{ "id": 5783341, "name": "HERMAN L. LOEB, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT A. WOLL et al., Defendants-Appellants (Farm Bureau Oil Company et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Loeb v. Woll", "decision_date": "1992-10-13", "docket_number": "No. 5-90-0345", "first_page": "25", "last_page": "31", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 25" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3100578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 1154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604197 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098641 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 2d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2550650 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/86/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5271614 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/48/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536094 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. App. 2d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5242211 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/44/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498792 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548061 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5666738 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661055 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5448234 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5441623 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112193 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2533039 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160495 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2459986 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 15053, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17030896395890263 }, "sha256": "eea10a1bec3025f457a41429274d2a3a78aa5d333ae129f738e98a2ac4b1d654", "simhash": "1:169e2f659ac7fffc", "word_count": 2584 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:21.957372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HERMAN L. LOEB, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT A. WOLL et al., Defendants-Appellants (Farm Bureau Oil Company et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HENRY LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal results from the granting of a summary judgment in favor of Herman L. Loeb (Loeb) and against Albert L. Woll (Woll) in an amended judgment entered in Wabash County on May 7, 1990. The facts in this case are somewhat complicated, but the issue presented for review is simple and straightforward.\nWoll and Loeb were brothers-in-law and had been co-owners of oil and gas leases in the Illinois basin since the late 1940\u2019s. On August 6, 1984, Woll filed suit in Clinton County to foreclose interests of Loeb in various leases for failure to pay operating and supervising expenses on certain leases. In an amended complaint Woll asked for expenses through October 1985. A trial was conducted in Clinton County on September 29, 1986, in which, over Loeb\u2019s objection, the trial court allowed Woll to produce evidence concerning the ongoing expenses through April 1986. After the trial a hearing was held on December 12, 1986, again before Judge Eberspacher. Folio-wing that hearing the court entered an order which stated in pertinent part:\n\u201cB. That this cause be, and the same is hereby, set for the taking of further evidence on the following issues only:\na) The identity and number of producing wells from month to month upon the Family leases.\nb) The identity and number of producing wells from month to month upon the Payne leases to and including the month of February, 1985.\nc) The amount of monthly expenses for each lease exclusive of \u2018overhead and supervision\u2019 expenses, however denominated[,] claimed by Woll or the Corporation, from July, 1983[,] to date as to the Family leases and from July, 1983[,] thru February, 1985[,] as to the Payne leases.\nd) That in default of the production of such evidence the First Amended Complaint of Woll Enterprises, Inc. is to be dismissed.\u201d\nThe court set January 9, 1987, as the date to hear the matters set forth in the order of December 12, 1986. Evidence was heard on that date in compliance with the order. However, no evidence was presented concerning the operating expenses for leases after April 1986. These expenses are now in contention in the instant case.\nPrior to opening statements on January 9, 1987, the following exchange occurred between Ben Mitchell, counsel for Woll, and Judge Eberspacher:\n\u201cBEN MITCHELL: I am co-counsel for the plaintiff. We are prepared to respond pursuant to paragraph D, as to D(a) the identity of producing wells. Also, as to sub-paragraph (b) [sic], we apologize to the Court. In fairness, we misunderstood your ruling when you said as to the family leases from July \u201983 to date. Just prior to open court we learned that you mean today or a very recent date. We are not prep- xe d to produce evidence concerning any invoices or expenses s ibfequent to the date of trial that were permitted in the trial.\nTHE COURT: Are you prepared to present them through the date of trial?\nBEN MITCHELL: No, Your Honor, because at the trial we were permitted to go through April and that is the end point at which we are prepared to present evidence.\nTHE COURT: Are you prepared to go through April?\nBEN MITCHELL: Yes. I would also state to the Court that there is other pending litigation between the parties and any resulting indebtedness which would occur subsequent to April of \u201986 would and will be fully covered and resolved in other litigation.\nTHE COURT: All right, sir. Anything further by way of opening?\nBEN MITCHELL: No, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Hanson \u2014 I\u2019m sorry. Mr. Witters?\nMICHAEL WITTERS: I have no opening statement at this time.