{ "id": 5783404, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WYDRICK BUFORD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Buford", "decision_date": "1992-09-16", "docket_number": "No. 1-88-3512", "first_page": "393", "last_page": "406", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 393" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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WYDRICK BUFORD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Wydrick Buford was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison terms of 30 years, 15 years and 5 years, respectively, for each crime, to be served concurrently.\nOn appeal, defendant raises seven issues as to whether: (1) the peremptory challenges by the prosecutor constitute a Batson violation; (2) defendant was denied a fair trial due to the allegedly improper and prejudicial interjection of race issues; (3) defendant was denied a fair trial due to the testimony about the victim\u2019s future plans and allowing a photograph of the victim before his death to be taken to the jury room; (4) the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction was error; (5) defendant's conviction for aggravated battery should be vacated since it arose out of the same act as his attempted murder conviction; (6) defendant was proven guilty of each charge; and (7) defendant\u2019s 30-year sentence is excessive.\nFor the reasons which follow, we vacate defendant\u2019s conviction for aggravated battery and find no error in the trial court\u2019s rulings on all other issues.\nThe shooting incident occurred during an argument over a small bag of marijuana on May 8, 1987. The Straman and Flores families lived next door to each other, and defendant was the boyfriend of one of the Flores\u2019 children. On the evening of the incident, several young men were in the Stramans\u2019 backyard, including Marty Glines (the murder victim), Wesley Pucek (the attempted murder victim), and other guests.\nSometime during the evening, Steve Straman obtained a small bag (a \u201cdime\u201d bag valued at $10) of marijuana from Ricardo Flores and brought the bag into the backyard inquiring if anyone wished to purchase some marijuana. Steve gave the bag to Marty and Wesley, who had expressed interest in that regard. Later in the evening, in response to Steve\u2019s inquiry, Marty and Wesley claimed they no longer had the bag and Steve became upset.\nAbout that time, defendant arrived at the Stramans\u2019 house and Steve explained his problem to defendant. Thereafter, in the alley behind the Stramans\u2019 backyard, a confrontation occurred among defendant, Marty, Wesley, Ricardo Flores, and other guests. While the argument continued, defendant took a gun from the garage and fired opp shot wounding Wesley and then a second shot killing Marty.\nThe testimony of the several occurrence witnesses essentially recounted the same sequence of events.\nDuring the voir dire, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged three black venirewomen and defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor\u2019s actions constituted a Batson violation. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions and found no Batson violations.\nFollowing the trial, defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder and aggravated battery, and was sentenced to 30 years, 15 years and 5 years, respectively, for each conviction to run concurrently.\nOn appeal, defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based on alleged Batson violations during jury selection.\nDefendant was the only black person involved in this case. The State exercised peremptory challenges to exclude three black women from the jury \u2014 Alice Bush, Bernice Talley and Valerie Lewis.\nBatson established a three-step analysis to determine whether or not the State used its peremptory challenges to remove venire members on the basis of race. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723.) First, the defendant must establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. Second, if the defendant made the requisite showing, the State has the burden to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Finally, the trial court then \u201cwill have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.\u201d Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.\nThe three-step analysis articulated in Batson and applied by its progeny establishes a systematic procedure whereby each step is to be considered in order. (E.g., People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 451, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination does the State rebut the defendant\u2019s showing by explaining its contested peremptory challenges).) However, in the present case, a consolidated proceeding, i.e., the simultaneous consideration of the defendant\u2019s proffered prima facie case and the State\u2019s explanations, was employed. Such proceeding, although not improper, hampers our review. (People v. Valentine (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1086-87, 582 N.E.2d 1338 (\u201c[t]his practice of \u2018collapsing\u2019 the Batson steps, as well as trial courts\u2019 failure to make detailed findings of fact to clarify the record when the Batson objection is raised, needlessly adds to the number of costly appeals\u201d); People v. Murff (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040, 574 N.E.2d 815 (\u201cwe do not approve of the consolidated Batson hearing held below\u201d); People v. Jones (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 208, 216, 541 N.E.2d 161 (although the consolidated proceeding was not erroneous, \u201cthis is not the recommended procedure as set forth in Batson\u201d).) At oral argument, the parties agreed that the consolidated procedure is not an issue. See Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (\u201cdeparture from the normal course of proceeding need not concern us\u201d).