{ "id": 5155305, "name": "GENE GRIFFIN, Adm'r of the Estate of Annie Griffin, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASWATH SUBRAM, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Griffin v. Subram", "decision_date": "1992-11-24", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20142104", "first_page": "712", "last_page": "720", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 712" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "84 N.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 S. Ct. 1204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 L. Ed. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5275782 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/50/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 1206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2647292 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3281169 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/281/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4938873, 4944815 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/326/0514-02", "/ill-app/326/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2424362 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/336/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 2d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5126662 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/2/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 N.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429856 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 993", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6328614, 6328844, 6327853, 6327629, 6327382, 6328441, 6328159 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0993-06", "/us/386/0993-07", "/us/386/0993-03", "/us/386/0993-02", "/us/386/0993-01", "/us/386/0993-05", "/us/386/0993-04" ] }, { "cite": "222 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. App. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2576935 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/76/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1052, "char_count": 21545, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.497341544922815e-08, "percentile": 0.39968160305871114 }, "sha256": "44bb77f7aae6a883b5c5184ef9eb3bd0979d7a0180a38d2f611187a5a6e9bca4", "simhash": "1:46716581ffe59da5", "word_count": 3509 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:49:43.416061+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GENE GRIFFIN, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Annie Griffin, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASWATH SUBRAM, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the jury verdict and judgment for defendant, Dr. Aswath Subram, and against plaintiff, Gene Griffin, administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Annie Griffin (Griffin). Plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion, seeking a new trial on all issues, was denied. Plaintiff appeals. Although plaintiff raises several issues for review, we need address only two: namely, whether the circuit court erred by permitting the jury, during its deliberation, to examine an exhibit which was not in evidence, and whether the court erred in allowing defense counsel excessive leeway in questioning defendant after his adverse witness testimony.\nOn March 3, 1984, Griffin, age 37, was admitted to South Suburban Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. R. Singh, a neurosurgeon, who advised a laminectomy. This surgical procedure was performed by Dr. Singh on March 14, 1984, assisted by Dr. S. Kumar, a general surgeon, and Dr. R. Palaniappan, an anesthesiologist.\nDuring the surgery, Griffin sustained a sudden and dramatic loss of blood pressure, frequently a symptom of massive internal bleeding. During the post-operative period, Griffin remained in shock, requiring transfusions of blood and other fluids. On March 15, 1984, the day after surgery, Dr. Kumar discovered a \u201cmurmur,\u201d a noise in the abdomen, which was further evidence of a vascular injury in that area. Dr. Subram was called in as a vascular specialist, to consult on Griffin\u2019s condition at 10:30 a.m., March 16, 1984. Dr. Subram found the patient in serious condition, in shock, with evidence that her liver and kidneys were failing.\nDr. Subram considered, among other possibilities, that the patient\u2019s deteriorating condition was the result of a vascular injury, suffered during surgery. He heard the murmur previously recorded by Dr. Kumar. He noted the findings of a hematologist indicating the \u201cpossibility\u201d of internal bleeding, but did not order the recommended CAT scan to confirm the findings. He did not attempt or dictate surgical intervention to repair the injury at that time or at any time during the next 17 hours, until Griffin\u2019s death at 3:20 a.m., March 17,1984.