{ "id": 5197084, "name": "ODAS NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Nicholson v. Chicago Bar Ass'n", "decision_date": "1992-08-11", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20142043", "first_page": "1040", "last_page": "1051", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 1040" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "681 F.2d 1091", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 543994 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/681/1091-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "2707", "parenthetical": "\"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential\"" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "2707" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "2709" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "2709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169865 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169-171" }, { "page": "1614-1616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715259 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 U.S. 149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1490186 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/436/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 1152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 372724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/345/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 922", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6196193 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "2753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0922-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 F. Supp. 243", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 117233 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248-49" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/609/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 179", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494943 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3162957 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85" }, { "page": "484-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S. Ct. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 L. Ed. 624", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 U.S. 824", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307489, 11307330, 11307257, 11307435, 11307384, 11307545 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/344/0824-05", "/us/344/0824-02", "/us/344/0824-01", "/us/344/0824-04", "/us/344/0824-03", "/us/344/0824-06" ] }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313175 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5605801 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5159883 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/11/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531575 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 1141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3161601 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/1141-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 3d 1042", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3388571 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1045" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/52/1042-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597010 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 U.S. 626", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6169566 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/370/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647095 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3290232 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3588167 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488160 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3318522 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0394-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1162, "char_count": 26539, "ocr_confidence": 0.849, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5090341414298425e-07, "percentile": 0.6670649524354508 }, "sha256": "3d842b245bd3e79c824773ef727fb1ad9aa5b3625ae8860cc723d4e0107b0f0e", "simhash": "1:fdb66b0b6b434a06", "word_count": 4320 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:27.838009+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ODAS NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1986, plaintiff, Odas Nicholson, a judge of the circuit court of Cook County, sought appointment to a vacancy on the Illinois Appellate Court. As a part of the application process, our State supreme court, the appointing authority, informed her that she should have her qualifications evaluated by the Chicago Bar Association (defendant), and in accordance with defendant\u2019s \u201cResolution Concerning Procedures for Evaluation of Candidates for Judicial Offices\u201d (Resolution), and \u201cGuidelines for Judicial Selection\u201d (Guidelines), plaintiff completed and submitted to defendant\u2019s Judicial Evaluation Committee (JEC) its \u201cQuestionnaire for Sitting Judges.\u201d On January 21, 1987, the JEC conducted a hearing to review plaintiff\u2019s qualifications, and the next day, the JEC notified her that she had been rated \u201cnot recommended\u201d for the office. Plaintiff subsequently filed with defendant a petition for rehearing and reevaluation, which was denied. She was not appointed to fill the position.\nOn March 10, 1988, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in circuit court against defendant. In count I she claimed that defendant\u2019s JEC did not follow its Resolution in conducting her evaluation, and that she was thus denied a fair and impartial investigation and hearing. Specifically she alleged that (1) the JEC \u201cfailed to follow [its own] [G]uidelines when it found [her] \u2018not recommended\u2019 (2) defendant violated sections 26.7 and 28.1 of its Resolution when it failed to communicate to her \u201ca statement of reasons of its finding of \u2018not recommended\u2019 (3) defendant violated section 22 of its Resolution because it \u201cfailed to disclose to [her] in advance of the hearing such information relating to her qualifications which ought to have been disclosed because of their adverse effect\u201d; (4) defendant violated section 27.2 of its Resolution when it failed to grant plaintiff a rehearing; and (5) defendant \u201cfailed to follow its own rules when it failed to contact any of [the] ten references [she had submitted and that defendant had] failed to seek wide participation [in the selection process] by the legal profession.