{ "id": 5782700, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHLEEN QUICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Quick", "decision_date": "1992-10-07", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20141230", "first_page": "446", "last_page": "456", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 446" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3552142 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462091 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2953346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4689058 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/254/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236611 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454543 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 3d 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3103049 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/99/1135-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427013 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130811 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430588 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5811071 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 U.S. 14", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167274 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/388/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 284", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957222 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535572 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2543073 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573939 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5080105 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822307 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2896152 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422518 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539877 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519932 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3109629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515314 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5407211 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2868574 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0337-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 939, "char_count": 22346, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4469203107188932e-07, "percentile": 0.6542858290193753 }, "sha256": "560e4fcb1d942889ab495a6b81972ada26d0287cc322baf5c0ee3bda689cc4c7", "simhash": "1:08cb796a1fcfa662", "word_count": 3748 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:05.842880+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHLEEN QUICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Kathleen Quick, was convicted of solicitation to murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 8 \u2014 1, 9 \u2014 1) for asking an undercover police officer to murder her husband. At trial, defendant unsuccessfully raised the entrapment and compulsion defenses and was sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) ruling that out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay even though they were offered to show their effect on her state of mind; (2) allowing improper rebuttal testimony; (3) tendering an improper and confusing jury instruction on the compulsion defense; (4) refusing to answer the jury\u2019s request for the dictionary meaning of \u201cimminent\u201d; (5) permitting the State to improperly cross-examine her; and (6) not giving an accomplice witness instruction sua sponte. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nOne of the issues in this case is whether it was prejudicial error for the trial court to give an instruction on the compulsion defense tendered by defense counsel, which omitted the \u201cif she reasonably believed\u201d portion.\nOn February 28, 1987, defendant paged Sergeant Randal Kacaba, an undercover Illinois State Police officer, and told him that a friend of a friend gave her his beeper number. After defendant stated that she understood that he could take care of her problem, Kacaba told defendant that he did not want to discuss the matter over the telephone, that he already knew what she wanted done, and not to worry about it. Kacaba suggested that she page him later to arrange a meeting.\nKacaba testified that George Lekas, a paid police informant, had earlier told him to expect defendant\u2019s call. Lekas said that he had met defendant in a bowling alley bar through Phil Lavin. Kacaba testified that he had never met Lavin, who was not a government agent, had not heard of him prior to February 28, 1987, and knew little about him.\nOn March 2, 1987, defendant again paged Kacaba. They met in a restaurant parking lot, wher\u00e9 defendant got into Kacaba\u2019s car and told him that she wanted to have her husband killed because she was tired of his physical abuse and accusations. Defendant stated that killing her husband was her only alternative because he would never agree to a divorce. Defendant then agreed to a $500 down payment for the killing.\nKacaba instructed defendant to bring a picture and information about her husband. He also told defendant that she could change her mind before paying the money, but not afterward, and she should page him again two days later.\nOn March 4, 1987, Kacaba obtained a court order authorizing him to use a tape recorder, a transmitter, and a video camera for the hotel room where the transaction would occur. Later that day, defendant paged Kacaba and told him that she still wanted to go through with the killing. Kacaba said that he would arrange a meeting with his partner, who would actually do the job. Defendant agreed to meet him the next afternoon with the $500 down payment in $50 bills.\nThe next day, Kacaba was wired with a recording and transmitting device. When he met defendant, Kacaba told her that they would meet his partner at a Holiday Inn and that she could change her mind at anytime. All she would have t\u00f3 do is get up and leave. Defendant replied that she understood and that she was a little nervous, but that she was going through with it. The tape-recorded conversation was played for the jury.\nDefendant followed Kacaba to the Holiday Inn, where they both went into room 124. Everything that occurred in the room was video taped and shown to the jury over defendant\u2019s objection. Bridgeview police officer Richard Cannella, who was posing as a hitman, was already in the room.