{ "id": 5187597, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LANGFORD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Langford", "decision_date": "1992-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20140794", "first_page": "855", "last_page": "860", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 855" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S. Ct. 2594", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 L. Ed. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 908", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12138787, 12138141, 12137863, 12138665, 12137706, 12139211, 12138412, 12137997, 12137579, 12137455, 12138290, 12138932, 12137335, 12138552, 12139069 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0908-12", "/us/496/0908-07", "/us/496/0908-05", "/us/496/0908-11", "/us/496/0908-04", "/us/496/0908-15", "/us/496/0908-09", "/us/496/0908-06", "/us/496/0908-03", "/us/496/0908-02", "/us/496/0908-08", "/us/496/0908-13", "/us/496/0908-01", "/us/496/0908-10", "/us/496/0908-14" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 1241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589139 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 970", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188484 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514683 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548262 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236590 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535572 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205331 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 9658, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.305662205487489e-08, "percentile": 0.43428304121205524 }, "sha256": "1d1cf5707ce5a4c1c5b8d9484cfefadb9cc30260e20f017d27b601026507fac3", "simhash": "1:373c85855f66a6a3", "word_count": 1529 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LANGFORD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn January 31, 1986, defendant Robert Langford shot James Allen and John Goolsby to death while they were standing near an apartment building at 345 West 72nd Street in Chicago. Defendant subsequently was convicted of the murders (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) following a jury trial. The jury declined the State\u2019s request to impose a death sentence, and defendant was ordered imprisoned for the rest of his life without the possibility of parole.\nDefendant now claims, for several reasons, that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial.\nWe affirm.\nDefendant first contends the State calculated to elicit surprise testimony from Jacqueline Capleton, an eyewitness who knew defendant, that one of defendant\u2019s attorneys had intimidated her into recanting her identification of defendant to police shortly after the murder.\nAt trial, Capleton stated that early one morning approximately six weeks prior to trial, she was visited by one of defendant\u2019s attorneys, Shelton Green, and an investigator. During that visit, Green intimated to Capleton that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office could not protect her. Capleton, already fearful of defendant, then told Green, untruthfully, that she was not certain the gunman was defendant. Green had impressed upon Capleton that defendant was innocent and that \u201cbecause a stray bullet don\u2019t miss anyone, anything could happen\u201d to her or her family. Capleton admitted her fears caused her to then sign an untrue written statement which represented that she had earlier identified defendant only after being harassed by police.\nIn a conference outside of the jury\u2019s presence, Green advised the trial judge that Capleton\u2019s testimony concerning his alleged statements was a surprise. Green withdrew from the case. Defendant moved for a mistrial, and the public defender\u2019s office moved to be allowed to withdraw from the case. Both motions were denied.\nDefendant argues he was denied a fair trial because the State failed to notify the defense of Capleton\u2019s testimony. He points to opening comments made by the State that Capleton was pressured by defense attorneys to recant her identification of defendant as an indication that the State knew how Capleton would testify. Defendant\u2019s objection to those comments was sustained. Defendant also claims his right to counsel was violated because Green already had established a relationship with the jurors such that Capleton\u2019s accusations tainted the entire defense team. Defendant argues the State was, at most, obligated to notify the defense of Capleton\u2019s testimony as the State must do in instances of exculpatory evidence, citing, principally, Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194, and United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 105 S. Ct. 3375. At least, defendant contends, the State had an ethical duty under Disciplinary Rules 1 \u2014 102 and 1 \u2014 103 to disclose the nature of Capleton\u2019s testimony. 134 Ill. 2d Rules 1\u2014102, 1\u2014103.\nAssuming the State was aware of the reasons Capleton would give for her recantation of the written statement she gave to defense counsel, we are not persuaded that the State\u2019s failure to disclose that matter to defendant constitutes reversible error. The reasons Capleton gave for recanting her written statement simply have no relation to the question of defendant\u2019s innocence. For that reason, defendant\u2019s reliance on Brady v. Maryland, requiring the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and United States v. Bagley, extending that rule to evidence favorable to the defense, is misplaced. Furthermore, even if we were to assume a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1 \u2014 102 or 1 \u2014 103 would provide a means to affect defendant\u2019s conviction, nothing in the language of either rule compels disclosure of the content of Capleton\u2019s testimony given its nonexculpatory nature.\nDefendant next maintains the trial judge permitted the State to present improper testimony concerning two rival Chicago street gangs to establish defendant\u2019s motive.