{ "id": 5785202, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND NICHOLS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Nichols", "decision_date": "1992-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 1-91-0992", "first_page": "499", "last_page": "513", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 499" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 N.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 965", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827462 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0965-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 996", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641824 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5581123 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/72/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516, 519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2738737 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 427", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722669 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "1059-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3127109 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2717106 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499200 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337746 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146004 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1088", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535418 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238211 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236590 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1260, "char_count": 30408, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5542353751163828e-07, "percentile": 0.6757150706469759 }, "sha256": "8ea5620eed5c7c29ae7e4723019a084d1066cf4f06322a2dcbf763c245700ea0", "simhash": "1:a2d574312660bec5", "word_count": 5011 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:21.957372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND NICHOLS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant appeals his conviction by a jury of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1), 9 \u2014 1(a)(2)), and attempted murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 4, 9 \u2014 1). He questions whether (1) the court erred in admitting evidence and extensive State comment regarding his gang affiliation and involvement, and the prevalence of gangs in the area of the occurrence; (2) he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial when the State elicited testimony and commented during closing arguments regarding the connection between gangs and drug trafficking in the area of the offense; (3) the court improperly denied his motion in limine to exclude evidence of the location of his arrest; and (4) the court erred in allowing the State to inquire about his failure to call a supposedly exonerating witness.\nDefendant was charged by indictment with two counts of first degree murder, three counts of aggravated battery and one count of attempted first degree murder. The case was tried on the murder and attempted murder counts. Defendant\u2019s motions in limine to exclude evidence of the nature of his prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and to bar reference to the fact that he was exiting a courtroom when police arrested him, were denied.\nAt trial, Chicago police officer Barbara Pillows testified that about 9:25 p.m., January 3, 1990, she responded to a call of a man shot at 7204 South Green Street, where she found the decedent, Farrell Lamont Lee, lying near the curb, who appeared to be dead. Pillows learned there was another man inside the house, Robert Prince, who also had been shot. Decedent was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.\nRobert Prince testified that about 9 p.m. on the evening of the occurrence he left his home with his cousin Socrates Houston and the decedent and drove to Houston\u2019s home at 7204 South Green. The three men exited the car and were conversing outside Houston\u2019s home, when they saw defendant and another youth walking towards them on Green Street. Defendant shouted \u201cBD,\u201d meaning \u201cBlack Disciples,\u201d and then pulled a gun out of his pants and began firing in the direction of Prince, Houston and decedent. Prince heard additional gunfire as he fled into the Houston house; he subsequently felt weak and realized he had been shot. The decedent was lying dead on the sidewalk. Prince was later treated for gunshot wounds to the liver and colon. On March 7, 1990, Prince positively identified defendant in a lineup. Prince never \u201chung out\u201d in the area of 72nd and Green, and testified the decedent had never been there prior to the occurrence.\nPrince testified that neither he nor decedent had ever known defendant before the date of the shooting, nor had they known Quin-t\u00e1is Taylor, the youth who had accompanied defendant that night. Prince denied that he or the decedent were street-gang members. He knew the meaning of \u201cBD\u201d because he was surrounded by it on the south side. Although he was unable to remember exactly what defendant or his companion was wearing the night of the shooting, he would never forget their faces.\nThe parties stipulated that if called, Dr. Mary Jumbelic, a forensic pathologist, would testify that decedent died as a result of a gunshot wound to the neck and the manner of death was homicide.\nKevin Green testified that he lived in the area of 72nd and Green from the time he was 5 years old until age 19, and moved back to 7210 South Green in August of last year. Green, who was a funeral director, described the area in January 1990 as having gang activity, being \u201cdrug ridden\u201d and \u201clike a war zone.