{ "id": 5187874, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD THOMPSON et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thompson", "decision_date": "1991-12-27", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201487\u20143716, 1\u201487\u20143736 cons.", "first_page": "770", "last_page": "780", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 770" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498634 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5412280 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3079105 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256509 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 1073", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2498925 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/1073-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3498097 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106754 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2655906 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152504 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567507 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152531 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3618351 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 1139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3622041 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2431981 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990291 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3131108 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474664 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2991135 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2655654 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909498 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3182751 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3591032 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0933-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1001, "char_count": 21978, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.948618177036335e-08, "percentile": 0.3706845457013131 }, "sha256": "486d93e3c9b9338db4f37584aac388ef425270c8fc77a396d867ebd2a5729c3e", "simhash": "1:2a10dd267763ece3", "word_count": 3650 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD THOMPSON et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendants Donald Thompson and Kenne Jordan were found guilty of armed robbery. Thompson was sentenced to 20 years\u2019 imprisonment, and Jordan was sentenced to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial judge made improper comments in the presence of the jury shifting the burden of proof to defendants; that the court violated defendants\u2019 due process rights by failing to instruct the jury on the requisite mens rea for armed robbery; that the trial court failed to properly conduct the voir dire of the jury; that the sentences are improper because the trial court relied on an element inherent in armed robbery; that the sentences are improper because the trial court relied on an improper aggravating factor; that Thompson was denied a fair sentencing hearing; that Jordan is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court improperly found he lacked remorse; and that the sentences are excessive.\nFor purposes of expedience, the specific facts pertaining to the trial judge\u2019s conduct of the trial and sentencing hearing upon which defendants\u2019 contentions on appeal are predicated shall be discussed in the analytical portion of the opinion. Our statement of facts here will be restricted to those relevant facts pertaining to the actual commission of the crime and the identification of defendants.\nAt trial, Yolanda Jackson testified that on November 16, 1986, at 7:00 p.m., she worked at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Chicago. Defendants entered the restaurant and tried to sell Jackson and a co-worker, Lurene Pierce, some jewelry. Thompson asked Jackson for a date. Defendant stood three feet from Jackson and remained in the restaurant for 10 to 15 minutes. When two police officers in uniform entered the restaurant, defendants left.\nAt 8:30 p.m. on the same day, defendants again entered the restaurant. Jackson took their food order, and Pierce began to pack the food. Thompson then grabbed Jackson\u2019s arm and demanded money from the register. Thompson held a gun pointed at Jackson. Jackson turned the money over to Thompson. Jordan reached over the counter and grabbed coins from the register. Defendants were in the restaurant approximately five minutes. When they exited the restaurant, Jackson activated a silent alarm.\nPierce, Jackson\u2019s co-worker, testified similarly.\nDefendants\u2019 two visits to the restaurant were videotaped, and still photographs of the videotape showing defendants at the counter were introduced into evidence.\nJackson testified further that five days later, on November 21, 1986, she went into a pizza parlor next door to the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant. Thompson, accompanied by Jordan, happened to be present and approached Jackson, to ask if she remembered him. Jackson recognized them as the men who had robbed the store, but told defendants that she did not know who they were. Jackson then left the pizza parlor and telephoned the police. When they arrived, she reentered the pizza parlor with the police officers and identified defendants.\nJordan\u2019s mother and sister testified on behalf of Jordan that he was home from 8:00 p.m. until midnight on November 16,1986.\nOpinion\nDefendants first contend that the trial judge committed reversible error when he made an improper comment in front of the jury. In a side bar, after the State rested its case, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion for a directed finding, stating that the State had met its burden of proof and the case would proceed to the defense case in chief. At that point, counsel and the judge returned to the presence of the jury, where the court stated:\n\u201cOkay. Accordingly, ladies and gentlemen at this particular juncture it is the opinion of the court that the defense will have to move forward in presenting its case.