{ "id": 5188806, "name": "In re A.F., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Helen F. et al., Respondents-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "In re A.F.", "decision_date": "1991-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20142318", "first_page": "1010", "last_page": "1016", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 1010" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3544225 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599586 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496652 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3096773 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236934 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 Ill. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313175 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/411/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260616 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 705, "char_count": 15410, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8803260585172702e-07, "percentile": 0.7274881662984984 }, "sha256": "a33fcc4cb5fb0399265c375b93b8f805b624869a61d709c462407c22cd1cf78b", "simhash": "1:be7f71b4c411d212", "word_count": 2573 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:59:47.941433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re A.F., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Helen F. et al., Respondents-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DiVITO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe circuit court of Cook County denied the motions of the State and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to vacate the guardianship of A.F., a minor, terminate wardship, and close the case. A.F.\u2019s motion to direct the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship also was denied. In this appeal, he contends that the circuit court erroneously denied his motion. For reasons that follow, we agree.\nOn September 19, 1989, DCFS filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for A.F. in the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County. The petition was based on section 2 \u2014 3(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 3(1)), alleging that A.F. was a neglected minor because his parents failed to provide the care necessary for his well-being. Following an initial hearing held that same day, the circuit court appointed the public guardian as attorney and guardian ad litem for A.F., and the public defender as attorney for his parents. Thereafter, the petition was amended to allege that A.F. was a dependent minor through no fault of his parents. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 4(l)(c).) The count alleging neglect was stricken from the petition.\nOn October 19, 1989, the circuit court accepted A.F.\u2019s parents\u2019 admission that A.F. was a dependent minor and entered a finding of no-fault dependency. The court also ordered a supplemental social investigation.\nOn December 19, 1989, a dispositional hearing was held. A.F., who was 16 years old at the time, was adjudicated a ward of the court, and Gary T. Morgan, the Guardianship Administrator of DCFS, was appointed his guardian.\nOn June 27, 1990, the public guardian filed a petition for supplemental relief asking the circuit court to \u201cdirect DCFS to screen with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s Office a Petition for Adjudication of Wardship regarding [A.F.] alleging that he is neglected and abandoned based on his parents\u2019 refusal to maintain contact with him, their refusal to cooperate with efforts toward reunification, and their refusal to accept the child back into their home after the expiration of the six-month limit on custody subsequent to a finding of no-fault dependency.\u201d At a hearing on July 12, 1990, the State and DCFS regional counsel moved to vacate guardianship of A.F., terminate wardship, and close the case.\nAt the hearing, Victoria Davis, a DCFS follow-up worker, testified that the case was initiated when A.F.\u2019s parents refused to pick him up from Chicago Reed Mental Health Center. His parents also had refused to cooperate with DCFS since that time and had not sought to regain custody and would not allow him to return home because of his violent behavior.\nRobert Longo, a clinical social worker, testified that he had counseled A.F. at St. Joseph Solace Place. A.F. was diagnosed as having conduct disorder and major depression; he had made minimal progress during therapy and had exhibited violent behavior towards people and property. A.F. had made several attempts to contact his parents by letter and telephone, but they had not responded. Longo believed that A.F.\u2019s parents should participate in counseling and that A.F. should be allowed sibling visitation with staff supervision; however, when Longo wrote two letters to A.F.\u2019s parents attempting to initiate reunification efforts, he received no replies. Longo believed that it was not in A.F.\u2019s best interests to be returned to his parents at that time.\nAlthough the State admitted that it did \u201cnot believe it is in the best interest of the minor for guardianship to be vacated, wardship terminated and the case closed,\u201d it, with DCFS concurring, contended that the statute mandated those orders because A.F. had been removed from the custody of his parents for longer than six months pursuant to the adjudication that he was a dependent minor. Counsel for the parents argued that closing the case would not be in the best interests of A.F. because he was not ready to return home. The public guardian argued that the circuit court should direct the State to file a second petition for adjudication of wardship on the grounds of parental neglect. The State responded that if a second petition were to be filed, the allegation of neglect would have to be against DCFS because it had legal custody of A.F.