{ "id": 5155172, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HORTEZ DANIEL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Daniel", "decision_date": "1992-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20140845", "first_page": "19", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 19" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3084513 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2841485 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2489729 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" }, { "page": "957" }, { "page": "957" }, { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0937-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1399, "char_count": 38317, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.370373343842738e-08, "percentile": 0.4418776924832297 }, "sha256": "28f53c506129bb28c9c92932b078bbb7607072cb9d3cb9b5e9fc6a5fdf071c88", "simhash": "1:116cb5ee7346a857", "word_count": 6254 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:43.416061+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HORTEZ DANIEL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Hortez Daniel, was convicted of first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)); armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 2); and residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3). The trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms ranging from 15 to 70 years.\nDefendant appeals, contending the trial court should have suppressed: (1) his confession, and (2) the fruits of a warrantless search of his car. Defendant also contends (3) his sentence was improper and excessive.\nWe affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nBackground\nThe record contains the following pertinent facts. On July 10, 1990, defendant was charged in a 14-count indictment with eight counts of first degree murder, two counts of home invasion, one count of armed robbery, one count of robbery, and two counts of residential burglary.\nA\nOn November 16, 1990, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements. The State\u2019s evidence was essentially as follows. On June 13, 1990, Chicago police detective Ellen Moran was investigating the murder of Eulis Reese. At approximately 10:30 a.m., as part of the investigation, Detective Moran and other Chicago police officers brought to a police station defendant; his father, Horace; his grandmother, Bernice; his cousin; and Horace\u2019s girlfriend. Defendant and his family were taken in two squad cars. Detective Moran could not remember whether defendant was placed in a squad car separate from his family.\nAt the police station, Detective Moran first questioned Horace\u2019s girlfriend. During this time, defendant was with his family. At approximately 12 noon, Moran took defendant to a second-floor interview room and questioned him for roughly one hour. From approximately 1:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., Moran investigated the information that defendant gave to her. She then briefed the next watch assigned to the case.\nChicago police detective George Holmes came on duty on June 13, 1990, at 4:30 p.m. His partner was Detective George Tracy. Defendant was still in the station\u2019s second-floor interview room. At approximately 7 p.m., Detective Holmes arrested defendant for the murder of Eulis Reese. At approximately 7:25 p.m., Detective Holmes advised defendant of his constitutional rights and, because defendant was 16 years old, also advised defendant that he could be charged as an adult. Defendant responded that he understood each of his rights. In the room with Detective Holmes was Chicago police department youth officer Carol Kilgore. The door to the room did not lock and defendant was not handcuffed. Defendant agreed to talk with Detective Holmes and they spoke for about an hour. Defendant did not appear upset and was able to answer questions.\nAt approximately 10 p.m., Detective Holmes again spoke with defendant in the presence of youth officer Kilgore. The conversation lasted for about 10 minutes. Defendant again appeared natural and normal.\nKilgore remained with defendant in the interview room from their 7:25 p.m. conversation until the end of her shift at midnight. Further, neither Kilgore nor anyone in her presence threatened or mentally coerced defendant. Also, defendant did not display any condition that rendered him unable to understand his constitutional rights.\nAlthough Horace remained at the police station throughout the day, Detective Holmes could not recall whether Horace spoke with defendant subsequent to his arrest. However, Horace was allowed to bring defendant food. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 14, Horace left the station.\nAt roughly 2:15 a.m., Detectives Holmes and Tracy spoke with defendant for 10 to 30 minutes. Thereafter, Holmes and Tracy, joined by Detectives Robert Utter and George Carey, took defendant with them on a field investigation. Defendant was handcuffed when they left the station. They went to one location, where they unsuccessfully searched for someone. They thereafter went to a second location, where they unsuccessfully searched for an object.\nAt approximately 3:30 a.m., the detectives then took defendant to Horace\u2019s home. Defendant and the four detectives met with Horace, Horace\u2019s girlfriend, and defendant\u2019s grandmother. In their presence, defendant made statements that implicated him in the crime. The detectives also recovered evidence from the residence. Defendant made additional statements as he left Horace\u2019s residence.