{ "id": 5784842, "name": "CHERYL C. BURCHETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCIS J. GONCHER, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Burchett v. Goncher", "decision_date": "1991-12-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-90-0509, 1-90-2100, 1-91-1664 cons.", "first_page": "1091", "last_page": "1100", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 1091" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 1037", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607576 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5658418 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3499255 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2996997 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971859 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 862", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298-99" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435207 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2622467 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3137958 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 1171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3228391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0869-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 974, "char_count": 22424, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.414078534526225e-07, "percentile": 0.6475414203685235 }, "sha256": "72f9632aac619dab20a96e19c84aacabc80679d5707d246c6bfc624471db9aad", "simhash": "1:22bf11cb5b45b54e", "word_count": 3835 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:21.957372+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHERYL C. BURCHETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCIS J. GONCHER, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURRAY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCheryl Burchett (Cheryl) brought a civil lawsuit alleging that Francis Goncher, Jr. (Goncher), defendant, was the father of her daughter Christa. The litigation was settled by an agreement of the parties in the form of an agreed order, which agreed order was approved and entered by the trial court. The facts are undisputed. They are as follows.\nOn March 11, 1988, Cheryl filed a complaint for paternity alleging that Goncher was the biological father of her minor child, Christa Goncher (Christa), born out of wedlock on December 11,1987.\nOn April 29, 1988, the trial court ordered Goncher to submit to a blood test for the purposes of determining the possibility of his paternity of Christa. Test results indicated that Goncher stood a 99.84% chance of fathering Christa. The results further indicated that 99.77% of all other men could be excluded as Christa\u2019s natural father. Thus, the testers concluded that \u201cpaternity is practically proved.\u201d\nOn November 17, 1989, a pretrial took place with no court reporter present. Both parties had counsel present. After the pretrial conference, the parties negotiated the terms of a final settlement. The terms of the settlement were reduced to the form of an agreed order settling all outstanding issues. The order was approved in writing by each of the parties and was entered by the trial court judge.\nBy the terms of the November 17, 1989, agreed order, Goncher was to pay Cheryl the aggregate sum of $3,000 per month for the support of Christa and Heather Goncher (Heather) until the youngest child reaches the age of 19V2 or is emancipated, whichever is the first to occur. In addition, Goncher was ordered to pay Cheryl $70,000 in satisfaction of child support arrearages accrued since the birth of Christa for her support, all pre/post natal care for Christa, which approximated $6,000, and he was to be responsible for all extraordinary medical, dental, optical, and psychological expenses of Christa and Heather. The order further provided that Goncher was to be responsible for all college or trade school expenses for the children as well as $20,000 in attorney fees to Cheryl\u2019s attorney.\nAs of the date of the agreed order Christa was not yet two and no prior support order had been entered. In a previous paternity action, case No. 85 Ml 99911, Goncher was ordered to pay $266.67 per month for the support of Heather. On October 11, 1987, this support for Heather was raised to $310 per month. The record contains no evidence or findings as to Goncher\u2019s income, Cheryl\u2019s income, Christa\u2019s financial needs or Heather\u2019s financial needs.\nOn November 22, 1989, five days after the entry of the agreed order of November 17, Goncher filed a motion to vacate the November 17, 1989, order. In his motion Goncher contended that he had mistakenly believed that the figure recommended by the trial judge was the statutory amount required for the support of two children. In addition Goncher charged that $3,000 represented 50% of his income, rather than 25% as specified in that statute. The trial court found that there had been a unilateral mistake on Goncher\u2019s part, but there was no newly discovered evidence, fraud, or coercion and denied the motion on January 12, 1990.