{ "id": 8499325, "name": "EUGENE H. ASPLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGE R. FERRALL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Aspling v. Ferrall", "decision_date": "1992-07-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141110", "first_page": "758", "last_page": "767", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 758" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7554", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71081", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "933 F.2d 449", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542063 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/933/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 F.2d 1142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6124234, 1671446 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/73/1142-01", "/f2d/817/1142-01" ] }, { "cite": "884 F.2d 688", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11353193, 6501586 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/884/0688-01", "/br/104/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 416", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171319 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "859 F.2d 664", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10530734, 6490590 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/859/0664-01", "/br/91/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "901 F.2d 979", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6122395, 10536975 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/113/0979-01", "/f2d/901/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "744 F. Supp. 1419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7394653 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/744/1419-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a71961", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7541", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "831 F.2d 1339", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1768010, 6544782 ], "weight": 16, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1342" }, { "page": "1343" }, { "page": "1343" }, { "page": "1344" }, { "page": "1345" }, { "page": "1346" }, { "page": "1346" }, { "page": "1347" }, { "page": "1348" }, { "page": "1349" }, { "page": "1349" }, { "page": "1349" }, { "page": "1351" }, { "page": "1350" }, { "page": "1346-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/831/1339-01", "/br/79/1339-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013-14" }, { "page": "1014" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7547", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7701", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 21377, "ocr_confidence": 0.827, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.716811838052614e-08, "percentile": 0.5302110277471775 }, "sha256": "57bbd714b98e68dbc5011a6f49b041b538e0327e2439b50cbe52e8b46f2ce215", "simhash": "1:5fdf147e5d68949d", "word_count": 3460 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:50.540896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "DUNN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "EUGENE H. ASPLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGE R. FERRALL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Eugene H. Aspling, appeals after the circuit court of Winnebago County dismissed his complaint against defendant, George R. Ferrall, pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619, and 2 \u2014 1005 of the Civil Practice Law (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619, 2 \u2014 1005). Ferrall had filed a combined motion under section 2 \u2014 619.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 619.1). Aspling sought damages against Ferrall personally for a breach of lease with Ferrall\u2019s company, Geri Corporation, under an alter ego theory. Geri Corporation was dissolved through bankruptcy proceedings. The issues on appeal are whether: (1) the bankruptcy trustee had the exclusive right to assert an alter ego claim; (2) the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the alter ego claim; (3) As-pling\u2019s filing of a proof of claim in the bankruptcy action was an \u201celection of remedies\u201d which precluded the cause of action for breach of lease; and (4) the settlement in bankruptcy court was res judicata as to Aspling\u2019s action. We affirm.\nWe will restate those facts that are evident from the record. On January 24, 1986, Geri Corporation filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in Federal court under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. \u00a7701 et seq. (1984)). Geri Corporation listed total assets of $3,713 and total liabilities of $293,766.40, of which $5,500 was secured debt. On June 23, 1986, Aspling filed a proof of claim against Geri Corporation in bankruptcy court for $178,215.27.\nIn November 1986, Aspling filed an action against Ferrall in State court seeking damages for a breach of lease with Geri Corporation under an alter ego theory. As support for the alter ego theory, the complaint stated that Ferrall managed the affairs of the corporation as if it were a proprietorship and for the purposes of defrauding Aspling. Aspling claimed that Ferrall, through Geri Corporation, leased properties to third parties that it had leased from Aspling and had received the rents from third parties without paying Aspling. Further, Aspling claimed that Geri Corporation made payments to Ferrall totalling $24,000 in 1985 when the corporation was insolvent.