\nIn Hernandez, as in the present case, the prosecutor defended his use of peremptory strikes without any direct inquiry from the trial court so that the trial court had no occasion to rule clearly and specifically on whether or not a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination had been made by the defendant. Where the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination after a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866; People v. Williams (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 761, 595 N.E.2d 1115; People v. Hemphill (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 453, 594 N.E.2d 1279; People v. Finley (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 571, 580, 584 N.E.2d 276.\nOur analysis must now address the second step of a Batson inquiry, i.e., whether or not the State came forward with race-neutral reasons for excluding the venire members. A neutral explanation \u201cmeans an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor\u2019s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor\u2019s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.\u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406, 111 S. Ct. at 1866.\nThe trial court\u2019s decision as to whether a prima facie case has been rebutted is a factual question grounded in credibility, and thus, it will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Williams, 230 Ill. App. 3d 761, 595 N.E.2d 1115, citing People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357; see also People v. Hope (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 315, 589 N.E.2d 503.) This standard of review was explained by the Court in Hernandez:\n\u201cIn the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel\u2019s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor\u2019s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies \u2018peculiarly within a trial judge\u2019s province.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 409, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 428, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 854, 105 S. Ct. 844, 854.\nSince a single discriminatory act in the selection of a jury is all that is required to demonstrate a violation, we must address each challenged venireperson. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 175; People v. Kindelan (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 548, 555, 572 N.E.2d 1138.\nIn the present case, the prosecutor exercised his first contested peremptory challenge to excuse Alice Bush because she gave contradictory statements as to whether or not she could be fair and as to the duties performed by her daughter, who was employed as a computer operator in the juvenile court system. In addition, Ms. Bush said that her discussions with her daughter concerning her daughter\u2019s work at juvenile court would impact on her ability to be fair and expressed concern over the nature of the case, i.e., murder.\nDefendant contends that other, nonblack venirepersons who were accepted as jurors had comparable traits and, thus, the prosecutor failed to provide an adequate race-neutral reason for the exclusion of Ms. Bush. We disagree.\nDefendant first argues that two jurors, Gladys Morgan and Linda Larson, exhibited equal equivocation regarding jury duties as Ms. Bush, but the record does not support that contention. During voir dire, Ms. Bush contradicted herself as to her ability to be fair. Neither Ms. Morgan nor Ms. Larson hesitated on her ability to be fair and each woman recognized the seriousness of the proceedings. In addition, other characteristics distinguished the two jurors from Ms. Bush, such as their marital status, their feelings toward handguns, and their employment status. Any perceived similarity in their statements concerning jury duty could legitimately be offset or outweighed by the different traits exhibited between Ms. Bush and the two other jurors. (People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 231, 538 N.E.2d 1107.) Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that Ms. Bush\u2019s answers regarding her daughter who works at juvenile court as a computer operator could reasonably give the State apprehension.\nDefendant next maintains that five jurors (Linda Larson, Gladys Morgan, David May, Lisa Pellegrino, and Al Mikottis) had ties to the court system or matters concerning juveniles comparable to the contacts of Ms. Bush. We disagree.\nWhen twice asked if her daughter\u2019s employment or her discussions with her daughter \u201cwould have any impact upon [Ms. Bush\u2019s] decision in this case, [Ms. Bush\u2019s] ability to be fair,\u201d Ms. Bush twice replied \u201cyes.\u201d In contrast, the five jurors whom defendant compares to Ms. Bush had no secondhand knowledge obtained from a computer operator of the juvenile court system and stated unequivocally that any perceived link to the court system would not impair his or her ability to be fair in the present case.\nMs. Larson was employed by the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute (ISPI) and was responsible for providing recreational activities for adults. When asked if the ISPI is affiliated with the court, Ms. Larson answered \u201cI don\u2019t know.\u201d\nMs. Morgan was employed as an investigator by the Department of Children and Family Services. Her duties were to visit homes to investigate complaints against a child caretaker, i.e., any person responsible for the care of a child.