\nDr. Subram was of the opinion that Griffin could not withstand an operation until and if her coagulopathy, the ability of her blood to clot, was improved through further transfusions of blood and platelets. The level of platelets can be accelerated by using \u201cpacks,\u201d a concentration of platelets, but Dr. Subram did not administer such \u201cpacks\u201d to Griffin until 9 p.m., nearly 12 hours after he first examined her.\nGriffin arrested at 9:50 p.m. and was revived. Dr. Subram did not then consider taking her to surgery. Although he admitted that there are many instances in which a doctor would operate on a patient in less than optimal conditions in order to correct the source of the instability, Dr. Subram did not believe that was necessary in Griffin\u2019s case. He was of the opinion that, following the vascular injury, an arteriovenous fistula had formed. An \u201cAV fistula,\u201d according to him, is a temporary connection between an injured artery and vein which closes the circulatory system and prevents further massive bleeding. He admitted he never had performed surgery to correct an AV fistula. He did not consult with any other vascular surgeon.\nBefore trial, a settlement was reached between plaintiff and all parties named in the complaint, except for Dr. Subram.\nPlaintiff moved in limine to preclude any testimony regarding the alleged negligence or medical malpractice of any other physician, person or institution, and sought to confine the issue at trial to what Dr. Subram did, or did not do, during the period of 10:30 a.m., March 16, 1984, to 3:20 a.m., March 17, 1984. The motion was denied. Plaintiff thereafter moved to reconsider, arguing that: (1) Dr. Subram could not rely on a defense that a third party previously or concurrently may have committed negligence; (2) allowing testimony that other physicians were also negligent invited the jury to improperly apportion loss and render a compromise verdict, contrary to Illinois law; and (3) any defense must rest on proof that Dr. Subram was free of negligence. The motion was denied.\nThe trial began March 6, 1991. During his opening statement, defense counsel introduced the theory of his case that Griffin\u2019s prior treating physicians, alone, violated the standard of care by failing immediately to detect, diagnose and repair the vascular injury which apparently occurred during the surgical procedure. Plaintiff\u2019s objections to a conclusion not based upon expert opinion and defendant\u2019s further speculation that the other doctors \u201cdidn\u2019t want to acknowledge\u201d the presence of bleeding were overruled.\nDr. Subram was called by plaintiff as an adverse witness. Plaintiff questioned defendant with the frequent use of leading questions. When defense counsel questioned him, counsel continued the use of leading questions, as upon cross-examination. Plaintiff objected to the continued use of leading questions by the defense. Plaintiff was overruled, the court explaining that, in This view, since plaintiff had been permitted to lead the witness, defense counsel could do so as well.\nPlaintiff also objected to defense counsel improperly eliciting from defendant opinions concerning areas of medicine in which he had no expertise; that were based upon previously undisclosed literature; and that were beyond the scope of the adverse examination. Plaintiff\u2019s request for a sidebar hearing, to consider the correctness of the court\u2019s ruling, was denied.\nDr. Philip Haid testified as plaintiff\u2019s expert. In his opinion, defendant violated the standard of care in the specialty of vascular surgery by failing to operate on Griffin in a timely manner to correct the vascular injury which occurred during surgery. He believed the patient had a 60% chance of recovery with corrective surgery, but had no chance of survival without such a procedure. It was Dr. Haiti\u2019s opinion that Griffin would have had a normal life expectancy had she survived the suggested corrective surgery.\nDuring cross-examination of Dr. Haiti, defense counsel introduced a compilation of figures, selected by counsel from Griffin\u2019s hospital records, in the form of a large chart. The chart was marked as defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 4, for identification. The figures on the chart represented the measure of patient\u2019s hemoglobin, hematocrit and platelets before, during and after surgery. Dr. Haiti agreed that such figures were indicators of whether or not a patient is bleeding, but disagreed with the contention that the apparent stabilization of hemoglobin and hematocrit, following transfusions, meant that Griffin was not actively bleeding, or that an AV fistula had formed. Dr. Haiti testified that the autopsy report showed no evidence of an AV fistula.\nDr. James Schuler testified as defendant\u2019s expert. He agreed with defendant\u2019s conclusion that an AV fistula had formed and was not, of itself, a major risk for the patient. Dr. Schuler based his opinion on the history of hematocrit values which had returned to a near-normal level, following transfusions of plasma and platelets. Dr. Schuler concurred with defendant\u2019s decision to postpone surgery because of the apparent bleeding disorder. On cross-examination, Dr. Schuler admitted that emergency surgery can be performed and such bleeding disorders overcome by rapid introduction of fresh plasma and platelets.