\nOn February 5, 1990, following a substitution of attorneys for defendant, Goncher filed an emergency motion to set aside and reconsider the court\u2019s orders of January 12, 1990, and November 17, 1989, pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 1203 and 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 1203, 2 \u2014 1401). In the alternative, Goncher requested the trial court to modify the judgment order of November 17, 1989, pursuant to \u201cchapter 40, par. 2516.\u201d This motion was based on the alleged unconscionability of the order; the court\u2019s failure to take evidence or to make findings as to the needs of the children or their parents\u2019 ability to contribute; the failure of the order to allocate the amount between the children; and the provision for arrearages of $70,000 for Christa\u2019s support. Cheryl filed a motion to dismiss the section 2 \u2014 1401 motion. On July 5, 1990, the court denied the section 2 \u2014 1401 motion, ruling that the order of November 17, 1989, was fair and equitable and agreed to by both parties.\nGoncher filed two appeals: the first is an appeal from the agreed order of November 17, 1989, and the order of January 12, 1990, denying defendant\u2019s motion to vacate the November 17, 1989, order; the second is an appeal from the order of July 5, 1990, denying the section 2 \u2014 1401 motion. The two appeals were consolidated by this court.\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the decisions of the trial court.\nNOVEMBER 17,1989, ORDER\nGoncher argues that his motion to vacate the agreed order should have been granted due to the fact that he agreed to the order because he mistakenly believed the order complied with the guidelines set forth in the Illinois statute relating to child support. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 505.) He further argues that the November 17, 1989, order is unconscionable.\nWe are first met with a question of the court\u2019s jurisdiction over an agreed order. As a general proposition, a consent decree is not appealable because it does not constitute a resolution of the parties\u2019 rights but is a mere recordation of their private agreement. (People ex rel. Lampkin v. Brown (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 869, 401 N.E.2d 1171; see also People ex rel. Fahner v. Colorado City Lot Owners & Taxpayers Association (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 1, 476 N.E.2d 409.) Once a consent decree has been entered it is generally considered to be binding on the parties and it cannot be amended or varied without the consent of each party. (Dunaway v. Storm (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 880, 334 N.E.2d 825.) However, this is not without exception. A circuit court has potential authority to modify a consent decree if circumstances so warrant. A court of equity does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if it is satisfied that what it was doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument of -wrong. (Fahner, 106 Ill. 2d at 9, 476 N.E.2d 409, citing United States v. Swift & Co. (1932), 286 U.S. 106, 114-15, 76 L. Ed. 999, 1006, 52 S. Ct. 460, 462.) A consent decree can be set aside only by agreement of the parties or upon a showing that it resulted from fraudulent misrepresentation, coercion, incompetence of one of the parties, gross disparity in the parties\u2019 bargaining positions, or newly discovered evidence. (Kandalepas v. Economou (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 51, 54, 547 N.E.2d 496; In re Haber (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 306, 425 N.E.2d 1007.) The trial court in the present case potentially had the authority to modify the consent decree, but first it had to determine whether the circumstances warranted the court\u2019s modification of the decree.\nFor the following reasons, we find that the trial court properly denied Goncher\u2019s motion to vacate the November 17,1989, order.\nGoncher argues that the November 17 order is flawed in every respect. He states that in addition to requiring him to pay approximately half his net income to support two children, the order fails to allocate the money between the children; the order fails to provide for abatement of any support upon the older child\u2019s emancipation; the order fails to itemize the financial needs of the children; the order fails to recite the incomes of the parents so that if circumstances change there would be basis for modification; and, finally, the order fails to indicate whether the guidelines were considered or why the support figures deviate substantially from those guidelines.\nGoncher argues that section 14 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2514) specifies that in determining the amount of any child support award, the court shall use the guidelines and standards set forth in section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act). Goncher correctly asserts that section 505 of the Act allows the court to order either or both parents to pay an amount that is reasonable and necessary for a child\u2019s support. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 505.) The Act specifies that the court shall determine a minimum amount of support by using the guidelines, which call for 25% of the parent\u2019s net income for the support of two children. It states that the guidelines shall be applied unless there is reason to deviate. However, at the time of the entry of the agreed order, the last sentence of section 505 stated: \u201cThe guidelines may be exceeded by the court without express findings, or by agreement of the parties.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 505(a)(2).) In the present case the parties entered an agreed order, the court was not asked to make specific findings, nor under the circumstances was there any reason for the trial court to do so. Goncher had counsel present at the time the order was entered and Goncher\u2019s acquiescence is apparent by his signature on the face of the order.\nAt the hearing on the motion to vacate, Goncher\u2019s counsel stated that the fraudulent misrepresentation, incompetency and gross disparity in positions were not present in this case. Goncher\u2019s counsel went on to state: \u201c[H]owever, I did allude to the fact that this particular set of facts may come under the coercion and/or newly discovered facts; tests that are set forth in Haber.\u201d Goncher\u2019s counsel argued:\n\u201cBasically what I had said in my brief, I am sure the Court had reviewed that, that the defendant, Francis Goncher, Jr. at the time that he entered into the agreement was again mistakenly under the assumption that the Court\u2019s recommendation as based on what the Court perceived as twenty-five percent of his net income and Mr. Goncher knowing what the court\u2019s guidelines are and what the statute specifically stated, that he would be responsible for twenty-five percent for two children, he therefore, agreed to it.\u201d\nGoncher\u2019s counsel also argued that if the court felt that the requirements set forth in In re Haber (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 306, 425 N.E.2d 1007, had not been met by the facts in the present case, the fact that there was a mistake by one of the parties (namely Mr. Goncher) was an important fact, and as a result of his mistake, there was no meeting of the minds as to that contract and, therefore, there was no contract.\nThe trial court made the following findings: that it was clear that this was an attempt to vacate what was clearly an agreed order; that for the court to step in and intervene on an agreed order would require something extraordinary, specifically as is set forth in the case of In re Haber (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 306, 425 N.E.2d 1007; that it was clear from the facts that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation; that \u201cgiven the financial disparity between the parties here, it would be extremely difficult[ ] to even make a thin argument with respect to coercion\u201d; and that \u201cif there would be an argument on the gross disparity between the capacities of the parties, *** would not serve the moving party in this case\u201d; and regarding newly discovered evidence \u201c[t]he Court finds, its [sic] impossible to find that there wasn\u2019t anything previously discovered or gone over or threshed out competently by both sides here, so there wasn\u2019t even a hint of any such problem.\u201d\nThe court further stated:\n\u201cSo we are then left with the one material issue and that is the issue of a unilateral mistake of material fact that was made by Mr. Goncher. The Court in following general principles of contract law; again is that is a unilateral mistake or misconception on his part. And there is an issue whether or not it is a mistake of fact, a mistake of opinion, but does rise to \u2014 nor can it be said under any circumstances to rise to fraud.\u201d\nThe trial court concluded by stating that it was compelled to follow the Haber case.\nEvidence that an agreement was entered into because of coercion, fraud or duress must be clear and convincing in order for courts to set aside the agreement. (In re Marriage of Carlson (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 924, 930, 428 N.E.2d 1005; see also In re Marriage of De Frates (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 607, 414 N.E.2d 1188.) Goncher alleged coercion not based on physical threat, but the coercion present and resulting from a combination of mistake of fact and stress of avoidance of a prolonged and emotional trial. We find no merit to this argument. The mistake Goncher alleges was his own. Furthermore, Goncher\u2019s desire to avoid a trial was a matter of his own choosing, not the type of coercion that would allow a court to set aside an agreement. We also find that Goncher\u2019s argument as to newly discovered evidence lacks merit. We agree with the trial court\u2019s analysis that \u201cthere wasn\u2019t even a hint of any such problem.