{ "id": 5784652, "name": "SAMELLA EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF CLARENCE HARRISON et al., Defendants-Appellees (Roosevelt Thomas, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Edwards v. Estate of Harrison", "decision_date": "1992-09-01", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-0537", "first_page": "213", "last_page": "224", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 213" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 999", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187497 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2482764 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2581085 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3438009 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 F.2d 173", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 41772 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/775/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621787 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "625" }, { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528547 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 1005", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008-09" }, { "page": "1010" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548803 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252071 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549861 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "891 F.2d 1473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10539052 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/891/1473-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 F. Supp. 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3838161 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/629/1002-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 988, "char_count": 23651, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3923692766464578e-07, "percentile": 0.6430513902547986 }, "sha256": "9e62fc0cc7dd47098b71e39d400465654238c43360cf565e67fbfb4a6ebf7df6", "simhash": "1:ca3b140745081457", "word_count": 3869 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:21.957372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SAMELLA EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF CLARENCE HARRISON et al., Defendants-Appellees (Roosevelt Thomas, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSamella Edwards (Edwards) and Roosevelt Thomas (Thomas) appeal from the judgment of the circuit court which granted attorney fees and costs against them and in favor of defendant Sonjia Renee Harrison (defendant). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 611.) Edwards and Thomas contend that the imposition of sanctions was an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nOn April 25, 1988, Edwards, by her attorney, Thomas, filed a complaint to quiet title and for injunctive relief. In count I she alleged that she owned and was in possession of certain improved Chicago real estate by virtue of an oral agreement between Sa-lathiel Walden, Clarence Harrison, and herself, in which she \u201cgave *** Mr. Harrison the money *** to clear the title of all back taxes and Mr. Harrison agreed to convey the premises back to [her] once he received a clear tax deed.\u201d Edwards further claimed that on the same day that he died, Harrison \u201creceived [a clear, 1984] tax deed to the property and delivered the original to [her].\u201d In count II she alleged that she also owned \u201cvaluable personal property located on the premises,\u201d and that \u201con information and belief, *** defendants [were] destroying, selling and otherwise disposing of [her] personal property.\u201d The complaint was signed by Thomas and verified by Edwards.\nDefendant moved to dismiss Edwards\u2019 complaint, contending that any alleged oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 59, par. 1 et seq.). Defendant also moved for sanctions pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611), attaching to her motion excerpts from Edwards\u2019 deposition in which she stated that she had never seen the complaint and that she claimed to own the property by virtue of both the 1984 tax deed and a 1987 quitclaim deed from Harrison. Edwards also stated in her deposition that she did not see Harrison on the day he died, and that she owned no personal property on the disputed premises. Attached as an appendix to defendant\u2019s memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment was a letter dated August 7, 1988, to defendant\u2019s attorney from Steven C. McKasson, a professional document examiner, stating that in his opinion, Harrison\u2019s purported signature on the 1987 quitclaim deed was not genuine.\nOn August 10, 1988, Edwards filed an amended complaint alleging that as proof of the above-described oral agreement, \u201cplaintiff tendered to Jerome Wade the sum of Ten Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety-Four ($10,600.94) [sic] for an assignment of the rights to pursue a tax deed in the name of Clarence Harrison.\u201d Edwards also alleged that Harrison \u201cdelivered [to her] the original [1984] tax deed, as well as the [1987] quit claim deed conveying the property to [her],\u201d on the date of his death. Count II still alleged that, \u201con information and belief, *** defendants [were] destroying, selling and otherwise disposing of [her] personal property.