\nThe circuit court denied the motions of the State and DCFS to vacate guardianship, terminate wardship, and close the case. The circuit court also denied the public guardian\u2019s motion to direct the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship based upon parental neglect and abandonment. A.F., through the public guardian, appeals, contending that the circuit court should have directed the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship on his behalf.\nA.F. contends that his parents\u2019 failure to achieve or even to work towards reunification justified the filing of a neglect and abandonment petition. He maintains that his parents failed to involve themselves with any services aimed at reunification and that his parents initiated no phone contact with him, failed to send him any written correspondence, failed to respond to his therapist\u2019s written requests, and refused to speak with him when he telephoned. He thus maintains that the court improperly allowed him to remain a no-fault dependent after the statutory six-month time limitation expired. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802\u20144(l)(c).\nIn this court, the public defender, representing A.F.\u2019s parents, responds that this case is now moot. A case becomes moot where the issues involved in the circuit court no longer exist because events occurring after the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief. (In re a Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255, 537 N.E.2d 292.) Here, since A.F. has reached his eighteenth birthday, the public defender maintains that he can no longer be adjudged a neglected minor pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802\u20143.\nAn exception to the mootness doctrine occurs when a case presents an issue of substantial public interest. (In re E.G. (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 98, 105, 549 N.E.2d 322.) In determining whether a case exhibits the requisite degree of public interest, a reviewing court must look to \u201cthe public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.\u201d People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769.\nWe find that this case falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Certainly, the proper adjudication of what is in the best interests of minors is of surpassing public concern. We note that the allegations of neglect against A.F.\u2019s parents occurred prior to A.F.\u2019s eighteenth birthday, as did all the hearings before the circuit court. We believe that this court should not deny review simply because A.F. turned 18 years old during the pendency of the appeal. As the public guardian contends, given the length of time necessary to resolve issues raised in appeals, questions such as those involved in the instant case are likely to recur should a minor, like A.F., who is close to his eighteenth birthday, appeal a similar order of the circuit court. Accordingly, we consider the issues raised by the parties in this case.\nIn this court, A.F. contends that the circuit court erred in extending the six-month no-fault period and in denying his motion to require the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship; the State, however, maintains that A.F. should not be permitted to contest the court\u2019s extension of the six-month no-fault term because he failed to object to the extension in the circuit court. A.F. replies that he made no objection in the circuit court because he was desirous of having DCFS\u2019s wardship continue while issues involving the requested petition were being litigated. He correctly states that the Juvenile Court Act permits the continuation of one status while a supplemental petition to determine another status is considered. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802\u201413(5).) He contends that termination of DCFS\u2019s wardship would leave him unprotected until another petition could be filed and would present the risk that a second petition for adjudication of wardship would fail, thus placing him in a \u201cprecarious\u201d position. See In re J.J. (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 1,10-11, 566 N.E.2d 1345.\nBecause we consider the issue of the court\u2019s denial of the requested petition to be related to the various options available to the circuit court, we consider whether the court properly extended the six-month limitation.\nThe overriding purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community are served. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801\u20142(1).) In dependency and neglect proceedings, both the State\u2019s Attorney and the court are charged with the duty of ensuring that at each step of the wardship adjudication process the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community are served. (In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 566 N.E.2d 1345.) Here, though we recognize the efforts of the State\u2019s Attorney and the circuit court to fulfill their duty to A.F., we find that, given the allegation that A.F.\u2019s parents demonstrated a complete lack of concern for Ms well-being, the court erred when it allowed A.F. to remain a no-fault dependent beyond the six-month limitation, without requiring the State to file the requested petition for adjudication of wardsMp.\nThe relevant portion of section 2\u20144 of the Juvenile Court Act, commonly known as the no-fault dependency provision, defines a dependent as a minor under 18 years of age,\n\u201cwho is without proper medical or other remedial care recognized under State law or other care necessary for Ms or her well being through no fault, neglect or lack of concern by his parents, guardian or custodian, provided that no order may be made terminating parental rights, nor may a minor be removed from the custody of Ms or her parents for longer than 6 months, pursuant to an adjudication as a dependent minor under tMs subsection.