\u201d\nGoncher maintains that he agreed to the November 17 order only because he erroneously believed that the amount of support was required by law. To entitle one to equitable relief for one\u2019s unilateral mistake of law, the mistaken party must show, in addition to his mistake as to his or her legal rights or responsibilities prior to entering a transaction, some wrongful conduct by the nonmistaken party that induced the mistaken party to act in favor of the nonmistaken party. (Herget National Bank v. Theede (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1057-58, 537 N.E.2d 1109, 1112, citing Bayne v. Cinak (1925), 320 Ill. 23, 28, 150 N.E. 344, 346.) Goncher, the mistaken party, made no showing in the trial court or in this court that Cheryl, the nonmistaken party, committed any wrongful conduct that induced Goncher to sign the agreed order. Goncher is not entitled to have the November 17 order vacated due to his unilateral mistake.\nThe parties in this case entered an agreed order. At the time, Goncher had the benefit of counsel. Furthermore, Goncher signed the order. We find no evidence of fraud, coercion or unconscionability. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly denied Goncher\u2019s motion to vacate the November 17,1989, order.\nSECTION 2-1401 MOTION\nA section 2 \u2014 1401 motion is a statutory procedure by which judgments may be vacated after 30 days but not later than two years after the entry thereof. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1401.) The trial judge concluded that the section 2 \u2014 1401 petition in this case was insufficient to satisfy relief.\nFor the following reasons, we agree with the decision and reasoning of the trial court.\nA section 2 \u2014 1401 petition arises out of the same proceeding in which the order or judgment that it is directed to was entered, but it is a collateral attack on such judgment. (City of Des Plaines v. Scientific Machinery Movers, Inc. (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 438, 442, 292 N.E.2d 154, 157.) The purpose of a former section 72 motion (now section 2 \u2014 1401 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 1401)) is to bring before the trial court facts not appearing in the record which if known to the court at the time judgment was entered would have prevented its entry. Lacey v. Lacey (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 776, 778, 321 N.E.2d 524.\nThe courts in Illinois have repeatedly held that eligibility for relief under section 72 (now section 2 \u2014 1401) rests solidly upon the requirement that petitioner act with due diligence so that his failure to avail himself of the remedy resulted from no fault or negligence of his own. Diacou v. Palos State Bank (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 304, 310, 357 N.E.2d 518; People ex rel. Lampkin v. Brown (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 869, 401 N.E.2d 1171.\nA legally sufficient section 2 \u2014 1401 petition must affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) a meritorious claim or defense; (2) due diligence in presenting the claim in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the section 2 \u2014 1401 petition for relief. (Thompson v. I F A, Inc. (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 293, 298-99, 536 N.E.2d 969; Smith v. Airoom, Inc. (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21, 499 N.E.2d 1381.) The petitioner must also show by a preponderance of the evidence that through no fault or negligence of his own an error of fact or a valid def\u00e9nse or claim was not made to appear to the trial court at the time the challenged judgment order or decree was entered. In re Estate of Nakaerts (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 862, 466 N.E.2d 1325.\nThis section does not afford a litigant a remedy whereby he may be relieved of the consequences of his own mistakes or of the negligence of his trial counsel. (Lammert v. Lammert Industries, Inc. (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 667, 360 N.E.2d 1355.) A party must follow his case, and section 2 \u2014 1401 will not save a party from his or his lawyer\u2019s fault or negligence. Sidenstricker v. Dobbs (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 620, 442 N.E.2d 924.\nGoncher states that: \u201cEquity is offended by the terms of the November 17th order.\u201d We disagree. In 1986, in an earlier paternity action (85 Ml 99911) brought by Cheryl on behalf of Heather, Goncher had been ordered to pay $266.67 per month as support and in 1987 that sum had been increased to $310 per month. Goncher argues that this was substantial evidence that the November 17 award of $3,000-per-month support for Heather and Christa was excessive as well as being in excess of the guidelines. We reject Goncher\u2019s argument.