\nAt the time the jury retired to deliberate, defendant sought to send to the jury several demonstrative exhibits highlighting portions of hospital reports. Plaintiff\u2019s objection that the exhibits were not in evidence and should be withheld from the jury was sustained, as follows:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The objection will be sustained. The reason for it is apparently this is material taken from the hospital records and so forth. It\u2019s highlighting the small portion of the hospital records, and all you did was blow them up, and I don\u2019t think it would really help the jury determine the case. I think it will just highlight that particular thing which you possibly blew up.\u201d\nWhile the jury was deliberating, however, the court received a message that the jury wanted to review defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 4, which the court previously had denied admittance in evidence and refused to submit to the jury. Defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 4 for identification is a 30-inch by 40-inch blowup of a chart compiled by defense counsel, summarizing measures of hemoglobin, hematocrit and platelets over a number of days, before, during and after Griffin\u2019s surgery.\nWithout informing either plaintiff\u2019s or defendant\u2019s counsel of the jury\u2019s request, or summoning them to open court to respond to the jury\u2019s request, the court permitted the exhibit not in evidence to go to the jury room. The record reveals the following colloquy between court and counsel some time after the court did so:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The one thing I want to the put [sic] on the record before the jury comes back is that the jury did give me a note whereby they wanted one chart and the chart was regarding the, I guess hemoglobin and \u2014 -\n[PLAINTIFF\u2019S COUNSEL]: Hematocrits?\nTHE COURT: Yes. And I sent them \u2014 I looked through the charts, since they wanted it and we had been talking about it in court, and I took, I believe it was the plaintiff\u2019s exhibit [sic] that had it which had been shown to the jury, and it would be the same as the transcript as far as the Court was concerned so the Court gave them that chart without the permission of either of the attorneys.\u201d\nThe jury soon thereafter found for defendant and against plaintiff.\nSubsequently, plaintiff filed a post-trial motion, with an accompanying memorandum of law, seeking reversal of the verdict and a new trial. The motion identified alleged errors committed by the court on rulings of law and procedure. During argument, plaintiff\u2019s counsel emphasized the court\u2019s refusal to limit testimony concerning the alleged negligence of nonparties and permitting the jury to rely on an exhibit not in evidence, without notifying counsel or conducting a hearing in open court. Plaintiff\u2019s post-trial motion was denied.\nI\nPlaintiff contends that, based on the facts outlined above, the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial.\nPlaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by failing to notify the parties and conduct a hearing when the jury, during deliberation, requested a defense exhibit not in evidence. Plaintiff maintains that defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 4 for identification was manufactured by defense counsel from hospital records which were themselves hearsay documents not in evidence. Further, the chart was used in an attempt to impeach plaintiff\u2019s expert during cross-examination. As such, plaintiff insists, defendant\u2019s exhibit No. 4 can be considered only a demonstrative or argumentative device that does not rise to the level of reliability to allow it to be admitted into evidence, relying on Esderts v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. (1966), 76 Ill. App. 2d 210, 222 N.E.2d 117, cert. denied (1967), 386 U.S. 993, 18 L. Ed. 2d 339, 87 S. Ct. 1309, which held that written statements used for impeachment purposes may not go to the jury room.\nDefendant counters that the exhibit was not manufactured but was intended to separate relevant from irrelevant information in Griffin\u2019s medical records. The information was arranged chronologically and reflected objective laboratory data for hemoglobin, hematocrit and platelet levels. The data were taken from a fairly substantial chart containing immeasurable other irrelevant data. Nothing relevant was deleted.\nDefendant further claims that neither the information contained on the exhibit nor the interpretation accorded that information was in dispute and that the court has considerable discretion with respect to which exhibits can be taken to the jury room, relying upon Wetherell v. Matson (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 314, 318, 367 N.E.2d 472. In Wetherell, however, the questioned procedure involved X-ray films received in evidence, but not allowed to go to the jury room, the precise opposite to the facts in this case. That case was reversed on other grounds and remanded for a new trial.