\nDetectives Holmes and Tracy then took defendant to the home of his friend and high school classmate Sergio Thomas. Detectives Carey and Utter followed. At Thomas\u2019 home, the detectives recovered additional evidence. At approximately 4:30 a.m., the detectives took defendant and Thomas back to the police station.\nDetectives Holmes and Tracy returned defendant to the second-floor interview room and removed his handcuffs. At approximately 5:15 a.m., the detectives again spoke with defendant. He was again advised of his constitutional rights, to which he again responded that he understood each of his rights. They spoke for roughly 30 minutes. During this conversation, defendant made a confession. The detectives then requested the presence of an assistant State\u2019s Attorney.\nThroughout the field investigation that morning and during the 5:15 a.m. conversation, each of the four detectives observed that defendant was alert and coherent, responsive and cooperative. Defendant did not appear to have any physical, psychological, educational, or emotional condition that rendered him incapable of understanding and. appreciating his constitutional rights. Each detective testified that neither he, nor anyone in his presence, threatened or mentally coerced defendant.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Aaron Iverson arrived at the police station and spoke with defendant at approximately 7 a.m. Detective Holmes was present at the beginning of the interview. Iverson explained to defendant that he worked with the police and was not defendant\u2019s lawyer. Iverson also informed defendant of his constitutional rights. Defendant was not in handcuffs and appeared alert and calm. Defendant and Iverson spoke for roughly one hour. Defendant agreed to repeat his confession in the presence of a court reporter.\nChicago police department youth officer Donald Petersen spoke with defendant at approximately 8:35 a.m. He advised defendant of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he could be tried as an adult for the offense of murder. Defendant responded that he understood these rights and admonition. Defendant spoke with Petersen for approximately 10 minutes, during which time Detective Moran was in the room periodically. Defendant was not handcuffed. He appeared relaxed and alert, and did not appear to have any physical, mental, educational, or emotional condition that prevented him from understanding his constitutional rights. In response to Petersen\u2019s questions, defendant stated that he had eaten and that he was \u201cokay.\u201d Neither Officer Petersen nor anyone in his presence threatened or mentally coerced defendant. During this conversation, defendant did not tell Petersen that he had been struck, threatened, or mistreated in anyway by anyone.\nPrior to the arrival of the court reporter, defendant went to sleep. When the court reporter arrived, defendant was allowed five or six minutes to wake up. At approximately 9:37 a.m., defendant was again advised of his constitutional rights, and then he repeated his confession, which the court reporter transcribed. With defendant and the court reporter were Iverson, Detective Moran, and youth officer Petersen.\nDefendant stated that he was making the confession voluntarily. He had received food, drink, and a cigarette. He was not denied use of the washroom.\nHowever, near the end of the confession, defendant indicated that he had been threatened by a police officer sometime during the early morning. Specifically, a man, using profanity, \u201cthreatened to beat [defendant\u2019s] head in the wall.\u201d Defendant was threatened a total of three times during this encounter. In response to Iverson\u2019s questions, defendant stated: he was never actually hit; the person who threatened him was not in the room at that time; the officer did not tell defendant that he had to give the statement or be hit; and that defendant had given the statement voluntarily because \u201cthat\u2019s what actually happened.\u201d Defendant read, made corrections to, and signed the typed statement.\nDefendant was the sole defense witness on the motion to suppress. Defendant\u2019s testimony was essentially as follows. In cooperation with the police, defendant and his family went to the police station to assist the police in their investigation of the victim\u2019s death. When defendant and his family were transported to the police station, he rode in a separate squad car with only the police. Upon their arrival, defendant was taken to a waiting room. He remained in that room throughout the day. He was not handcuffed while he was in the police station.\nDuring the 7:25 p.m. conversation with Detective Holmes and Officer Kilgore, defendant was told that the detectives had recovered a gun from his car. Defendant was further told that Horace identified the gun as the one taken from the victim\u2019s home. During the 10 p.m. conversation with Detective Holmes and Officer Kilgore, defendant was told that a friend had seen him with a large amount of money on the day that the victim was killed.\nDuring the early morning of June 14, a police officer entered the interview room. The officer approached defendant, drew a fist near defendant\u2019s face, and told defendant to \u201csit up. Tell me or I\u2019m going to bust your [expletive] head in the wall.\u201d Defendant could not identify this officer, but the officer was one of the detectives that interviewed him and also testified at the hearing.\nThe four detectives subsequently took defendant on the above-described field investigation. During the investigation, Officer Carey told defendant \u201cdon\u2019t make us mad, or I\u2019m going to [expletive] you up.\u201d After their return to the police station, defendant made a confession because, as he testified, he \u201cwas scared\u201d of \u201cPolice Officers beating me up.