{ "id": 5186223, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL PIAT, Defendant-Appellee (George H. Ryan, Secretary of State, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Piat", "decision_date": "1992-09-04", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20140755", "first_page": "262", "last_page": "268", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 262" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567088 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188649 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2940450 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S. Ct. 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601376, 600516, 599429, 599272, 600169, 600650, 601608, 601164, 600750, 602032, 600145, 601105, 601778, 599319, 600920, 601855 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0842-13", "/us/484/0842-06", "/us/484/0842-08", "/us/484/0842-14", "/us/484/0842-09", "/us/484/0842-04", "/us/484/0842-10", "/us/484/0842-11", "/us/484/0842-15", "/us/484/0842-01", "/us/484/0842-16", "/us/484/0842-07", "/us/484/0842-05", "/us/484/0842-12", "/us/484/0842-03", "/us/484/0842-02" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3643043 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494431 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294364 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146-47" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529432 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0099-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 15383, "ocr_confidence": 0.81, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.794772785122533e-08, "percentile": 0.4961269942765003 }, "sha256": "27d419e53c188f8e3190086724a6fd8a91c548f21c34e9f40d9dcfdbe8147a86", "simhash": "1:e0b5caa7ab9accba", "word_count": 2553 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL PIAT, Defendant-Appellee (George H. Ryan, Secretary of State, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Secretary of State (Secretary) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake County, traffic division, directing the Secretary to issue a judicial driving permit (JDP) to the defendant, Michael Piat.\nAt issue is whether the circuit court erred in ordering the Secretary of State to issue a JDP to defendant after the Secretary had ordered a discretionary suspension of defendant\u2019s driving privileges pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. OS1^, par. 6 \u2014 206(a)(31)). Hereafter, all statutory references will refer to the Code unless otherwise indicated. Resolution of this issue involves a legal interpretation of section 6\u2014 206(a)(31) of the Code.\nOn March 2, 1991, following a motor vehicle accident, defendant was arrested and charged under section 11 \u2014 501 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501) for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). On April 17, 1991, defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.1), commonly referred to as a statutory summary suspension. On the same date, the Secretary, pursuant to section 6\u2014 206(a)(31), also ordered a discretionary suspension of defendant\u2019s driving privileges. On April 30, 1991, the circuit court, pursuant to the court\u2019s authority set forth in sections 11 \u2014 501.1 and 6 \u2014 206.1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, pars. 11 \u2014 501.1, 6 \u2014 206.1), issued defendant a JDP. On May 10, 1991, the court order contained a finding that, except for the statutory summary suspension, defendant had valid driving privileges at the time of the court hearing. On May 10, 1991, the Secretary advised the circuit court by letter that defendant was not entitled to a JDP because, in addition to the summary suspension based on section 11 \u2014 501.1, defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was also suspended by the Secretary pursuant to his discretionary powers set forth in section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31). On May 28, 1991, the circuit court reconsidered the matter and again ordered the Secretary to issue a JDP. The Secretary appeals from the May 28,1991, order.\nThe Secretary argues that the circuit court has the statutory authority to issue a JDP only when the suspension of driving privileges is a statutory summary suspension pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1. Defendant argues that the circuit court did not err because section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) specifically provides that the penalties associated therewith shall be as prescribed by section 6 \u2014 208.1 which, by its section 6 \u2014 208(e) language, authorizes the circuit court to issue a JDP.\nSection 11 \u2014 501.1 provides, inter alia, for the statutory summary suspension of a person\u2019s driving privileges upon failure to take a chemical test intended to determine the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person\u2019s blood, if arrested for offenses defined in section 11 \u2014 501 or a similar provision of a local ordinance. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(a).\nSection 6 \u2014 206.1 sets forth the requirements and procedures to be followed by a driver seeking a JDP. With reference to the case before us, section 6 \u2014 206.1(a)(4)(iii) provides:\n\u201cThe Court shall not issue an order granting a JDP to:\n* * *\n(iii) Any person whose privilege to operate a motor vehicle was invalid at the time of arrest for the current violation of Section 11 \u2014 501, or a similar provision of a local ordinance, except in cases where the cause for a driver\u2019s license suspension has been removed at the time a JDP is effective. In any case, should the Secretary of State enter a suspension or revocation of driving privileges pursuant to the provisions of this Code while the JDP is in effect or pending, the Secretary shall take the prescribed action and provide a notice to the person and the court ordering the issuance of the JDP that all driving privileges, including those provided by the issuance of the JDP, have been withdrawn.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6\u2014 206(a)(4)(iii).