\nThe State presented the challenged evidence through the testimony of Chicago police detective John Bloor, who was qualified as an expert for that purpose. In particular, Bloor testified that defendant was a member of one of the gangs. Bloor recounted the history of the gangs and described the continuing dispute between them over the right to sell drugs in the area where the murders occurred. Bloor established it was that dispute that motivated defendant to shoot the victims, who he stated were members of that rival gang.\nDefendant contends Bloor\u2019s testimony was improper because the testimony was not supported by the type of evidence ordinarily relied upon by such experts in the field. Defendant points out that Bloor\u2019s testimony was based, primarily, on information gathered by police by talking to gang members. Defendant also complains that Bloor\u2019s testimony was irrelevant to establish defendant\u2019s motive.\nIllinois courts recognize that a police officer\u2019s testimony regarding gang activity is proper when the officer\u2019s testimony qualifies as expert opinion, the testimony is relevant, and the prejudicial effect of the opinion does not outweigh its probative value. People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 495 N.E.2d 1207.\nThe trial judge\u2019s allowance of Bloor\u2019s testimony here did not constitute an abuse of discretion so as to provide a basis to disturb defendant\u2019s conviction. (See People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 481, 568 N.E.2d 864.) Bloor\u2019s experience with gang activity qualified him as an expert. Bloor worked as a gang crimes specialist for 10 of his 16 years on the police force. The area to which he was assigned was the area in which the murder occurred. In this case, Bloor\u2019s testimony was relevant to the extent that Bloor explained defendant was motivated to shoot the victims because they were members of a rival street gang vying for the same geographic area in which to sell narcotics. For that same reason, the establishment of a motive for the shooting, the admission of Bloor\u2019s testimony did not outweigh its probative effect. See People v. Ayala (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 586, 567 N.E.2d 450.\nDefendant also complains about the State\u2019s presentation of evidence that defendant was in Federal custody in Tennessee at the time the police located him, one month after the murders. Defendant claims the allowance of that testimony was prejudicial because it informed the jury of defendant\u2019s arrest in another matter.\nWe do not agree. Evidence concerning defendant\u2019s presence in Tennessee was established through the testimony of Chicago police detective William Foley. The record indicates that care was taken to introduce that testimony in such a way as to prevent the jury from discovering the existence and nature of any other charges against defendant. The evidence that defendant was in Tennessee was admitted properly as evidence of flight from which the jury could have inferred consciousness of guilt. See People v. Nightengale (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 968, 523 N.E.2d 136, appeal denied (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 587, 530 N.E.2d 258.\nFinally, defendant complains that comments made by the State in closing argument and rebuttal were prejudicial. Defendant argues the State sought to imply how defendant\u2019s counsel had coerced Capleton\u2019s statement by having the jury draw a comparison to defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s courtroom demeanor during delivery of his opening statement. Defendant contends the State improperly referred to Capleton\u2019s courage in testifying and otherwise bolstered the credibility of witnesses for the State and its theory of the crime. Defendant points to other comments as indicating an attempt to disparage defendant\u2019s counsel.\nGenerally, a prosecutor is permitted a great deal of latitude in making the closing argument, and the trial judge\u2019s determination of the propriety of the argument will be followed absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 163, 514 N.E.2d 970.) Improper remarks are the basis of reversal only when they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant. People v. Harris (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 366, 547 N.E.2d 1241, cert. denied (1990), 496 U.S. 908, 110 L. Ed. 2d 275, 110 S. Ct. 2594.\nWe note that the complained-of comments relating to attempts to bolster the credibility of the eyewitnesses were not objected to at trial and therefore are waived. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) As for the remaining comments, we cannot conclude, based on the evidence presented, that the comments resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant. Overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was supplied by the testimony of Capleton and Deanna Henderson, a second eyewitness. Both viewed the murders at close range from separate vantage points. Each knew defendant\u2019s identity and positively identified him as the murderer at trial. In light of that evidence, we do not conclude the trial judge\u2019s decision to permit the State to make the comments now cited by defendant as improper constituted an abuse of discretion.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and MANNING, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Linda Signer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John M. O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Rebecca Davidson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT LANGFORD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20140794\nOpinion filed June 29, 1992.\nRehearing denied September 16, 1992.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Linda Signer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn M. O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Linda Woloshin, and Rebecca Davidson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0855-01", "first_page_order": 875, "last_page_order": 880 }