\u201d Over defense objections, Green described characteristics of the neighborhood gangs around the time of the offense: there were \u201cBD,\u201d or Black Disciples, and \u201cGD,\u201d or Gangster Disciples; both gangs were \u201cfolks,\u201d and their colors were black and blue; and both gangs were aligned under the six-point star symbol. The term \u201cBD\u201d was \u201ccommon knowledge\u201d in the neighborhood because it was heard very frequently. Green had conducted Black Disciples\u2019 funerals, where it was common to see the gang colors as well as wreaths in the shape of a six-point star.\nOn the night of the occurrence, Green was entering his home when he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the home of his neighbor, Socrates Houston. Green subsequently saw a man who \u201clooked like he was dead\u201d lying on the ground in front of Houston\u2019s house. Green did not know anyone named Robert Prince or Quint\u00e1is Taylor, nor did he know defendant. On cross-examination, Green stated that the \u201cvast majority\u201d of young men in his area belonged to street gangs. He did not know whether Houston was a gang member.\nSocrates Houston substantially corroborated Prince\u2019s testimony as to the events leading up to the shooting. He heard a male voice holler \u201cBD,\u201d but did not turn around because he \u201chear[s] it every day around there.\u201d He denied being a member of a street gang.\nCassandra Brown testified that in December \u00cd989, she resided in an apartment at 7108 South Green -with Kim Smith and Kim\u2019s baby. Defendant \u201cgot\u201d the apartment for Kim and Cassandra, and initially paid rent. Defendant was a member of the BD street gang. In early January 1990 defendant came to the apartment and unloaded and then reloaded a gun he kept in the apartment closet. When Brown heard sirens and saw an ambulance on Green Street, defendant said-\u201che just killed some pussy motherfuckers down the street.\u201d Defendant later stated the police would have to kill him before they took him back to jail, and instructed Brown to wear royal blue silk t\u00f3 his funeral. Brown moved out of the apartment in February 1990. She was beaten up by five men, four of whom she recognized as friends of defendant, on February 26,1990.\nQuint\u00e1is Taylor testified that he has known defendant about two years. Taylor denied ever being in a gang, or that he knew the meaning of \u201cBD\u201d or Black Disciples. Taylor resided for the past year at 7005 South Carpenter, \u201cnot too far\u201d from the shooting, and previously resided about one block from the shooting for approximately three years. Taylor denied seeing defendant on the day of the occurrence, or that he knew the decedent or Prince.\nTaylor admitted testifying before the grand jury that he was with defendant the day of the occurrence; that defendant yelled \u201cBD\u201d to a group of people who responded \u201cGD,\u201d after which defendant fired his gun about five times; and that he knew the initials \u201cBD\u201d designated a street gang. Taylor did not know whether black and blue were \u201cgangster colors,\u201d but acknowledged that he wore those colors the previous day.\nChicago police officer James Hardaway testified that on February 26, 1990, during a conversation with Brown regarding an incident unrelated to the shooting, she provided him with information that prompted him to contact Area 3 violent crimes.\nChicago police officer John O\u2019Mara testified he received this call from Officer Hardaway and interviewed Brown, who gave him the names of defendant and Quintius Taylor. On March 7, 1990, having obtained a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest, O\u2019Mara and his partner, Officer Phillip Collins, proceeded to a courthouse on Chicago Avenue, after learning defendant was there. When they arrived, defendant was already in custody of Officer Craig Cegielski. Cegielski was breathing heavily, his clothing was disheveled, and his glasses were broken. Defendant was transported to headquarters and viewed in a lineup by Prince.\nChicago police officer Phillip Collins testified he was Officer O\u2019Mara\u2019s partner and was present at the lineup. When Prince saw defendant, he jumped up and said \u201c[tjhat\u2019s him, that\u2019s the son of a bitch *** I\u2019ll never forget his face.\u201d\nOfficer Craig Cegielski testified that on March 7, 1990, being aware that a warrant had been issued for defendant\u2019s arrest, he went to the courthouse on Chicago Avenue when he learned defendant was there. He saw defendant in the hallway, informed him of the warrant, and instructed him to put his hands on the wall. Defendant initially complied; but as Cegielski reached for his handcuffs, defendant turned and punched him in the face, rib cage, and knee, and attempted to kick him in the groin. A struggle ensued, but Cegielski eventually subdued defendant. Officers Collins and O\u2019Mara subsequently arrived and assisted in transporting defendant to headquarters.\nDefense witness Chicago police officer Martin Lee testified that, in the emergency room following the shooting, Prince described his assailants simply as two male blacks, one of whom wore an eskimo coat. Lee was uncertain whether the term \u201ceskimo coat\u201d was actually used by Prince or was his interpretation of Prince\u2019s description.\nGreg Jackson, called by the defense, testified that he resided in an apartment on the northeast corner of 72nd and Green. About the time of the occurrence, Jackson saw a group of men conversing near his apartment while another two men approached on Green Street. One of the two men, wearing a \u201csky-blue jacket,\u201d raised his arm and began shooting. Jackson was unable to see the men\u2019s faces and was unable to identify defendant as the shooter.