\u201d Further, defendant repeated his confession to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Iverson and in the presence of a court reporter for the same reason. The first time defendant alleged that he was threatened was at the end of his court-reported confession. Also, no one ever physically attacked defendant.\nAt the close of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the confession. The court found as follows. Defendant voluntarily went to the police station. He was not under arrest until 7 p.m. Defendant was at the police station for \u201ca substantial length of time.\u201d However, police questioning was intermittent rather than continuous. Defendant\u2019s family was present at the station \u201cfor a substantial period of time\u201d both prior to and following his arrest. Defendant had normal intelligence and prior experience with the police.\nThe trial court did not find that defendant was threatened. Further, even if defendant was threatened, the threats were not of such a nature as to overcome his will. The court also noted that police substantially complied with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801 \u2014 1 et seq.) Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary and admissible.\nB\nOn January 7, 1991, immediately prior to trial, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant sought to suppress a .32 caliber revolver. The police recovered the handgun from the trunk of defendant\u2019s automobile as the result of a warrantless search.\nThe testimony at the hearing was essentially as follows. At approximately 1 p.m. on June 13, 1990, Detective Moran asked for defendant\u2019s consent to verify his school attendance records and to search his automobile. Detective Moran testified that defendant gave his consent; he told her that the car was parked in front of Thomas\u2019 home and that Thomas had the car keys. However, defendant testified that Moran did not ask for, and he did not give, his consent to search the car.\nDetective Moran then spoke to defendant\u2019s father, Horace. Horace told Moran that he had bought the automobile and signed the papers for it. However, there was testimony that title to the car was in defendant\u2019s name, Horace drove the car \u201cmaybe once,\u201d and that defendant drove the car primarily. At Moran\u2019s request, Horace signed a consent-to-search form. Moran believed that Horace could consent to the search because defendant was 16 years old and because Horace had paid for the car.\nAt the close of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. The court noted that it was disputed whether defendant consented to the search of the car. The court further noted, however, that it was undisputed that Horace consented. The court found that the police acted in good faith and could reasonably believe that Horace could consent to the search.\nC\nThe State\u2019s case at trial, which included defendant\u2019s confession, was essentially as follows. On June 11, 1990, Sergio Thomas rode a motor scooter to his high school. Although the scooter actually belonged to another, Thomas told several classmates, including defendant, that Thomas owned the scooter. Thomas told defendant that the scooter cost roughly $1,800.\nOn June 12, defendant was at school between 8:30 a.m. and 9 a.m. Later that day, he went to the victim\u2019s apartment. The victim was 77 years old. He was the boyfriend to defendant\u2019s grandmother; he was regarded as a stepfather by Horace. The victim lived with defendant\u2019s grandmother and cousin. In the victim\u2019s apartment, Horace kept approximately $3,600 and a .32-caliber revolver in a suitcase in a closet.\nDefendant spoke with the victim for a few minutes. Defendant then grabbed the victim from behind and choked him; defendant used his forearm in a \u201cfull Nelson\u201d hold. The victim passed out and defendant placed him on the kitchen floor.\nDefendant found the suitcase containing the money and the handgun. He returned to the kitchen and placed them both on the kitchen table. Defendant also loaded the handgun and laid it on the table. The victim stirred. Defendant took a kitchen knife, put one hand over the victim\u2019s mouth, and attempted to stab the victim. However, defendant cut himself during the ensuing struggle.\nDefendant took the gun and ordered the victim to stand up and be quiet. Defendant then went into the living room to see whether anyone was coming. The victim attempted to escape down the back stairs of the building. Defendant returned to the kitchen and chased the victim. Defendant shot at the victim twice as he ran down the stairs, from a distance of eight or nine feet. Defendant shot at the victim a third time as he ran toward his car. Defendant then took the money and ran in the opposite direction of the victim.\nDefendant hid the money behind his school and hid the gun behind a house. He eventually picked up his car, retrieved the money and the gun, and drove to his high school to meet Thomas.\nAt approximately 2:45 p.m., defendant and Thomas drove to Thomas\u2019 home. Thomas noticed that one of defendant\u2019s thumbs was bandaged and bloody. When they arrived, defendant placed the gun in the back of the car beside the spare tire, telling Thomas that he had to hide it. Defendant took the money to Thomas\u2019 room, where defendant counted $2,000. Thomas gave defendant a black waist sack in which defendant put the $2,000. Thomas hid the remainder in his mattress. Defendant did not tell Thomas how defendant acquired the money.