\u201d Defendant moved to dismiss Edwards\u2019 amended complaint, again contending that the oral agreement alleged in count I was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and that Harrison\u2019s purported signature on the 1987 quitclaim deed was a forgery. On October 11, 1988, the trial court dismissed count I with leave to amend, and dismissed count II with prejudice.\nOn February 7, 1989, Edwards filed a second amended complaint, alleging that by virtue of a 1984 quitclaim deed from Walden and a 1987 quitclaim deed from Harrison she was the owner of the land in question. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that, as a matter of law, (1) the 1984 Walden deed was insufficient to establish her ownership in the property, since she admits that the property was sold pursuant to a subsequent tax sale to Harrison, (2) the 1987 Harrison deed was void because his signature had been forged, and (3) the 1984 tax deed did not entitle Edwards to the property because the deed was in Harrison\u2019s name only. Attached as an appendix to defendant\u2019s memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment was McKasson\u2019s sworn affidavit stating that Harrison\u2019s signature was a forgery. On the same day defendant also answered Edwards\u2019 second amended complaint, setting forth two affirmative defenses: (1) that any property rights which Edwards had in the premises in 1984 were extinguished by the subsequent tax sale of the property; and (2) the 1987 quitclaim deed was void because Harrison\u2019s purported signature thereon was a forgery.\nEdwards responded to defendant\u2019s motion by relying on Walden\u2019s discovery deposition regarding the authenticity of Harrison\u2019s signature to support her contention that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the signature on the 1987 quitclaim deed was genuine. On March 28, 1989, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion, holding that Edwards\u2019 \u201c \u2018response\u2019 to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment [was] legally insufficient\u201d because \u201cthe mere attachment of a party\u2019s \u2018verification\u2019 to a response to a motion for summary judgment does not bring the response in conformity with Supreme Court Rule 191\u201d (107 Ill. 2d R. 191), and requested that an order be drafted consistent with the ruling therein. Although his \u201cinstinct [was] to grant summary judgment originally,\u201d the trial judge \u201cinterpreted] respondent\u2019s evidence liberally\u201d and declined to rule that Edwards had admitted that Harrison\u2019s signature was a forgery, and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing as to the forgery issue only.\nThe evidentiary hearing was held on May 2, 1989, and although McKasson testified in behalf of defendant, Edwards produced no witnesses to attest to the authenticity of Harrison\u2019s signature, but instead, \u201crel[ied] on our response to defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\u201d The court responded, however, that because it was an evi-dentiary hearing, it could not \u201cread affidavits and accept those, unless there is a stipulation to that effect.\u201d Thus, as to the issue of authenticity, Edwards had only the 1987 quitclaim deed itself to rely upon. As a result of this hearing, the court ordered \u201cplaintiff\u2019s complaint *** dismissed with prejudice.\u201d\nOn May 23, 1989, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611, defendant again moved for sanctions against Edwards and Thomas, alleging that they had filed a series of \u201cfalse and fraudulent\u201d complaints which were not grounded in fact and were not supported by existing law. In particular, defendant alleged that Thomas should have discovered that Edwards\u2019 claim of ownership was barred by the Statute of Frauds, that a subsequent tax sale extinguished any ownership rights which Edwards may have had by virtue of Walden\u2019s 1984 quitclaim deed, and that the signature on the 1987 quitclaim deed, purporting to be Harrison\u2019s, was a forgery. Edwards responded that the underlying theory of her case had never changed, e.g., that her oral agreement was supported by consideration to a third party who had purchased the taxes to the property. Edwards also alleged in her response that prior to the evidentiary hearing, Thomas had hired a private investigator to locate the notary public who notarized the deed, but had been unable to locate him. Nowhere in the record, however, does Thomas provide the name of the investigator, or an affidavit from the investigator, or a description of the steps the investigator undertook to locate the notary public. Edwards also claimed that she was financially unable to hire her own handwriting expert.\nOn October 2, 1989, the court granted defendant\u2019s motion for sanctions, noting the following:\n\u201c2 \u2014 611 requires that a lawyer make a reasonable inquiry into the law and the facts before filing a complaint. There is no requirement or test for subjective bad faith and good faith is not a defense to imposition of 2 \u2014 611 sanctions.\nThe pleading is not well grounded in fact if the pleading contains untrue statements of fact which the attorney knew or reasonably should have known that all, that the complaint with reference to the validity of the quit claim deed contained untrue statements of fact.\nHad Mr. Thomas conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts before filing the complaint, he would have discovered (a) That the signature was suspect to a lay person\u2019s eyes; (b) Attempt to corroborate the testimony of the single witness who claimed to know Mr. Harrison\u2019s signature; (c) Produce those people at the trial; and frankly (d) If finances warrant it, produce a handwriting expert.