{ "id": 5154200, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO CHAVEZ HERRERA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Herrera", "decision_date": "1992-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20143007", "first_page": "284", "last_page": "292", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 284" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576381 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288322 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569137 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 967", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499577 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "988" }, { "page": "988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0967-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594991 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594222 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0803-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 17372, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.602379771905004e-08, "percentile": 0.4035764247259203 }, "sha256": "01ac6fa2fbfcf2ef30b318e3aab98d1a9ebb5094e7dfbd886e2f67820569eaef", "simhash": "1:c26eb82233cb8a31", "word_count": 2881 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:43.416061+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO CHAVEZ HERRERA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPedro Chavez Herrera, defendant, was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)), following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County. He was sentenced to a term of eight years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial where (1) the State was permitted to refer to him as \u201cHerrera\u201d; (2) the State, on cross-examination, asked him about his connection with the \u201cDurango Pipeline\u201d and suggested that he had transported controlled substances from Mexico; and (3) the State was not required to produce its confidential informant.\nWe affirm.\nOn May 4, 1988, Chicago police officers executed a search warrant in the name of Luisa Sanchez (the codefendant whose cause was severed), on a home located at 13953 South Hoxie Avenue, in Burnham, Illinois. The search warrant was based upon information provided by an undisclosed informant that Luisa had sold cocaine to him from inside the residence earlier that day. Officer Thomas West testified that he directed the operation of police officers who searched the home. The witness stated that this assignment was a part of an ongoing narcotics investigation called \u201cOperation Pipeline.\u201d\nPrior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine asking the court to preclude the State from referring to defendant as Pedro Herrera. After hearing arguments, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe record discloses that the house on which the search warrant was executed was a split-level model. The living room, dining room, and kitchen were on the main level; the bedrooms were on the upper level; and the family room was on the lower level. At trial, police officers testified that at approximately 4 p.m. they proceeded to the front and back doors of the house. Officer West testified that Luisa opened the front door \u201cwithin seconds\u201d of the officers knocking. Upon being seen, she began screaming \u201clos Perros,\u201d which in Spanish is slang for \u201cthe police.\u201d\nOfficers who were stationed at the rear of the house testified that they were able to view defendant through a large unobstructed window in the back door. The officers observed defendant seated at a table in the family room moving his hands about the table. Located on the table, immediately in front of defendant, was a triple beam scale. There was a box of plastic bags on defendant\u2019s left, and a large plastic bag containing a quantity of white powder on his right. When Luisa screamed \u201clos Perros,\u201d defendant stood up from the table and ran to the back door. The officers arrested defendant as he attempted to leave out of the back door. Upon searching defendant\u2019s pockets, the officers found a small plastic bag of cocaine and a folded $10 bill containing cocaine. The total weight of both items was 5.05 grams.\nDefendant and Luisa were detained in the living room while officers searched the house. Officers recovered a triple beam scale, a box of plastic sandwich bags, and a large plastic bag containing 440.3 grams of cocaine on top of the table. Beneath the table, officers found a pack of disposable rubber gloves, two small hand scales, and an orange object affixed to one of the scales which was described as a \u201cpersonal ditty bag\u201d for keeping small amounts of cocaine. The search also resulted in the recovery of a handgun from a closet in the basement and 6.15 grams of cocaine from one of the upstairs bedrooms.\nThe officers determined that defendant had a Texas driver\u2019s licence and that his keys did not fit the door locks of codefendant\u2019s house. Defendant was charged with possession of the 440.3 grams of cocaine recovered at the table where he had been seated. He was not charged with possession of the cocaine recovered from the upstairs bedroom or the small amount found in his pocket.\nDefendant testified that he and his family have lived in El Paso, Texas, since 1973. This testimony was corroborated by various documents, stipulated to by the parties, that defendant resided in Texas. Defendant stated that he operated a family-run grocery store in El Paso. The witness lived in Chicago from 1962 to 1973, during which time he worked in the steel mills. The witness stated that he has two sisters who live in Chicago. He testified that he travels to the area approximately three times a year to visit his sisters and friends.\nDefendant testified that he met Luisa at a tavern while visiting Chicago about one year before his arrest. He stated that he had bought a gram of cocaine from Luisa when they met and that he had an affair with her. At the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, he had come to Chicago for his niece\u2019s birthday party. Defendant stated that after the party, he telephoned Luisa and then went to her home. When he arrived at about 1 p.m., they had sexual intercourse. Afterward, Luisa opened the drawer, located next to the bed, and removed one of several \u201cbills\u201d located inside. The bill contained cocaine which they both used. Defendant asked Luisa if she had any cocaine to sell. He stated that he gave Luisa $300, which was all of his money. He further stated that Luisa gave him a gift of one of the $10 bills containing cocaine. They went to the basement, where Luisa removed a large scale and weighed out some cocaine for him.