\nSection 6 \u2014 206 provides the Secretary with discretionary authority to suspend or revoke a person\u2019s driver\u2019s license. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 206.) Section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31), which the Secretary utilized to suspend defendant\u2019s JDP, states:\n\u201cThe Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing of such person\u2019s records or other sufficient evidence that such person:\n* * *\n31. Beginning on January 1, 1991, has refused to submit to a test as required by Section 11 \u2014 501.6 or has submitted to such a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more in which case the penalty shall be as prescribed in Section 6 \u2014 208.1.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6\u2014 206(a)(31).\nSection 11 \u2014 501.6 provides for the chemical testing of a driver who has been involved in a personal injury or fatal motor vehicle accident for the purpose of determining the alcohol or other drug content of such person\u2019s blood. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014 501.6.) Section 11 \u2014 501.6(a) states, in part:\n\u201cCompliance with this Section does not relieve such person from the requirements of Section 11 \u2014 501.1 of this Code.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11 \u2014 501.6(a).)\nBoth sections 11 \u2014 501.6 and 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) became effective January 1, 1991, and focus on an intoxicated driver involved in a personal injury or fatal motor vehicle accident.\nSection 6 \u2014 208.1 establishes the time period for various types of statutory alcohol or other drug-related suspensions. Section 6\u2014 208.1(e) provides:\n\u201cFollowing a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges pursuant to Section 11 \u2014 501.1, for a first offender, the circuit court may, after at least 30 days from the effective date of the statutory summary suspension, issue a judicial driving permit as provided in Section 6 \u2014 206.1.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 208.1(e).\nIn legal support of its position that the trial court erred in ordering the issuance of a JDP, the Secretary cites the cases of People v. Boyd (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 99, and People v. Dobrinick (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 144. In Boyd, defendant was arrested for an alleged violation of section 11 \u2014 501. He took a breath test, with results showing an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.10, and accordingly received a statutory summary suspension from July 12, 1990, to October 12, 1990. On July 24, 1990, defendant pleaded guilty to the DUI offense and was placed on one year\u2019s probation. At the same time, the court granted his petition for a JDP for the period of August 12 to October 12, 1990. The Secretary refused to grant the JDP because defendant\u2019s driving privileges were revoked due to his guilty plea to the DUI (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 205(a)(2)). In upholding the Secretary\u2019s refusal to grant defendant a JDP, the appellate court stated:\n\u201cHowever, it is clear the JDP is only effective for statutory summary suspensions. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206.1(a).) It can have no impact on any other suspension or revocation authorized by the Code. Therefore, if a driver\u2019s underlying driving privileges are lost for another reason and he also has received a statutory summary suspension, the court cannot issue a JDP and any JDP already issued is invalid because there are no driving privileges to be allowed to be used. This is clearly the import of section 6 \u2014 206.1(a)(4)(iii)-\u201d Boyd, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 101.\nIn Dobriniek, defendant was arrested on August 16, 1990, for DUI. His breathalyzer test showed an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.10, and accordingly he received a statutory summary suspension from October 3, 1990, to January 3, 1991. On September 26, 1990, on defendant\u2019s petition, the trial court granted him a JDP for the period of November 2, 1990, to January 3, 1991. The Secretary refused to issue the JDP because the defendant\u2019s driving privileges were suspended for 12 months, effective October 5, 1990, for repeated moving violations. In upholding the Secretary\u2019s refusal, the appellate court reaffirmed the holding in Boyd that a JDP could not be granted when the defendant\u2019s driving privileges are lost for reasons other than a statutory summary suspension. (Dobrinick, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 146-47.) The fact that Dobrinick involves the suspension of the underlying driving privileges rather than a revocation, as in Boyd, does not affect the analysis or change the conclusion reached in Boyd. Dobrinick, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 147.\nIn our case, defendant argues that Boyd and Dobrinick are distinguishable because each arises out of DUI arrests occurring before section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) became law. Defendant asks that we construe section 6 \u2014 206(aX31) as authority for the court to order the Secretary to issue a JDP. Defendant theorizes that subsection 31 is distinguishable from the preceding 30 subsections of section 6 \u2014 206(a) because it is the only subsection requiring that the penalties shall be as prescribed in section 6 \u2014 208.1.\nThe cardinal rule of all statutory construction, to which other rules are subordinate, is that the true intent and meaning of the legislature must be ascertained and given effect; the language used in statutes is the primary source for determining the intent, and where the language used is certain and unambiguous, the proper function of the court is to enforce the statute as enacted. (People v. Markovich (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1004.) Where the language of the statute is clear, its meaning should be given effect without resort to supplementary principles of statutory construction. (People v. Server (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 888, 901, appeal denied (1987), 114 Ill. 2d 555, cert. denied (1987), 484 U.S. 842, 98 L. Ed. 2d 88, 108 S. Ct. 131.) Absent statutory definitions indicating a different legislative intention, courts will assume that words have their ordinary and regularly understood meaning. People v. Dednam (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 565, 568.