{ "id": 5148959, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICKEY Z. GIACOMO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Giacomo", "decision_date": "1993-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201491\u20140787", "first_page": "247", "last_page": "259", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 247" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796944 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "482 N.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3601296 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6213196 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 U.S. 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6158265 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 298", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11299279 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "1292" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "1293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2691185 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0208-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 957, "char_count": 26712, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.628765409931148e-08, "percentile": 0.4045177923500559 }, "sha256": "0db048c43d8c9754d991dee616c57c161364f66d0faf17b20728773871c855d8", "simhash": "1:a8a3b05d33db0535", "word_count": 4503 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:04.850958+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "WELCH and RARICK, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICKEY Z. GIACOMO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LEWIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, 15-year-old Nickey Giacomo, was convicted of two counts of aggravated arson (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 20\u20141.1) following a stipulated bench trial. Prior to his trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that his statements were not voluntary and that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. The court denied this motion. On appeal, the only issue raised by the defendant is that the court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.\nAt the hearing on the motion to suppress, Pinckneyville Chief of Police Thomas A. Denton, Jr., testified that his office investigated a fire in a teacher\u2019s bathroom at the high school on February 1, 1991. At the time of this fire, which was intentionally set, school was in session and teachers and students were present. Denton had five suspects for this fire, but the defendant was not one of them.\nOn February 7, 1991, Officer Denton received a call at approximately 11:50 a.m. regarding a second fire at the high school. Denton was advised that afternoon by the fire marshal\u2019s investigator that the fire on the stage in the school auditorium had been intentionally set. As in the previous fire, school was in session and teachers and students were present. The only witness to the fire was Dean Brewer, the school principal, who noticed smoke coming from the auditorium when he was walking across the school parking lot.\nDenton began his investigation of the second fire by asking Brewer for a list of students who had received disciplinary action during the previous week. One of the students on the list was the defendant. Denton had been unaware of the defendant prior to this time, so he asked Brewer about the defendant. Brewer advised Denton that the defendant had been caught stealing a pair of pliers from shop class during the past week, for which he had received an oral reprimand.\nDenton next checked the students who were on lunch break \u201cB,\u201d since students can wander around the school without a pass during lunch break, and since this was the time the fire occurred. Denton discovered that the defendant was on lunch \u201cB,\u201d and that this lunch period started with a study hall in the school auditorium.\nDenton sought additional information on the defendant after he found that the defendant\u2019s schedule provided him with the opportunity to set the fire. Brewer suggested that Denton talk to Mrs. C.K. Longshore for more background information. Mrs. Longshore advised Denton that the defendant came from a \u201cdifficult background\u201d and that the defendant might have had prior involvement with the police.\nThe information provided by Mrs. Longshore prompted Denton to contact Vickie Suttle, a probation officer for Perry County. Suttle told Denton that the defendant was on probation for committing a burglary in Randolph County and that his supervision on probation had been transferred from Randolph County to Perry County.\nDenton called the Coulterville police department in Randolph County, and the Coulterville police explained the defendant\u2019s burglary charge to him. The Coulterville police also advised Denton that they had charged the defendant with arson in 1988; however, he was never prosecuted for this offense. Denton received this information at about 8 p.m. on February 7, 1991.\nDenton interviewed the defendant at 9 a.m. the following day, February 8, 1991, in the third-floor conference room inside the library at the school. The defendant was brought to the conference room by Brewer. Denton stated that at the beginning of the interview, he had no evidence that the defendant had set the fire in the school auditorium, and so he initially asked the defendant how he became aware of the fire and as to his whereabouts. The defendant told Denton he was in study hall in the auditorium; he went to lunch; and, after lunch, he went out the door onto the football field, where he encountered two other students, one of whom was named Clark. The defendant also told Denton that Brewer entered the lunch room two or three minutes before the defendant left. While talking to the two students, the defendant smelled smoke, and then he saw Brewer and a janitor run up the stairs to the auditorium.\nBecause there was a 10- to 15-minute discrepancy in the defendant\u2019s explanation and in Brewer\u2019s statement of events, Denton asked the defendant about this time discrepancy. The defendant appeared \u201cunsettled\u201d by this question, and he began to \u201csquirm\u201d in his chair. Denton told the defendant that he believed the defendant knew \u201ca lot more about this fire.