\nMr. May was employed as a guidance counsellor at a high school.\nMs. Pellegrino worked as a bartender. One of her friends was employed by the City of Chicago in its Department of Revenue and was responsible for licensing violations, not street crimes.\nMr. Mikottis, a structural engineer, had a friend who worked as a police officer in the Chicago suburb of Oak Brook.\nBased on our review of the record, we conclude that defendant\u2019s attempt to equate or compare the traits of some accepted jurors with Ms. Bush is, at best, tenuous and inconclusive.\nThe second peremptory challenge by the prosecutor excused Bernice Talley on the grounds that she had acted inappropriately when she \u201cinterrupted the questioning by the Judge and started to take a piece of candy at that time.\u201d The interruption, the State maintains, was unwarranted and demonstrated that Ms. Talley was inattentive.\nDefendant argues that the trial judge\u2019s clarification of the circumstances undercuts any possible credibility in the State\u2019s proffered explanation for the exclusion of Ms. Talley.\nThe trial judge, in accepting the prosecutor\u2019s reason as race neutral, stated as follows:\n\u201c[Tjhough I did not find it objectionable in that the lady [Ms. Talley] was coughing and needed to receive some mint or cough drop which I told her to certainly do, that was not any disrespect to the Court. The fact the State might attach some significance to that is within their prerogative. But simply based upon the nature of the selection process and use of peremptory challenges at this point I do not feel the State is excluding persons based upon the race.\u201d\nThe exercise of a peremptory challenge on the basis of an individual\u2019s courtroom conduct or demeanor has been repeatedly approved by courts. (Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 240 (and cases cited therein); Kindelan, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 557 (and cases cited therein).) A peremptory challenge was held legitimate where the prosecutor stated that he \u201cwas not too happy with [the person\u2019s] demeanor and how he answered the questions.\u201d (People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 971, 987, 504 N.E.2d 1318.) A venireperson who is inattentive may be peremptorily excused by the prosecutor. People v. Taylor (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 261, 269, 524 N.E.2d 1216.\nAs a reviewing court, we examine a cold record which may convey the conduct of Ms. Talley as unremarkable or inconsequential. However, the record includes a clear statement by the trial judge that, although he did not view Ms. Talley\u2019s conduct as disrespectful, he believed the State was not \u201cexcluding persons based upon race.\u201d\nThe deference accorded a trial judge\u2019s determination is founded on the premise that he, unlike a reviewing court, has the opportunity to observe personally the demeanor of the prospective juror and to evaluate subjectively the sincerity of the prosecutor. Murff, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 1041 (the trial court \u201cwas in the best position to judge both that person\u2019s demeanor and the prosecutor\u2019s sincerity\u201d); see also Kindelan, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 557; People v. Baisten (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 64, 560 N.E.2d 1060.\nGiven the acceptance of courtroom conduct as a legitimate basis for a peremptory challenge and the mandate for deferential review in these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding was manifestly erroneous. See Taylor, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 269.\nThe third venirewoman to be excused by the prosecutor was Valerie Lewis, because she was unemployed, single, and had a three-month-old baby. The State asserts that the combination of these three factors indicates that Ms. Lewis was preoccupied and unreliable while defendant contends that the State did not challenge other potential jurors with similar traits.\nThe record refutes defendant\u2019s contention and reveals that no juror had a combination of these traits. Instead, each selected juror was employed with the exception of the second alternate who, unlike Ms. Lewis, was retired and had no children. Moreover, the State had previously excused a white venireman who, like Ms. Lewis, was unemployed and single.\nAlthough we might question the relevancy of employment status, concern over such status of prospective jurors is legitimate and race neutral. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 241 (unemployment or unstable job history); Hemphill, 230 Ill. App. 3d 453, 594 N.E.2d 1279 (unemployment); People v. Melchor (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 372, 377, 535 N.E.2d 1082 (unemployment or employment in nonprofessional occupations).\nIn addition, the marital status of a prospective juror could be found a racially neutral reason. People v. Knott (1991), 224 Ill. App. 3d 236, 250-51, 586 N.E.2d 479, citing United States v. Cartlidge (5th Cir. 1987), 808 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (reasonable explanation includes prospective juror\u2019s status as single or divorced, in favor of married person).\nWe find that the reasons proffered by the State for its removal of Ms. Lewis were sufficiently race neutral.\nDefendant next asserts that two questions posed by the State during the cross-examination of defense witness Lionel Jean Baptiste improperly interjected issues of racial hostility and thus he was denied his right to a fair trial. Defendant concedes that he did not raise this issue in his post-trial motion but contends that the plain error doctrine should be applied.