\nThe State inquired on cross-examination \u201cwhat type of neighborhood\u201d it was and Jackson responded \u201cterrible,\u201d that there were drugs and gangs; he had heard the terms \u201cBD\u201d and \u201cfolks\u201d before, and heard them \u201cevery day\u201d walking down his street.\nDefendant testified on his own behalf. On the date of the occurrence, he lived at 6859 South Throop Street with his girlfriend, Edna Johnson. He is a member of the Black Disciples street gang. It is not unusual for people his age in his neighborhood to be involved with gangs. Defendant denied knowing decedent, denied shooting decedent or Prince, denied being in the area of 72nd and Green when the shooting occurred, but could not recall where he was at that time. Defendant admitted knowing Taylor, who is also a Black Disciple. Defendant requested that Brown move out of 7108 South Green because she was stealing items from the apartment.\nDefendant testified to the circumstances of his arrest, stating that he was in a courthouse on March 7, 1990, when someone grabbed him by the back of his neck. The man was not uniformed and did not identify himself as a policeman. Defendant turned around and hit him. Defendant denied telling Brown that \u201cthe police aren\u2019t going to take me alive,\u201d or words to that effect.\nAfter the jury found defendant guilty of murder and attempted murder, he was sentenced to 45 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder, and 25 years for attempted murder.\nI\nDefendant contends that the State\u2019s repeated reference to the pervasiveness of gangs in the area of the shooting, and to defendant\u2019s gang membership, was extremely prejudicial and totally irrelevant in light of the scant evidence suggesting the offense was gang-related. Specifically, defendant disputes the extensive testimony by Green regarding gang classification, colors, symbols and funerals; Brown\u2019s testimony of defendant\u2019s membership in the Black Disciples; the cross-examination of Taylor concerning gang initials and colors; and defendant\u2019s cross-examination regarding initials, colors, slogans, symbols, tattoos and the like.\nAlthough a deep and widespread public prejudice may exist against street gangs, gang-related evidence will not necessarily be excluded if it is otherwise relevant and admissible. (People v. Gonzalez (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489, 568 N.E.2d 864; People v. Smith (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 40, 58, 565 N.E.2d 900; People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 372, 263 N.E.2d 840.) \u201cAn accused may not insulate the trier of fact from his gang membership where it is relevant to a determination of the case, simply because prejudice attaches to that revelation.\u201d (People v. Rivera (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 609, 618, 495 N.E.2d 1088.) Evidence indicating defendant\u2019s gang affiliation or involvement in gang-related activity is admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act. (Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58; People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d at 372.) Such admissibility is premised, however, upon proof that gang membership or activity is related to the crime charged. (Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58.) It is the circuit court\u2019s function to weigh the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect in determining whether it should be admitted; the court\u2019s decision on this issue will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 489.\nThe State has no obligation to prove motive to sustain a murder conviction; nevertheless, any evidence tending to show that an accused had a motive for killing the deceased is probative because it makes more probable the fact that the accused did kill the deceased. (Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 56.) Such evidence is competent when it tends to establish the existence of the motive relied upon; when the State undertakes to prove facts purportedly demonstrating motive, the accused must be shown to have known of these facts. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 56.\nInitially, we note that defendant has waived any dispute regarding his cross-examination by failing to object thereto either at trial or in a post-trial motion. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 199, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Although an exception to the waiver rule will be applied when the evidence is \u201cclosely balanced,\u201d in order to correct grave errors involving fundamental fairness (People v. Thurman (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 326, 329-30, 472 N.E.2d 414), this exception is inapplicable here, because the evidence in this case was overwhelming despite defendant\u2019s cross-examination testimony. Additionally, it is not likely that the evidence prejudiced defendant, in light of his cavalier admission on direct examination, that he was a member of the Black Disciples, which, having thousands of members, was \u201cone of the largest\u201d gangs around.\nThe assailant\u2019s identity was a critical issue in the case at bar, and the most telling evidence of this question was the fact that the shooter shouted \u201cBD\u201d before firing his weapon. The evidence regarding the Black Disciples, including the extent of their activity in the neighborhood, was therefore relevant not only to give meaning to the term \u201cBD,\u201d but to establish a motive for a seemingly unprovoked, inexplicable killing. Further, Brown\u2019s testimony that defendant, a Black Disciple, had bragged around the time of the occurrence that he had \u201cjust killed two pussy motherfuckers\u201d served to link defendant to the gang as well as to the occurrence. For these reasons, the gang evidence was properly admitted.