{ "id": 5188102, "name": "MATT PIDGEON, Chairperson, Citizens Advisory Committee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Pidgeon v. State Board of Elections", "decision_date": "1992-09-03", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140586", "first_page": "490", "last_page": "497", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555183 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283106 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 F. Supp. 1015", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7404508 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/658/1015-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 F.2d 937", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11356815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/851/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a71973", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 802", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180874 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" }, { "page": "746" }, { "page": "1409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0802-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811183 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 1170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1178" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573989 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 1245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1250" }, { "page": "1250-51" }, { "page": "1250" }, { "page": "1250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130327 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367-68" }, { "page": "368-69" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987 Ill. Laws 3243", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 738, "char_count": 15327, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15612686299471515 }, "sha256": "e1e20506d93762349de3fd3be22c4eac31be1657801ee37fe277020734e22576", "simhash": "1:c3ad8c7c0287bbf2", "word_count": 2406 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MATT PIDGEON, Chairperson, Citizens Advisory Committee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn June 12, 1991, plaintiff, Matt Pidgeon, filed a complaint in Sangamon County circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant, State Board of Elections (Board). Plaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Public Community College Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 103 \u2014 7)\u2014which governs the election of members of the board of trustees of a community college district that is contiguous to an experimental community college district \u2014 violates the Illinois Constitution in two respects: (1) section 3 \u2014 7 constitutes special legislation in violation of article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a713), and (2) section 3 \u2014 7 constitutes an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to an administrative board in violation of article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a71) (the separation of powers provision). On June 13, 1991, the Board filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint. On June 14, 1991, the circuit court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion and granted it. Plaintiff elected to stand on his complaint and now brings this appeal. We affirm.\nI. Background\nIn his complaint, plaintiff described himself as \u201ca resident, citizen taxpayer[,] and registered voter in the Belleville Area Community College District #522\u201d (District), and also as chairman of the Citizens Advisory Committee, which he identified as \u201ca group of citizens concerned with the future of the District.\u201d\nPlaintiff alleged in his complaint that a recent amendment to section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act changed the manner in which district trustees were elected: trustees are now elected from within single-member electoral districts, rather than elected at large. (See Pub. Act 85\u2014 765, \u00a71, eff. Sept. 24, 1987 (1987 Ill. Laws 3243, 3244).) The complaint further alleged that (1) this new manner of electing trustees applied only to community college districts which are contiguous to an experimental community college district, and (2) because the District is contiguous to the sole experimental community college district in Illinois, the recent amendment to section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act applies only to the District and nowhere else in the State of Illinois, thus constituting special legislation. Accordingly, plaintiff asked the court to declare unconstitutional these new election procedures in section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act. Plaintiff also alleged that the Board had begun to draw a map for several single-member electoral districts to provide for the election of the District\u2019s new board of trustees, and plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the Board from doing so.\nPlaintiff\u2019s separation of powers claim alleged that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act violates article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution because \u201cdrawing districts for electoral purposes is a legislative, not administrative function.\u201d Plaintiff asserted that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act is the only exception to the rule in Illinois that legislative bodies draw the boundary lines of electoral districts.\nThe Board moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff lacked standing; (2) the Board was entitled to sovereign immunity; (3) plaintiff\u2019s claims were barred by laches-, (4) plaintiff did not allege any facts demonstrating irreparable harm; (5) section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act constituted valid legislation; and (6) plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against the Board for which relief could be granted, and he was incapable of doing so.