\nThe witness, while working as a law clerk for the public defender\u2019s office, had accompanied defense counsel to interview Pucek, the attempted murder victim. During cross-examination, the State asked the witness if the public defender had told him prior to the interview that the case involved a \u201cracial thing between some white kids and the defendant [who] was black.\u201d Following defendant\u2019s objection which was overruled by the trial court, the witness denied the State\u2019s account of his conversation with the public defender.\nIt is well established that to preserve an issue for review, both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the alleged error are required. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) As admitted by defendant, he failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, we find that this issue has been waived.\nReview of an issue which has been waived through procedural default \u201cis limited to plain errors or defects in substantial rights which deprive the accused of a substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial or which occur in cases in which the evidence is closely balanced.\u201d (People v. Odle (1988), 128 Ill. 2d 111, 134, 538 N.E.2d 428.) Neither element of the plain error exception to the waiver rule appears in the present case. Even assuming that the prosecutor\u2019s questions injected irrelevant issues of racial tension, the answers by Baptiste clearly dispelled such notion.\nIn the third issue raised on appeal, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial based on a reference to the decedent\u2019s future career plans and allowing a photograph of the decedent to be brought into the jury room. We disagree.\nDuring the State\u2019s direct examination of the murder victim\u2019s older brother, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cQ. Do you know if Marty had any plans for the future after a summer of lifeguarding?\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\nA. All right, this was to be his last year.\nTHE COURT: When there is an objection and I sustain the objection, you cannot answer that question.\u201d\nLater, the jury also received a curative instruction which stated in part \u201c[y]ou should disregard questions and exhibits which were withdrawn or to which objections were sustained.\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (2d ed. 1981).\nWe do not believe any prejudice flowed from this exchange. The revelation that there is life after lifeguarding for a 20-year-old young man like decedent could hardly be deemed shocking or inflammatory. Moreover, any potential prejudice is generally cured where there is a prompt objection, sustaining of the objection, and an instruction to disregard the testimony. People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 317, 456 N.E.2d 59; People v. Brooks (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422, 526 N.E.2d 420.\nSimilarly we do not believe the decedent\u2019s photograph unfairly aroused the sympathies of the jury when the trial court allowed it to go to the jury during deliberations. The photograph of decedent was taken about one year before his death and is a posed portrait showing his face and chest. Defendant specifically stated that he had no objection to admitting the photograph into evidence but did not think it should go into the jury room.\nIn his ruling, the trial judge reasoned:\n\u201cThere had been some discussion about the size of the individuals involved in this altercation, and the photograph will aid the jury in determining if the size of the victim is correct, to make whatever conclusions they wish in regards to that.\u201d\nWhether or not an exhibit should be admitted into the jury room is primarily within the discretion of the trial court. (Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 318.) Given the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing an exhibit which was admitted into evidence without objection to go into the jury room.\nDefendant next asserts that he was denied a fair trial because a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not given sua sponte by the trial court. We find defendant\u2019s argument meritless.\nThe record reveals that defendant never requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction and also declined the trial court\u2019s specific invitation to request such an instruction. The following exchange appears in the record:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. The record should further reflect that the Court inquired of defense, even gave them an opportunity to confer with their client with regards to the giving of the voluntary manslaughter instructions, and it was the defendant\u2019s position that they did not wish those instructions to go to the jury; is that correct?\n* * *\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, for the record, we discussed this issue about the voluntary instruction, giving or not giving the voluntary manslaughter instruction. He [defendant] agrees with our decision, Judge.\nTHE COURT: That it should not be given?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.\u201d\nThe parties bear the burden of preparing and tendering proper jury instructions. (People v. Smith (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 95, 104, 374 N.E.2d 472; People v. Garcia (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 618, 621, 523 N.E.2d 992.) Generally a party may not raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless it is one that he tendered (Garcia, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 621), but he should certainly not be the beneficiary of that failure where the court indicated a willingness to instruct on this issue. The decision not to tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction was a defense tactic, and the court was not obligated to instruct the jury sua sponte over defendant\u2019s request. Garcia, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 622.