{ "id": 8499683, "name": "ERNEST FEILER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COVENANT MEDICAL CENTER OF CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, Indiv. and d/b/a Burnham Hospital, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Feiler v. Covenant Medical Center of Champaign-Urbana", "decision_date": "1992-08-13", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140843", "first_page": "1088", "last_page": "1094", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 1088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599648 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574302 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676175 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2965112 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851-52" }, { "page": "852" }, { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3635831 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1185" }, { "page": "1185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5071739 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938" }, { "page": "938-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 1359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1369" }, { "page": "1369" }, { "page": "1369" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2535575 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5393338 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636966 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0217-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 662, "char_count": 12675, "ocr_confidence": 0.839, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.568482564654257e-08, "percentile": 0.44876091231573734 }, "sha256": "15b0858304c699dfba3492d3187a416af9dc0fc291f640fb197cd2726c44af30", "simhash": "1:aef57dadb2455cd0", "word_count": 2036 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:50.540896+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "STEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "ERNEST FEILER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COVENANT MEDICAL CENTER OF CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, Indiv. and d/b/a Burnham Hospital, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s negligence action because it was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) the sale of Burnham City Hospital (Burnham) from the City of Champaign (City) to a non-public entity, Covenant Medical Center of Champaign-Urbana (Covenant), waived defendants\u2019 right to rely on the one-year statute of limitations, and (2) defendants should be estopped from relying on the one-year statute because Burnham held itself out as a private hospital. We affirm.\nOn November 30, 1990, plaintiff filed a complaint against Covenant, a not-for-profit corporation, individually and doing business as Burnham Hospital, and Burnham Hospital. Plaintiff alleged that on December 3, 1988, he was an independent contractor working as a physician at Burnham, and due to the defendant\u2019s negligence, he was infected with chronic hepatitis when an intoxicated emergency-room patient (who had chronic hepatitis) lunged toward him causing him to cut his thumb with a scalpel contaminated by the patient\u2019s blood, thereby infecting him with the disease.\nOn March 12, 1991, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(5)), alleging that plaintiff\u2019s complaint was barred because it was filed more than one year after the alleged occurrence. Defendants asserted that at the time of the alleged occurrence Burnham was a \u201cpublicly owned facility, a municipal hospital owned by the City of Champaign, a local public entity\u201d as defined by section 1 \u2014 206 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 1 \u2014 206). Since Burnham was a local public entity, defendants maintained that actions against it must be \u201ccommenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 101). Plaintiff\u2019s claim therefore was barred because it was commenced on November 30, 1990, more than one year from the date of the incident (December 3, 1988). On May 2, 1991, the circuit court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nOn May 29, 1991, plaintiff filed a document denominated as a motion to vacate summary judgment but which in fact challenged the section 2 \u2014 619 dismissal, and on September 16, 1991, filed a response to defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss. The court took the two pleadings as a motion to reconsider its order to dismiss. On October 16, 1991, the circuit court affirmed its order of dismissal. This appeal followed.\nBurnham operated as a publicly owned hospital until September 22, 1989, when ownership of the hospital was transferred to Covenant. On September 5, 1989, the city council of Champaign passed a resolution authorizing a consolidation agreement between the City and Servantcor, a not-for-profit corporation which operated Mercy Hospital, to consolidate Burnham and Mercy Hospitals. To effectuate the consolidation the City transferred the operations of Burnham to a locally controlled not-for-profit corporation, Covenant, which would operate both Burnham and Mercy Hospitals. Under the transfer agreement, Covenant was to be liable for all liabilities of Burnham including \u201call liabilities for personal injury arising from acts or omissions of CITY doing business as Burnham.\u201d\nSection 8 \u2014 101 of the Act provides:\n\u201cNo civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 101.)\nPlaintiff argues the sale of the hospital to a private entity before the one-year limitations period expired waived defendants\u2019 right to assert the limitations period as a defense. Plaintiff concedes that if Burnham had remained a municipal entity Burnham would have been entitled to assert the limitations period. Since Burnham ceased to exist as a public entity before expiration of the limitations period, however, its right to the one-year statute of limitations was waived. Plaintiff contends the language of section 8 \u2014 101 refers only to suits brought against local entities, and since the present action was brought against a private entity, Covenant, the one-year limitations period in the Act does not apply.\nWe hold the status of the entity as it existed on the date of the injury controls what statute of limitations applies. At the time of the injury here, Burnham was a public entity and therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 8 \u2014 101.) Dismissal was appropriate since Burnham was not sued within the one-year statute of limitations. The limitations defense was not waived by the sale of the public hospital within the one-year period as the status of the entity on the date of the injury is determinative. Covenant\u2019s liability for personal injuries arising out of the actions of Burnham is based on the terms of the transfer agreement and Covenant did not agree to accept liability greater than that of the City. Since Burnham cannot be liable, because the suit was not filed within the statute of limitations, neither can Covenant.\nPlaintiff argues, alternatively, that if the statute of limitations was not waived, defendants should be estopped from asserting the one-year limitations period because Burnham concealed its status as a public entity.\nThe 1924 ordinance provided there was \u201chereby established and shall hereinafter be maintained a Public Hospital in the City of Champaign, to be officially known and designated as The Burnham City Hospital.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Champaign, Ill., Ordinance 223 (Nov. 10, 1924) (\u201cAn Ordinance for the Establishment and Maintenance of a Public Hospital\u201d)-) In spite of this designation plaintiff contends the hospital held itself out as \u201cBurnham Hospital.