\u201d\nOn January 27, 1987, a judgment was entered in the cause in Clinton County, which incorporated by reference the provisions of the order of December 12, 1986. The court determined the specific amounts owed to Woll for each lease based upon the evidence. No mention was made concerning the period from May through December 1986.\nDuring the pendency of Woll\u2019s complaint filed in 1984, Loeb filed his own complaint, case No. 86 \u2014 CH\u201421, on October 8, 1986, against Woll in Wabash County, Illinois, to foreclose an equitable oil and gas lien on certain leases. Later, Loeb filed a second complaint, case No. 87\u2014 CH \u2014 15, on May 29, 1987, against the Freda Loeb Trust for Pearl L. Woll (plaintiff is the trustee) in Wabash County, Illinois, to foreclose an equitable oil and gas lien on certain leases.\nIn accordance with Ben Mitchell\u2019s representations to Judge Eber-spacher that Woll would recover indebtedness resulting after April of 1986 in the other litigation, Woll filed a second complaint, case No. 88\u2014 CH \u2014 3, on January 26, 1988, against Loeb in Wabash County to foreclose an equitable oil and gas lien on certain leases of which the family leases were a part. In this complaint Woll alleged that Loeb owed operating expenses from May of 1986 to August of 1987.\nAll of the dealings between the parties have been settled by stipulation except those concerning the monies allegedly owed by Loeb to Woll for the period of April 1986 through December 1986. In the Wabash County case presently on appeal, both sides presented motions for summary judgment asking the court to determine the meaning of the order of December 1986 and the judgment of January 27, 1987, entered in the circuit court of Clinton County. The circuit court of Wabash County ruled in favor of Loeb, in effect holding that Judge Eberspacher\u2019s order of December 12, 1986, and judgment of January 26, 1987, included the expenses from May 1986 through December 1986 and that since the matter was already decided, the issue was res judicata. Woll appeals. The sole issue presented for our review is whether Judge Eberspacher\u2019s judgment of January 27, 1987, covered the period from May to December of 1986. The circuit court of Wabash County held that a reading of the order of December 12, 1986, and the judgment of January 27, 1987, precludes Woll from claiming expenses again for the period ending December 31, 1986.\n\u201cThe doctrine of res judicata provides that \u2018a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.\u2019 (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408.) When res judicata is established 1 \u201cas a bar against the prosecution of a second action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand *** it is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other matter which might have been offered for the purpose.\u201d \u2019 Housing Authority for La Salle County v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 246, 251-52, quoting Barry v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1940), 374 Ill. 473, 478.\nThe courts have created the doctrine of res judicata to protect litigants from the onerous burden of retrying an identical cause of action or issue with the same party, and to promote economical use of judicial resources by barring repetitive litigation. (Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 423, 432.) Toward that end, the courts have barred parties from bringing suit on issues that could have been raised, but were not, in an earlier proceeding. Redfern v. Sullivan (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 372, 375; see also Yaw v. Beeghly (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 627, 632-33; Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 93, 99.\u201d Pacemaker Food Stores, Inc. v. Seventh Mont Corp. (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 781, 784, 493 N.E.2d 390, 393.\nIt should be noted that the pleadings in the Clinton County case asked for expenses only through October of 1985, and that at the trial held in September of 1986 the court allowed Woll to introduce evidence through April of 1986. In the Clinton County case Woll did not raise the issue of expenses for the months in question in its original or amended complaints, nor were expenses for those months a part of the proof at trial. Certainly, then, Woll would not be litigating the issue twice. As a general proposition of law the evidence must correspond to the pleadings. \u201cA party cannot be afforded relief despite the presence of evidence supporting such relief, absent corresponding pleadings.\u201d Tembrina v. Simos (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 652, 656, 567 N.E.2d 536, 539, appeal denied (1991), 139 Ill. 2d 605, 575 N.E.2d 924; see also Bartsch v. Gordon N. Plumb, Inc. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 188, 485 N.E.2d 1105.\n\u201c \u2018A judgment must represent the ultimate and fixed precise determination of the judicial proceeding in which it is entered, and in substance it must show distinctly, and not inferentially, that the matters in the record have been finally disposed of in favor of one of the litigants or that the rights of the parties in litigation have been finally adjudicated.\u2019 \u201d (Pertolanitz v. Chicago Transit Authority (1963), 44 Ill. App. 2d 256, 266, 194 N.E.2d 501, 505, quoting 23 Ill. L. & Prac. Judgments \u00a721 (1956).)\nAs was stated in In re Marriage of Adams (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 797, 805-06, 416 N.E.2d 316, 323,\n\u201cIt is fundamental that a judgment order must be supported by the allegations in the complaint as well as by the evidence. (Larson v. City of Loves Park (1964), 48 Ill. App. 2d 191, 198 N.E.2d 525.) Affirmative relief cannot be properly granted without a pleading requesting it. Tison & Hall Concrete Products Co., Inc. v. A.E. Asher, Inc. (1967), 86 Ill. App. 2d 34, 229 N.E.2d 137.