\nDefendant and Thomas returned to defendant\u2019s car. Defendant unloaded the gun and replaced it beside the spare tire. Thomas drove defendant\u2019s car to an automobile dealer to buy a scooter. On the way to the dealer, defendant threw the bullets onto the street. They eventually arrived at the dealership, where defendant bought a scooter for $1,820. Thomas signed the papers and the scooter was placed in his name because defendant was too young.\nDefendant drove the scooter and Thomas drove defendant\u2019s car back to Thomas\u2019 home. Defendant gave Thomas his car keys and said that he would return that night or the next day. Thomas advised defendant not to carry the gun while driving the scooter. Thomas took the remainder of the money from his mattress and hid it in a tool box trader his desk.\nAt approximately 12:45 p.m. on June 12, Detective Moran was assigned to investigate the homicide. She noticed a pool of blood where the victim was found, roughly 50 to 60 feet from the building\u2019s back stairs leading to the victim\u2019s apartment. There were bloody footprints on the stairs, another pool of blood on the kitchen floor, and blood on the kitchen cabinets and the back door knob. They found the victim\u2019s pants, inside of which was a wallet containing approximately $70. The parties stipulated that the victim died of two gunshot wounds.\nThrough her investigation, Detective Moran met the family of the victim and that of defendant. Horace told Moran that money and a gun were missing from the victim\u2019s apartment.\nAs we recounted earlier, on June 13, defendant and his family were taken to the police station. That afternoon, Detective Moran received the consent of both defendant and Horace to search defendant\u2019s car. At approximately 3:30 p.m., Detective Moran went to Thomas\u2019 home. Thomas gave the car keys to Moran, who found the revolver near the spare tire. The parties stipulated that the handgun was the instrument of death.\nWhen the detectives and defendant went to Horace\u2019s home on June 14 at 3:30 a.m., they recovered the black waist sack. It contained roughly $130. Also, when the detectives and defendant thereafter went to Thomas\u2019 home, they recovered the remainder of the stolen money.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for an acquittal on the two counts of home invasion and the two counts of murder based on the home invasion. Presenting no witnesses, the defense rested.\nThe trial court convicted defendant of first degree murder. The court convicted defendant of armed robbery and further found that the charge of robbery merged into the armed robbery conviction. The court also convicted defendant of residential burglary.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that the victim\u2019s age was an aggravating factor that qualified defendant for an extended prison term. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20145\u20143.2(b)(3)(ii), 1005\u20148\u20142(a).) The court sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms of 70 years on the murder conviction, 20 years on the armed robbery conviction, and 15 years on the residential burglary conviction. Defendant appeals.\nOpinion\nI\nDefendant first claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress statements. Defendant contends that his confession was involuntary.\nThe test for determining the voluntariness of a defendant\u2019s statement is quite settled. \u201cThe test for voluntariness is whether the statement was made freely and without compulsion or inducement of any sort or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overcome at the time he confessed.\u201d People v. Jones (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 937, 957, 554 N.E.2d 516, 528; see People v. Hattery (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 785, 821, 539 N.E.2d 368, 392.\nThe question of whether a confession is a product of free will must be answered on the facts of each case because no single fact is dispositive. In determining whether a defendant gave statements voluntarily, a court may consider many factors, which include: the defendant\u2019s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, and education, and physical condition at the time of questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises. The trial court\u2019s finding that a statement was voluntary will not be disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reviewing the trial court\u2019s finding, we may consider the entire record, including trial testimony. Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 957, 554 N.E.2d at 528; Hattery, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 821, 539 N.E.2d at 392-93.\nFurther, this test applies to both juvenile and adult confessions. However, courts recognize that the making of an incriminating statement by a juvenile is a sensitive concern that requires great care, in the absence of counsel, to assure that the admission was neither coerced nor suggested, nor the product of ignorance of rights, fright, or despair. (Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 957, 554 N.E.2d at 528.) For the following reasons, we uphold the trial court\u2019s finding of voluntariness.\nA\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s findings that defendant freely and voluntarily went to the police station on June 13, 1990, at 10:30 a.m. and that he was not under arrest until 7 p.m. Rather, defendant contends that his confession was the result of an illegal detention that began at 10:30 a.m.