\u201d\nIn count II, plaintiff alleged that defendant denied her due process of law when it \u201cfailed to assure [her] the opportunity to be heard in her defense in an orderly proceeding before the hearing.\u201d More specifically, plaintiff alleged that she was denied due process when defendant (1) \u201cfailed to institute a proper investigation of [her qualifications] and to contact any of [her] references, thereby making its recommendation arbitrary and without proper support,\u201d (2) \u201cfailed to present any information to [her] before or after her hearing which adversely affected her qualifications,\u201d (3) \u201cfailed to provide [her] an opportunity to be heard and to defend any alleged criticism of her qualifications,\u201d (4) \u201cfinally informed [her] of its reasons for not recommending her which were not factually supported,\u201d and (5) \u201carbitrarily refused to allow [her] petition for rehearing and reevaluation.\u201d Plaintiff requested that the court order defendant to \u201cset aside its evaluation of \u2018not recommended\u2019 and to reevaluate plaintiff in a manner consistent with its own rules.\u201d\nOn May 19, 1988, defendant moved, pursuant to section 2\u2014615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014615), to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint. On February 21, 1989, the court dismissed count I of her complaint with leave to amend within 21 days, and reserved ruling with respect to count II. On April 3, 1989, the court dismissed with prejudice count II of plaintiff\u2019s complaint. On February 26, 1990, more than 10 months after it was due, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, explaining that the late filing was due to the oversight of her attorney. On June 14, 1990, the court entered a final and appealable order, denying plaintiff\u2019s motion as untimely. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on July 13,1990.\nI\nPlaintiff contends that even though she was more than 10 months late in presenting it, the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for leave to file her amended complaint. She relies on First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Sousanes (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 394, 396, for the proposition that \u201cthe greatest liberality should be applied in allowing amendments with the paramount consideration being whether the amendment furthers the interests of justice.\u201d She suggests that either \u201cprejudice [or] surprise to the other party\u201d must be alleged before a court has discretion to dismiss an amended complaint as untimely. She also argues that Gray v. Starkey (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 555, 559, supports her position, in that there the trial court was found not to have abused its discretion in permitting the plaintiffs \u201cto file an amended complaint 81 days after the expiration of the time previously granted [them] to do so.\u201d\nPlaintiff further asserts that her case was essentially dismissed for want of prosecution and that, therefore, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. (Kraus v. Metropolitan Two Illinois Center (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 210.) Finally, as to this issue, she maintains that the June 14, 1990, order denying her leave to file an amended pleading was not final, citing Gray (41 Ill. App. 3d at 558), and that therefore the court erred in dismissing her complaint with prejudice.\nAlthough the immortal Dante teaches us that the sins of the warm-hearted are to be weighed in different scales than those of the cold-blooded, plaintiff fails to persuade us. The issue of whether a trial court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings is one which is properly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Sousanes, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 396.) Accordingly, a reviewing court may intervene only where the trial court acted arbitrarily or, in light of all the circumstances presented, exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial injustice resulted (In re Marriage of Silber (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 853, 856); or where the judgment of the trial court is found to be palpably erroneous, contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or manifestly unjust (In re Marriage of Poston (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 689, 692); or where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Petrovich (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 881, 887, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 556.\nBound, as we are, by the strictures of such a rigid scope of review, we cannot conclude that the trial court here abused its discretion. Section 2\u2014616(a) of our Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014616(a)) provides that \u201c[a]t any time before final judgment amendments may be allowed on just and reasonable terms.\u201d Surely, the phrase \u201cjust and reasonable terms\u201d must necessarily include the imposition of a time limitation within which the amendment must be filed. To hold on the basis of the record in this case that there was an abuse of discretion would in effect deny the trial court the right to impose what it considers to be \u201cjust and reasonable terms.\u201d The authority of the trial court to dismiss a plaintiff\u2019s action with prejudice because of her failure to abide by its orders is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the circuit court. Moreover, such authority has generally been considered an \u201cinherent power,\u201d governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own dockets so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases (see generally Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1962), 370 U.S. 626, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734, 82 S. Ct. 1386); and, as previously noted, the exercise of such authority will not be set aside except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. A contrary course would amount to a substitution of the judgment of the reviewing court in place of that of the trial court in which such discretion properly resides.