{ "id": 5782976, "name": "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THORNTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, Petitioner, v. THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Education v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board", "decision_date": "1992-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0500", "first_page": "724", "last_page": "731", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 724" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3309982 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1246" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5801027 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L.R.R.M. 1192", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "L.R.R.M. (BNA)", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.L.R.B. 437", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "N.L.R.B.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 L.R.R.M. 1239", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "L.R.R.M. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274421 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5795806 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 L.R.R.M. 2288", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "L.R.R.M. (BNA)", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 L.R.R.M. 2540", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "L.R.R.M. (BNA)", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "610 F.2d 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11068 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/610/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 L.R.R.M. 2457", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "L.R.R.M. (BNA)", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "669 F.2d 133", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1161593 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/669/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 1176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3555001 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 1370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294804 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a7141", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 843", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5247365 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2497199 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884" }, { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0875-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 879, "char_count": 17226, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.5631665044581806e-08, "percentile": 0.3497900842867673 }, "sha256": "f6ace5be6817a28458e7b9506ff5369b4bd1ca496aa6bc6bfeaaf8414d881293", "simhash": "1:76b430d7f8c2ac25", "word_count": 2864 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:21.957372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THORNTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, Petitioner, v. THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case concerns operation of regulations of respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB), which require that a respondent to a complaint charging an unfair labor practice must file an answer within 15 days of being served with the complaint and that failure to do so shall, upon motion of a party \u201cbe deemed an admission of all allegations in the complaint\u201d (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71120.30(d)(3), at 387 (1991)). See 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71120.30(d)(2) (1991).\nThe foregoing regulation further states:\n\u201cWhen a party has failed to file a timely answer, leave to file a late answer may be granted by the Hearing Officer for good cause shown. If good cause is shown, the answer shall be deemed timely. Good cause will include: a written statement by the party of: ultimate facts showing a meritorious defense to the complaint; and either a reasonable excuse explaining the party\u2019s failure to file a timely answer, or that the party was prevented from filing a timely answer by: fraud, act or concealment of the opposing party; accident; excusable mistake; or lack of notice, lack of jurisdiction or other grounds traditionally relied upon for equitable relief from judgments.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71120.30(d)(4), at 387 (1991).\nThe case on administrative review presents a situation where a lawyer for petitioner Board of Education of Thornton Township High School District No. 205 (District), while under great personal pressure, failed to file a timely answer to an unfair labor practice complaint. Although the evidence does not indicate the opposing party suffered any damage because of the delay in answering, we uphold an IELRB decision taking the allegations of unfair labor practice as admitted.\nPetitioner brought this proceeding for direct administrative review of the decision of respondent IELRB which determined that the District was deemed to have admitted the allegations of a complaint for unfair labor practices filed against it by failing to timely file an answer to that complaint. The District contends the IELRB erroneously and unreasonably interpreted its foregoing procedural rule in determining the District lacked \u201cgood cause\u201d for allowing the late filing of its answer to the complaint. We affirm.