{ "id": 5187720, "name": "REAL ESTATE BUYER'S AGENTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD FOSTER, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Real Estate Buyer's Agents, Inc. v. Foster", "decision_date": "1992-09-10", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141175", "first_page": "257", "last_page": "261", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 257" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569711 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592152 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554934 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121957 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466136 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179746 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3234335 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121957 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0382-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 9977, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.402007692620507e-08, "percentile": 0.4427582457510071 }, "sha256": "c803b5d4cabbb74aa247e4d87cc5cb7afce4b898436c1a50cfb3605aa02fe30a", "simhash": "1:2bee7546a5481efd", "word_count": 1647 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "REAL ESTATE BUYER\u2019S AGENTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD FOSTER, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Real Estate Buyer\u2019s Agents, Inc., appeals pro se through its president and nonattomey, Terry Laughlin, from an order of the circuit court of Kane County which dismissed its small claims complaint against defendant, Edward Foster. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint based upon section 2 of the Frauds Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 59, par. 2).\nOn August 21, 1991, plaintiff filed its small claims complaint against defendant. It alleged that defendant, through his agent, Village Real Estate, offered plaintiff a 3% real estate commission if plaintiff obtained an offer from Ramona Webb of \u201c$80,000 with no points to seller\u201d for a house owned by defendant in Bellwood, Illinois. Plaintiff further alleged that it obtained a signed offer to purchase the real estate on those terms, but that defendant refused to sign the contract. Plaintiff sought a real estate broker\u2019s commission from defendant in the amount of $1,500. The complaint was signed by Terry Laughlin, plaintiff\u2019s president. A copy of a written offer by Ramona Webb to purchase the property for a purchase price of $80,000 was attached to the complaint. The offer stated that the seller would pay plaintiff a commission in the amount of $2,400.\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on September 13, 1991. Defendant argued in the motion that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(2) of the Civil Practice Law (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(2)) because, according to Supreme Court Rule 282(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 282(b)), no corporation may appear as a claimant in a small claims proceeding unless represented by counsel. Defendant also argued that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(7) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619(a)(7)) because the unsigned contract for the sale of land relied on by plaintiff was unenforceable under section 2 of the Frauds Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 59, par. 2).\nFollowing a hearing on October 15, 1991, an order was entered which stated that the court found that \u201cthis matter concerns itself with the sale of real estate and is governed by the Statute of Frauds.\u201d The court therefore granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(7) of the Code. The order also stated that the court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based upon Supreme Court Rule 282(b) and that \u201cTerry Laughlin can represent Plaintiff herein.\u201d Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, plaintiff argues that its complaint should not have been dismissed based upon the Statute of Frauds as an agreement to pay a real estate broker\u2019s commission may be oral. Defendant has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief in response. We will, however, consider the appeal under the standard set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nSection 2 of the Frauds Act provides:\n\u201cNo action shall be brought to charge any person upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them, for a longer term than one year, unless such contract or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith ***.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 59, par. 2.)\nAlthough the Frauds Act requires that any contract for the sale of land must be in writing, it contains no such requirement with regard to real estate brokers\u2019 contracts of employment. (Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Drovers National Bank (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 867, 871.) There is no requirement under the Frauds Act that agreements to pay a real estate broker\u2019s commission must be in writing or that claims for a brokerage commission must be based upon a written instrument. (Edens View Realty & Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 480, 487.) A brokerage contract may be oral, and the contract is governed by the law applicable to ordinary contracts. Bossow v. Bowlway Lanes, Inc. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 983, 986.\nIn its complaint, plaintiff was seeking to enforce an alleged oral agreement to pay a real estate broker\u2019s commission and was not seeking to enforce a contract for the sale of real estate. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint based upon the Frauds Act.