence where the original sentence was vacated because of the court\u2019s consideration of an improper aggravating factor, and where no new matters in aggravation were presented at the resentencing hearing.\nAt the new sentencing hearing, decedent\u2019s mother read a victim-impact statement. The State then referred to the brutal character of defendant\u2019s conduct in the commission of the offense. Specifically, the State pointed out that defendant inflicted numerous stab wounds to decedent. In mitigation, defendant\u2019s landlady, supervisor and brother testified concerning defendant\u2019s good character and peaceful nature. Prior to the hearing, defendant had been employed for two years for a railroad company. He began his employment as a laborer on a \u201csteel gang\u201d and was promoted to machine operator. His supervisor recalled one instance where he unjustifiably \u201ccame down pretty hard\u201d on defendant and defendant did not become aggressive or lose his temper. The record contained a statement from Ralph Stevens, a tavern owner who knew defendant. Stevens recalled an incident at his tavern in 1988. He was talking with defendant when four men entered the tavern. According to Stevens, one of the men \u201cappeared to be trying to provoke George.\u201d Defendant ignored the man. When Stevens told the man to leave defendant alone or vacate the premises, the man grabbed a club Stevens kept on a shelf and threatened Stevens. When the man moved as if to hit Stevens, defendant disarmed him. \u201cThe three other men jumped on George from behind, but he was able to discourage their attempts to fight and they then withdrew and left the tavern.\u201d Stevens concluded, \u201cI have only admiration for his reserved behavior, and bravery that night, as well as his ability to defuse that situation.\u201d Defendant was honorably discharged from the army and obtained an associate of arts degree from a junior college. Defendant had no prior convictions.\nAfter hearing matters in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment, stating:\n\u201c[T]he Appellate Court points out that the manner in which the crime was committed is something that can appropriately be considered, as well as the factors listed in the statute in mitigation and the other factors listed in aggravation.\nIt\u2019s true that the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and that he has no history of anything of that sort subsequent to this offense as well.\nAnd I considered that in arriving at the original sentence, and I am still considering it today.\nIt is also true that at least in his initial stabbing of Lee Cummings, George Willis acted under strong provocation and, in fact, I found that the first stabbing was an act conducted in self-defense.\nBut the fact remains that George Willis stabbed Lee Cummings ten more times after that, and four of them were in the back while Lee Cummings was begging and pleading for his life.\nI am reviewing in my mind \u2014 or I have reviewed in my mind, I should say, whether or not the character and attitude of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime.\nAnd whether or not it\u2019s likely that the circumstances would recur, or whether these are circumstances that are unlikely to recur, and I am not convinced enough of that to find those factors exist in mitigation.\nArguments with other people can always occur. Arguments with people in superior positions can always occur. Arguments that lead to physical violence can occur.\n* * *\nI think the statement made by defense counsel in argument in mitigation, in fact, correctly sums up the situation here.\nShe said that George Willis has lived the last five years just like he lived the first 32, and I agree with that.\nI think that he has done the best he could do for himself and in the intervening years between the killing of Lee Cummings and today\u2019s resentencing hearing George has kept himself busy. He\u2019s improved his personal income. He\u2019s working on his education. He\u2019s joined some social organizations. He\u2019s working on his own self-esteem.\nBut I also feel that this is for himself and while he may have been given the last four years, or five years, in which to do that by virtue of the fact that he was not incarcerated, that there has not been a significant change that\u2019s been demonstrated to me by the evidence presented and the arguments of the attorneys that would change my opinion as to the likelihood \u2014 Let me put it this way.\nAs to the necessity for protecting society, the serious nature of the offense, and the qualities of the defendant himself.\nI agree Mr. Willis hasn\u2019t made it any worse, and I\u2019m certainly glad of that. But I haven\u2019t really heard anything here that would lead me to believe me that he\u2019s made it better in such a way that probation would be an appropriate disposition in this case. I don\u2019t think it is.\nHaving considered all the factors listed by the statute, all of the evidence that\u2019s been presented to me today, and the arguments, the sentence that I feel is appropriate here is again a period of incarceration.\nAnd my original determination as to the period that would be appropriate has not changed.\u201d\nA sentence within the statutory limitations will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Lucas (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 148, 156, 574 N.E.2d 850.) However, if the trial court has abused its discretion, this court has the power and authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (107 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)) to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. While we recognize that the reviewing court must exercise its authority under Rule 615 sparingly, it is our opinion that this is a proper case in which to exercise our authority to reduce defendant\u2019s sentence.\nWhen we remanded this case to the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing, we instructed the trial court that it may not consider as an aggravating factor that defendant\u2019s conduct resulted in the taking of a life. At the second sentencing hearing, the State introduced essentially the same evidence in aggravation that it had introduced in defendant\u2019s first sentencing hearing. This evidence concerned the amount of stab wounds defendant inflicted on the victim and the manner in which the victim died. While the State introduced a victim-impact statement read by the victim\u2019s mother, this statement was virtually identical to the statement that had been read by the victim\u2019s cousin in defendant\u2019s first sentencing hearing. Despite the fact that the trial court had one less aggravating factor to consider, the trial court again sentenced defendant to 10 years.\nA similar situation occurred in People v. McCumber (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 19, 499 N.E.2d 139, wherein the court vacated the defendant\u2019s 10-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter because of the trial court\u2019s consideration of improper factors. On remand, the trial court again imposed a 10-year sentence, but this time the sentences were to run concurrently, rather than consecutively. In reducing the defendant\u2019s sentence to seven years, the appellate court found that it had engaged in an act of futility in remanding the case for a resentencing hearing since defendant\u2019s original sentence was determined after considering improper factors and at defendant\u2019s second sentencing hearing the judge imposed the same sentence.\nIn the instant case, while no new aggravating evidence was introduced at defendant\u2019s second sentencing hearing, new mitigating evidence was submitted. At the second hearing, as in the initial sentencing hearing, defendant introduced evidence that he had no prior criminal record, had a peaceful nature prior to the incident, served in the military and received an honorable discharge, and received a degree from junior college. At the resentencing hearing, defendant submitted additional mitigating evidence pertaining to his conduct since the stabbing while defendant was free on appeal bond. Defendant introduced evidence of his peaceful nature since the stabbing, the counselling he received in order to help him deal with anger and aggression, his continued schooling and his steady employment. This mitigating evidence indicates that defendant has strong potential for rehabilitation. See People v. Walker (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 294, 280 N.E.2d 726 (in reducing defendant\u2019s sentence, the court observed that the mitigating evidence introduced at the resentencing hearing \u201cfrom the vantage point in time four years after the commission of the offense\u201d showed \u201cthat defendant has sufficiently established a more favorable potential for rehabilitation so as to qualify this as an appropriate case for us to reduce defendant\u2019s sentence\u201d). 4 Ill. App. 3d at 296.\nBased on these particular circumstances, where no new factors in aggravation were introduced, the trial court had one less aggravating factor to consider, and new mitigating evidence was introduced, we exercise our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615 to reduce defendant\u2019s sentence to seven years.\nAccordingly, defendant\u2019s sentence is affirmed as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Elyse Krug Miller, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Rogelio Pena, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGE WILLIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20142794\nOpinion filed July 10,1992.\nRehearing denied August 28,1992.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Elyse Krug Miller, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Rogelio Pena, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1056-01", "first_page_order": 1076, "last_page_order": 1081 }