\nOn April 26, 1991, the instant unfair labor practice charge was filed by respondent Union of Support Staff, IEA-NEA (Union), alleging the District had renounced and rescinded a successor collective-bargaining agreement. After usual investigation procedures by IELRB, a complaint issued, and a copy of the complaint and a notice of setting of hearing was served on the District on August 15, 1991. Hearing on the complaint was set for September 30 and October 31, 1991. Upon the District\u2019s motion and agreement of the parties, the hearing was continued until November 13 and 14, 1991. According to an undisputed affidavit of District\u2019s counsel, he first discovered no answer had been filed on October 31, 1991, when preparing for the hearing with District officials. He allegedly checked with the assigned hearing officer, who confirmed that no answer had been filed. According to the affidavit, counsel then prepared and sent in an answer on November 1, 1991, but at the same time counsel for the Union filed a motion for a determination that all allegations of the complaint be taken as admitted.\nThe hearing officer then entered a rule on the District to show cause why the complaint should not be taken as admitted. In response, the District filed an affidavit setting forth that the lead attorney for the case had been under great pressure because of a heavy load of educational labor relations matters and a very tragic family situation and had forgotten to answer. As answer by the District was due by Friday, August 30, 1991, and was not tendered until November 1,1991, the answer was 63 days late.\nOn February 29, 1992, the hearing officer issued a recommended decision and order granting the Union\u2019s motion for default, denying the District\u2019s request to file a late answer based on a lack of good cause, and deeming the allegations of the complaint admitted by the District. Thornton Township High School District No. 205, 8 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1024, No. 91 \u2014 CA\u20140055\u2014C (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision and order, Jan. 29, 1992).\nThe District filed exceptions to the order, and on May 22, 1992, the IELRB adopted the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision and order noting that the District\u2019s attorney had previously practiced before the Board and concluding the District did not have good cause to file the late answer. As IELRB deemed the foregoing reason sufficient to decide the issue of whether the complaint was to be taken as admitted, it did not decide whether the District had sufficiently set forth a meritorious defense to the charges. Thornton Township High School District No. 205, 8 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1052, No. 91 \u2014 CA\u20140055\u2014C (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, May 26, 1992).\nThe portion of the aforementioned IELRB regulation permitting filing of a tardy answer upon showing \u201cgood cause\u201d (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71120.30(a)(4), at 387 (1991)) is of comparatively recent origin. Prior to its enactment, this court decided Mattoon Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 875, 550 N.E.2d 610, upholding an IELRB order which took the allegations of an unfair labor practice complaint as admitted because of a tardy answer. There, the school district maintained its answer was delayed because its attorney had obtained some faulty advice from an IELRB hearing officer and had filed a motion to defer the issue to arbitration in lieu of an answer. This court recognized that some circumstances might excuse a timely answer but held the circumstances there fell far short of an excuse. This court emphasized the public policy of speedy resolution of educational labor relations disputes.\nThe orders of the IELRB and its hearing officer here confirmed the prior IELRB interpretation of the new \u201cgood cause\u201d provision of its regulations in City Colleges of Chicago No. 508, 7 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1018, No. 91 \u2014 CA\u20140005\u2014C (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision and order, Dec. 31, 1990) (hereinafter 7 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1018), adopted in 7 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1055, No. 91 \u2014 CA\u20140005\u2014 C (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Apr. 17, 1991). The respondent there argued that failure to file a timely answer resulted from anticipation that the case would settle as well as \u201coversight\u201d caused by its counsel\u2019s busy schedule. (7 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1018, at IX-84.) The respondent there also claimed that a delayed hearing would not prejudice the other party and that the proffered reasons constituted \u201creasonable excuse\u201d to allow the filing of a late answer.\nThe heart of the City Colleges decision, followed by IELRB here, was that the \u201cgood cause\u201d standard of the new regulation was intended to be the standard by which a circuit court would set aside a judgment rendered more than 30 days but not more than two years earlier under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1401) and its precursor, section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (CPA) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 72).