{
  "id": 5783962,
  "name": "DEMME (DAVID) BEKELE, a Minor, by Hanna Hailu, his Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD NGO, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Bekele v. Ngo",
  "decision_date": "1992-09-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20142978",
  "first_page": "330",
  "last_page": "332",
  "citations": [
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "year": 1989,
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    {
      "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 868",
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        3179841
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:05.842880+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DEMME (DAVID) BEKELE, a Minor, by Hanna Hailu, his Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD NGO, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis negligence action arose out of a traffic accident between the operators of a bicycle and a car. Plaintiff, Demme (David) Bekele, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Hanna Hailu, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant, Ronald Ngo, following a bench trial and from the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for a new trial.\nDefendant has not filed an appellee brief, but we are authorized to decide this case under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128, 345 N.E.2d 493.\nFor the reasons which follow, we affirm.\nThe accident occurred at the intersection of an alley and a sidewalk in a residential Chicago neighborhood. The nine-year-old plaintiff was riding a bicycle on a sidewalk and defendant was driving a car down the alley.\nPlaintiff testified that while he was riding his bicycle on the sidewalk, he saw defendant in the alley, stopped his bicycle about one-quarter of the way into the alley and attempted to back up, but that defendant ran over his bicycle with the car\u2019s bumper and right front tire.\nDefendant testified that as he was emerging from the alley, he saw plaintiff coming down the sidewalk and stopped his car but that plaintiff rode his bike into the side of his car on the right front fender in front of the wheel. Defendant\u2019s son\u2019s testimony corroborated defendant\u2019s statement that the car was damaged on the right front fender in front of the wheel.\nClearly, the parties\u2019 versions of the events vary. The trier of fact, not the reviewing court, must resolve conflicts in the evidence and questions of fact.\nPlaintiff contends that the trial court\u2019s decision is erroneous because defendant violated section 11 \u2014 1205 of the Hlinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 1205) and that such violation is prima facie evidence of negligence under the holding in Wallace v. Weinrich (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 868, 409 N.E.2d 336.\nSection 11 \u2014 1205 provides as follows:\n\u201cThe driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, building, private road or driveway within an urban area shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving into the sidewalk area extending across such alley, building entrance, road or driveway, or in the event there is no sidewalk area, shall stop at the point nearest the street to be entered where the driver has a view of approaching traffic thereon, and shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on such roadway.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 1205.\nPlaintiff also relies on section 27 \u2014 223 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, which provides:\n\u201cThe driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk or onto the sidewalk area extending across an alleyway, yielding the right-of-way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and upon entering the roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on said roadway.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Chicago Municipal Code \u00a727 \u2014 223 (1987), now Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 24\u2014060 (1990).\nBoth the Vehicle Code and the Municipal Code define the term \u201cpedestrian\u201d as \u201c[a]ny person afoot.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 951/2, par. 1 \u2014 158; Chicago Municipal Code \u00a727 \u2014 200 (1987), now Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 4\u2014010 (1990).) A \u201cbicycle\u201d is defined as a \u201cdevice propelled by human power upon which any person may ride.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 1 \u2014 106; Chicago Municipal Code \u00a727\u2014 200 (1987), now Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 4\u2014010 (1990).) Given these statutory definitions, neither section 11 \u2014 1205 of the Vehicle Code nor section 27 \u2014 223 of the Chicago Municipal Code is appropriate in this case since plaintiff was not a pedestrian within the meaning of these statutes.\nPlaintiff\u2019s status as a bicyclist also distinguishes him from the two-year-old pedestrian involved in the Wallace case relied on by plaintiff. (Wallace, 87 Ill. App. 3d 868, 409 N.E.2d 336.) In Wallace, the two-year-old plaintiff was a pedestrian struck by a car backing out a driveway and the court held that a violation of section 11 \u2014 1205 of the Illinois Vehicle Code was prima facie evidence of negligence. However, we find that the present case does not fall within the parameters of section 11 \u2014 1205.\nThis is not to say that an automobile driver emerging from an alley would not be required to yield to a minor operating a bicycle, but merely that the minor does not come within the ambit of the statutes and defendant\u2019s liability would be predicated upon common law negligence.\nAlthough plaintiff argues that the trial court\u2019s reasoning was flawed, a reviewing court generally considers the propriety of the decision, not the reasoning. Much as we might wish, we cannot disturb the judgment of the court following a bench trial where it has resolved the conflicting evidence unless that judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence and an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. (Schackleton v. Federal Signal Corp. (1989), 196 Ill. App. 3d 437, 444-45, 554 N.E.2d 244; In re Estate of Thompson (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 874, 880, 542 N.E.2d 949.) We believe that the record does not mandate an opposite conclusion.\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nJudgment affirmed.\nTULLY and CERDA, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Sheldon Hodes, of Chicago (Leonard D. Litwin, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "No brief filed for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DEMME (DAVID) BEKELE, a Minor, by Hanna Hailu, his Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RONALD NGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20142978\nOpinion filed September 30, 1992.\nSheldon Hodes, of Chicago (Leonard D. Litwin, of counsel), for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0330-01",
  "first_page_order": 350,
  "last_page_order": 352
}