\nI want to make my position clear here to the Appellate Court. What I am saying is that this signature on the deed compared to genuine signatures of Mr. Harrison were so grossly disproportionate that it created a duty on a lawyer\u2019s part to make reasonable inquiry as to the genuineness of the signature.\nSecond of all, once the defendant raised the affirmative defense of forgery, which admittedly was not raised until obviously the complaint was filed, the plaintiff\u2019s counsel had a further obligation to inquire further, further than his client\u2019s statements as to the genuineness of the signature, which was not done at least from a production of evidence point of view.\u201d\nOn December 13, 1989, the court \u201cdeducte[d] $8,070.25 from the [claimed] fees for a total of $20,824.75, and $853.64 from the [requested] costs, for a total of $1990.56.\u201d\nPursuant to Edwards\u2019 motion to clarify, on January 19, 1990, the court issued a memorandum opinion stating that Edwards and Thomas were jointly and severally liable for the amount of sanctions pursuant to Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American Cemetery Association (D. Kan. 1986), 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1013, rev\u2019d on other grounds (10th Cir. 1989), 891 F.2d 1473, for \u201cwhen the attorney and client share responsibility for litigation strategy that violates the rule, the court will impose joint and several liability.\u201d On February 21, 1990, Edwards filed her notice of appeal. Edwards and Thomas filed separate briefs, each on his or her own behalf.\nI\nIn his brief Thomas claims that the trial court erred in applying section 2 \u2014 611 instead of Supreme Court Rule 137. (134 Ill. 2d R. 137.) Defendant responds, however, that the court could not have applied Rule 137 because \u201c[constitutional law, as well as common sense, dictate that a court cannot apply a new rule \u2014 especially one involving sanctions \u2014 to conduct that occurred before the new rule was even announced.\u201d We disagree. Rule 137 became effective August 1, 1989, and preempted all matters previously governed under section 2 \u2014 611. It is identical to former section 2 \u2014 611 except for three minor changes: (1) Rule 137 makes the imposition of sanctions discretionary rather than mandatory; (2) Rule 137 requires a trial judge to set forth specific reasons for sanctions in an order; and (3) unlike section 2\u2014 611, Rule 137 has no provisions regarding insurance companies.\nIn support of her contention, defendant cites Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2 (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 303. Although Rivard notes a general \u201cpresumption of prospectivity,\u201d it also notes that \u201cthe presumption of prospectivity does not apply to changes in procedure or remedies. When a change in the law changes procedure alone, it will be construed as retroactive so long as that is what the legislature intended.\u201d (Rivard, 122 Ill. 2d at 310.) More important, this court has recently held in Sajdak v. Sajdak (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 481, 494, that even though the defendant\u2019s pleadings there were filed\n\u201cbefore the adoption of the rule, we believe that the rule should be given retrospective application since it imposes no greater duty on the parties than did section 2 \u2014 611. The only change relevant to the case before us is a procedural one \u2014 the requirement that the judge make specific findings in his order imposing sanctions.\u201d\n(But see Cmarko v. Fisher (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 440, 444 (because the complaint had been filed prior to the effective date of Rule 137, the court held that amended section 2 \u2014 611 controlled); In re Estate of Smith (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008-09, appeal denied sub nom. Gualandri & Co. v. Smith (1991), 136 Ill. 2d 544 (because all relevant pleadings, except one, had been filed prior to the effective date of Rule 137, the court \u201cle[ft] it to the circuit court on remand to determine which of section 2 \u2014 611 and Rule 137 apply to which of the papers filed\u201d).) Accordingly, we find that under these circumstances Rule 137 is capable of retroactive application and that it was the appropriate measure to apply in the case at bar.\nWe also find, however, that although the trial court did not explicitly state that it was following the requirements of Rule 137, the standards it applied were consonant with the rule. In particular, the judge \u201cset forth on the record and with specificity\u201d the reasons for imposing sanctions (In re Estate of Smith, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 1010), in that he made specific findings regarding Thomas\u2019 and Edwards\u2019 failure to ensure that their pleading was well-grounded in fact.