\nIn support of its interpretation of its regulation incorporating the standard of section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code and its precursor, IELRB notes that the phrase \u201creasonable excuse\u201d appearing in its regulation is also contained in the language of cases passing upon the operation of the above Code and CPA provisions.\n\u201cTo vacate a valid judgment after 30 days from its entry under [section] 72 of the Civil Practice Act defendants must show reasonable excuse for failure to defend within the appropriate time or that they were prevented from so doing by the fraud, act or concealment of the opposing party, accident, excusable mistake or one or more of the grounds traditionally relied upon for equitable relief from judgments. The defendants must also state ultimate facts showing a meritorious defense. This section cannot be used to avoid the consequence of a defendant\u2019s negligence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Stoller v. Holdren (1964), 47 Ill. App. 2d 81, 82-83, 197 N.E.2d 492, 493.)\nThe supreme court also has stated that the requirements of section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code include a \u201cmeritorious defense\u201d and submission of a \u201creasonable excuse\u201d demonstrating due diligence. Smith v. Airoom, Inc. (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 209, 221-22, 499 N.E.2d 1381, 1386.\nThe District argues that the IELRB imposed an overly narrow interpretation of its regulation by applying the standard for interpreting section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code and that cases interpreting the more lenient provisions of section 2 \u2014 1301(e) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1301(e)), pertaining to motions to vacate filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment, \u201cprovide a more apt analogue for interpreting section 1120.30(d)(4)\u201d of title 80 of the Illinois Administrative Code. The District points out that under section 2\u2014 1301(e) of the Code, \u201cgood cause\u201d is a requirement for vacating a default judgment. See Baltz v. McCormack (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 76, 78, 383 N.E.2d 643, 644; Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1301(e), Historical and Practice Notes, at 400 (Smith-Hurd 1983).\nAs section 2 \u2014 1301 of the Code concerns requests to set aside default judgments entered within the previous 30 days, it is, to that extent, more analogous to the situation where, as here, relief is sought by a party at the time the complaint against it is taken as admitted. However, the IELRB is interpreting a regulation which it enacted pursuant to its statutory rule-making power, and we must give some deference to it unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable. (People ex rel. Margolis v. Robb (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 843, 847, 587 N.E.2d 630, 633.) We also consider the policy of speedy determination of labor disputes of the nature here. (Mattoon, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 550 N.E.2d at 616.) Clearly, the IELRB is not being arbitrary or unreasonable in its interpretation of its regulation by adopting the section 2 \u2014 1401 standard.\nThe IELRB admits that the standard of section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code which it has adopted is stricter than that imposed under similar circumstances by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) under the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C. \u00a7141 et seq. (1988)), also known as the National Labor Relations Act. We, nevertheless, give deference to the IELRB\u2019s interpretation of its own regulations, particularly in view of the stated need for speed in resolving disputes in educational labor matters.\nThe major thrust of the District\u2019s argument is that even under section 2 \u2014 1401 standards, it should have been given some relief. Certainly, the lead attorney for the District is entitled to sympathy for the great stress he was under. However, as we will explain, cases decided under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code do not hold such misfortune sufficient to grant section 2 \u2014 1401 relief. Multilawyer firms are expected to have a backup system designed to avoid missed filing deadlines. We also recognize that, here, the tardiness of the District\u2019s answer was not shown to have prejudiced the Union. Rather, the case seems to have proceeded as it would if an answer had been timely filed.\nUnder section 2 \u2014 1301(e) of the Code, lack of prejudice to opposing parties resulting from tardy filings of pleadings has been considered very important in deciding whether a judgment should be opened (Kessling v. United States Cheerleaders Association (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 582, 584, 574 N.E.2d 1370, 1371), as has the hardship which the opposing party would suffer by being required to go to trial if a default judgment is set aside. (Anglin v. Dearth (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370, 529 N.E.2d 1176, 1179.) Similarly, the NLRB has considered these factors in regard to whether to allow a late filing. Livingston Powdered Metal, Inc. v. N L R B (3d Cir. 1982), 669 F.2d 133, 109 L.R.R.M. 2457; N L R B v. Zeno Table Co. (9th Cir. 1979), 610 F.2d 567, 102 L.R.R.M. 2540, reh\u2019g denied (9th Cir. 1980), 103 L.R.R.M. 2288.