\nNevertheless, assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying plaintiff leave to plead over, we hold that her proposed amended complaint does not cure the defects that exist in her original complaint (Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc. (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 263, 273) and that, moreover, under no set of facts could plaintiff have pleaded a cause of action. (People ex rel. Council 19 of the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Egan (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1045; McErlean v. Union National Bank (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1149.) Plaintiff relies on Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 127, 133, for the proposition that \u201cthe constitution and bylaws of an unincorporated association constitute a contract between the association and its members\u201d; yet there was no contractual relationship at all between defendant, acting as an evaluator, and plaintiff, acting as a candidate seeking the evaluator\u2019s recommendation.\nShe also relies on Werner v. International Association of Machinists (1956), 11 Ill. App. 2d 258, 279, for the proposition that \u201ccourts will interfere with the decision of an association expelling one of its members if it appears that the rules of the association governing expulsion have not been observed.\u201d Plaintiff does not allege, however, nor can she, that she was expelled from membership in defendant\u2019s organization; thus, Werner is inapposite. Rather, our courts have held that the judiciary \u201cmust refrain from interfering in the affairs of a private association absent a showing of economic necessity.\u201d (Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 746, 756, appeal denied (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 630.) Plaintiff here has not pleaded any facts suggesting economic necessity.\nII\nOn April 3, 1989, the trial court dismissed count II of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, on the ground that \u201cplaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle her to the relief she requests.\u201d She asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim to due process.\nA\nDefendant contends that \u201cwhen a reviewing court has notice of facts which show that only moot questions or mere abstract propositions are involved or where the substantial questions involved *** no longer exist, it will dismiss the appeal\u201d (People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 622, cert. denied (1952), 344 U.S. 824, 97 L. Ed. 624, 73 S. Ct. 24), a situation that exists here, thus mooting plaintiff\u2019s case because \u201cno actual controversy exists [since] events occur[ed] which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief.\u201d (Wheatley v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 481, 484-85.) Defendant further argues that the office which plaintiff sought has been filled, and, because more than two years have elapsed since plaintiff\u2019s evaluation, she is eligible to be reevaluated by submitting a new questionnaire.\nContrary to defendant\u2019s position, an actual controversy exists on these facts. Although the position which plaintiff sought has been filled, and although it is also true that plaintiff is entitled under one of defendant\u2019s internal resolutions to a new hearing, neither of these factors operates to moot her case. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not seek appointment to the appellate court; rather, she seeks an order setting aside the \u201cnot recommended\u201d rating and requiring defendant to reevaluate her qualifications for the appellate court. The gravamen of the remedy sought here is a withdrawal of the \u201cnot recommended\u201d rating; therefore, even though plaintiff is entitled to a new evaluation, it would not supersede the prior finding. Consequently, there still exists an actual controversy which this court might be able to remedy. (Wheatley, 99 Ill. 2d at 484-85.) For these reasons, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s appeal is not moot.\nB\nIn order to state a cause of action for due process under the fourteenth amendment, defendant\u2019s actions must be those of a State actor, and not merely those of a private association. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian (1988), 488 U.S. 179, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469, 109 S. Ct. 454.\nIn this connection the case of Rouse v. Judges of the Circuit Court (N.D. Ill. 1985), 609 F. Supp. 243, warrants our consideration. In Rouse, the plaintiff, an attorney licensed in Illinois and employed as an assistant Cook County public defender, sought appointment to the position of associate judge of the circuit court. When the plaintiff submitted her name as a candidate to the circuit court, she was referred to the defendant herein for her \u201cinitial evaluation.\u201d She was afforded a hearing before a panel of the Committee on Evaluation of Candidates, and later received written notice that she was found \u201cnot recommended\u201d because of a lack of \u201cjudicial temperament [and] professional experience,\u201d and was thus excluded from further consideration for the position she was seeking. The plaintiff filed suit in Federal court, claiming that the circuit court of Cook County \u201cha[d] delegated to the Chicago Bar Association [CBA] the screening and the initial evaluation of potential candidates for judicial office in Cook County,\u201d that no candidate would be considered unless she were recommended by the CBA, and that the investigation and subsequent hearing were unfair because the chairman of her hearing panel harbored a bias against her.\nAfter dismissing the defendant\u2019s abstention argument, the court addressed the issue of State action, citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (1982), 457 U.S. 922, 937, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482, 495, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753, in which the Supreme Court set forth the circumstances under which private action may be fairly attributable to a State:\n\u201cFirst, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. *** Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.\u201d\nThe Rouse court found the first prong of this test to be easily met, since the judges of the circuit court of Cook County collectively determine the method of selecting associate judges.