\nII\nOn appeal Edwards and Thomas contend that the trial court abused its discretion (Lewy v. Koeckritz International, Inc. (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 330, 334) in awarding sanctions against them. Rule 137, as did its predecessor section 2 \u2014 611, imposes on both client and counsel the duty to make reasonable inquiry into the facts to support a legal claim or defense before pleadings and other legal papers are filed with the court. (Lewy, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 334; see also Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Anderson (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 615, 622.) Generally, an attorney cannot simply rely on the client\u2019s representations when additional information is readily obtainable from third parties, but instead,\n\u201cmust objectively review the information submitted by his client, to determine if it factually supports the client\u2019s claim; [and] if such review reveals important discrepancies, inconsistencies, or gaps in the information provided, the attorney must investigate further before filing the relevant legal paper with the court.\u201d (Anderson, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 625.)\nSubjective good faith is not sufficient to meet the burden of Rule 137; rather, a court must use \u201can objective standard to determine whether a particular inquiry was reasonable, based upon the circumstances that existed at the time the pleading was filed.\u201d (Cmarko, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 445.) This standard is met when the relevant legal paper has a \u201creasonable basis in fact.\u201d Tarkowski v. County of Lake (7th Cir. 1985), 775 F.2d 173, 176.\nA\nWe conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees against Thomas. Even if the outcome of this matter would have been different had it been decided originally by this court, such is not the standard of review we are required to employ. Rather, the standard, as enunciated in Lewy (211 Ill. App. 3d at 334-35), is that if \u201creasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the trial court\u2019s actions, then a reviewing court cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion.\u201d Thus, it would not be meet for us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.\nBefore Thomas filed the second amended complaint, which relied, in part, upon the 1987 quitclaim deed from Harrison to support Edwards\u2019 claim to the property, defendant notified him that there was a strong likelihood that Harrison\u2019s signature was a blatant forgery, showing him the report from McKasson which indicated glaring discrepancies in a comparison of the signatures. Nevertheless, Thomas chose not to heed the evidence and subsequently filed the second amended complaint, still relying on the validity of the 1987 quitclaim deed from Harrison.\nEven though an attorney is not obligated to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit merely because the opposing party presents purported evidence of a crucial fact in his pleadings (Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Black Steer Provision Co. (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391-92), under the facts at bar, once Thomas was aware of \u201cimportant discrepancies, inconsistencies, or gaps in the information provided,\u201d it became his responsibility to \u201cinvestigate further before filing the relevant legal paper with the court.\u201d (Anderson, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 625.) Although Thomas asserts that he made a reasonable inquiry into the validity of Harrison\u2019s signature before he filed his amended pleading, at no time did he ever present any evidence in support of his efforts. First, at the evidentiary hearing, he represented to the court that he had hired an investigator to locate the notary who witnessed Harrison\u2019s signature on the deed, but Thomas failed to offer into evidence the name of the investigator, the efforts the investigator undertook to locate the notary, or the results of his search.\nSecond, Thomas asserted that he could reasonably believe that Harrison\u2019s signature on the deed was genuine because of Salathiel Walden\u2019s discovery deposition testimony attesting to its validity. The critical portion of Walden\u2019s deposition testimony, however, is hopelessly unpersuasive. In response to the question, \u201cAnd does that look like his signature that you have seen before?\u201d Walden answered, \u201cClose.\u201d Indeed, defendant presented two witnesses to contradict Walden\u2019s statement: Shinell Lasley, Harrison\u2019s ex-wife, and Stephen McKasson, a handwriting expert. Moreover, McKasson provided a detailed and irrefutable analysis to support his conclusion that Harrison\u2019s signature was a forgery. Thus, even if the trial judge had considered Walden\u2019s deposition, the evidence indefeasibly proved that the signature was forged.\nThomas also attempts to buttress his argument with the allegation that Edwards had paid $10,694 to Wade in return for a tax deed in Harrison\u2019s name, but the record does not support this contention. The record reflects only that Edwards withdrew $10,694.49 from the Inland Steel Credit Union. Nowhere, however, is there any evidence that this amount was in turn received by Wade or that it was given to him for the purpose of obtaining a tax deed to the property in question.\nWe also deem it irrelevant to determining the propriety of sanctions that the trial court did not grant summary judgment in favor of defendant. The trial judge exhibited extraordinary patience in allowing plaintiff multiple opportunities both to plead and to prove her case. Indeed, he viewed Walden\u2019s deposition testimony in an extremely favorable light in order to reach the conclusion that it was necessary to hold a hearing on the issue of genuineness; but, merely because the trial court refused to grant summary judgment on this issue does not mean that Thomas conducted a reasonable inquiry into the validity of Harrison\u2019s signature and therefore had a reasonable basis for relying on the 1987 quitclaim deed to support his claim. Summary judgment and Rule 137 address different issues; summary judgment is permissible where no genuine issue of material fact is present. Rule 137 is applicable, however, where the person signing the legal paper failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for the claims made in that document.