\u201d\nDefense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion and out of the presence of the jury, stated: \u201cIt\u2019s appropriate and proper for the court to indicate that the defense must proceed in presenting its case if it sees fit to do so and I see nothing wrong or reversible with that particular statement.\u201d\nDefendants maintain that the comment could \u201chave only one meaning\u201d for the jurors. \u201cBuried just below the surface of [the] comment is the message: it is the opinion of the court [that] the State has proven its case unless the defense can present some evidence to counter the State\u2019s case.\u201d\nIn order for an improper comment by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must show that the remark was prejudicial and that he was harmed by the comments. (People v. Heidorn (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 933, 449 N.E.2d 568.) The remark must constitute a material factor in the defendant\u2019s conviction. People v. Brown (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 368, 409 N.E.2d 81.\nWe find that the propriety of the judge\u2019s comment here was at the very least questionable and should have been avoided. While not overtly stating that defendants must go forward with a defense, the remark unnecessarily risked conveying the signal by implication.\nThe State relies on People v. Cannon (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 162, 273 N.E.2d 829, in urging that there was no error. In that case, the court found no impropriety where, after the State rested its case on a Friday afternoon, the judge informed the jury that \u201cthe taking of evidence would be resumed on Monday,\u201d and then asked counsel for one of the defendants if on Monday \u201che would be ready to start some part of his case.\u201d (Cannon, 49 Ill. 2d at 166.) The court on appeal held: \u201cWe fail to see how the jury could construe the inquiry to mean that the court was of the opinion that the People had proved their case.\u201d (Cannon, 49 Ill. 2d at 166.) Unlike the present case, Cannon involved an inquiry, not a statement of the court\u2019s \u201copinion\u201d; involved the possibility of defendant\u2019s presenting evidence, not an announcement that defense \u201cwill have to move forward in presenting its case\u201d; and involved a statement made to counsel for a codefendant for whom the court later directed a verdict of acquittal.\nHowever, while the judge\u2019s comment in this case, unlike those in Cannon, creates a much closer question of impropriety, it would clearly not constitute reversible error. Because the State\u2019s evidence here was overwhelming, the comment of the trial judge, regardless of its impropriety, could not have been a prejudicial factor in defendants\u2019 convictions. Two eyewitnesses identified defendants as the robbers. They viewed defendants in good light for 10 to 15 minutes the first time, and for five minutes the second time, from a distance of three feet. Moreover, the two visits were videotaped and still photographs of defendants standing at the cash register were admitted into evidence. Finally, defendants approached Jackson, in a pizza parlor next door to the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant they had robbed five days earlier, and asked if Jackson remembered them. Jackson then offered a positive identification of defendants to the police. In view of this overwhelming evidence which supported the convictions, the remark by the trial judge could not have played a material role in the jury\u2019s verdict. Thus any error was clearly harmless. (See People v. Tucker (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 683, 542 N.E.2d 804 (trial court\u2019s improper comments which concerned the burden of proof were harmless error where defendant made no showing of resulting prejudice).) We note further that the jury here was properly instructed on the burden of proof at the end of the trial. See People v. Cannon, 49 Ill. 2d at 166.\nDefendants next contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants acted knowingly or intentionally when they robbed the store. Defendants failed to object at trial and, therefore, have waived the issue for purposes of appeal. (See People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 387 N.E.2d 331.) Defendants urge that plain error occurred. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).) No plain error occurred here, where the case is not factually close. (See People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177, 180, 415 N.E.2d 1027; People v. Anderson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 646, 653, 417 N.E.2d 663.) Moreover, armed robbery is a general intent crime (People v. Banks (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 383, 392, 388 N.E.2d 1244), and instructions need not include a description of a specific mental state. People v. Avant (1989), 178 Ill. App. 3d 139, 532 N.E.2d 1141; People v. Talley (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 170, 531 N.E.2d 1139; People v. Leonard, (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 380, 526 N.E.2d 397.\nDefendants next contend that the trial court failed to ask two of the jurors questions during voir dire as required under the holding in People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d 1062. Defendants assert that the trial judge here failed to question juror Paul Kertay regarding defendants\u2019 right not to testify. He also failed to question juror Kim Lang about a defendant\u2019s right not to offer any evidence in his own behalf and the State\u2019s burden of proving defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOur review of the record does not agree with defendants\u2019 contention regarding Kertay. The trial judge questioned both Kertay and Lang regarding defendants\u2019 right not to testify. We agree, however, that the judge failed to ask Lang about defendants\u2019 right not to offer any evidence. Contrary to the State\u2019s argument, this inquiry was not made unnecessary by the court\u2019s general comments to the general venire since the record does not reflect that this specific admonition was ever given to the general venire. Notably, neither defendant here testified; Jordan\u2019s defense consisted of his mother\u2019s and sister\u2019s alibi testimony; Thompson offered no defense.