{ "id": 5196532, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD JOHN (E.J.) SPRIEGEL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Spriegel", "decision_date": "1992-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201491\u20140858", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "494", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 892", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2500516 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 248", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221328 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1804, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "1804" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592304 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 1277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2467814 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5793161 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/1040-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 1206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429743 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172008 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/412/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12122945 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0325-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 576, "char_count": 9084, "ocr_confidence": 0.849, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.501197875807479e-08, "percentile": 0.4865152369887202 }, "sha256": "849ba9b815c0dfe8e8c1556fbebd2b5f9760e4714469a3f5cd4003c3169cf63b", "simhash": "1:7a09318aab5835cf", "word_count": 1509 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:27.838009+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD JOHN (E.J.) SPRIEGEL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe police found a brick of cannabis in the trunk of defendant\u2019s car after he consented to a search. He was convicted of unlawful possession and now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.\nOn February 11, 1989, the Macomb police department received an anonymous tip on the Crime Stoppers line. The caller said that on February 12, E.J. Spriegel would be driving from Wheeling, Illinois, to Macomb in a silver or bluish Toyota, license plate number ANJ 342. The caller also described Spriegel\u2019s physical appearance. According to the tip, the vehicle would contain marijuana and cocaine, with the cocaine being concealed in a \u201cFix-a-Flat can.\u201d\nActing on this information, Sergeant Robert Fitzgerald checked the license plate and learned that it was registered to Patricia Spriegel of Wheeling, Illinois. His check of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license revealed that it listed a Macomb address. Sergeant Fitzgerald disseminated this information to other police departments along possible routes from Wheeling to Macomb.\nOn February 12, 1989, State Police Trooper Michael Inman learned that the Toyota had been observed near Roseville at about 10 p.m. Inman eventually spotted the car and began to follow it into Macomb. According to Inman, defendant failed to signal when he turned into his driveway. However, Inman also testified that it was always his intention to stop the vehicle and he had been waiting for a traffic violation to occur so that he could. Another State Police officer and a university police officer both responded to In-man\u2019s call for backup.\nWhen Spriegel got out of the car, he did not have his driver\u2019s license with him. Inman then agreed to allow defendant to go unaccompanied into the house to retrieve the license and also to take his dog inside. Prior to going into the house, the defendant and the dog were thoroughly frisked. The defendant\u2019s two companions were also frisked and remained outside.\nAfter Spriegel returned from the house, Inman asked if he could search the car. The trooper did not at that time read Spriegel his Miranda rights, nor did he inform defendant of his right to refuse to consent.\nThe search of the interior of the car revealed nothing. The police then asked if they could search the trunk. Defendant consented and opened the trunk with a key. The police opened and searched various items of luggage which were in the trunk. Defendant assisted in removing these bags and unpacking the trunk of the vehicle. At one point, the defendant even offered to open a bag of dog food.\nEventually, the police found a brown paper bag in the spare tire area of the trunk. Inside this bag was a white plastic bag which in turn contained a brick of cannabis.\nInman testified that he then read defendant his Miranda rights whereupon defendant acknowledged that the cannabis was his. Defendant contends that he was not read his rights until after he had admitted ownership of the drugs. He makes no claim, however, that his confession was involuntary or that it was improperly obtained.\nAt the police station, in response to questioning, defendant stated that he had given his consent due to intimidation. When asked what he meant by intimidation, defendant responded \u201cWell, you\u2019re a police officer.\u201d Defendant denied that Trooper Inman had used any force or threatened him in order to get him consent to the search.\nDefendant brought a motion to suppress, alleging that the stop and subsequent search amounted to an illegal search and seizure. The trial court denied this motion, finding that the stop was proper under Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412, and that defendant voluntarily consented to the search.\nDefendant was convicted of unlawful possession of cannabis. He was fined $10,000 and sentenced to 24 months\u2019 probation. He now appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.\nIn Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an anonymous telephone tip, as corroborated by independent police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. The Court held that the tip standing alone was insufficient. By the time the officers made the stop, however, it had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion. The only way the officers corroborated the tip was to follow the suspect and observe that her actions correlated with those predicted by the informant.\nHere, the officers had done some independent corroboration. In addition to actually observing defendant, the police had run a computer check on the license plate and on defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The information obtained through those checks correlated with the informant\u2019s information. Upon these facts, the information available to the police at the time of the stop provided a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868.\nDefendant concedes that the initial stop was a valid Terry stop. He contends, however, that his consent to the search was not the product of his own free will, but instead was merely an acquiescence to authority brought about by the intimidating actions of the officers.\nIt is well established that a party may consent to a search conducted without a warrant and thus eliminate the need for probable cause and a search warrant. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973), 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041.) Miranda warnings need not be given in order to obtain valid consent. (People v. Smith (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 914, 464 N.E.2d 1206.) Moreover, ignorance of knowledge of the right to refuse to consent does not vitiate the voluntariness of the consent but is merely a factor to consider. (Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 464 N.E.2d at 1211.) The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. (People v. Sesmas (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 591 N.E.2d 918.) The trial court\u2019s determination of the voluntariness of consent will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Harris (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 557 N.E.2d 1277.\nThe trial court found:\n\u201cThe evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant unequivocally consented to the search of the trunk and that he was not coerced into the act. Defendant cooperated with the police and helped them unpack his trunk. Defendant was allowed to go into his house unaccompanied by an officer. He was allowed to care for his animal. Defendant was asked for permission to search both the interior and trunk compartments. *** In response to the officer's request to search defendant replied \u2018Well, why? Yeah, I guess so.\u2019 His response was unequivocal and unconditional. I find it was voluntary.\u201d\nSpriegel argues that he was intimidated into consenting. He cites the presence of several armed, uniformed officers and the fact that both he and his companions were subjected to a pat-down search.\nThese same factors are present at many such lawful stops and do not, by themselves, give rise to such intimidation as to override a suspect\u2019s free will and make him incapable of giving valid consent to search. The validity of the consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Casazza (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 414, 581 N.E.2d 651.) Furthermore, the scope of a consensual search is objective reasonableness\u2014what would the typical reasonable person understand by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? (Florida v. Jimeno (1991), 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 111 S. Ct. 1801.) Unqualified consent to search a vehicle can include consent to search closed containers within the vehicle (Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 303, 111 S. Ct at 1804), as well as the vehicle\u2019s trunk. People v. Woolery (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 892, 550 N.E.2d 616.\nSpriegel agreed to allow the search of the vehicle. He then consented again to the search of the trunk. Spriegel alleges that he was told, not asked, to open the trunk, thus making it an involuntary search. The trial court, after hearing the evidence and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, determined that Spriegel had in fact been asked and consented. That decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the McDonough County circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and HAASE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Flack, McRaven & Stephens, of Macomb (James Patrick Murphy, of counsel), for appellant.", "William Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (John X. Breslin and Lawrence Michael Kaschak, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWARD JOHN (E.J.) SPRIEGEL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201491\u20140858\nOpinion filed September 4, 1992.\nFlack, McRaven & Stephens, of Macomb (James Patrick Murphy, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (John X. Breslin and Lawrence Michael Kaschak, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 514 }