\nPolice must have probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime in order to detain that person involuntarily for purposes of interrogation. The test to determine whether a person has been detained for custodial interrogation is whether a reasonable, innocent person in the circumstances would believe that he was free to leave. The test is objective; therefore, defendant\u2019s belief that he was under arrest is not determinative. People v. Finklea (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 448, 451-52, 456 N.E.2d 680, 682; People v. Reed (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 331, 335-36, 432 N.E.2d 979, 982-83.\nAs with the general issue of voluntariness, a court must look to all of the circumstances surrounding the questioning, with no single factor deemed controlling. The factors include: the place of interrogation, any statements or conduct that indicate that the accused is not free to leave, the extent of the knowledge of the police and the focus of their investigation, and the intentions of police officers in questioning the accused. A court should also consider the time, length, mode and mood of the interrogation; the number of police officers present and the presence or absence of the accused\u2019s friends or family; the manner in which the accused arrived at the interrogation site; and the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused. People v. Matthews (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 371, 402-03, 562 N.E.2d 1113, 1131-32, quoting People v. Smith (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 524, 528, 501 N.E.2d 1010, 1013; Finklea, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 456 N.E.2d at 682.\nFurther, the facts that the questioning took place in a police station and that police drove the defendant to the station, considered either individually or in combination, are not sufficient to convert the questioning into an arrest. Also, the fact that police suspicions may have shifted during the course of the interrogations does not render the situation custodial. Finklea, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 453, 456 N.E.2d at 682.\nApplying these factors to the case at bar, we conclude that defendant\u2019s confession was not the result of an illegal detention. Defendant himself testified that he and his family were taken to the police station to cooperate with the police and to assist in the investigation of the victim\u2019s homicide. The record does not show that the police had at that time focused their investigation on defendant.\nTrue, defendant\u2019s pre-arrest interrogation period lasted from 10:30 a.m. until 7 p.m. However, at least Horace was present throughout the interrogation period. Further, defendant was questioned only once, by only Detective Moran, and for only one hour. Defendant was not restrained in any way; he was not placed in a locked room; he was not told that he was not free to leave. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s findings, that defendant freely and voluntarily went to the police station on the morning of June 13, 1990, and that he was not under arrest until 7 p.m., were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nB\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602) on \u201cmany, many occasions.\u201d Rather, defendant points to the fact that he was first advised of his constitutional rights at 7:25 p.m., approximately nine hours subsequent to his arrival at the police station. However, defendant came to the police station voluntarily and was not in custody until his arrest at 7 p.m. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. See Finklea, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 453-54, 456 N.E.2d at 683.\nDefendant also points to the fact that he was not readmonished until 5:15 a.m., approximately 10 hours subsequent to his first admonishment, and that he made incriminating statements in the interim. However, once an accused is advised of the Miranda warnings and acknowledges his understanding of them, the voluntariness of subsequent statements is not compromised by failure to repeat the warnings at each successive interview. (People v. Hill (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 125, 131-32, 233 N.E.2d 367, 371; People v. Genus (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1011, 393 N.E.2d 1162, 1169.) We note that defendant was advised of his rights on several additional occasions prior to giving a transcribed confession. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nC\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s findings regarding alleged threats made by a police officer. The trial court did not find that defendant was threatened. Further, the court did find that even if defendant was threatened, the threats were not of such a nature as to overcome his will.\nThe trial court applied the correct analysis. As we stated earlier, the test of voluntariness is based on all of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. No one factor is dispositive. \u201cIt is possible that, although threats or promises may have been made, the evidence as a whole shows that a statement was made voluntarily and is therefore admissible in evidence.\u201d (People v. Jones (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 849, 853, 291 N.E.2d 305, 308.) It was within the province of the trial court to judge the credibility of defendant and the other witnesses. (See Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 960, 554 N.E.2d at 530.) We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nD\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding that there \u201cwas clearly no evidence of any physical abuse in this case.\u201d Defendant characterizes the following facts as \u201cincidents of abuse\u201d: he was given food only once during the interrogation period; he was isolated in a small room with no sleeping facilities; he was given something to drink only once; and police officers interrupted what sleep he obtained to interrogate him.