\nHowever, defendants failed to object at trial or include this issue in their motion for a new trial and, thus, have waived the issue for purposes of appeal. People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 321, 340-41, 544 N.E.2d 330; People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 181-82, 469 N.E.2d 119; People v. Thomas (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 782, 542 N.E.2d 881.\nMoreover, even if there was no waiver, it would not provide a basis for reversal because even though the error is of constitutional magnitude, the overwhelming weight of the evidence supporting the convictions enables us to find with certainty that this was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendants next contend that, in sentencing defendants, the trial court improperly relied on an inherent element of the offense of armed robbery as an aggravating factor. At Jordan\u2019s sentencing hearing, the court stated:\n\u201cBut I\u2019m going to start again with your first premise that there were no threats of violence. Mr. Grzeca [defense counsel], if I had a gun in my hand and I waived [sic] it in front of your face and didn\u2019t even open up my mouth, you are not going to stay here and wait and see if there is any threat of violence, you as an individual, you can justifiably anticipate that there is plenty of violence there; if that trigger is pulled and it is a matter of very little pressure that could be put on that trigger to use that gun you may not be here to talk about it later on. *** So I can\u2019t see any basis for saying there were no threats of violence ***.\u201d\nAt Thompson\u2019s sentencing hearing, the court noted generally that whatever it had said to Jordan was also applicable to Thompson.\nThese comments, however, were made only after defense counsel argued that no violence or serious harm was involved in this case. Defense counsel argued:\n\u201c[T]here was no testimony that would link what the courts have considered serious harm to any act that was committed by Mr. Jordan, meaning, there were no threats of violence from Mr. Jordan, there were no movements, any type of *** exaggerated type of movement toward the victim in this matter, there was no evidence of that. *** [H]ere, there was no serious harm, there was [sic] no physical injuries, there was no testimony as to emotional stress suffered after this incident. So that takes it out of the realm of serious harm.\nIt is ironic that [the prosecutor] used the word[s] \u2018some violence\u2019 and yet failed to go into any detail as to what that violence was. The words \u2018some violence\u2019 leaves [sic] the court begging for an avenue to inflict a sentence that is proportionate with a violent act.\u201d\nThus, the trial judge was merely responding directly to defense counsel\u2019s argument at sentencing that there were no threats of violence nor any movement toward the victim. (See People v. Reid (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 88, 445 N.E.2d 329 (court\u2019s comments as to threat of harm were in response to defense counsel\u2019s argument; the comments did not indicate the court considered the threat of harm as an aggravating factor).) No error occurred.\nWe are unpersuaded by the case defendants cite. (See People v. Rhodes (1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 362, 363, 490 N.E.2d 169 (court vacated a 10-year sentence for armed robbery and remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court had expressly considered the serious physical harm threatened during the robbery).) Unlike the present case, Rhodes did not involve a trial judge responding to argument in mitigation made by defense counsel regarding the absence of violence.\nDefendants next contend that the trial court improperly considered compensation as an aggravating factor during sentencing. While the State argued in aggravation that defendants received compensation from the robbery, the trial court never referred to that fact. We presume that in imposing sentence on a defendant, the trial judge considers only proper factors. People v. Heredia (1989), 193 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 550 N.E.2d 1023.\nDefendant Thompson alone contends that \u201cthe trial court denied [him] effective assistance of counsel at sentencing when it precluded counsel from presenting evidence and questioning a probation officer.\u201d At sentencing, the court noted the presentence report included the phrase: \u201cOn advice from his attorney, defendant made no statement.\u201d\nAt the sentencing hearing, the court asked the probation officer to clarify the statement. She testified that she had expressly advised defendant that without his attorney present, it may be in his best interest not to comment on the incident. In an attempt to satisfy the court on this question, counsel for Thompson then sought to question the probation officer.\n\u201c[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I inquire?\nTHE COURT: Sure, you may.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On that basis you informed this Defendant, since his Attorney was not here and you proceeded to ask him the questions that you asked at that point, is that right?\nTHE COURT: Counsel, that is an improper question, that has nothing to do with a pre-sentence investigation.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don\u2019t understand.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll answer that question, that has nothing to do with it, any reference to advice of an attorney representing an individual during a pre-sentence investigation. I will ask you\nnot to even go into that. Do you understand that?\n* * *\n*** Because as a matter of fact you weren\u2019t even the attorney of record at the time and so that question is completely improper for you to ask.\u201d\nDefendant Thompson now argues that the court\u2019s decision \u201cprohibited counsel from fulfilling his duty to his client regarding insuring the accuracy of the presentence report.\u201d Thus, Thompson concludes, the record \u201cclearly demonstrates an abridgement of [his] rights to a full sentencing hearing.\u201d Thompson asks that we remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nWe agree with the State\u2019s position (which Thompson does not refute in his reply brief) that this is actually an issue regarding the fairness of the sentencing hearing, and not an issue regarding the denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel since counsel, by his attempts to inquire into the matter before he was cut off, demonstrated his effective assistance.