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 4(l)(c).)\nNotwithstanding section 2 \u2014 4\u2019s specific prohibition against removing a minor from Ms parents for longer than six months, the circuit court here allowed A.F. to remain in foster care for more than nine months. Though the court recognized the problem of A.F.\u2019s parents regaimng custody given their complete lack of attention to or concern for their child, the court\u2019s only remedy \u2014 allowing A.F. to remain a no-fault dependent \u2014 was not in the best interest of A.F.\nIn the instant case, A.F. petitioned the court to direct the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship on the grounds that he was a neglected and abandoned minor. Such a petition was proper because it reflects the statutory aim of providing a number of avenues of access to the juvenile court for minors who need its services. (See People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 132, 150-51, 441 N.E.2d 54.) Such a petition thus enables the court to fulfill its duty to a minor to receive the care and guidance which the Juvenile Court Act provides. See In re James J. (1989), 193 Ill. App. 3d 75, 80, 549 N.E.2d 834, aff'd (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 1, 566 N.E.2d 1345.\nWe reject the State\u2019s argument that such a petition would be inappropriate since it would have to allege that the current legal custodian, DCFS, was not providing proper care for the minor. Clearly, A.F.\u2019s parents have the responsibility to work for the benefit of their child, even when that child is under the guardiansMp of the State; the failure of parents to work towards the return of their child is a basis for a finding of unfitness and the termination of parental rights. (See In re T.R. (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1022, 482 N.E.2d 372.) Simply because DCFS is the current legal guardian does not relieve the parents of their duties and responsibilities to their child. (See In re J.R.Y. (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 396, 399, 510 N.E.2d 541.) If that were the case, A.F.\u2019s parents would be granted immunity from a finding of parental neglect and abandonment for the sole reason that DCFS is the legal guardian of their son, a result we deem contrary to the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act.\nWe find that, based upon A.F.\u2019s parents\u2019 failure to maintain contact with him and their alleged lack of concern for his well-being, the circuit court should have granted A.F.\u2019s request to direct the State to file a petition for adjudication of wardship. Regarding the six-month limitation imposed by section 2 \u2014 4, we can envision times when the best interest of the minor requires an extension of the time period. For example, an extension would be in the best interest of the minor where parents demonstrate proper effort and concern, and all parties, including the minor, agree that an extension is proper, or, where an extension is granted while another status determination is being considered. Here, however, once the circuit court denied A.F.\u2019s motion to have the State file a petition for adjudication of wardship, there was no circumstance justifying an extension of the six-month time limitation. Indeed, the extension was not in A.F.\u2019s best interest. The circuit court\u2019s action relegated A.F. to long-term foster care with no hope of adoptive placement because the no-fault dependency status prohibits the termination of parental rights. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 4(1)(c).\nWe conclude that the circuit court should have ordered the State to file a new petition for adjudication of wardship based upon parental neglect and abandonment, and should have either terminated A.F.\u2019s wardship or allowed it to continue while the petition was under consideration. Under the circumstances in the present case, the circuit court erred in allowing A.F. simply to remain a no-fault dependent after the statutory six-month time limitation had expired.\nThe order of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nSCARIANO, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.\nOn July 29,1991, during the pendency of this appeal, A.F. turned 18.\nThe public defender has characterized A.F.\u2019s chances for adoptive placement as \u201chighly unlikely\u201d because of his advanced age and \u201capparent psychological and emotional problems.\u201d We find, however, that the public defender\u2019s speculation on A.F.\u2019s prospects for adoption is irrelevant to our determination.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DiVITO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Therese Schafer, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Joseph M. Gump and Robert Guch, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellees Helen F. and Roy F." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re A.F., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; Helen F. et al., Respondents-Appellees).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20142318\nOpinion filed October 22, 1991.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Therese Schafer, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Kenneth T. McCurry, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Joseph M. Gump and Robert Guch, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellees Helen F. and Roy F." }, "file_name": "1010-01", "first_page_order": 1030, "last_page_order": 1036 }