\nDefendant also relies upon section 2 \u2014 1107(d) of the Civil Practice Law, which provides:\n\u201cPapers read or received in evidence, other than depositions, may be taken by the jury to the jury room for use during the jury\u2019s deliberation.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141107(d).)\nDefendant urges that because the statute is written in the disjunctive, \u201cpapers read or received in evidence *** may be taken *** to the jury room,\u201d this court may interpret that language and give it the requisite \u201cplain and ordinary meaning.\u201d The exhibit was clearly a \u201cpaper read *** in evidence\u201d and, consequently he suggests, it was within the circuit court\u2019s discretion to permit the exhibit to go to the jury room during deliberations.\nDefendant\u2019s contention flies in the face of the circuit court\u2019s initial ruling, denying admission in evidence of the exhibit. One cannot do indirectly that which has been prohibited directly. Further, the challenged exhibit, used by the experts to explain the bases for their opinions, is not admissible as substantive evidence. There is a considerable difference between admitting medical records as evidence and recognizing medical records as the bases for expert opinion. In Henry v. Brenner (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 609, 486 N.E.2d 934, relied upon by defendant, the medical records were not allowed in evidence. There the court explained the problems inherent in Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, which do not create additional exceptions to the hearsay rule, but were designed to broaden the scope of expert testimony. They may not be used as vehicles for the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. This point also was made in People v. Anderson (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 1, 495 N.E.2d 485, which held that underlying facts or data may be offered not for their truth, but only for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for the expert\u2019s opinion. Further, as asserted in plaintiff\u2019s reply brief here, \u201c[i]n most cases, the trial judge gives the jury a limiting instruction to that effect. That was not done in this case.\u201d See, e.g., Brenner, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 615.\nDefendant nevertheless argues that the medical values summarized in his exhibit No. 4 were accurate, were not challenged, nor objected to by the plaintiff. It is true that no challenge or objection to its limited use to that point was made by plaintiff; however, the exhibit was never offered in evidence for the truth of its contents.\nDefendant invites this court to review the evidence. This appeal is not brought under the Pedrick standard (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504), however, which would require this court to scrutinize the medical evidence. (Mielke v. Condell Memorial Hospital (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 42, 48, 463 N.E.2d 216.) Rather, this appeal charges an abuse of discretion by the circuit judge in refusing to grant a new trial on the basis of certain erroneous evidentiary and procedural rulings that prejudiced plaintiff\u2019s right to trial on the evidence. (Mehochko v. Gold Seal Co. (1966), 66 Ill. App. 2d 54, 213 N.E.2d 581.) The circuit court\u2019s action here in making the unilateral decision to provide the jury with the challenged exhibit in and of itself must be deemed reversible error. In this regard the supreme court in People v. Beck (1922), 305 Ill. 593, 598-99, 137 N.E. 454, made the following instructive observations:\n\u201cAll this the bill states occurred after the jury had retired and in the absence of the defendant and his counsel. It is not stated that the jury were brought into open court, but even if they were, the occurrence is not relieved of its objectionable features. Neither the defendant nor his counsel was present. No opportunity was given to object to the rulings of the court or to present instructions in behalf of the defendant or to ask for a modification of those given by the judge. The defendant and his counsel were excluded from participation in this part of the trial. So far as they were concerned the proceedings were secret and ex parte, and their only information in regard to them was derived from hearsay after the event.\u201d\nThat the exhibit was prejudicial to plaintiff\u2019s case, standing as evidence without an opportunity for rebuttal had it been admitted, cannot be doubted. Defendant himself notes that it was \u201cabsolutely crucial\u201d to his theory of the case. Once it is demonstrated, as here, that matter not in evidence was submitted for consideration by jurors, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there was no reasonable likelihood of prejudice; otherwise, prejudice is presumed and a motion for a new trial must be granted. (Heaver v. Ward (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 242, 386 N.E.2d 134.) Defendant here does not show how the challenged exhibit was not prejudicial to plaintiff when, as defendant admits, the information contained in the exhibit was \u201cabsolutely crucial\u201d to his theory of the case. It is on this point that Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779, relied upon by defendant, must be distinguished. In Lawson, the court found that the irrelevant content of a government booklet, although detrimental to the plaintiff, was not crucial to the issues and, therefore, not prejudicial. Also, in Lawson, the booklet was received in evidence.