\nWe uphold the trial court\u2019s finding. The fact that the interview room lacked comfortable furnishings does not indicate that defendant was coerced into making his confession. \u201cThe mere existence of some discomfort is not sufficient to render a statement involuntary.\u201d (People v. Stachelek (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 391, 402, 495 N.E.2d 984, 991.) Indeed, defendant never testified that he was hungry, thirsty, tired, or denied access to the washroom. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nE\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding that the police substantially complied with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 801\u20141 et seq.) However, the Act does not apply to defendant. \u201cDefendant in the instant case was not arrested pursuant to a petition in the juvenile court, but was simply arrested for murder and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts.\u201d People v. Visnack (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 113, 126, 481 N.E.2d 744, 753.\nDefendant also assigns error to the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant had prior experience with police. However, this is an accepted factor in the totality of the circumstances which a court should consider. People v. Racanelli (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 124, 132, 476 N.E.2d 1179, 1185.\nWe have carefully reviewed the entire record. In view of all of the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s confession, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding, that defendant voluntarily made the confession, was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nII\nDefendant next claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence. He contends that the police did not receive a valid consent to search his car. Defendant argues that the illegal search produced not only Horace\u2019s revolver, but also defendant\u2019s further inculpatory statements, additional physical evidence and, ultimately, defendant\u2019s confession.\nOn a motion to suppress evidence, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that the search was unreasonable. (People v. Brown (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 528, 540, 515 N.E.2d 1285, 1292.) A trial court\u2019s determination on a motion to suppress will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous. Brown, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 515 N.E.2d at 1289.\nUnder the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, a search conducted without a search warrant is per se unreasonable. An exception to the requirements of a search warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. (People v. Callaway (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 872, 877, 522 N.E.2d 337, 340; People v. Johnson (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 886, 891, 321 N.E.2d 38, 42-43.) To be valid, the consent must be freely and voluntarily given. Whether a consent is voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances. Callaway, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 877, 522 N.E.2d at 340.\nIn the present case, the trial court based its ruling on the undisputed fact that Horace consented to the search. It is axiomatic that consent to a search must be voluntary. It is further settled that consent need not be given by the defendant. \u201cRather, any person who has access to or control of the property for most purposes has authority to consent to a search, and the evidence seized during the search may be used against defendant.\u201d People v. Bolden (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635, 504 N.E.2d 835, 839, cited in People v. Harris (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1013, 557 N.E.2d 1277, 1280.\nThe authority that justifies third-party consent is not based on the law of property, but is based rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. Therefore, it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right, and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Brown, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 515 N.E.2d at 1290, quoting United States v. Matlock (1974), 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 250 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 n.7.\nA corollary to the concept of common authority applies when a parent gives a third-party consent to search the property of a minor. It is reasonable to recognize that \u201ca parent may consent to a warrant-less search of his [or her] minor child\u2019s property as a part of the parent\u2019s right and duty to exert parental authority and control over minor children.\u201d (Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 196, 204 (1981).) This court has specifically held as follows:\n\u201cWe believe that there is implicit in the rights and duties imposed upon a parent, the right to exert parental authority and control over a minor son\u2019s [or daughter\u2019s] surroundings ***.\u201d In re Salyer (1977), 44 Ill. App. 3d 854, 859, 358 N.E.2d 1333, 1336.\nAdditionally, our supreme court has recently held as follows:\n\u201cBut this court has not decided what standard the alleged consent has to meet or whether the consent needs to be unequivocal and specific. We now hold that, when a court is deciding whether consent was given (not whether that consent was voluntary), the circumstances must have been such that the police could have reasonably believed they had been given consent to enter.