\nDefendant told Cannella that she wanted her husband killed because he constantly beat her up and she was \u201ctired of his shit.\u201d After discussing the price, defendant gave Cannella two photographs of her husband and wrote information about him on a pad, including places he frequented and times he left work. Cannella testified that he had heard of Lavin, but did not know if he gave defendant the beeper information or encouraged her to kill her husband.\nDefendant testified that she met her husband at a church youth gathering when she was 13 years old and he was 15 years old. They started dating casually, meeting after church on Sundays, spending all day together, and going to church again at night.\nDefendant stated that her husband began physically abusing her after she began working. At first, he shoved her, but he later escalated to hitting her, causing bruises. During that time, defendant met Lavin, who knew her husband. According to defendant, they became friends, but not lovers, and defendant confided in Lavin about her husband\u2019s physical abuse. During a telephone conversation in 1985, Lavin suggested that he could take care of her husband for her. The trial court sustained the prosecutor\u2019s hearsay objection to that testimony.\nDefendant also testified that Lavin came to her job and gave her the beeper number. The trial court sustained the prosecution\u2019s objection to defendant\u2019s testimony about Lavin\u2019s statements to her regarding the beeper number; how much it would cost; and what she should say. The trial court ruled that any testimony relating to Lavin\u2019s statement to defendant was inadmissible hearsay and admonished the jury to disregard it.\nDefendant then testified that she continued having conversations with Lavin, but did not reveal the content of those conversations. Defendant stated that she felt that she had to call the number because Lavin\u2019s remarks had scared her. Defendant\u2019s testimony of the events leading to her arrest was substantially the same as that of Officers Kacaba and Cannella.\nAlthough defendant did intend to kill her husband at that time, she maintained that she decided to do so only after her husband hit her and after Lavin kept suggesting it to her. Defendant also testified that she thought that killing her husband was her only solution to her marital problems. Defendant testified that she never discussed killing her husband with anyone but Lavin, Kacaba, and Cannella; she never met Lekas; she never asked Lavin to find a hitman to kill her husband; Lavin was the first person to raise the subject; and she did not ask Lavin to come to her workplace to give her the beeper number. Defendant also stated that her previous efforts to employ a hitman to kill her husband involved Lavin, but that she never met or paid anyone to kill her husband prior to this incident. Defendant said that it was Lavin who told her that her husband would never let her have a divorce.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that Lavin kept badgering her about killing her husband. Defendant admitted that she was taught that having her husband killed would be a mortal sin for which she could go to hell for eternity. She also stated that she told Cannella that he could make extra money by robbing her husband\u2019s truck.\nAccording to defendant, Lavin had previously informed her that it would cost $1,000 to have her husband killed. Defendant stated that she was not a tough person, but tried to appear tough so that the \u201chitmen\u201d would believe her. She claimed that she did everything she did because she was told to do so by Lavin and the \u201chitmen.\u201d\nIn the State\u2019s rebuttal case, Lavin testified over defendant\u2019s objections. He stated that he met defendant in 1984 or 1985 and that they had a year-long sexual affair beginning in the summer of 1985 or 1986. Lavin knew defendant\u2019s husband, was friendly with him, and did not believe he had a bad temper. According to Lavin, defendant frequently complained that her husband beat her and that she was not happy in her marriage, but Lavin thought she was fantasizing. Lavin stated that only once, when he and defendant were both naked, did he see a bruise on defendant\u2019s thigh.\nLavin testified that he became annoyed when defendant repeatedly asked if he knew someone who could kill her husband. When Lavin saw Lekas in a bowling alley bar in February 1987, he told Lekas that someone kept bothering him about wanting to get someone killed. Lavin had known Lekas for four or five years and considered him a con man. Two days later, in the bowling alley, Lekas gave Lavin a piece of paper with a phone number and the name \u201cRich\u201d on it and he told Lavin to have his friend call the number and \u201cthey\u2019ll take care of the problem.\u201d Even though Lavin thought the number was phony, he gave it to defendant so that she would stop bothering him.\nAccording to Lavin, he told defendant that he had talked to a guy, had no idea what it was or who it was for, and said, \u201cit\u2019s yours, I don\u2019t want nothing to do with it.\u201d From that time until defendant was arrested, Lavin claimed that he did not speak to her.\nLavin denied telling defendant that she would be killed if she did not call the number and ask for Rich; that he told her what to say after calling the number; or that he knew about her meeting at the Holiday Inn on March 5, 1987. Lavin also denied ever working as a police agent or ever working for or with Lekas.\nAt the instructions conference, the trial court allowed a compulsion instruction, but not an entrapment instruction since there was no evidence that Lavin was an agent acting on behalf of Lekas, who was a paid government informant. After the jury deliberated, defendant was convicted of solicitation of murder and sentenced to 10 years\u2019 imprisonment. We reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.\nOn appeal, defendant asserts that she was denied a fair trial because she was prohibited from testifying to Lavin\u2019s out-of-court statements, which were the crux of her defense. Defendant maintains that Lavin and Lekas were working together to entrap her into committing the offense and that she felt compelled to go through with the crime because Lavin told her that the hitmen would kill her if she backed out.\nThe trial court barred defendant from testifying to any statements by Lavin on the basis that they were hearsay. Defendant contends that the statements were not hearsay because they were not being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, they were being offered for their effect on her state of mind. We agree.