\nA review of the record discloses that the 1986 order in the previous case was an agreed settlement order, settling the rights arising between Goncher and Nicholas Joseph D\u2019Andrea, Steven Mitchell D\u2019Andrea, Heather Graziani (Goncher), and Cheryl. That order provided for a cash settlement in excess of $100,000 and for payment of $266.67 in child support per child until each child reached the age of majority. The order further provided that upon termination of any support obligations for Steven Mitchell D\u2019Andrea, child support for Heather would then be raised to $300 per month. The previous support order is not substantial evidence that the November 17 award was excessive as well as in excess of the guidelines. The 1986 order was an agreed order and this court is not aware of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the 1987 order. This court cannot determine from the previous orders whether or not $3,000 per month for the support of Christa and Heather is in excess of the guidelines. Furthermore, whether or not the amount exceeds the guidelines is not relevant in this case since the November 17 order was an agreed order. As stated numerous times in this opinion, both parties were present at the pretrial when the settlement agreement was reached, each party had the benefit of counsel and each party signed the agreed order prior to its entry. The only matter that we find the previous child support order to be substantial evidence of is the fact that Goncher was not a novice to actions involving child support.\nGoncher maintains that it is undisputed that the sum awarded as support is approximately 50% of his net income. In his affidavit Goncher states: \u201cThat the figure $3000.00 as and for monthly child support represents a figure of approximately 50% of his net monthly income ***.\u201d We find nothing in the record or Goncher\u2019s brief to substantiate his actual income. Moreover, even if $3,000 was approximately 50% of Goncher\u2019s net income at the time the order was entered, Goncher has not shown that this would have prevented the entry of the agreed order.\nIn Welfelt v. Schultz Transit Co. (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 767, 494 N.E.2d 699, the court held that the plaintiff who was present at the settlement conference and initially approved settlement amounts, but later changed his mind, was not entitled to petition for relief from the judgment as a remedy for his belated change of mind. The court in Lofendo v. Ozog (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 237, 454 N.E.2d 806, found that the grounds asserted in the petition to vacate the judgment of dismissal, i.e., that plaintiff, after discussing the case with various members of her family, decided that the amount offered in settlement was unacceptable, were not sufficient to justify vacation of such judgment more than 30 days after its entry.\nRelief can be granted with respect to consent orders under section 2 \u2014 1401 and \u201c \u2018must be judged by the broad equitable considerations which govern all Section 72 [now 2 \u2014 1401] petitions.\u2019 \u201d (Lubowsky v. Skokie Valley Community Hospital (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 909, 914, 398 N.E.2d 1037, quoting City of Des Plaines, 9 Ill. App. 3d at 443.) In denying Goncher\u2019s section 2 \u2014 1401 petition, the court found\n\u201cthat at entry of 11/17/89 order both sides were adequately represented by able and competent counsel; that before court entered the widest latitude of discovery was allowed for both sides; that order entered was with the direct consent of both parties, both parties being present during the day long negotiations and both parties signing the order prior to its entry; that the order was fair and equitable being a complete adjudication of all issues; that the court considers and rejects the legal and equitable arguments raised by respondent\u2019s [Goncher\u2019s] counsel; that the order was agreed to by both parties.\u201d\nA decision involving a petition to vacate filed under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of sound legal discretion by the trial court. (Thompson v. I F A, Inc. (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296, 536 N.E.2d 969; Lubuowsky v. Skokie Valley Community Hospital (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 909, 916, 398 N.E.2d 1037; City of Des Plaines v. Scientific Machinery Movers, Inc. (1972), 9 Ill. App. 3d 438, 443-44, 292 N.E.2d 154.) After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial judge properly reviewed the section 2 \u2014 1401 petition and considered all relevant criteria. We do not find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.\nAccordingly, for all the reasons set forth above we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLORENZ, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURRAY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Herbert A. Glieberman, of Herbert A. Glieberman & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Norbert N. Rosenthal, of Norbert N. Rosenthal & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHERYL C. BURCHETT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCIS J. GONCHER, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNos. 1\u201490\u20140509, 1\u201490\u20142100, 1\u201491\u20141664 cons.\nOpinion filed December 20, 1991.\nHerbert A. Glieberman, of Herbert A. Glieberman & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nNorbert N. Rosenthal, of Norbert N. Rosenthal & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1091-01", "first_page_order": 1115, "last_page_order": 1124 }