\nBecause the issue of which of the parties would be allowed to claim the two minor children as tax exemptions was not raised in any of the pleadings, it was error for the trial court to rule on the issue.\u201d\nIn the instant case the trial judge cited People v. Brown (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, 442 N.E.2d 136, in which the court observed that a guiding principle in statutory construction is to ascribe to language its plain and ordinary meaning. Judge Keenan said essentially that the meaning of the trial court in Clinton County was obvious. We disagree.\nThe purpose of the evidentiary hearing on January 9, 1987, was to complete the evidentiary hearing of September 1986. The order of December 12, 1986, set forth those matters to be heard, including, in section B, subsection c, \u201c[t]he amount of monthly expenses *** claimed by Woll or the Corporation, from July, 1983 to date as to the Family leases.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As we have indicated, immediately prior to the hearing, a discussion was held by counsel and the court concerning the evidence to be heard. The attorney for Woll stated that he had misunderstood the order and was not prepared to offer evidence subsequent to April 1986. When the court asked him if he was prepared to present such evidence through the date of trial in September of 1986, counsel responded that he was not. When the court asked if he was prepared to present such evidence through April, counsel responded in the affirmative and stated that there was further pending litigation covering that later period. The court said, \u201cAll right,\u201d and the trial proceeded.\nIt appears that the trial court\u2019s decision in the instant case is sustained only by the words \u201cto date\u201d in Judge Eberspacher\u2019s order of December 12, 1986. The trial court selected a date, December 31, 1986, and found that it was obvious the trial court intended that date. We do not believe that such an intention is obvious. One might infer that the trial court intended this date, but the judgment must show distinctly and not inferentially that the rights of the parties have been determined as of a particular date.\nOne can infer equally as readily from the discussion between the court and counsel that the court was willing to permit counsel to produce evidence only through April of 1986. Further, the Clinton County trial court did not deny the claim from April through December. The court in its judgment of January 27, 1987, could have been clear as to the time period, but it was not. A clear wording of the judgment of January 27, 1987, would have given the parties the opportunity to appeal the decision. The mere fact that both sides now have good arguments as to the meaning of the judgment indicates that it was unclear. Because the meaning of this imprecise judgment could be determined only inferentially, res judicata has not been established as a bar against the prosecution of the claim for expenses from April through December of 1986. We know that the court wanted to have evidence presented as close to the date of hearing as possible. Beyond that the court\u2019s intent is unclear. To bar a claim, not even sought in the pleadings, based upon the judgment of January 1987 would be highly unfair. It was stipulated that those bills and the amounts thereof from April through December were not paid. If the trial court had meant that the expenses subsequent to April were disallowed, all it had to do was to say so. To be valid, a judgment must show distinctly, not inferentially, that the matters of record have been disposed of. Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 622, 572 N.E.2d 1154.\nIn this court\u2019s opinion, the trial court\u2019s judgment of January 17, 1987, did not include expenses for the months of April through December 1986. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply here.\nRes judicata is a judicial doctrine designed to protect litigants from the burden of retrying an identical cause of action or issue with the same party or privy and to enhance judicial economy by prohibiting repetitive litigation; res judicata concludes all matters which were or might have been determined and requires identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. (Cranwill v. Donahue (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 968, 426 N.E.2d 337.) In the instant case, although the trial court tried to determine expenses to a late date, no pleadings asked for those expenses, no evidence was heard as to those expenses, and no reference to the expenses of April through December is discernible in the judgment, and it appears that the trial court acquiesced in the foregoing of evidence for the months here at issue. The judgment was equivocal and cannot bar a later attempt to obtain those same expenses, sought in a subsequent lawsuit. In the judgment of January 26, 1987, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff in the exact amount prayed for and shown by the evidence.\nThe trial court of Wabash County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for entry of judgment by the trial court in favor of Woll on his motion for summary judgment pursuant to the stipulation entered into by and between the parties.\nReversed and remanded.\nGOLDENHERSH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HENRY LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "L. James Hanson and Arnold J. Pirtle, both of Mitchell, Neubauer & Shaw, P.C., of Mt. Vernon, for appellants.", "C. Michael Witters, of Mt. Carmel, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HERMAN L. LOEB, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALBERT A. WOLL et al., Defendants-Appellants (Farm Bureau Oil Company et al., Defendants).\nFifth District\nNo. 5-90-0345\nOpinion filed October 13, 1992.\nL. James Hanson and Arnold J. Pirtle, both of Mitchell, Neubauer & Shaw, P.C., of Mt. Vernon, for appellants.\nC. Michael Witters, of Mt. Carmel, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0025-01", "first_page_order": 45, "last_page_order": 51 }