\nDefendant also claims excessive reference was made to gangs during closing and rebuttal argument, and disputes the State\u2019s characterization of him as \u201cthe big bad bragging gangbanger\u201d and \u201cthe big stuff gangbanger.\u201d\nAgain, defendant failed to raise these objections before the circuit court, and therefore waived them; in any event, his claims lack merit. Prosecutors are allowed great latitude in closing argument, and the circuit court\u2019s determination of the propriety of argument will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Weatherspoon (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 315, 322, 379 N.E.2d 847.) Both parties have a right to comment on the evidence and to draw any legitimate inferences therefrom. (Weatherspoon, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 322.) If evidence regarding gangs and gang membership was properly admitted during the trial, it is subject to comment during closing argument. See Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 491.\nThe record shows that each of the disputed remarks was simply a review of properly admitted evidence. As stated above, gang evidence was relevant to establish the shooter\u2019s motive and identity, and there was nothing in closing argument that constituted an unjustified characterization of the evidence here. This case involved 14 witnesses and much evidence; the State gave equal attention to all this evidence in its closing. The reference to gang colors and to defendant as a \u201cbig bragging gangbanger\u201d derived from his alleged admission to Brown that he just killed two \u201cmotherfuckers,\u201d and from his subsequent comment that she wear \u201croyal blue silk\u201d to his funeral.\nAssuming, arguendo, that the gang evidence was somewhat cumulative, it seems highly unlikely that this prejudiced defendant in light of his own admissions, both to Brown and on the witness stand. In response to his own attorney\u2019s questioning, defendant admitted his gang membership, and responded without objection to each of the State\u2019s questions regarding gang colors, slogans and whether he wore a gang tattoo; indeed, the record indicates he wore gang colors on each day of the trial. His argument, therefore, is without merit.\nII\nDefendant next alleges error in the State\u2019s inquiry, over his objection, during his cross-examination as to whether a past gunshot wound, unrelated to the charges at bar, was due to his gang activity.\nThe State commenced its cross-examination of defendant with the following:\n\u201cQ. Anybody ever shoot at you, Raymond?\nA. No.\nQ. No?\nA. I\u2019ve been shot, [but] nobody ever shot at me. * * *\n* * *\nQ. You say you have been shot?\nA. Yes, I have.\nQ. Was that as part of your gang activity?\nMR. GIOAANNINI [Defense counsel]: Objection, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nTHE WITNESS: Excuse me?\nQ. [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: Was that as part of your gang activity that you were shot?\nA. No, it wasn\u2019t.\nQ. Had nothing to do with gangs?\nA. No, it did not.\nQ. Did you ever tell anybody that shooting had something to do with gangs?\nA. No, I did not.\nMR. GIOAANNINI: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Oh, I\u2019ll allow the answer to stand.\u201d\nDefendant contends this questioning had no relevance to this cause, conveyed to the jury that defendant had a propensity toward violence, and only served to compound the error in allowing extensive testimony relating to gangs and gang membership. Further, defendant contests the State\u2019s failure to perfect this questioning by introducing rebuttal evidence to support it.\nEvidence of other crimes or misconduct is admissible only if relevant to show criminal intent, common design, identity and motive, rather than a mere propensity on defendant\u2019s part to commit the offense charged. (People v. Kimbrough (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292; People v. Henenberg (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 464, 346 N.E.2d 11.) Even if relevant, such evidence is only admissible if its probative value clearly outweighs its prejudicial effect. (People v. Gordon (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767, 419 N.E.2d 66.) A reference to prior criminality does not require reversal in all circumstances; unless there is a reasonable probability that improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction or influenced the jury\u2019s determination of guilt, reversal is unnecessary. (Schneble v. Florida (1972), 405 U.S. 427, 432, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345, 92 S. Ct. 1056, 1059-60; Henenberg, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 469; see also People v. Tranowski (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 169 N.E.2d 347.) Application of the harmless error rule here requires an assessment of the probable impact of the evidence on the minds of the average jury. (Henenberg, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 469.) Reversal is unwarranted where the evidence otherwise proves defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tranowski, 20 Ill. 2d at 17.