\nThe State relies upon the Boyd and Dobrinick decisions as authority for the proposition that the defendant\u2019s suspension of driving privileges is a discretionary suspension. Section 6 \u2014 206 of the Code is entitled, \u201cDiscretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit \u2014 Right to a hearing.\u201d As indicated earlier, section 6 \u2014 206(a) provides that the Secretary is \u201cauthorized to suspend or revoke\u201d a person\u2019s driving privileges. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206(a).) We believe such language makes it clear that defendant\u2019s suspension pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) was discretionary. More importantly, defendant\u2019s section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) suspension was clearly not a statutory summary suspension mandated under section 11\u2014 501.1, which Boyd and Dobrinick point out is an essential prerequisite for the issuance of a JDR\nWe believe defendant\u2019s argument that Boyd and Dobriniek are distinguishable because the cases concern arrests before section 6\u2014 206(a)(31) became effective is of little avail. The language labeling subsection 31 discretionary is contained in the general applicability heading of section 6 \u2014 206 and in section 6 \u2014 206(a) and is therefore equally applicable to subsection 31 as to the other 30 subsections under section 6 \u2014 206(a) in existence at the time of the Boyd and Dobriniek decisions. Further, defendant\u2019s discretionary 6 \u2014 206(a)(31) supervision is clearly not a suspension under section 11 \u2014 501.1 and, thus, not a suspension for which a JDP could be issued. Boyd, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 101.\nDefendant next argues that a JDP may be issued for discretionary suspensions under subsection 31 because of the language therein that, if the Secretary chooses to issue a suspension under its provisions, \u201cthe penalty shall be as prescribed in Section 6 \u2014 208.1\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1990 Supp., ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 206(a)(31)). Defendant theorizes that, as a result of the above-quoted language, all of the provisions of section 6 \u2014 208.1 are incorporated into subsection 31, including the language of section 6 \u2014 208.1(e) that \u201cthe circuit court may, after at least 30 days from the effective date of the statutory summary suspension, issue a judicial driving permit as provided in Section 6\u2014 206.1\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 208.1(e)). Defendant takes out of context only language favorable to his argument. As already indicated, section 6 \u2014 208.1(e) provides, in full:\n\u201cFollowing a statutory summary suspension of driving privileges pursuant to Section 11 \u2014 501.1, for a first offender, the circuit court may, after at least 30 days from the effective date of the statutory summary suspension, issue a judicial driving permit as provided in Section 6 \u2014 206.1.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 6 \u2014 208.1(e).)\nThe plain language of that section indicates that a JDP may be granted only for statutory summary suspensions issued pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1. As defendant\u2019s suspension was issued pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206(aX31), not section 11 \u2014 501.1, he could not be issued a JDP.\nFinally, defendant cites People v. Inghram (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 140, and the dissenting opinion of People v. Pine (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 88, as authority for his argument that the legislature intended to allow circuit courts to issue JDP\u2019s in all cases where a person\u2019s driving privileges have been suspended under the Code. In Inghram, the supreme court held that the authorization of the circuit court, pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206.1, to issue a JDP was not an unconstitutional delegation of its executive power to the judiciary. Inghram, 118 Ill. 2d at 150.\nThe majority opinion in Pine concluded that the Secretary had standing as a nonparty to appeal an order of the circuit court directing him to issue a JDP pursuant to section 6 \u2014 206.1 based on the Secretary\u2019s broad authority to administer the State\u2019s laws governing the conduct of drivers on the road. (Pine, 129 Ill. 2d at 96-100.) The Pine dissent disagreed with the majority finding that the Secretary\u2019s administrative and ministerial responsibilities in JDP proceedings as set forth in the Code were sufficient to grant the Secretary standing to appeal as a nonparty. We find that neither Inghram nor Pine, as defendant suggests, supports the proposition that the circuit court has the authority to issue a JDP in all cases where a person\u2019s driving privileges are suspended.\nFor the above-noted reasons, it is clear that the suspension of defendant\u2019s driving privileges by the Secretary, pursuant to his discretionary powers set forth in section 6 \u2014 206(a)(31), was effective during the duration of the period of the JDP. Therefore, the order of the circuit court of Lake County directing the Secretary to issue a JDP is reversed.\nReversed.\nINGLIS, P.J., and NICKELS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bryan R. Winter, of Fuqua, Winter, Stiles & Anderson, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL PIAT, Defendant-Appellee (George H. Ryan, Secretary of State, Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20140755\nOpinion filed September 4, 1992.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nBryan R. Winter, of Fuqua, Winter, Stiles & Anderson, Ltd., of Waukegan, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0262-01", "first_page_order": 282, "last_page_order": 288 }