\nIn February 1987, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint to avoid a preference under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. \u00a7547 (1986)). The trustee claimed that Geri Corporation had transferred checks totalling $27,122.48 to Ferrall while the corporation was insolvent. The trustee sought a judgment because the payments were made to a corporate insider, for an antecedent debt, within one year prior to the chapter 7 filing.\nOn November 16, 1987, the complaint filed by the bankruptcy trustee was settled for $5,750. The bankruptcy judge entered an order dismissing the proceeding with prejudice. Aspling claims that he was informed of the settlement approximately one month before the judge formally dismissed the proceeding.\nIn January 1990, Aspling was paid $5,524.76 pursuant to the final report and account of the bankruptcy trustee. Aspling was the sole general unsecured creditor with a claim against Geri Corporation.\nFrom June 1988 to February 1991, Aspling\u2019s cause of action in the Winnebago County circuit court remained dormant. On February 6, 1991, Aspling continued discovery requests, filing a motion to compel production of documents. Ferrall then filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint under sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code and pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619.1 of the Code (Ill. Rev. . Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619.1). Ferrall claimed that Aspling lacked standing to bring his claim because an alter ego claim could be pursued only by the bankruptcy trustee. Ferrall also claimed that the settlement of the preference claim in bankruptcy court between the bankruptcy trustee and Ferrall was res judicata with respect to Aspling\u2019s cause of action. Ferrall later filed a supplement to the motion seeking summary judgment under section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1005).\nAfter a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed As-pling\u2019s complaint. The trial judge stated that Aspling lacked standing to bring the action, that Aspling\u2019s claim in the bankruptcy proceedings was an election of remedies, and the settlement of the preference claim was res judicata as to Aspling\u2019s claim. Aspling filed a timely appeal on October 2, 1991.\n\u201cA motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code admits all well-pleaded facts as well as reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts.\u201d (Streams Condominium No. 3 Association v. Bosgraf (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013.) A section 2 \u2014 619 motion should be granted only if no genuine issue of material fact exists. (Bosgraf, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 1013-14.) The standard is similar for a motion for summary judgment. (Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240.) The court considers the pleadings, affidavits and depositions when ruling on a motion to dismiss (Bosgraf, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 1014) or a motion for summary judgment (Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240).\nSTANDING\nAspling first contends that the trial court erred when it found that he lacked standing to bring the action. The trial judge stated that the bankruptcy trustee had the exclusive right to assert an alter ego claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. Aspling claims that his alter ego claim is a \u201cpersonal\u201d claim that a bankruptcy trustee has no standing to bring, citing, among other cases, Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. (7th Cir. 1987), 831 F.2d 1339. Ferrall counters that Koch Refining is authority for the proposition that Aspling\u2019s claim is a \u201cgeneral\u201d claim that may be brought only by the bankruptcy trustee.\nWe will begin our analysis with Koch Refining, where the court explained the role of the bankruptcy trustee:\n\u201cThe trustee represents not only the rights of the debtor but also the interests of creditors of the debtor. *** [T]he trustee, in his capacity as a creditor, may bring suit to reach property or choses in action belonging to the estate that will then be distributed to all creditors.\u201d Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1342.\nSection 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines what property belongs to the estate. Property of the bankruptcy estate is \u201call legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\u201d (11 U.S.C. \u00a7541(a)(l) (1986); Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1343.) Section 541 property includes property fraudulently transferred by the debtor before bankruptcy, creditors\u2019 fraud claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. \u00a71961 et seq. (1982)), and rights of action against shareholders of a corporation for breaches of fiduciary duty. Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1343.\nIn Koch Refining, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the theory of alter ego and found that State law determines whether an alter ego action is property of the debtor or the creditors. (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1344.) The court held that Illinois law allows any creditor to bring an alter ego action \u201cwithout regard to the specific nature of [the] relationship with the corporation and its alleged alter ego.\u201d (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1345.) Thus, the bankruptcy trustee can bring an alter ego cause of action. Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1346.\nHowever, the Koch Refining case does not explicitly stand for the proposition that a creditor lacks standing to bring an alter ego claim simply because the bankruptcy trustee also has the power to bring the claim. In fact, the Koch Refining court distinguished a case relied upon here by Aspling, In re Curtina International (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 15 Bankr. 993. In Curtina, the bankruptcy court held it did not have jurisdiction over a creditor\u2019s alter ego claim because it \u201c[did] not relate to, or affect the administration of [the] bankruptcy case and [was] merely a private controversy exclusively between third parties in which the trustee asserts no interest.\u201d (Curtina, 15 Bankr. at 996.) The Koch Refining court distinguished Curtina by noting that both the trustee and the creditors in Cur-tina sought to hold individual corporate principals liable, based on different causes of action. The trustee\u2019s action was based on fraudulent conveyance while the creditor\u2019s claim was based on the alter ego theory. (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1346.) The court further stated:\n\u201cThe Curtina trustee chose not to assert an alter ego claim and determined that the creditor\u2019s pursuit of his action was a private controversy in which he had no interest. Curtina does not hold that a trustee lacks standing to assert an alter ego claim, nor that an alter ego claim cannot be property of an insolvent corporation\u2019s estate.\u201d Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1347.\nAspling claims that Curtina is similar to the case at hand and should be controlling authority. However, Curtina does not hold that a creditor may maintain an alter ego claim against the corporate shareholders. The Curtina court merely held that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate an alter ego claim brought by a creditor. (Curtina, 15 Bankr. at 996.) The remaining discussion therein insinuating a separate cause of action for the creditor in another court is dictum.\nThe determination whether Aspling may bring a separate alter ego action lies in the distinction between a \u201cgeneral\u201d and a \u201cpersonal\u201d claim. A trustee has no standing to bring a personal claim of a creditor. An action is \u201c \u2018personal\u2019 if the claimant himself is harmed and no other claimant or creditor has an interest in the cause.\u201d (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1348.) A trustee may maintain only a general claim, a claim for the benefit of all creditors and not for specific creditors. (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1349.) Stated alternatively, a single creditor may not maintain an action against corporate fiduciaries if the creditor shares in an injury common to all creditors \u201cand has personally been injured only in an indirect manner.\u201d Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1349.\n\u201cTo determine whether an action accrues individually to a claimant or generally to the corporation, a court must look to the injury for which relief is sought and consider whether it is peculiar and personal to the claimant or general and common to the corporation and creditors.\u201d (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1349.) The Koch Refining court held that the alter ego claim of the creditors was a general claim and that the trustee was the proper party to bring the claim. (Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1351.) The court also stated:\n\u201cIf the trustee succeeds in his preference action and recovers the amounts conveyed to the [creditors] within the preference period, [the creditors] will certainly seek reimbursement of those transfers. However, even in that posture they allege no personal injury; they are similarly situated to other creditors who have been treated inequitably by the debtor and thus share in the common injury.\u201d Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1350.\nWe interpret Koch Refining to mean that the bankruptcy trustee, as the proper party to bring general claims of the bankruptcy estate, has the exclusive right to bring an alter ego action against corporate shareholders and fiduciaries. One of the bases of Aspling\u2019s alter ego claim against Ferrall was the fact that Ferrall was paid $24,000 while Geri Corporation was insolvent. That very fact was the basis for the trustee\u2019s section 547 preference claim against Ferrall in the bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee brought the action on behalf of all creditors to enhance the value of the bankruptcy estate. Further, Aspling\u2019s complaint states, in part:\n\u201c(9) That based upon the foregoing, the Defendant!,] GEORGE R. FERRALLf,] intentionally under-capitalized Geri Corporation for the purpose of defrauding creditors.