\nThe means are many and varied by which a party may be able to create an issue of fact and .defeat a motion for summary judgment and still not meet Rule 137\u2019s reasonable inquiry requirement. By its denial of summary judgment the trial court enabled Thomas to produce evidence at the hearing to rebut defendant\u2019s evidence that Harrison\u2019s signature was forged; yet, Thomas merely demonstrated how totally lacking his efforts were in getting to the truth of the matter \u2014 to be sure, it was entirely appropriate for the trial judge to conclude that Thomas was arrantly incredible as to this all-encompassing issue. Indeed, at the close of the hearing on May 2, 1989, the trial judge stated, \u201cI am outraged at this case. It has a strong odor of fraud on the court,\u201d and he expressed the opinion that if the deed was in fact notarized, \u201cthere is no question that *** he did it contrary to the law.\u201d After even the most cursory review of the record, we can, without any tedious cerebration, agree with the judge\u2019s conclusions.\nWe therefore hold that once Thomas received notice of the exceedingly strong probability that Harrison\u2019s signature was not genuine, he was under a duty to make reasonable inquiry into the validity of the signature. We are not convinced that Thomas made even the flimsiest record of his attempts to hire an investigator to locate the notary who witnessed Harrison\u2019s signature, and we do not agree that Thomas was justified in relying upon the quitclaim deed itself, along with Walden\u2019s totally forceless deposition testimony appended to plaintiff\u2019s response to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, to contradict the testimony of Harrison\u2019s former wife and the conclusions presented from the witness stand by McKasson, an expert in such matters. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against Thomas.\nB\nWe also find, in addition to the reasons stated above, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions against Edwards. Rule 137 places the burden of reasonable inquiry on clients as well as on their attorneys by virtue of the fact that their signatures appear on the relevant legal papers. (Lewy, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 334.) Thus, because Edwards verified both the first and second amended complaint, she was under the same duty as Thomas to make reasonable inquiry regarding the genuineness of Harrison\u2019s signature. More so than Thomas, Edwards should have had reason to question the validity of the deed, since she had been Harrison\u2019s business partner for quite a while and thus would have been quite familiar with his genuine signature.\nC\nHaving found both Thomas and Edwards liable under Rule 137, we also find that the trial court was within its discretion in making their liability joint and several. See Dreisilker Electric Motors, Inc. v. Rainbow Electric Co. (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 304, 313; Kennedy v. Miller (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 785, 793; and National Wrecking Co. v. Midwest Terminal Corp. (1991), 234 Ill. App. 3d 750, 601 N.E.2d 999.\nIll\nFinally, in oral argument before this court defendant sought imposition of costs and fees incurred in defense of this appeal; but since she has not filed an appropriate motion or petition in this court, and inasmuch as she did not argue it in her brief, we decline to entertain the issue sua sponte.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nDiVITO and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.\nThe tax deed was dated in 1984 and recorded in 1987.\nThe quitclaim deed was dated in 1987 and recorded in 1988.\nIn later pleadings, plaintiff refers to this amount as \u201c$10,694.00.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "William T. Rodeghier, of Chicago, for appellant Samella Edwards.", "William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and David J. Walker, of counsel), for appellant Roosevelt Thomas.", "Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., of Chicago (Stuart J. Chanen and Christine M. Bodewes, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SAMELLA EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESTATE OF CLARENCE HARRISON et al., Defendants-Appellees (Roosevelt Thomas, Appellant).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20140537\nOpinion filed September 1, 1992.\nRehearing denied October 15, 1992.\nWilliam T. Rodeghier, of Chicago, for appellant Samella Edwards.\nWilliam J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte and David J. Walker, of counsel), for appellant Roosevelt Thomas.\nSachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., of Chicago (Stuart J. Chanen and Christine M. Bodewes, of counsel), for appellee.\nWe note that although the estate of Clarence Harrison has been made a defendant, it was established at the trial level that no such estate was ever opened and that an appearance was entered on behalf of Sonjia Renee Harrison only." }, "file_name": "0213-01", "first_page_order": 233, "last_page_order": 244 }