\nInitially, we note that the State did attempt to introduce evidence to prove up defendant\u2019s impeachment here, albeit in a somewhat untimely manner. Based upon defendant\u2019s objection, however, the court disallowed the evidence finding that it was collateral. In any event, assuming arguendo that the questioning was improper, the error was harmless. As demonstrated above, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt here was overwhelming. Furthermore, defendant admitted he was a member of the Black Disciples. He testified regarding the gang symbol and colors, admitted he wore gang tattoos, and wore gang colors during trial. He bragged to Brown about his gang membership. In light of defendant\u2019s statements and conduct, the questions casting light on defendant\u2019s own victimization caused no further prejudice. See Henenberg, 37 Ill. App. 3d 464, 346 N.E.2d 11.\nIll\nPrior to trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude for impeachment purposes any reference to the nature of his prior felony conviction, which was for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the crime was not sufficiently similar to the crime charged to prejudice defendant.\nOn appeal, defendant does not assign error to the denial of this motion; rather, he argues he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and due process when the State subsequently elicited testimony from Green and Jackson linking gangs with drug dealing in the neighborhood, and commented on this connection twice during closing argument.\nIn People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, the supreme court held that evidence of a prior felony conviction is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness as long as the conviction or defendant\u2019s release from confinement occurred no more than 10 years prior to the trial in which the felony evidence is proffered. (Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 519; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 155 \u2014 1.) Introduction of such evidence is limited to the purpose of impeachment, and not to prove the defendant\u2019s propensity to commit the crime charged; when the conviction shows propensity more than lack of credibility, the evidence should not be allowed. (People v. Siebert (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 895, 902, 390 N.E.2d 1322.) Defendant concedes that the ruling on the motion in limine was \u201cperfectly logical\u201d at the time it was made \u201cin light of the fact that there should have been absolutely no mention of drugs, drug dealing, or their connection with local gangs\u201d in this case. Once the State knew of the ruling, however, it succeeded in \u201cbringing through the back door\u201d an inference that because defendant was a convicted drug dealer and gang member, and the local gangs were the source of drug dealing and the cause of the offense at bar, the defendant was the \u201cperfect suspect\u201d for this crime.\nDefendant principally relies on Green\u2019s description of the neighborhood as a \u201cdrug ridden war zone,\u201d \u201cinfested with gang activity.\u201d The record suggests, however, that the State did not purposefully elicit this testimony and, in any event, that the testimony probably did not harm defendant. Green gave the above responses when the State asked him generally to describe the neighborhood around the time of the offense; the inquiry made no allusion to drugs. Green\u2019s answer did not link defendant, or even the gangs, to this chronic drug dealing. It simply described the neighborhood. Moreover, following a defense objection, the State never again mentioned drugs during Green\u2019s testimony.\nDefendant also complains of the cross-examination of defense witness Jackson, who described the neighborhood as \u201cterrible,\u201d as having \u201cdrugs and everything which is in every neighborhood,\u201d as well as \u201cgangs.\u201d Again, the questions merely asked for a description of the witness\u2019 neighborhood; they did not necessarily link drugs to gangs, or to defendant. It requires a strained inference to construe this testimony as demonstrating that defendant had a propensity to commit murder.\nDefendant similarly takes issue with a statement in the State\u2019s closing argument, in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cBut he doesn\u2019t just throw away the gun he still has the gun [sic], he is a gangbanger, he\u2019s not going to throw away a good gun he\u2019s just going to get rid of the shells he used.\nBut, in any event, no one said this guy is smart. He is nothing like Kevin Green from that same neighborhood. I mean, does he sound real smart, you heard him on the stand, the type of character he is. I mean you know a little bit about him now, you know a little bit about his background. You know about his felony conviction for possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s argument lacks merit. Soon after this statement, the State suggested that the felony evidence was to be considered on the issue of defendant\u2019s credibility. The comment itself refers to defendant\u2019s conviction in context of his character. Defendant also attacks a subsequent statement in which the State said drug trafficking in the neighborhood, along with gangs, was a \u201cway of life.\u201d\nDefendant does not allege prosecutorial misconduct, but merely implies that the resulting effect of the cumulative evidence prejudiced him. Neither this comment alone, nor the witness\u2019 testimony regarding the instance of drugs, portrayed defendant as having a tendency toward murder. Accordingly, this argument is unpersuasive.\nIV\nDefendant next contends the court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude reference to the fact that he was exiting a courtroom located above a police station at the time of his arrest, because he was present there for an offense totally unrelated to the case at bar. Defendant argues that this error \u201caggravates and compounds\u201d the errors alleged above.