{ "id": 5195696, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD FUHRMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Fuhrman", "decision_date": "1992-09-01", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201491\u20140490", "first_page": "503", "last_page": "507", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 503" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472848 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 488, "char_count": 8815, "ocr_confidence": 0.874, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.5201424870716401 }, "sha256": "a18cc9686e8bea6834827f1e94dd6de20309267c521413aaa14db2be307f1ce6", "simhash": "1:6ff6912d7c0dcde2", "word_count": 1453 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:27.838009+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD FUHRMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Richard Fuhrman, was charged on August 29, 1989, with residential burglary. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1\u20143(a).) On December 8,-1989, Fuhrman was found to be unfit to stand trial and was placed in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (the Department) for treatment.\nFuhrman was later reexamined and, on January 18, 1991, he was still found to be unfit. The same day, Fuhrman filed a motion for a discharge hearing. Thereafter, the court appointed Dr. Daniel J. Cu-neo, a clinical psychologist, to determine Fuhrman\u2019s sanity at the time of the offense. In his report, Cuneo opined that Fuhrman was legally sane at the time of the offense but was mentally ill. As a consequence, Fuhrman would qualify for a guilty-but-mentally-ill plea.\nDuring the subsequent June 28, 1991, discharge hearing, Fuhr-man objected to the introduction of a statement he had previously made. Fuhrman claimed that the statement was made at a time when he had been found unfit to stand trial. The trial court treated Fuhr-man\u2019s objection as a motion to suppress and refused to conduct a suppression hearing. The discharge hearing continued, and the trial court found that the State could meet its burden of proof if the case went to trial. Accordingly, the court remanded Fuhrman to the Department for further treatment.\nFuhrman appeals the trial court\u2019s refusal to conduct a hearing on his motion to suppress. We reverse and remand so that the trial court can conduct a suppression hearing.\nAt the June 28, 1991, discharge hearing, Susan Berk testified that she left her home on August 1, 1989, and noticed a broken window when she returned around 7:45 a.m. the next day. Also, the back door, which had been locked the day before, was open. Inside, Berk found many items of her personal property had either been misplaced or were missing. Also, she discovered a shotgun had been taken from her garage. Following this discovery, Berk called the police. Later that day, she saw some of her property inside a house two doors down the street.\nDeputy Christopher Canupp of the Will County sheriff\u2019s department testified that during the investigation of this incident, he met with the owner of the house where Berk\u2019s property was discovered. The owner allowed Deputy Canupp to enter his garage. Inside the garage, Canupp found Fuhrman hiding. Berk was then brought to the scene, and she identified as hers a shotgun found in the garage. The owner explained that he had allowed Fuhrman and another man to stay in the garage.\nWill County Sheriff\u2019s Investigator James Creed was called to testify for the State. When the prosecutor began to question Creed regarding a statement Fuhrman had made, defense counsel objected. Fuhrman\u2019s counsel argued that the statement could not be used because the trial court had previously found Fuhrman was unfit to stand trial. The prosecutor stated he had no objection to immediately conducting a suppression hearing. The trial court treated the objection as a motion to suppress, but found the motion was untimely. The trial court based its finding on the fact that Fuhrman had been declared unfit to stand trial well before the discharge hearing, and also because the defense counsel admitted that Fuhrman\u2019s statement was contained in discovery materials filed in 1989.\nCreed testified that he had advised Fuhrman of his constitutional rights. Fuhrman indicated that he understood them, signed a waiver, and agreed to talk. Fuhrman told Creed that he and Jim Hunt had burglarized the Berk residence. Fuhrman said he used a knife to break a window and enter the house, while Hunt entered through the garage. Fuhrman said he took some food and a clock. Hunt also entered the house and took a television set. Creed stated that Fuhrman seemed to be coherent when he made the statement. However, Creed did testify that Fuhrman\u2019s speech was slurred and he appeared as if he had been drinking. Creed indicated, on cross-examination, that he did not smell alcohol on Fuhrman.\nAt the close of the discharge hearing, the trial court found that the State would be able to meet its burden of proof if the case went to trial. Accordingly, the court remanded Fuhrman to the Department for further treatment.\nOn appeal, Fuhrman argues the trial court erred when it refused to conduct a suppression hearing. Fuhrman interprets section 114\u201411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to require that a motion to suppress must be made before the beginning of a trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 114\u201411(a), (g).) Fuhrman argues the motion to suppress was timely since it was made during a discharge hearing and before a criminal trial had commenced. We agree.\nCiting People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 204, 568 N.E.2d 837, the State first argues that Fuhrman has waived this issue. We disagree. The State notes the basis for the defense counsel\u2019s objection was because Fuhrman had been found unfit to stand trial. The State specifically argues that Fuhrman\u2019s counsel had failed to claim that the confession was not voluntary. However, while Fuhrman\u2019s defense counsel might have chosen her words more carefully, we clearly find from the record that the objection was made based on the voluntariness of Fuhrman\u2019s confession. Moreover, both the prosecutor and the trial court treated Fuhrman\u2019s objection as a motion to suppress. Therefore, we find the issue has been preserved for appeal.\nIn response to the merits of Fuhrman\u2019s argument, the State contends that a discharge hearing should be considered the same as a trial for purposes of section 114\u201411. We disagree.\nIt is fundamental that a court, when interpreting a statute, is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent by according the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. (People v. Anderson (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 308, 521 N.E.2d 148.) Section 114-11 clearly requires that a motion to suppress must be made prior to a trial. As the State points out in its brief, there are similarities between a trial and a discharge hearing. However, we note that, depending upon the result of the discharge hearing, Fuhrman may later be subjected to a trial for whatever crime he was charged with. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 104\u201425(a), (e), (g)(l).) We therefore interpret section 114\u201411 to mean that a discharge hearing is not the same procedure as a trial. (People v. Polachek (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205, 470 N.E.2d 584, 587.) Accordingly, Fuhrman\u2019s motion to suppress was made prior to trial as required by the statute.\nFurthermore, we note that the prosecutor did not object to proceeding with the suppression hearing. Additionally, the two police officers who witnessed Fuhrman\u2019s confession, Deputies Creed and Canupp, were both present at the discharge hearing. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to discern any resulting prejudice to the State. On the other hand, there was great prejudice to Fuhrman by the court\u2019s refusal to allow a suppression hearing. In our view, under all the circumstances, it would have been neither unfair, nor inconvenient, for the trial court to have conducted a suppression hearing. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred when it refused to allow the suppression hearing.\nFinally, we find without merit the State\u2019s argument that even if the motion to suppress had been heard and granted, the remaining evidence presented at the discharge hearing would still prove Fuhrman guilty of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the State argues that there is no need for another discharge hearing.\nFirst, we note that in his decision, the trial judge specifically referred to the confession in finding that the State had met its burden of proof. Moreover, without the confession, the evidence presented did not preclude that someone else could have been involved in the burglary. We believe that the evidence resulting from the use of Fuhr-man\u2019s confession was a substantial factor in the trial court\u2019s determination. Accordingly, this cause is remanded so the circuit court of Will County can conduct a suppression hearing.\nFor the reasons indicated, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY, P.J., and GORMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Edward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD FUHRMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201491\u20140490\nOpinion filed September 1, 1992.\nStephen Omolecki, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Robert M. Hansen, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0503-01", "first_page_order": 523, "last_page_order": 527 }