\nDefendant relied on cases where out-of court statements were not hearsay. See People v. Moore (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 337 (it was improper to prohibit the defendant from testifying about conversations that were the important factual foundation of the defendant\u2019s claim that he shot the deceased in self-defense); People v. Hines (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 976 (conversation between the killer and defendant\u2019s representative about how to commit the crime was proper to show that they had reached an agreement); People v. Sadaka (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 260 (evidence of a known heroin trafficker\u2019s telephone number found on the defendant was not hearsay because it was introduced to show an association between the defendant and the person whose telephone number was in defendant\u2019s possession); People v. Husted (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 160 (exclusion of a conversation that was integral to the defendant\u2019s theory of defense could deny the defendant a fair trial).\nDefendant then analogizes self-defense cases to the compulsion defense, asserting that out-of-court statements by others could similarly compel an individual to commit a crime. See People v. Hoddenbach (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 57; People v. Moore (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 202; People v. Ganci (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 234; People v. Limas (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 643; People v. Davis (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 127.\nThe State\u2019s response is fundamentally flawed. It does not address defendant\u2019s argument that the out-of-court statements were not hearsay. Instead, the State concludes that the trial court properly excluded Lavin\u2019s out-of-court statements because they were hearsay that did not come under any exception to the hearsay rule. The State argues that the statements were hearsay because they were offered as substantive evidence to prove the truth of defendant\u2019s own statements that she was afraid she would be hurt or killed if she backed out of killing her husband. The State also maintains that defendant cannot prove her own out-of-court statements. Furthermore, the State contends that defendant cannot use the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to admit Lavin\u2019 s statements to prove her own state of mind because she was not the declarant. People v. Berry (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 256.\nThe State is confusing two separate hearsay concepts: nonhearsay statements or verbal acts, offered to show the effect of the declarant\u2019s statement on the person hearing it; and a hearsay exception, which permits out-of-court statements to prove the declarant\u2019s state of mind, emotion, or sensation, when his state of mind is at issue or in cases when a declarant\u2019s statements of intention are used as proof that the intended act was done.\nThe State then argues that the trial court has the discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and admissible. (People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89.) However, there is no issue of relevancy raised here. The testimony was excluded on the basis of hearsay, not because it was irrelevant.\nThis case is similar to People v. Perez (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 457, 466, where the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to testify fully to out-of-court statements consisting of threats and an offer of cocaine, which influenced his state of mind, even though he was allowed to testify to some of those statements. Furthermore, in Perez, the defendant\u2019s motive was material to the issue of a lack of predisposition, which was an essential element of his entrapment defense. Perez, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nAn out-of-court statement used for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted may be admissible to show the state of mind of the recipient after hearing the statement. (Perez, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 466.) If that statement is offered to prove its effect on the listener\u2019s state of mind or to show why the listener acted as she did, it is not hearsay. (People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 636.) Furthermore, where the intention, motive, or belief of the accused is material to the issue, she should be allowed to testify directly to that fact, and to have the circumstances surrounding the act considered in connection with her testimony. Perez, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nLavin\u2019s out-of-court statements were improperly excluded as hearsay. They were offered to show their effect on defendant\u2019s state of mind after she heard them. Furthermore, Lavin\u2019s out-of-court statements were crucial to defendant\u2019s defense. By barring that testimony, the trial court\u2019s rulings denied defendant her constitutional right to present a defense. (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038; Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019, 87 S. Ct. 1920; People v. Manion (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 564.) Accordingly, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.\nDefendant then asserts that the trial court\u2019s error prohibiting her from testifying to Lavin\u2019s statements was compounded by Lavin improperly testifying in the State\u2019s rebuttal case. We agree.\nLavin gave a detailed version of his statements to defendant, including that (1) defendant constantly complained of beatings by her husband, but Lavin thought she was fantasizing; (2) starting as early as 1985, defendant repeatedly said that she wanted to have her husband killed; (3) Lavin did not tell her that she or her children would be harmed if she did not call the number; and (4) Lavin did not coach defendant about what to say at the Holiday Inn.\nRebuttal testimony is testimony that is adduced by the prosecutor to explain, repel, contradict, or disprove evidence given by the defendant. (People v. Hunter (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 516, 538.) Since defendant was not allowed to testify about Lavin\u2019s statements and the jury was instructed to disregard her attempts to describe them on cross-examination, Lavin\u2019s detailed rebuttal testimony about those statements was improper.