\nEvidence of other crimes or misconduct by an accused is not admissible if offered simply to show he is criminally predisposed. (Henenberg, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 468.) In considering what constitutes \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence, direct proof of a criminal act is not necessary; it is sufficient that the evidence could lead the jury to infer prior criminality on defendant\u2019s part. (Henenberg, 37 Ill. App. 3d at 468.) Illinois courts have denounced evidence which, without independent relevance, implies that defendant was well known by police because of frequent presence both at headquarters and in court. People v. Blakely (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 536, 542-44, 365 N.E.2d 996; see also People v. Cherry (1971), 130 Ill. App. 2d 965, 267 N.E.2d 744.\nIn the case at bar, Brown testified that defendant told her on the night of the shooting that the police would have to kill him in order to take him back to prison. To corroborate this testimony, the State presented evidence of defendant\u2019s arrest, during which he punched and kicked Officer Cegielski. In denying defendant\u2019s motion to exclude reference to the location of the arrest, the court stated as follows:\n\u201cI will allow them to indicate the location of the arrest and to describe the circumstances ***.\nAgain if you want I will certainly give the jury a limited instruction at that point that the location of the arrest is not to be considered in any way other than establishing where the arrest occurred. But I think under those circumstances I would allow [sic] because it is a circumstance to attempt to flee maybe on the street is different than attempting to plea [sic] in a courthouse although I will certainly indicate that the State cannot go into the fact as to why he was there.\u201d\nAccording to the State, the court properly found relevance in the fact defendant resisted arrest in a courthouse, because this deterred defendant from having a gun as he had predicted in his conversation with Brown.\nAt trial, brief references to the courthouse or police station were made in the testimony of Officers O\u2019Mara, Collins, and Cegielski in context of the circumstances leading to the arrest. The State made similar references in its closing and rebuttal arguments. Nevertheless, no mention was made of the reason defendant was at the courthouse; there was no suggestion that he was present in response to allegations against him. When the testimony was first commenced, the court interrupted to instruct the jury that the evidence was to be received for a limited purpose, and that no significance was to attach to the fact that it was a court facility. Defendant\u2019s mere presence in a courthouse on one occasion does not require an inference of criminal activity on his part. Defendant\u2019s argument here lacks merit.\nV\nDefendant lastly argues that the court erred in overruling his objection to the State\u2019s \u201crepeated questioning,\u201d during his cross-examination, regarding his failure to call a potentially exonerating witness.\nDefendant testified during direct examination that he could not recall his whereabouts on January 3, 1990, at the time of the occurrence. On cross-examination, defendant admitted he told police the night of his arrest that he was at home with his girlfriend, Edna Johnson, at the time of the shooting, and stated that he \u201cmisspoke\u201d at that time. The following colloquy then took place:\n\u201cQ. Edna Johnson?\nA. Right.\nQ. She was your girlfriend?\nA. Right.\n** *\nQ. Is she here today?\nA. I don\u2019t see her.\nQ. The person that you say you were with at home January the 3rd, 1990, the night that you don\u2019t remember is not here. You don\u2019t see her, right?\nMR. GIOYANNINI: Objection, Judge *** [ajsked and answered.\nTHE COURT: Overruled, [sic] it has been asked and answered.\u201d\nDefendant maintains this questioning was reversible error because he had not asserted an alibi defense, and \u201cthe obvious inference\u201d raised by these questions was that, since she was not present in court, her testimony would have been unfavorable to him.\nWhen a party specifically objects to certain evidence, all grounds not specified are waived. (People v. Eyler (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 173, 549 N.E.2d 268.) As the foregoing reveals, defendant objected only on the ground that the question had been asked and answered. Therefore, he waived the issue on appeal. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).\nWere we to consider this issue, any error in the State\u2019s questioning was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against defendant, and in view of the fact that the State ceased all reference to the absence of the witness after defendant\u2019s objection.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the jury\u2019s conviction of defendant cannot be disturbed and the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nDiVITO and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dennis A. Giovannini and Herbert L. Goldberg, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Brian Clauss, and George J. Arnold, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND NICHOLS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140992\nOpinion filed September 22, 1992.\nDennis A. Giovannini and Herbert L. Goldberg, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Brian Clauss, and George J. Arnold, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0499-01", "first_page_order": 519, "last_page_order": 533 }