\nWhile in the basement, they heard a noise at the front door. Luisa went upstairs to see who was at the door. Once upstairs, defendant heard her scream \u201cpolice.\u201d He became frightened and attempted to leave out of the back door. As he opened the door, police officers placed him under arrest and searched his pockets.\nThe following line of questioning occurred during the State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant:\n\u201cQ. You and Luisa saw one another every time you came to Chicago?\nA. When I would come, I would see her.\nQ. Now, excuse me, El Paso, Texas is located very close to the Mexican border, isn\u2019t it?\nMR. GIBBONS [Defense counsel]: Objection. Relevance.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll let the witness answer.\nA. Next to it.\nQ. And, in fact, it\u2019s very close to Durango, Mexico, isn\u2019t it?\nMR. GIBBONS: Objection.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019d sustain the objection.\nQ. Have you ever heard of a thing called the Durango Pipeline, Mr. Herrera?\nMR. GIBBONS: Objection.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll sustain the objection.\nMR. GIBBONS: Side bar.\nTHE COURT: Respectfully I will deny your request.\nMR. GIBBONS: I would be asking for a mistrial.\nTHE COURT: Respectfully sustained. Ask the jury to disregard it.\n* * *\nQ. And you made love on each occasion and you got drugs from her on each occasion?\nA. Yes, it is.\nQ. And, sir, the drugs that you used, they always came from Luisa Sanchez or they always came with you from Texas?\nMR. GIBBONS: Objection, Judge, unless he\u2019s going to be able to prove up these questions.\nTHE COURT: I would sustain the objection.\u201d\nFollowing jury deliberations, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and was sentenced to a term of eight years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine barring the use of defendant\u2019s name \u201cHerrera.\u201d At a hearing on the motion, defendant argued that the Herrera name is notorious in the drug trafficking district throughout the United States and had negative connotations in the mind of the jury. Defendant presented medical records, utility bills, and the warranty deed to his home to establish that his name is Pedro Chavez and not Herrera. Although defendant\u2019s grandmother\u2019s name is Herrera, his father\u2019s name is Chavez. Defendant\u2019s position at the trial court level, and on appeal, is that by permitting the State and its witnesses to refer to him as Pedro Herrera he was denied his fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial.\nThe State countered that defendant was charged under the Herrera name and that the Herrera name was on the motions and the police reports. The State further argued that the witnesses knew defendant as Herrera, and that to call him by any other name would cause confusion in the minds of the witnesses, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney and the jury. The trial court found that in order to avoid confusion among the witnesses, the State could refer to defendant as Pedro Chavez Herrera. In making its ruling, the court noted that in Mexico, it is not uncommon for people to use their mother\u2019s family name as well as their father\u2019s family name.\n\u201cWhether a prosecutor\u2019s comments or arguments constitute prejudicial error is evaluated according to the language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of the argument on the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial.\u201d (People v. Coleman (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 803, 807.) Improper remarks \u201cwill not be considered reversible error unless they constitute a material factor in the defendant\u2019s conviction or result in substantial prejudice to the accused.\u201d (People v. Cook (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 449, 461.) \u201cImproper [comments] may be considered harmless error if there is overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Cook, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 461.\nThe facts lead us to conclude that the prejudicial effect of permitting the State to refer to defendant as Herrera was insufficient to warrant reversal. The evidence supporting defendant\u2019s conviction was overwhelming, and we do not believe referring to defendant as Herrera resulted in substantial prejudice.\nThe trial court permitted the State to refer to defendant as Herrera, the name by which the witnesses had come to know him, and stated that it was denying his motion for the legitimate purpose of avoiding confusion among the jury, the State, and the witnesses. Although the record is devoid of facts as to how witnesses came to know defendant as Herrera, the use of the name was not wholly inappropriate. The trial court properly noted that defendant\u2019s maternal family name was Herrera and that it was not uncommon, under the circumstances, to use the family name of either parent.\nDefendant also contends that prejudicial error occurred when the State cross-examined him about his name and the Durango Pipeline and suggested that he had transported controlled substances from Mexico.\nThe State maintains that defendant has waived review of this issue because he failed to object to the statements at trial and to raise them in a post-trial motion. Generally, an issue which has not been objected to during trial and has not been raised in a post-trial motion is not preserved for appeal unless the error was so serious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187.) As the issue here alleges the violation of a constitutional right, we will review the statements to determine whether defendant was denied a fair trial.\nThe State maintains that its cross-examination was proper as the questions related to the evidence and were within the scope of direct examination. The State further maintains that if the statements were improper, the comments were harmless as they did not constitute a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction.\nThe court in People v. Johnson (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 967, explained the scope of cross-examination as follows:\n\u201c[T]he limitation on the scope of cross-examination is construed liberally to allow inquiry into whatever tends to explain, qualify, modify, discredit, or destroy the testimony on direct. [Citations.] In addition, a \u2018good-faith basis is required on the part of examining counsel as to the truth of the matter contained in leading questions propounded to a witness on cross-examination.\u2019 \u201d (Johnson, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 988, quoting M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7607.3, at 340 (5th ed. 1990).)\nThe scope of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its findings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Riggins (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 904, 914.) \u201cReversal is required only where there is a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to defendant.\u201d Johnson, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 988.\nOn review, we believe the State had a good-faith basis for exploring on cross-examination of defendant whether the bag of cocaine found in his possession belonged to him or to Luisa. Defendant testified that he resided in El Paso, Texas, and that he traveled to Chicago three times a year to visit family and friends. He further testified that he was merely visiting Luisa and that the cocaine seized while in his possession did not belong to him.\nThe State was entitled to discredit defendant\u2019s testimony that the cocaine found in his possession at the time of his arrest did not belong to him. However, we believe the State\u2019s suggestions that defendant was affiliated with the Durango Pipeline and had transported cocaine from Mexico were improper. Nevertheless, we conclude that the comments were not of a sufficient nature to cause prejudice to defendant\u2019s case.\nDefendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. In order to support defendant\u2019s conviction, \u201cthe State must establish that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of narcotics, that the narcotics were in the immediate control or possession of the defendant, and that the amount of narcotics was in excess of any amount which might be viewed as merely possessed for personal use.\u201d (People v. Witherspoon (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 323, 333.) Here, the comments did not constitute a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction nor did they result in substantial prejudice. (See People v. Cook (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 449.) The State\u2019s comments were relatively limited and did not relate to a material element of the offense. Moreover, we believe the trial court cured the prejudicial effect of the State\u2019s cross-examination by sustaining defendant\u2019s objections.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to produce the State\u2019s confidential informant. Defendant contends that the informant could have provided corroborating testimony that he was not in the house earlier that day and that he was visiting Luisa\u2019s house. The State maintains that the informant\u2019s role was not that of a transactional informant and that any testimony he might have given would not have assisted defendant\u2019s case.\nSupreme Court Rule 412(j)(ii) addresses the circumstances whereby disclosure of an unidentified witness is required. The rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cInformants. Disclosure of an informant\u2019s identity shall not be required where his identity is a prosecution secret and a failure to disclose will not infringe the constitutional rights of the accused. Disclosure shall not be denied hereunder of the identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearing or trial.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 412(j)(ii).\nIn determining whether a confidential informant\u2019s identity should be disclosed, a court should balance \u201cthe strong public policy reasons favoring it against a defendant\u2019s need for disclosure in order to prepare his defense.\u201d (People v. Witherspoon (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 323, 331.) Where the confidential informant is not a participant or a material witness to the essential elements of the offense, his identity can be withheld. (People v. Velez (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 318, 326.) Moreover, defendant bears the burden of establishing that the informant can testify to facts bearing on the charged offense. Witherspoon, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 331.\nAfter reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant did not meet his burden of demonstrating the need for disclosure of the informant\u2019s identity. The fact that defendant was not present in the house at the time of the earlier drug transaction between Luisa and the informant bears no relevance to defendant\u2019s presence in the house at the time of his arrest. Police officers testified that they observed defendant sitting at a table which had 440.3 grams of cocaine on it. The informant\u2019s information was used only to support a search warrant of the residence. Here, the informant did not participate in the crime and had little to offer as a material witness to the essential elements of the offense.\nDefendant also contends that the informant may have provided additional relevant evidence; however, he does not state with specificity what information he believes the informant could provide. \u201cWhen there has been no specific request, absent a finding that the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt, constitutional error has not been committed.\u201d People v. Velez (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 318, 325.\nBased on our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to produce the State\u2019s confidential witness.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nLINN and McMORROW, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Gibbons, of Kreiter & Gibbons & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Stabrawa, and Marcia Northrup, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO CHAVEZ HERRERA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20143007\nOpinion filed November 5, 1992.\nThomas A. Gibbons, of Kreiter & Gibbons & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Stabrawa, and Marcia Northrup, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0284-01", "first_page_order": 302, "last_page_order": 310 }