\nWe find that defendant has waived this issue since he not only failed to tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction but also refused to do so when the trial court proposed the instruction.\nIn the fifth issue on appeal, defendant contends, and the State concedes, that his conviction for aggravated battery should be vacated because it arose out of the same physical act, i.e., the firing of a single shot which wounded Wesley Pucek, as his attempted murder conviction. We agree. Aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of the attempted murder conviction and both offenses were predicated on the single act of shooting Pucek. People v. Washington (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 389, 468 N.E.2d 1285.\nHowever, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, remandment for re-sentencing is not required where the trial court imposed separate sentences for each conviction and the record, as in the present case, does not indicate that a vacated conviction had any bearing or influence on the remaining convictions for murder or attempt murder. See People v. Geneva (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1029, 554 N.E.2d 556; People v. Poe (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 457, 463, 459 N.E.2d 667; People v. Hines (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 35, 38, 433 N.E.2d 1137; People v. Wilson (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 395, 397, 417 N.E.2d 146.\nDefendant next asserts that he was not proven guilty of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that the evidence was contradictory and inconsistent, and that it failed to establish the requisite intent element for the murder of Marty Glines and the attempted murder of Wesley Pucek.\nSince we vacate the aggravated battery conviction, we need not consider this charge in defendant\u2019s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence.\nIt is well established that a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267.) \u201c \u2018[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789.\nThe jury as the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, must assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight to be given their testimony, evaluate the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51, 538 N.E.2d 461 (and cases cited therein).) Thus, any discrepancies perceived by defendant in the testimony of the witnesses were within the province of the jury to consider and resolve.\nThe element of intent can be established by the surrounding circumstances, and the intent to take a life may be inferred from the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon, and other circumstances. (People v. Manzo (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 552, 560, 539 N.E.2d 237.) The very act of firing a gun at a person supports the conclusion that the shooter did so with an intent to kill. Manzo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 560.\nThe uncontroverted testimony of the occurrence witnesses and the attempted murder victim revealed that defendant had a gun, aimed and shot Wesley Pucek, and within seconds a subsequent gunshot was fired killing Marty Glines. From our examination of the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact must inescapably have found defendant guilty of the murder of Marty Glines and the attempted murder of Wesley Pucek.\nLastly, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that the 30-year sentence imposed for his murder conviction is excessive.\nAbsent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb a sentence which falls within the statutory limits. People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 544, 372 N.E.2d 641; People v. Abernathy (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 292, 315, 545 N.E.2d 201; see also Andrews, 132 Ill. 2d at 464 (an abuse of discretion standard is used to determine whether a sentence is excessive).\nIn 1987, the statutorily mandated prison term for first degree murder ranged from 20 to 40 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l).) Effective January 1, 1988, the maximum prison term for first degree murder was increased to 60 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(1).) Thus, defendant\u2019s 30-year term clearly falls within the range required by statute. In addition, defendant acknowledges, and the record confirms, that the sentencing judge considered defendant\u2019s youth, lack of gang affiliation, insignificant prior criminal record, and rehabilitative potential. We conclude that the 30-year sentence was not an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part.\nRIZZI and TULLY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Michael Davidson and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Sta-brawa, and Carrie Weiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WYDRICK BUFORD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20143512\nOpinion filed September 16, 1992.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Michael Davidson and Vicki Rogers, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Sta-brawa, and Carrie Weiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0393-01", "first_page_order": 413, "last_page_order": 426 }