\nOn June 14, 1991, the trial court granted the Board\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act did not constitute special legislation.\nOn appeal, plaintiff again argues that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act constitutes special legislation and an improper delegation of legislative authority to an administrative body. Because we agree with the trial court that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act is not special legislation, and because we further find that there is no reason why the Board cannot be properly authorized to draw the boundaries of electoral districts, we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint, and we need not address the other grounds that the Board raised in circuit court and reasserts here.\nII. Analysis\nA. Special Legislation\nIn Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245, the Illinois Supreme Court extensively discussed the Illinois constitutional prohibition against special legislation and wrote the following:\n\u201cThe provision in the Constitution of Illinois prohibiting special legislation states: \u2018The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter of judicial determination.\u2019 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, sec. 13.) Special legislation confers a special benefit or privilege on a person or group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated. It discriminates in favor of a select group without a sound, reasonable basis. [Citations.] *** Though the constitutional protections involved are not identical, a claim that the special-legislation provision has been violated is generally judged by the same standard that is used in considering a claim that equal protection has been denied. [Citations.]\nUnless legislation operates to the disadvantage of a suspect classification or infringes upon a fundamental right, the legislation, to be upheld as constitutional, must simply bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.\u201d Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill. 2d at 367-68, 483 N.E.2d at 1250.\nIn County of Bureau v. Thompson (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 323, 337, 564 N.E.2d 1170, 1178, the supreme court added the following regarding the burden one bears who seeks to have a statute declared unconstitutional:\n\u201cAs *** guidance in ruling on [legislative] validity ***, we note the presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional [citation]; to the same purpose, statutory classifications created by the legislature \u2018are presumed to be valid\u2019 [citations]. As a result, it is for the party challenging a statute\u2019s constitutionality \u2014 here, plaintiffs \u2014 to rebut these presumptions and prove the unconstitutional nature of the statute.\u201d\nIn Chicago National League Ball Club, the supreme court identified the focus of a court\u2019s inquiry when a special legislation claim is made as follows:\n\u201cThere is a presumption in favor of the validity of any legislation ***. *** When a classification under a statute is called into question, if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to sustain the classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time the statute was enacted must be assumed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill. 2d at 368-69, 483 N.E.2d at 1250-51.\nPlaintiff argues that \u201c[w]hatever evil is perceived in the existence of an at-large election scheme in the [District] must necessarily exist in all community college districts across the State of Illinois.\u201d Based upon this assertion, plaintiff contends that \u201c[n]o set of facts exist which would justify the distinction between this District and all other [community college] Districts in the State.\u201d We disagree.\nIn Chicago National League Ball Club, the supreme court addressed a similar argument and wrote the following:\n\u201cThe legislature need not choose between legislating against all evils of the same kind or not legislating at all. Instead it may choose to address itself to what it perceives to be the most acute need. [Citations.] An entire remedial scheme will not be invalidated \u2018 \u201csimply because it failed, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1250, quoting Friedman & Rochester, Ltd. v. Walsh (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 413, 421-22, 367 N.E.2d 1325, 1329, quoting McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners (1969), 394 U.S. 802, 809, 22 L. Ed. 2d 739, 746, 89 S. Ct. 1404, 1409.\nWe are aware, and we can presume the legislature is similarly aware, of extensive litigation in this State regarding alleged violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Voting Rights Act) (42 U.S.C. \u00a71973 (1988)). In each such instance, the alleged \u201cevil\u201d the plaintiffs challenged in Federal court was the at-large election of members of some political subdivision of the State of Illinois, as opposed to the election of the members of that political subdivision from single-member districts. (See McNeil v. Springfield Park District (7th Cir. 1988), 851 F.2d 937 (upholding the at-large system for electing members to the Springfield park district and the Springfield school board under the Voting Rights Act); see also McNeil v. City of Springfield (C.D. Ill. 1987), 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1033 (holding that the defendant city\u2019s commission form of government, composed of commissioners elected in at-large elections, violated the Voting Rights Act).) It is conceivable that the legislature, by amending section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act, sought to remedy the \u201cevil\u201d of at-large elections in this one political subdivision of the State \u2014 the District \u2014 in order to avoid requiring the District to litigate the appropriateness of such electoral districts in Federal court. That the legislature did not choose to eliminate all the \u201cevils\u201d of at-large elections in other community college districts at the same time it chose to remedy this \u201cevil\u201d regarding the District does not invalidate the remedial scheme of section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act. Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill. 2d at 367, 483 N.E.2d at 1250.\nHaving found at least one rational basis for the legislature\u2019s action, and having further found that there is no reason why the legislature had to change every community college district at once as it seeks to remedy the \u201cevil\u201d of at-large elections, we need not consider plaintiff\u2019s special legislation claim further.\nWe believe our holding in this case complies with the most recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court on the subject of special legislation, People v. Anderson (1992), 148 Ill. 2d 15, 31, 591 N.E.2d 461, 469, wherein the court wrote the following:\n\u201cWe note *** that the legislature has broad authority to make classifications for the general welfare, and its classifications are presumed to be valid. [Citation.] For a classification to be valid under either equal protection or special legislation analysis, it need only have a rational relation to a legitimate State objective. [Citations.] The State certainly has a legitimate interest in protecting people from physical injury, and we conclude that there is a rational basis for limiting the reach of the hazing statutef, the issue before the supreme court in Anderson,] since it is reasonable to assume that most hazing occurs in colleges, universities and other schools. We therefore hold that the hazing statute does not violate equal protection or the limitation on special legislation. Should the legislature see fit to broaden the scope of the statute to include other possible groups, it is free to do so. The legislature need not deal with all conceivable evils at once; it may proceed one step at a time. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 357, 367.\u201d\nB. Separation of Powers\nPlaintiff alleges that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act unconstitutionally delegates to an administrative body \u2014 the Board \u2014 the authority to draw the electoral districts from which the new trustees on the District\u2019s board will be elected. Citing article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution, plaintiff argues that \u201clegislative acts shall be done by legislative bodies, and [the constitution] prohibits usurpation of those powers by the judiciary or executive bodies.\u201d Plaintiff then argues that section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act provides the only instance in Illinois in which an administrative body, as opposed to \u00e1 legislative body, \u201chas been assigned the politically charged legislative task of drawing district boundaries.\u201d Plaintiff concludes by asserting that drawing an election district boundary \u201cis a legislative process and must be accomplished by a legislative body.\u201d Plaintiff cites no authority in support of these bald assertions, nor are we aware of any.\nThe Illinois Constitution specifically addresses redistricting only in article IV, section 3 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a73), in which it directs how the legislative districts for the Illinois General Assembly shall be redistricted. Interestingly, the constitution directs that if the General Assembly cannot redistrict itself by June 30 of a year following a Federal decennial census, then a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted with the authority to redistrict the General Assembly. The constitution directs that the legislative leaders of the General Assembly shall appoint the members of this commission and specifically provides that of the two commission members to be appointed by each legislative leader, one must not also be a member of the General Assembly.\nClearly, the resulting commission is an administrative body, not a legislative one, yet the constitution mandates this administrative body to determine the district electoral boundaries of the most significant and important legislative body in the State of Illinois, namely, the General Assembly. At a minimum, this constitutional scheme suggests that the legislature\u2019s decision in section 3 \u2014 7 of the Act to delegate the drawing of the District\u2019s electoral boundaries to a nonlegislative body is not beyond the pale of Illinois constitutional law.\nLast, with regard to the question of the powers of the General Assembly, we find the following observation of the supreme court in Kluk v. Lang (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 306, 324, 531 N.E.2d 790, 798, to be relevant to the case before us:\n\u201c[T]he principle is well established that the Constitution is not a grant of power to the General Assembly but only checks the latter\u2019s power. [Citations.] Thus, unless in the Constitution of Illinois or of the United States a restriction is found on the General Assembly\u2019s discretion to determine how to fill legislative vacancies by appointment, its discretion should receive judicial deference.\u201d\nSimilarly, where as here, the legislature has seen fit to designate the Board as the appropriate body to determine electoral boundaries for the District\u2019s new single-member electoral districts, we will defer to the discretion of the General Assembly.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, P.J., and COOK, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donald M. Craven, of Donald M. Craven, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MATT PIDGEON, Chairperson, Citizens Advisory Committee, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140586\nOpinion filed September 3, 1992.\nRehearing denied October 29, 1992.\nDonald M. Craven, of Donald M. Craven, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0490-01", "first_page_order": 510, "last_page_order": 517 }