\nII\nPlaintiff next finds error in the court having allowed defense counsel to ask leading questions of Dr. Subram following plaintiff\u2019s examination under section 2\u20141102 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141102 (section 2\u20141102)) and to attempt to establish his defense during this questioning.\nUnder section 2\u20141102 plaintiff was permitted to examine Dr. Subram by asking leading questions. Thereafter, defense counsel questioned his client as though upon cross-examination. It is well settled that defense counsel in such a situation has the right to examine but not to cross-examine a defendant who has testified as an adverse witness under section 2\u20141102. The rule is set forth in Edwards v. Martin (1954), 2 Ill. App. 2d 34, 41, 117 N.E.2d 864:\n\u201cIn numerous cases it has been held that a party called for examination under section 60 [now section 2\u20141102] of the Civil Practice Act does not become a witness of the adverse party calling him and he is, therefore, not subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness. He may be examined by the opposing party only on matters to which he has testified upon the examination made by the party calling him. Horner v. Bell, 336 Ill. App. 581; La Prise v. Carr-Leasing, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 514; Combs v. Younge, 281 Ill. App. 339.\u201d\nSee E. Cleary & M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7607.4 (5th ed. 1990); R. Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers, Civil \u00a728.3 (6th ed. 1989).\nIt is also improper for a party, during examination of an adverse witness, to endeavor to elicit evidence which goes to establish his own case. (Suich v. H. & B. Printing Machinery, Inc. (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 863, 541 N.E.2d 1206.) The adverse examination of Dr. Subram by plaintiff focused on what he did or did not do during the time Griffin was under his care. Defense counsel, in his examination, questioned Dr. Subram on the events that occurred before he saw Griffin, including details of the laminectomy; massive bleeding; the procedure to be followed in the event of a vascular injury; and mortality of a patient who is not treated immediately. In Darling II v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital (1964), 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 319-20, 200 N.E.2d 149, 182, aff\u2019d (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied (1966), 383 U.S. 946, 16 L. Ed. 2d 209, 86 S. Ct. 1204, the court held:\n\u201cIn that further examination, following the plaintiff\u2019s cross-examination under section 60 [now section 2 \u2014 1102], the defendant might examine this witness as to matters tending to explain or qualify the testimony given on cross-examination, but not as to new matters not brought out on the cross-examination or as to matters constituting part of the defendant\u2019s defense; the scope of the further examination is largely in the discretion of the Trial Court, but it should not be so extended as to interject the defense into the plaintiff\u2019s case at that stage of the trial \u2014 the orderly procedure of a trial does not sanction that: Horner v. Bell (1949), 336 Ill. App. 581, 84 N.E.2d 672. The defendant\u2019s questions involved here were more properly related to matters constituting a part of the defendant\u2019s defense, rather than tending to explain or qualify the testimony given on cross[-]examination ***.\u201d\nOther errors alleged need not be addressed in view of our disposition of this appeal.\nFor the reasons stated, this cause must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcCORMICK and DiVITO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barsy, Joseph & Lichtenstein, of Chicago (Joel T. Daly, Burton Joseph, and Ross A. Keene, of counsel), for appellant.", "Thomas & Buckley, of Chicago (Michael G. Thomas and Jean M. Buckley, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GENE GRIFFIN, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Annie Griffin, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASWATH SUBRAM, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20142104\nOpinion filed November 24, 1992.\nBarsy, Joseph & Lichtenstein, of Chicago (Joel T. Daly, Burton Joseph, and Ross A. Keene, of counsel), for appellant.\nThomas & Buckley, of Chicago (Michael G. Thomas and Jean M. Buckley, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0712-01", "first_page_order": 730, "last_page_order": 738 }