\nHowever, we may affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record. (Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387.) In his motion to dismiss, defendant raised another basis for dismissing the complaint. He argued that plaintiff, a corporation, had to be represented by counsel pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 282(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 282(b)). Rule 282(b), which was effective August 1, 1987, states that \u201c[n]o corporation may appear as claimant *** in a small claims proceeding, unless represented by counsel.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 282(b).) We conclude that this cause was properly dismissed as the record shows that plaintiff was represented by its president and not by legal counsel.\nWe recognize that the Appellate Court, Third District, in Woerner v. Seneca Petroleum, Inc. (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 329, held that Rule 282(b) was preempted by section 2 \u2014 416 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 416). Section 2 \u2014 416, which was effective January 1, 1984, provides that a corporation may prosecute a small claims proceeding as plaintiff \u201cthrough any officer, director, manager, department manager or supervisor of the corporation, as though such corporation were appearing in its proper person.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 416.) Woerner held that the legislative enactment was controlling as the \u201clegislature preempted the question of pro se representation of corporations by enacting section 2 \u2014 416 almost four years prior to the supreme court\u2019s adoption of Rule 282.\u201d Woerner, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 331.\nOur supreme court, however, has held that, when a statute directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a supreme court rule on a matter within the court\u2019s authority, the rule prevails. (People v. Williams (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 477, 483; People v. Felella (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 525, 538.) As the statute and the supreme court rule directly and irreconcilably conflict, the rule must prevail. We therefore decline to follow Woerner.\nThe record on appeal demonstrates that plaintiff\u2019s president is not an attorney. In plaintiff\u2019s summons of the defendant, plaintiff\u2019s attorney is listed as \u201cNONE \u2014 Pro Se.\u201d The new case information sheet also lists plaintiff\u2019s attorney as \u201cNONE.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s appellate brief is signed by Terry Laughlin as \u201cPlaintiff-Appellant Pro Se.\u201d Finally, although Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(l) requires that an attorney file a written appearance before addressing the court (134 Ill. 2d R. 13(c)(l)), no such appearance was filed here.\nBecause plaintiff, a corporation, was not represented by counsel, as required by the rule, the complaint was properly dismissed. We further conclude, however, that, under these circumstances, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. Plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to proceed with its cause of action with counsel. We therefore affirm the dismissal of this cause; however, the dismissal shall be without prejudice.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County dismissing the cause is affirmed as modified, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nAffirmed as modified and remanded.\nMcLAREN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS" }, { "text": "JUSTICE DUNN,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nAlthough I agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint based upon the Frauds Act (Bl. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 59, par. 2), I adamantly disagree with its conclusion that the trial court\u2019s dismissal should be affirmed because plaintiff, a corporation, was not represented by counsel. This conclusion results in a substantial injustice to plaintiff.\nWhile the majority is correct that it may affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record (Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387), in this case, the majority is affirming the trial court based on a fact not at all supported by the record on appeal. There was no report of proceedings filed on appeal regarding the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion, nor is there a bystander\u2019s report pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)). The record contains only the complaint itself, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and the trial court\u2019s order. That order specifically states, \u201c[Djefendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 282(b) is denied and Terry Laughlin can represent [pjlaintiff hereon [sic].\u201d\nThe record is silent as to whether Terry Laughlin is an attorney. The record reveals only that Terry Laughlin, as president, was representing the corporation pro se. In the absence of a complete record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. (Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392.) Thus, there is no basis for the majority\u2019s conclusion that it may affirm the dismissal of this cause because plaintiff was not represented by an attorney. I would reverse the portion of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint based upon the Fraud Act, but affirm the portion of the trial court\u2019s order finding that Terry Laughlin may represent the plaintiff.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE DUNN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Terry Laughlin, of Real Estate Buyer\u2019s Agents, Inc., of Roselle, appellant pro se.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REAL ESTATE BUYER\u2019S AGENTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD FOSTER, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141175\nOpinion filed September 10, 1992.\nRehearing denied October 19, 1992.\nDUNN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nTerry Laughlin, of Real Estate Buyer\u2019s Agents, Inc., of Roselle, appellant pro se.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0257-01", "first_page_order": 277, "last_page_order": 281 }