\n(12) That based upon the foregoing, the Defendant^] GEORGE R. FERRALL[,] treated Geri Corporation as his alter ego creating and maintaining such Corporate form for the purpose of defrauding creditors, including the Plaintiff.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAspling\u2019s complaint acknowledges that he is not the only creditor injured by Ferrall\u2019s alleged conduct. Aspling has not claimed that his detrimental position is personal or peculiar to him and not shared by the other creditors of Geri Corporation. As such, Aspling has presented a general claim which is within the exclusive province of the bankruptcy trustee.\nThe cases relied upon by Aspling are distinguishable. As previously stated, the holding in Curtina (15 Bankr. at 993), is limited to a determination that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a creditor\u2019s alter ego claim. Ferrall also distinguishes Cur-tina on the basis that the assets the creditors were seeking in their alter ego action were not property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. We fail to see this distinction and rely only on the limited holding in Curtina. Curtina does not address the effect of a separate alter ego action by a creditor after preference claims against the corporate shareholders have been settled and the bankruptcy estate has been distributed.\nIn Scholes v. Schroeder (N.D. Ill. 1990), 744 F. Supp. 1419, the receiver for a corporation brought actions, some of which belonged only to the corporate investors. This case is inapplicable because the Koch Refining case makes clear that, in Illinois, a bankruptcy trustee may bring an alter ego action as assignee for the corporation\u2019s creditors. The cause of action does not belong only to certain creditors.\nIn E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Hadley (11th Cir. 1990), 901 F.2d 979, the bankruptcy trustee brought an action against a brokerage firm through which certain securities were purchased by the bankrupt dealer for customer creditors. The court held that the trustee lacked standing to bring this action. The Hadley court followed the reasoning of the ninth circuit in Williams v. California 1st Bank (9th Cir. 1988), 859 F.2d 664, that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to assert general causes of action on behalf of the creditors. We find Hadley inapplicable because the seventh circuit, pursuant to Koch Refining, allows the trustee to bring general claims on behalf of creditors. Hadley is also distinguishable because the trustee\u2019s action was on behalf of a specific group of creditors and was not in the interests of all creditors, as the trustee\u2019s action was in Koch Refining. Similarly, in Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. (1972), 406 U.S. 416, 32 L. Ed. 2d 195, 92 S. Ct. 1678, the reorganization trustee brought suit against the indenture trustee on behalf of debenture holders. Again, the trustee was representing only a specific group of creditors, debenture holders, whereas an alter ego claim would benefit all creditors.\nFerrall cites St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc. (2d Cir. 1989), 884 F.2d 688, a case which thoroughly analyzed Koch Refining. The PepsiCo court stated:\n\u201cCongress intended [through the Bankruptcy Code] to protect all creditors by making the trustee the proper person to assert claims against the debtor. This reasoning extends to common claims against the debtor\u2019s alter ego or others who have misused the debtor\u2019s property in some fashion. If a claim is a general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, and the creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee\u2019s action.\u201d PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 701.\nAspling\u2019s claim has no particularized injury different from any other creditor. Through Ferrall\u2019s alleged conduct in treating the corporation as his own proprietorship, the corporate entity had no assets with which to pay the creditors of the corporation. Thus, Aspling is bound by the actions of the trustee, unless the trustee has abandoned a claim and allowed creditors to pursue it independently.\nWe believe that this holding promotes judicial economy and fairness to all creditors by preventing separate alter ego claims in potentially different jurisdictions by various creditors. This concern was discussed in In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc. (5th Cir. 1987), 817 F.2d 1142:\n\u201c[T]o allow [the creditor\u2019s] actions to proceed would undercut the general bankruptcy policy of ensuring that all similarly-situated creditors are treated fairly. * * *\n* * *\nFurthermore, if [the creditor\u2019s] action based upon alter ego may proceed completely outside of bankruptcy, then any creditor of [the debtor] may do likewise. The result is the multi-jurisdictional rush to judgment that *** cuts against the fundamental policies of the Bankruptcy Code. We would also be promoting a potential conflict in judgments such that one creditor may convince a court or jury that [the debtor, its parent corporation and its shareholders] are all one in the same, while another creditor may not. Problems of collateral estoppel and unfair distribution of debtor assets would clearly abound.