\u201d Plaintiff attached to his response to the motion to dismiss a surgical pathology report which contained in its upper left-hand corner the hospital\u2019s insignia and the hospital\u2019s identification as \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d and a document entitled \u201cBURNHAM HOSPITAL Nursing Services Emergency Services Policy \u2014 PROTOCOL FOR DRUG ABUSE AND/OR PATIENTS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR ALCOHOL.\u201d Also attached to plaintiff\u2019s response was an affidavit by plaintiff stating that at all times in which he dealt with the hospital it identified itself as \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d; that correspondence from Burnham always used the name \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d; forms, such as doctor\u2019s reports, discharge summaries, nurses notes, et cetera, all used the name \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d; signs on the hospital identified it as \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d; and Burnham was listed in the telephone book as \u201cBurnham Hospital.\u201d\nIn response, defendants submitted an affidavit from the medical staff coordinator of Covenant, who is responsible for maintaining records regarding physicians appointed to Covenant and appointed to the medical staffs of Mercy and Burnham prior to the merger. The affidavit attested that the attached application for appointment to the medical staff of Burnham, tendered by plaintiff, was a true and accurate copy of his application. That application was addressed to \u201cBurnham City Hospital.\u201d No counteraffidavit was filed by plaintiff.\nThe doctrine of equitable estoppel is invoked to prevent fraud and injustice. (Carey v. City of Rockford (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 217, 218, 480 N.E.2d 164, 165.) While it is well established that the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be asserted against a municipality (Kenny Construction Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1971), 52 Ill. 2d 187, 197, 288 N.E.2d 1, 7; Central Transport, Inc. v. Village of Hillside (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 499, 515, 568 N.E.2d 1359, 1369), courts do not favor a finding of estoppel against a public body. (Bank of Pawnee v. Joslin (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 927, 938, 521 N.E.2d 1177, 1185.) Whether the doctrine of estoppel may be applied against a municipal corporation depends upon the consideration of all the circumstances of the case. (City of Chicago v. Sievert Electric Co. (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 481 N.E.2d 1, 4; Joslin, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 938-39, 521 N.E.2d at 1185.) Estoppel against a public body should not be invoked except \u201cunder compelling circumstances,\u201d such as where not invoking estoppel would defeat the operation of public policy. People ex rel. Brown v. Illinois State Troopers Lodge No. 41 (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 98, 105, 286 N.E.2d 524, 528.\nEquitable estoppel has been applied to prevent a litigant, whose conduct has caused a plaintiff to delay filing suit until after the period of limitations has run, from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to the action. (Neaterour v. Holt (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 741, 749, 544 N.E.2d 846, 851-52.) To prevail on this theory, plaintiff must establish that he reasonably relied on defendant\u2019s conduct or presentations in forbearing suit. (Neaterour, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 749, 544 N.E.2d at 852.) Additionally, it is incumbent upon the proponent to prove that he relied upon some acts or representation of the defendant \u201c \u2018and had no knowledge or convenient means of knowing the true facts.\u2019 (Emphasis added.)\u201d Neaterour, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 750, 544 N.E.2d at 852, quoting Pantle v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 365, 371, 335 N.E.2d 491, 495.\nThe party who asserts the applicability of equitable estoppel has the burden of proving its requisite elements by \u201c \u2018clear, precise and unequivocal\u2019 \u201d evidence. (Central Transport, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 515, 568 N.E.2d at 1369, quoting In re Estate of Muhammad (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 756, 763, 463 N.E.2d 732, 738.) Whether a party has met its burden of proof with respect to estoppel is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. (Central Transport, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 515, 568 N.E.2d at 1369.) \u201c[A] court of review will not reverse [a] trial court\u2019s decision [with respect to estoppel] unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Lawrence v. Board of Education of School District 189 (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 187, 201, 503 N.E.2d 1201, 1210.\nIn response to this section 2 \u2014 619 motion, plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact to support his estoppel claim. Plaintiff contends that Burnham concealed its status and created confusion which prevented him from becoming aware of defendant\u2019s true nature. Plaintiff, however, offered no facts to show that Burnham prevented him from obtaining information regarding its true identity as a public hospital. Moreover, he failed to allege or offer any evidence that he had no knowledge of Burnham\u2019s actual status as a public entity. To the contrary, the evidence established that plaintiff knew defendant Burnham was a city hospital when he addressed his 1981 application to \u201cBurnham City Hospital.\u201d Evidence that Burnham sometimes referred to itself as \u201cBurnham Hospital\u201d did not contradict the evidence that plaintiff knew that, at least at times, Burnham referred to itself as \u201cBurnham City Hospital.\u201d Plaintiff failed to file a counteraffidavit and is not now in a position to argue that more evidence might be available or that a question of fact exists as to his knowledge. Defendants are not estopped from interposing as a defense the bar of the statute of limitations.\nPlaintiff relies on Kievman v. Edward Hospital (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 442, 481 N.E.2d 909, to support his estoppel argument. In determining the hospital there was estopped from relying on plaintiff\u2019s failure to give notice under the Act, the Kievman court relied on the facts that there was public confusion as to the hospital\u2019s status, that defendant was aware its identification policy had previously caused confusion on the part of parties seeking to bring actions against it, and there was a policy on the part of defendant to avoid recognition as a municipal body to its advantage. (Kievman, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 446-47, 481 N.E.2d at 912-13.) These factors are lacking in the case at bar and render Kievman inapposite.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fred I. Benjamin and Gary G. Katz, both of Benjamin & Shapiro, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "David E. Krchak, of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ERNEST FEILER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COVENANT MEDICAL CENTER OF CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, Indiv. and d/b/a Burnham Hospital, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140843\nOpinion filed August 13, 1992.\nFred I. Benjamin and Gary G. Katz, both of Benjamin & Shapiro, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nDavid E. Krchak, of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "1088-01", "first_page_order": 1108, "last_page_order": 1114 }