\u201d People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 299, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1254, citing Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), 497 U.S. 177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 110 S. Ct. 2793.\nApplying these principles to the present case, we uphold the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence. Detective Moran believed that Horace could consent to the search of the car because defendant was 16 years old and because Horace paid for the car. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court found that the police acted in good faith and could reasonably believe that Horace could consent to the search. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination was manifestly erroneous. See, e.g., State v. Braxton (1978), 294 N.C. 446, 465, 242 S.E.2d 769, 780; State v. Dhaemers (1967), 276 Minn. 332, 338, 150 N.W.2d 61, 65.\nIll\nDefendant lastly claims that his prison sentence of 70 years was improper and excessive. It is true that Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) authorizes this court to reduce a criminal sentence. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4).) However, a sentencing decision is a matter of judicial discretion and, so long as the sentence is within the statutory limits, we hesitate to exercise our power to reduce it absent a finding that the trial court exceeded its discretion. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883.\nA\nDefendant argues that the 20-year sentence on the armed robbery conviction should be vacated because \u201cthe acts on which the armed robbery conviction was based represent a segment in a rapid succession of events leading to the murder.\u201d\nIt is established \u201c \u2018that when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 287-88, 426 N.E.2d 535, 538, quoting People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 845.) \u201cAs long as there are multiple acts as defined in King, their interrelationship does not preclude multiple convictions and the imposition of concurrent sentences based upon them.\u201d Myers, 85 Ill. 2d at 288, 426 N.E.2d at 538.\nIn the case at bar, defendant had already committed the offense of armed robbery when he committed the separate offense of murder. Defendant repeatedly shot at the victim as he attempted to escape. This act occurred after defendant robbed, stabbed, and threatened the victim with a gun. We conclude that defendant was properly charged with the separate offenses of murder and armed robbery. See, e.g., People v. Withers (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 77, 80, 347 N.E.2d 393, 396; People v. Thompson (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 684, 690, 278 N.E.2d 1, 6.\nDefendant also argues that the 15-year sentence on the residential burglary conviction should be vacated because \u201cthe trial court merged the residential burglary with the murder charge.\u201d Defendant misreads the record. The record shows that the trial court convicted defendant of murder, armed robbery, and residential burglary. The court found that the robbery charge merged into the armed robbery conviction. The record does not contain any reference whatsoever to a merger of the residential burglary charge into any other offense. We cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion on this issue.\nB\nDefendant next argues that his 70-year, extended-term sentence is disproportionate when compared against: (1) \u201csentences imposed for murder on other youthful defendants,\u201d (2) \u201cother murders for which a lesser term has been imposed,\u201d (3) \u201cthe terms imposed for murder convictions based on similar facts,\u201d and (4) \u201csentences imposed by the same judge for murders containing equal or greater aggravation.\u201d\nThis court has previously rejected such a \u201cproportionality\u201d argument. We observed:\n\u201cInitially, we note that persons who commit crimes independently are seldom, if ever, similarly situated. Furthermore, it would be a futile act to require a sentencing court to consider the sentences previously imposed on other defendants who were convicted of a particular type of crime ***.\u201d (People v. Conaway (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 202, 204, 427 N.E.2d 1302, 1304.)\nThe trial judge is normally in a better position to determine punishment than a reviewing court. A trial judge properly bases a sentence on the particular circumstances of each individual case, including the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. The trial judge has the superior opportunity to consider these factors; we have before us only the cold record. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.\nAfter reviewing the record in the present case, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion. The 70-year extended sentence was within the statutory range. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005\u20145\u20143.2(b)(3)(ii), 1005\u20148\u20142(a).) The record shows that the trial court considered many different factors prior to imposing sentence. We hold that defendant\u2019s extended sentence of 70 years was proper and not excessive.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Gael O\u2019Brien, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Jeanne Lobelson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HORTEZ DANIEL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140845\nOpinion filed September 30, 1992.\nRehearing denied December 3,1992.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Gael O\u2019Brien, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Jeanne Lobelson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0019-01", "first_page_order": 37, "last_page_order": 55 }