\u201d (S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d at 1153-54.)\nThis concern is further compounded in our situation where the bankruptcy estate has already been distributed and the preference action against Ferrall settled. Principles of finality dictate that we find Aspling lacked standing to bring a separate alter ego action. Thus, the trial court did not err.\nABANDONMENT\nAspling also contends that, even if the trustee had the exclusive right to present the alter ego claim, the trial court erred in finding that the trustee had presented the alter ego claim in his preference action or, alternatively, that the alter ego claim was not abandoned. Aspling argues that the preference claim in no way affected his alter ego action. Aspling also argues that the alter ego claim was never the trustee\u2019s to abandon.\nAspling relies on Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Industries, Inc. (7th Cir. 1991), 933 F.2d 449, as authority that the settlement agreement in the preference action would not affect a separate alter ego claim. However, Lumpkin is distinguishable on its facts. There, former employees of Envirodyne\u2019s subsidiaries sought unpaid pension benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. \u00a71081 et seq. (1990)). The basis for the claim was that Envirodyne, a parent of the subsidiaries, was liable for lost benefits under a corporate law alter ego theory. (Lumpkin, 993 F.2d at 453.) The court, reversing the district court\u2019s dismissal of the action, stated that the employee\u2019s claims could not have been presented in the previous bankruptcy proceedings involving Wisconsin Steel, whose pension fund was the responsibility of Envirodyne\u2019s subsidiaries. The claim was not a general claim, but was a personal claim brought by a specific group of creditors, former employees with ERISA claims. Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 463.\nPiercing the corporate veil of a parent corporation for the specific purpose of reaching unpaid pension benefits is significantly different from a creditor seeking to reach the bankrupt entity\u2019s assets through the shareholders under an alter ego theory. The other creditors of the bankrupt subsidiary in Lumpkin would not benefit at all from the employee\u2019s success. However, in our situation, a successful alter ego theory by Aspling could benefit all creditors by increasing the assets available for distribution to the creditors.\nWe find that the alter ego claim was the trustee\u2019s to abandon and the trustee did not abandon that claim. Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a trustee may abandon property of the estate after notice and a hearing. (11 U.S.C. \u00a7554(a) (1986).) Scheduled property under section 521(1) of the Code is automatically abandoned at the close of the case unless otherwise ordered by the court. (11 U.S.C. \u00a7554(c) (1986).) Property of the estate that is not abandoned remains property of the estate unless otherwise ordered by the court. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7554(d) (1986).\nHere, the trustee did not abandon the alter ego claim, and As-pling acknowledges this in his brief. Ferrall correctly points out that the alter ego claim was not scheduled property under section 521(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, so it was not automatically abandoned. A trustee could choose to abandon a claim and allow creditors to pursue it; however, where there has been no such election by the trustee, the creditors have no standing to assert the cause of action. PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 698, citing Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1346-50.\nIn review, we hold that the bankruptcy trustee had the exclusive right to bring an alter ego action on behalf of Aspling and the other creditors. We also hold that the trustee did not abandon this claim. Our holdings on the issues of standing and abandonment are determinative, rendering moot any discussion of the election of remedies and res judicata.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDUNN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas E. Greenwald, of Connolly, Oliver, Close & Worden, of Rockford, for appellant.", "Michael F. O\u2019Brien, of Clark, McGreevy & Johnson, P.C., and Edward J. Enichen, of Guyer & Enichen, both of Rockford, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EUGENE H. ASPLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GEORGE R. FERRALL, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141110\nOpinion filed July 29, 1992.\nThomas E. Greenwald, of Connolly, Oliver, Close & Worden, of Rockford, for appellant.\nMichael F. O\u2019Brien, of Clark, McGreevy & Johnson, P.C., and Edward J. Enichen, of Guyer & Enichen, both of Rockford, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0758-01", "first_page_order": 778, "last_page_order": 787 }