\nNext, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by giving the jury a confusing instruction on the compulsion defense, which, in effeet, instructed the jury on the wrong standard. The State contends that defendant waived this issue. Not only did she not object to the instruction at trial, the State argues, but it was the defense counsel who prepared and tendered the instruction. Since the alleged error affected defendant\u2019s substantial rights, we will consider it as plain error. People v. Almo (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 54, 66.\nThe Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 24 \u2014 25.21 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d) on the compulsion defense states:\n\u201cIt is a defense to the charge made against defendant that [s]he acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if [s]he reasonably believed death or great bodily harm would be inflicted upon [her] if [s]he did not perform the conduct with which [s]he is charged.\u201d\nThe instruction given to the jury differed from the IPI instruction in that it omitted a substantial part of the instruction. The instruction given to the jury was:\n\u201cIt is a defense to the charge made against the defendant that she acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm would be inflicted upon her if she did not perform the conduct with which she is charged.\u201d\nBecause the words \u201cif she reasonably believed death or great bodily harm\u201d were omitted, the trial court committed plain error in giving the instruction to the jury.\nA defendant is entitled to the benefit of any defense shown by the entire evidence and very slight evidence will justify the giving of an instruction. (People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540.) A jury instruction may not be misleading or confusing and should fully and fairly inform the jury of the law applicable to the respective theories of defense. (People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1138.) The court\u2019s duty is to give the jury proper guidance, not to generate confusion. People v. Jenkins (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 61, 66.\nThe compulsion defense instruction given in this case was confusing and incorrect. The trial court had the duty to clarify that confusion even though the defense counsel had tendered the erroneous instruction. The issue was not whether defendant would be harmed, since it was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant would not have been harmed because the \u201chitmen\u201d were actually undercover police. Instead, the issue was what defendant reasonably believed. If she reasonably believed that she would be injured, that would be sufficient for the compulsion defense. The error was so substantial that it reflected on the fairness of the trial. (People v. Linscott (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 22, 28.) Since the trial\u2019s outcome could have been different if the correct instruction had been given, the instruction was prejudicial error.\nNext, defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it refused to answer the jury\u2019s request for the dictionary definition of the word \u201cimminent\u201d contained in the compulsion defense instruction. Defendant waived this issue because she did not object at trial and did not include the error in her post-trial motion.\nDefendant then asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the State to cross-examine her about whether soliciting her husband\u2019s murder was a mortal sin for which she could go to hell for eternity. The State maintains that the cross-examination questions were in response to defendant\u2019s direct examination testimony that she met her husband at a church youth gathering and the two continued to see each other on Sunday afternoons after church. The State also argues that the questions were not offered to prove bad moral character, but to determine when defendant made the decision to kill her husband and how important that decision was to defendant.\nThe trial court erred in allowing the testimony. The court should not permit cross-examination that is designed to insult, degrade, or humiliate a witness (People v. Brown (1912), 254 Ill. 260, 269) or whose only apparent purpose is to demonstrate that the defendant was of bad moral character (People v. Butler (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 45, 50). Inquiring into defendant\u2019s religious beliefs was improper. It is disturbing that the prosecutor asked those questions. There is a difference between religious activities and religious beliefs. Defendant\u2019s testimony about her religious activities did not allow the State to question her about her religious beliefs.\nFinally, defendant waived her argument that the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving the jury an accomplice instruction. Defendant did not tender such an instruction and the evidence did not support such an instruction. It is the burden of the party who desires a specific instruction to present it to the court and request that it be given to the jury. (People v. Turner (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 540, 562; People v. Bodoh (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 415, 431.) A trial court is only required to offer an instruction sua sponte if it relates to the elements of the offense charged, the presumption of innocence, or the burden of proof. (Turner, 128 Ill. 2d at 562-63.) Moreover, a court is obligated to use restraint in giving instructions sua sponte so as not to interfere with or frustrate defense strategy. People v. Garcia (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 618.\nBased on the forgoing, defendant\u2019s convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nGREIMAN, P.J., and TULLY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gordon H. Berry, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Judy L. DeAngelis, and Susan Smith Snyder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHLEEN QUICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141230\nOpinion filed October 7, 1992.\nRehearing denied November 20, 1992.\nGordon H. Berry, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Judy L. DeAngelis, and Susan Smith Snyder, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0446-01", "first_page_order": 466, "last_page_order": 476 }