\nWith respect to the second prong, the Rouse court determined that\n\u201c[p]rivate actors who perform exclusive public functions are, for these purposes, state actors. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809, 97 L. Ed. 1152 (1953); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978). Further, private parties who de facto perform governmental functions by controlling public officials or acting as their agents are acting under color of state law. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169-171, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1614-1616, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).\u201d (Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 246.)\nThe court went on to hold that in situations where the CBA \u201cevalu-at[ed] the qualifications of candidates for new associate judgeships,\u201d it was acting \u201cas a defacto screening committee for the Circuit Court,\u201d since a \u201cnot recommended\u201d finding was \u201ctantamount to exclusion from further consideration.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 247.) Because the circuit court is charged by law with the responsibility of \u201cscreening, evaluating and electing new associate judges, *** [by] excluding candidates from the ballot, the C.B.A. has undertaken to perform an exclusive public function on behalf of the Circuit Court and is a state actor.\u201d Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 247.\nThe court distinguished, however, instances where the CBA acted solely as a private association, that is, instances where it\n\u201cevaluates the qualifications of full Circuit Court judges running for reelection *** [or where it] reviews and evaluates sitting associate Circuit Court judges who are seeking retention and transmits its findings to the Judges who subsequently vote on those candidates. *** In those situations the candidates have already been determined and the C.B.A. is simply commenting on their qualifications.\u201d Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 246-47.\nThe analysis in Rouse has since been superseded by the Supreme Court case of National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian (1988), 488 U.S. 179, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469, 109 S. Ct. 454, where the issue was whether the NCAA\u2019s \u201crecommendation\u201d that the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) suspend Tarkanian from its athletic program was State action. The Court noted that, in the typical State action case,\n\u201ca private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff ***. This may occur if the State created the legal framework governing the conduct [citation]; if it delegates its authority to the private actor [citation]; or sometimes if it knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior [citation].\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 484-85, 109 S. Ct. at 462.)\nRelying, in part, on the fact that UNLV was free to reject the NCAA\u2019s \u201crecommendation,\u201d and the fact that the State had not conferred any \u201cofficial authority\u201d on the Association, the Court held that the NCAA was not a State actor.\nWhile it is true on the facts of this case that the supreme court is given the power to fill vacancies occurring in the office of appellate court judge (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a712), plaintiff does not allege, nor is it shown in the record, that those seeking appointment must first seek review by defendant; indeed, in her brief, plaintiff claims that \u201cshe is the only sitting judge referred by the Illinois Supreme Court to the defendant for evaluation ***[, and] that since her referral the Illinois Supreme Court has made six appointments to the Appellate Court without referring any of the parties to the defendant.\u201d Even if plaintiff were to have alleged that those seeking appointment must first seek review by defendant, nowhere in the record is it shown that the supreme court is not free to accept or reject defendant\u2019s recommendations, and appoint whomever it chooses. Plaintiff, herself, makes this concession in paragraph 15 of her amended complaint. Therefore, pursuant to Tarkanian, defendant cannot be said to be a State actor.\nC\nEven if defendant were a State actor, plaintiff cannot further show a due process violation. \u201cTo establish a violation of the due process clause, [p]laintiff must demonstrate^ in addition to State action,] that she was deprived of a \u2018liberty\u2019 or \u2018property\u2019 interest.\u201d Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 247; see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S. Ct. 2701.\n1. Liberty. Plaintiff essentially contends that the \u201cnot recommended\u201d rating was false and unjustified given her excellent credentials. She, like Rouse, however, does not allege that the \u201cnot recommended\u201d rating injured her good name, reputation, honor or integrity. (Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 558, 92 S. Ct. at 2707 (\u201c[w]here a person\u2019s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential\u201d).) Neither does she allege, as in Rouse, that defendant\u2019s rating \u201cimposed on [her] a stigma or other disability that foreclosed [her] freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.\u201d (408 U.S. at 573, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 559, 92 S. Ct. at 2707.) Nor has she alleged that defendant\u2019s rating has reduced her professional standing or foreclosed her from other employment in her field; indeed, she is still employed as a judge of the circuit court of Cook County and is not precluded from seeking any other position by election or appointment to any judicial office. We therefore hold that\n\u201c[p]laintiff has no protected liberty interest in obtaining a single position of judge where other opportunities for employment in her field existf, and that t]he limited effect of defendant\u2019s \u2018not recommended\u2019 rating does not rise to the level of a protected liberty interest under the due process clause because it does not significantly injure her professional standing or foreclose her from an array of other employment opportunities as an attorney.\u201d Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 248.