\nWhile the sentencing judge was critical of the probation officer for offering this advice to Thompson, there is no indication that the judge relied on the statement in the presentence report in imposing a sentence on Thompson. Thus, it does not appear that any further inquiry would have had any impact on the ultimate sentence since the judge\u2019s interest was focused on the propriety of the probation officer\u2019s conduct rather than the defendant\u2019s conduct. Although it would have been preferable for the court to permit full scope of cross-examination, it is apparent here that there was no abuse since the area in which cross-examination was limited did not pertain to matters material to the imposition of sentence. The character and scope of cross-examination at a sentencing hearing are left largely to the discretion of the trial court, and the court\u2019s ruling will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion which results in manifest prejudice to the defendant. People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 18, 552 N.E.2d 791.\nNext, defendant Jordan alone contends that the trial court improperly stated at the sentencing hearing that Jordan lacked remorse. At the hearing, Jordan stated:\n\u201cI would like to say to you that I have done wrong things at times, you know, I\u2019m really being found guilty of something that I didn\u2019t do as it is, and like counsel said, you know, if you can take into consideration, you know, and not give us a whole lot of time for something we haven\u2019t done.\u201d\nThe court later stated:\n\u201cYour attorney was talking about remorse. Mr. Grzeca [defense counsel], I don\u2019t think I\u2019m going to address myself to that particular aspect because of the nature of the offense before this court. Try as I may, I looked over the facts of this case, I looked over the pre-sentence investigation which is part of Mr. Jordan\u2019s case consisting of twelve pages, I can find nothing in any way to reflect upon any remorse by the defendant herein.\u201d\nThe trial court is in the best position to evaluate the sincerity of the defendant\u2019s remarks. (People v. Greene (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 933, 430 N.E.2d 23.) In the present case, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s conclusion that defendant lacked remorse was erroneous. Here, it would not have been inappropriate, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, for the trial court to deem defendant\u2019s continued protestations of innocence to be a demonstration of a lack of remorse. See People v. Greene, 102 Ill. App. 3d 933, 430 N.E.2d 23 (court rejects defendant\u2019s arguments that at the sentencing hearing, the trial court misinterpreted a statement made by defendant as evidence of a lack of a penitent attitude).\nIn regard to the court\u2019s reference to lack of remorse and continued protestation of innocence, our supreme court has held that a defendant\u2019s failure to show remorse or a penitent spirit may properly be considered in determining sentences. (People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 529, 499 N.E.2d 422.) These factors may be evaluated in light of all other relevant factors. People v. Ralon (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 927, 960, 570 N.E.2d 742.\nDefendants next contend that the sentences imposed are excessive. Absent an abuse of discretion, a sentence will not be altered on review. (People v. La Pointe (1982), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344.) It is not our function to serve as a sentencing court. (People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882.) The record reveals that the sentencing judge carefully considered all arguments in mitigation and aggravation, and the presentencing investigation reports, including defendants\u2019 prior criminal records.\nIn December 1984, Thompson was convicted of strong arm robbery when he robbed an 84-year-old woman and a 64-year-old woman; he received 30 months\u2019 probation. While on probation, in October 1986, Thompson was convicted of attempted robbery; he received 30 months\u2019 probation once again. One month later, he committed the armed robbery at issue here.\nIn February 1982, Jordan was convicted of robbery; he received 60 days\u2019 imprisonment and four years\u2019 probation. While on probation, in August 1985, Jordan was convicted of theft; he was sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment. Five months after being paroled, Jordan committed the armed robbery at issue here.\nWe find no abuse of discretion in the 20-year and 18-year sentences imposed on Thompson and Jordan, respectively. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014l(aX3) (armed robbery is a Class X felony punishable from 6 to 30 years in prison).\nJordan asserted at the sentencing hearing that he \u201cwould have took [sic] six years a long time ago\u201d if he had actually committed the crime. However, there is no support in the record that any plea offer was previously made. (Cf People v. Dennis (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 74, 328 N.E.2d 135 (trial court participated in plea negotiations where defendant was offered two to six years; after trial, court sentenced defendant to 40 to 80 years in prison; appellate court reduced sentence to 18 years).) Defendant has failed to make an affirmative showing in the record that the greater sentence was imposed, e.g., as punishment for exercising his right to trial. See People v. Moffitt (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 106, 485 N.E.2d 513; People v. Greene, 102 Ill. App. 3d 933, 430 N.E.2d 23.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.\nJudgments affirmed.\nLORENZ, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Bonnie Meyer Sloan, and Donna J. Norton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD THOMPSON et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNos. 1\u201487\u20143716, 1\u201487\u20143736 cons.\nOpinion filed December 27, 1991.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Bonnie Meyer Sloan, and Donna J. Norton, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0770-01", "first_page_order": 790, "last_page_order": 800 }