{ "id": 5188220, "name": "NATALIE LEONARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. KARL KURTZ et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Leonard v. Kurtz", "decision_date": "1992-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201491\u20140948", "first_page": "553", "last_page": "557", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 553" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3462019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E .2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613896 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545061 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 819", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246834 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" }, { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 N.E. 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3162362 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/175/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" }, { "page": "605-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591864 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "304-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122805 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" }, { "page": "555" }, { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0546-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 451, "char_count": 9010, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3112140900878777 }, "sha256": "80b2d6c04370b44e035175ff83ec951c58c8a1ba897c281a84f150db67060642", "simhash": "1:7045650e899f8afc", "word_count": 1444 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NATALIE LEONARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. KARL KURTZ et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial court dismissed various negligence counts alleged in plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (134 Ill. 2d R. 308) to consider the following two questions of law:\n\u201c1. In a wrongful cremation cause of action, is the surviving spouse (or relatives) a bystander pursuant to Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 and therefore subject to the zone of danger rule for resulting emotional distress?\n2. In a wrongful cremation cause of action, is the surviving spouse (or relatives) a direct victim and thus an exception to the Rickey zone of danger rule as was the patient in Corgan v. Muehling (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 296, 574 N.E.2d 602 and thus not subject to the Rickey zone of danger rule for resulting emotional distress?\u201d\nIn plaintiff\u2019s lawsuit for wrongful cremation of her husband\u2019s remains, we find the plaintiff was not a bystander or a direct victim of defendants\u2019 alleged negligence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.\nPlaintiff alleged in her amended complaint that she was the surviving spouse of Wilfred Leonard. As the lawful custodian of his remains, she employed defendants Karl Kurtz, Kurtz Memorial Chapel, Ltd., Kurtz Ambulance Service, Inc., and Kurtz Paramedic Service, Inc., to transport her husband\u2019s remains to defendants Gerald Dames and Gerald Dames and Sons Funeral Home.\nThe defendant Park Crematory, Inc., obtained possession of Mr. Leonard\u2019s remains and cremated them. Plaintiff did not authorize or desire the cremation of her husband\u2019s remains. Plaintiff was 70 years old and was raised and schooled in the Roman Catholic faith. She is a deeply religious person who believes that cremation is not a proper religious means for disposing of the remains of a human body.\nPlaintiff alleged that defendants owed her a duty to use ordinary care to safeguard her husband\u2019s remains against unauthorized cremation. Plaintiff further alleged that the defendants were negligent in: (1) permitting the remains to be cremated without her approval; (2) failing to perform a proper identification of decedent\u2019s remains prior to cremation; and (3) failing to safeguard decedent\u2019s remains to prevent unauthorized cremation.\nPlaintiff additionally alleged in her amended complaints that defendants Kurtz and Dames, who are licensed funeral directors, attempted to coerce her into signing a cremation consent form by threatening to keep her husband\u2019s cremated remains. Plaintiff also claimed that they offered her free funeral services for his remains if she would sign the cremation consent form.\nPlaintiff alleged that as a result of all of the defendants\u2019 acts, she \u201csustained severe injuries in that she suffered great pain and anguish and severe emotional distress.\u201d\nPrior to 1983, Illinois courts applied the \u201cimpact rule\u201d in cases of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Our supreme court in Braun v. Craven (1898), 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657, ruled that a plaintiff could not recover for physical injury that developed because of emotional distress unless he received either physical injury or some impact to his person at the occurrence of the tort. (Braun, 175 Ill. at 413, 51 N.E. at 661-62.) Under this rule, recovery for negligently caused emotional distress suffered by a direct victim or bystander who witnessed the injury of another was consistently denied unless accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury or impact to the plaintiff. Hayes v. Illinois Power Co. (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 587 N.E.2d 559, 561.\nIn 1983, our supreme court adopted the zone of physical danger rule as an exception to the physical impact requirement. The zone of physical danger rule allows a bystander to an accident to plead a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.) The zone of physical danger rule requires that a plaintiff must have been endangered by the defendant\u2019s negligence and must have suffered physical injury or illness as a result of the emotional distress caused by the negligence. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 230, 261, 512 N.E.2d 691, 707.\nWe note that under the supreme court\u2019s analysis in Rickey, Illinois courts have not previously allowed a cause of action for emotional distress based on the negligent mishandling of a corpse. Koeller v. Cook County (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 425, 535 N.E .2d 1118; Courtney v. St. Joseph Hospital (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 397, 500 N.E.2d 703.\nWe find that the allegations of defendants\u2019 negligence in plaintiff\u2019s amended complaints clearly fail to meet the requirements of Rickey. Plaintiff does not allege that she suffered any physical injury or illness. Plaintiff\u2019s complaints allege that she \u201csustained severe injuries in that she suffered great pain and anguish and severe emotional distress.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s allegation merely concludes that she suffered emotional distress. Rickey requires an allegation that plaintiff suffered physical injury or illness as a result of the emotional distress. It is not enough to simply equate physical injury or illness with emotional distress. Plaintiff must allege the causation between her physical injury or illness and the emotional distress which was caused by defendants\u2019 negligence. Even if the plaintiff could demonstrate that she suffered \u201cphysical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress\u201d (Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5), she failed to allege that she was \u201cin a zone of physical danger and *** [defendants\u2019 negligence put her in] reasonable fear for [her] own safety.\u201d Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.\nHere, plaintiff did not allege that she witnessed any of defendants\u2019 alleged acts or omissions, or that she was placed in a zone of physical danger which caused her to fear for her own personal safety. Therefore, we find the plaintiff\u2019s allegations are insufficient to establish that she was a bystander within the zone of physical danger.\nThe second question which we are asked to address is whether the surviving spouse in a wrongful cremation action is a direct victim trader Corgan v. Muehling (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 296, 574 N.E.2d 602. Plaintiff argues that she was a direct victim of defendants\u2019 alleged negligence. We disagree.\nThe plaintiff in Corgan sought damages for emotional distress caused by her therapist\u2019s exploitation when he convinced her to engage in sexual relations under the guise of therapy. Our supreme court in Corgan found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for negligence. (Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 308, 574 N.E.2d at 607.) The plaintiff correctly notes that the supreme court in Corgan clarified Rickey when it determined that the zone of physical danger rule applied only to bystanders and not to direct victims. (Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 304-06, 574 N.E.2d at 605-06; Hayes, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 587 N.E.2d at 562.) Plaintiff argues that she is a direct victim of defendants\u2019 negligence just like the plaintiff in Corgan. Therefore, plaintiff argues that the zone of physical danger rule pertaining to bystanders does not apply in this appeal.\nPlaintiff contends that she is a direct victim because the mishandling of her husband\u2019s remains constituted a tort committed directly upon her. We disagree. We find that there is no contemporaneous physical injury to the plaintiff which is sufficient to make her a direct victim. Plaintiff also argues that for no other reason than that she is the surviving spouse, she must be a direct victim of a wrongful cremation. We also disagree.\nWe find that the facts in the instant appeal are dramatically different from the facts in Corgan. In Corgan, the plaintiff sued the defendant because of the malpractice which he performed directly upon her. Here, the plaintiff can only claim that her emotional distress was a derivative consequence of the allegedly negligent acts performed upon her deceased husband\u2019s remains. We note that the alleged acts of negligence clearly were not performed by the defendants directly upon the plaintiff. There was no direct contact between the plaintiff and defendants. Therefore, we find the plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Corgan is misplaced.\nFor the reasons indicated, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County which dismissed various negligence counts alleged in plaintiff\u2019s amended complaint is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSLATER and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Laird M. Ozmon, of Laird M. Ozmon, Ltd., of Joliet (James P. Stevenson, of counsel), for appellant.", "Matyas & Norris, of Chicago (Patrick Norris, of counsel), for appellee Park Crematory, Inc.", "Stefanich, McGarry, Wols & Okrei, of Joliet (Roman R. Okrei, of counsel), for appellee Gerald Dames.", "Miles P. Cahill, of Modesto, Reynolds & McDermott, of Wheaton, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NATALIE LEONARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. KARL KURTZ et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201491\u20140948\nOpinion filed September 22, 1992.\nLaird M. Ozmon, of Laird M. Ozmon, Ltd., of Joliet (James P. Stevenson, of counsel), for appellant.\nMatyas & Norris, of Chicago (Patrick Norris, of counsel), for appellee Park Crematory, Inc.\nStefanich, McGarry, Wols & Okrei, of Joliet (Roman R. Okrei, of counsel), for appellee Gerald Dames.\nMiles P. Cahill, of Modesto, Reynolds & McDermott, of Wheaton, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0553-01", "first_page_order": 573, "last_page_order": 577 }