\n2. Property. \u201cTo have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.\u201d (Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561, 92 S. Ct. at 2709.) Moreover, \u201c[property interests *** are not created by the Constitution^ but] are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.\u201d (Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 561, 92 S. Ct. at 2709.) Plaintiff asserts that she had \u201ca legitimate claim of entitlement to a position on the Appellate Court\u201d insofar as \u201cthere were no black women on the Appellate Court [and she] was encouraged to seek appointment to the Appellate Court.\u201d Plaintiff does not state, however, the source of this property interest, nor does she allege discrimination because of race.\nThe Rouse court addressed this issue also and found that the plaintiff had no entitlement to the position of associate judge since it was an elected office. \u201cAll that plaintiff allege[d], and all that she could [have] allege[d], [was] that she [met] the minimum objective qualifications.\u201d (Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 248.) Here, too, plaintiff cannot allege an entitlement to the appointed position. Indeed, plaintiff can point to no source which has created her alleged property interest; rather, she asserts that because she is minimally qualified for the office, she was entitled to receive fair consideration consistent with due process. The Rouse court rejected a similar argument, stating simply that the CBA\u2019s promulgation of a procedural scheme \u201cdoes not by itself create a constitutionally protected property interest.\u201d (Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 248-49; see also Shango v. Jurich (7th Cir. 1982), 681 F.2d 1091, 1100.) \u201cThe protectible property interest must be found under state law and must exist independently of and apart from any procedural guarantees.\u201d (Rouse, 609 F. Supp. at 249.) Because plaintiff here has identified no independent State law granting her the right to a fair and impartial hearing by defendant, we hold that she has no protected property interest at stake.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we hold that even if the trial court had abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to file her amended complaint as untimely, her proposed amended complaint would not have cured the defects found in her original complaint.\nAffirmed.\nDiVITO and CERDA, JJ., concur.\nEventually, plaintiff was informed that her \u201cnot recommended\u201d rating was based on a \u201clack of legal knowledge and ability.\u201d\nThe guidelines address such characteristics as integrity, legal knowledge and ability, judicial temperament, diligence, punctuality, health, age, professional experience, litigation experience, past professional conduct, financial responsibility, political activity, character, patience, common sense, tact, social consciousness, association and public service, and the judicial system.\nSection 26.7 provides as follows:\n\u201cThe presiding officer or a member of the Executive Committee shall prepare the statement of reasons provided for herein, which statement shall be subject to the approval of the presiding officer.\u201d\nSection 28.1 provides as follows:\n\u201cThe finding of the Hearing Division panel shall be promptly communicated by the President to the candidate, the Board, the Committee, and to the Court, committee, party, or other entity which submitted the candidate for evaluation or which may be considering the candidate for election, nomination, slating or appointment. In the case of a finding of \u2018NOT RECOMMENDED,\u2019 the communication shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for finding.\u201d\nSection 22 provides as follows:\n\u201cIf the Executive Committee shall determine that information relating to the qualifications of a candidate has been developed or received which, in fairness, ought to be disclosed to the candidate in advance of the hearing, such information shall be provided the candidate within a reasonable time prior thereto.\u201d\nSection 27.2 provides as follows:\n\u201cIn the case only of a \u2018NOT RECOMMENDED\u2019 finding by a panel, a candidate may request a re-evaluation within ten days after being informed of the hearing result. The request must be in writing, must specify the basis for the request and must be directed to the General Chairman at the Chicago Bar Association Offices. *** Such an evaluation shall only be ordered on a determination that the hearing panel\u2019s finding is arbitrary or capricious, or to avoid fundamental unfairness. A re-evaluation shall not be ordered solely because the Review Committee disagrees with the hearing panel\u2019s findings. *** The decision of the Review Committee regarding whether to re-evaluate the candidate shall be communicated to the candidate as provided elsewhere in this Resolution. *** There is no right to re-evaluation by any candidate who receives a favorable finding ***.\u201d\nAccording to section 27.1 of defendant\u2019s Resolution:\n\u201cThere shall be no re-evaluation or re-hearing of any candidate evaluated by the Committee for the same office within two years, except as otherwise provided in this Section. A candidate for an office for which the candidate has been evaluated within a two year period shall be found as previously found without hearing. Each \u2018two year' period shall commence on the date of the panel hearing finding as to the first candidate of an ascertainable class or group of candidates, e.g., candidates for appointment to fill vacancies in the office of Associate Judge pursuant to published notice of vacancies, candidates for election to the office of Circuit Judge at a general election.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and Erik D. Gru-ber, of counsel), for appellant.", "Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago (Rene A. Torrado, Jr., and Janet M. Hedrick, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ODAS NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20142043\nOpinion filed August 11, 1992.\nWilliam J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and Erik D. Gru-ber, of counsel), for appellant.\nVedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago (Rene A. Torrado, Jr., and Janet M. Hedrick, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1040-01", "first_page_order": 1060, "last_page_order": 1071 }