\nThe IELRB regulation does speak of \u201cgood cause\u201d for late filing of an answer to be granted upon the existence of \u201cother grounds traditionally relied upon for equitable relief from judgment.\u201d (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71120.30(d)(4), at 387 (1991).) The District points out that in such cases as Cohen v. Wood Brothers Steel Stamping Co. (1991), 227 Ill. App. 3d 354, 358-59, 592 N.E.2d 59, 61-62, and In re Marriage of Hoppe (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 271, 282, 580 N.E.2d 1186, 1193, courts have spoken of a somewhat relaxed standard for section 2 \u2014 1401 relief, based upon equitable standards. However, no case has been called to our attention where the lack of prejudice to opposing parties has been stated to be a factor for granting section 2 \u2014 1401 relief except Zee Jay, Inc. v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1102, 552 N.E.2d 1027, 1030. The opinion there did not indicate that lack of prejudice was a substantial factor in the court\u2019s affirmance of a grant of section 2 \u2014 1401 relief from a judgment.\nWe do not find sufficient precedent under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code for us to overturn the IELRB decision on the basis that no prejudice resulted from the District\u2019s failure to answer within 15 days. Rather, we must look to the question of whether the District had \u201cgood cause\u201d arising from a \u201creasonable excuse\u201d for the late filing. As we have indicated, that does not exist. Tardiness arising from illness of a party has not required section 2 \u2014 1401 relief. See Canton v. Chorbajian (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1022, 410 N.E.2d 1166, 1172; Morski & Associates, Inc. v. R & R Resources, Inc. (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363, 555 N.E.2d 1044, 1047.\nIn Elfman v. Evanston Bus Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App. 2d 469, 184 N.E.2d 787, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 609, 190 N.E.2d 348, the court found that counsel\u2019s failure to respond to a summons caused by stress from the illness and death of his mother was not a sufficient excuse for a lack of diligence:\n\u201cNor do we consider that the press of other business, or absence from the city, or the mental strain involved in family illness and death, constitute sufficient justification for the lack of diligence shown by this record. If this attorney was unable to attend to the case, it was plainly his duty and the duty of defendant to employ another attorney who could attend to it. When counsel for defendant is a law firm and not an individual practitioner, the failure to arrange for the services of another attorney becomes even less excusable.\u201d Elfman, 36 Ill. App. 2d at 477,184 N.E.2d at 791.\nEven under the NLRB standard of \u201cgood cause,\u201d inadvertence due to work load or illness is insufficient. See Urban Laboratories, Inc. (1980), 249 N.L.R.B. 867, 104 L.R.R.M. 1233 (nonlawyer respondent was preoccupied with other matters); Jones (1983), 267 N.L.R.B. 906, 114 L.R.R.M. 1151 (inadvertence and neglect of its attorney); Ancorp National Services, Inc. (1973), 202 N.L.R.B. 513, 82 L.R.R.M. 1734 (respondent\u2019s officer in charge of labor relations was seriously ill); United States Telefactors Corp. (1989), 293 N.L.R.B. 567, 131 L.R.R.M. 1239 (settlement was expected, respondent\u2019s attorneys had an unusually heavy work load and one of its attorneys was ill); Father & Sons Lumber & Building Supplies, Inc. (1989), 297 N.L.R.B. 437, 133 L.R.R.M. 1192 (respondent was busy with other matters and there was a breakdown in staff communications).\nFinally, we note that when passing upon requests for relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code and section 72 of the CPA courts have been held to have some discretion. (Halle v. Robertson (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 564, 568, 579 N.E.2d 1243, 1246; Capitani v. Miller (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 702, 705, 386 N.E.2d 96, 99.) Logically, the IELRB was similarly possessed of some discretion in ruling here. Particularly in view of the expressed policy of speedy resolution of educational labor relations disputes (Mattoon, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 550 N.E.2d at 616), we find no abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and LUND, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anthony G. Scariano, David P. Kula, and Robert H. Ellch, all of Scariano, Kula, Ellch & Himes, Chartered, of Chicago Heights, for petitioner.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.", "Stephen G. Katz, of Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, of Chicago, for respondent Union of Support Staff, IEA-NEA." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THORNTON TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, Petitioner, v. THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201492\u20140500\nOpinion filed September 30, 1992.\nAnthony G. Scariano, David P. Kula, and Robert H. Ellch, all of Scariano, Kula, Ellch & Himes, Chartered, of Chicago Heights, for petitioner.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jerald S. Post, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.\nStephen G. Katz, of Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, of Chicago, for respondent Union of Support Staff, IEA-NEA." }, "file_name": "0724-01", "first_page_order": 744, "last_page_order": 751 }