\u201d The defendant then admitted that he had gone back to the auditorium after lunch and that he and the \u201cClark kid\u201d were on the stage and threw matches back and forth. The defendant speculated that one of the discarded matches might have started the fire.\nDenton was aware that the \u201cClark kid\u201d was in class at the time of the fire and was not on lunch \u201cB,\u201d so he asked the defendant why Clark was out of class. The defendant did not respond immediately but then admitted to Denton that, after lunch, he went up onto the stage in the auditorium and found a discarded magazine which he lit and placed next to some \u201cflats,\u201d i.e., pieces of canvas attached to wooden boards used in plays. The defendant\u2019s version of how the fire started matched the point of origin of the fire determined by the fire marshal, and Denton stated that the defendant could know this only if he had set the fire. The defendant also told Denton where the matches were that he used to set the fire and led Denton to where the matches were buried in the ground by a trash barrel.\nDenton did not advise the defendant of his rights until after the defendant confessed to setting the fire. After the defendant\u2019s admission, Denton took a 10-minute break and verified the defendant\u2019s statement. When Denton returned to the conference room, he gave the defendant his Miranda rights. Denton took \u201cexceeding care in explaining\u201d these rights to the defendant because he knew the defendant had a speech impediment, because he knew the defendant was classified as \u201clearning disabled,\u201d and because an attempt had been made to contact the defendant\u2019s parents but they had not responded to the notification. Denton wanted the defendant to understand the gravity of the situation, and he wanted the defendant to understand his rights. Denton tape-recorded the administering of the defendant\u2019s rights and the interview with the defendant which followed. The tape recording and the transcription of the taped interview were admitted into evidence. In Denton\u2019s opinion, the defendant understood the questions he was asked.\nDenton admitted that he had no knowledge of the defendant\u2019s reading comprehension. He also admitted that before the taped interview, he had Brewer get Bradley, the school superintendent, and the defendant made an inculpatory statement with them present. Denton stated that from 9 a.m. to 9:20 a.m., the defendant made no inculpatory statements; from 9:20 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., the defendant made inculpatory statements; from 9:30 a.m. to 10 a.m., the defendant repeated his statements with Brewer and Bradley present; after 10 a.m., Denton checked out the defendant\u2019s story and an attempt to contact the defendant\u2019s parents was made; and at 10:50 a.m., Denton returned to the conference room, and at 11:02 a.m., he gave the defendant his rights and the defendant signed a waiver form.\nDean Brewer, the principal of the high school, testified that some of the defendant\u2019s classes were learning disabled and some were not. Brewer further stated that the defendant had been tested when he was in school in Arkansas and that the results of those tests revealed that the defendant had a full-scale intelligence quotient of 75, which is considered to be in the low average range.\nBrewer confirmed that he had told Denton about the pliers episode and that he had given the defendant an oral reprimand. On February 8, 1991, Denton told Brewer that he wanted to interview the defendant first, so Brewer removed the defendant from his classroom and took him to the third-floor conference room. When Brewer removed the defendant from class, he told the defendant the police needed to talk to him since he was a student in the auditorium at the time of the fire. After Brewer delivered the defendant to the conference room, he left. Brewer returned to the conference room when he learned that the defendant had admitted setting the fire of February 7, 1991, and the fire of February 1, 1991. Brewer, along with Officers Denton and Sroka and School Superintendent Bradley, heard the defendant\u2019s statement before the taped statement was made. Brewer was also present when the defendant made his taped statement. Brewer stated that Denton gave the defendant his Miranda rights and that he also explained the rights to the defendant. Brewer believed that the defendant understood.\nOn cross-examination, Brewer admitted that the defendant\u2019s tests revealed that he has a reading level of a nine-year-old and is functioning at a third- or fourth-grade level. Brewer also stated he attempted to contact the defendant\u2019s parents at about 10:10 a.m., but when he called, the defendant\u2019s brother said his parents were not home. Brewer told the defendant\u2019s brother to tell his parents that it was important and that they should either come to school or call the school as soon as they arrived home. The defendant\u2019s parents contacted Brewer after the defendant had been taken to the police station.\nThe defendant testified that he is 15 years old and is in the ninth grade. The defendant recalled that Brewer removed him from class on February 8, 1991, and that Brewer told him they wanted to talk to him about what happened on February 7, 1991. Brewer took him to the conference room and left him there with the two officers. The defendant described the room as being 10 feet by 10 feet in size, and it had one window and one door, which was kept closed during the interview.\nThe defendant stated Denton asked him about the fire and, at first, he denied knowing anything; however, the defendant subsequently admitted to setting the fire. After an hour, Denton told the defendant he was going to tape the interview, and after the tape was started, Denton advised him of his rights. The defendant testified that he did not understand his rights, but that he said he understood because he was afraid. The defendant remembered that Denton told him he could leave the interview at any time, but that he did not leave because he \u201cfigured he would get into trouble.\u201d\nThe defendant admitted he knew what a courtroom was and what a judge was. He also admitted he had been in court three or four times before. On the other occasions that he had been in court, he had admitted committing the burglaries and had been placed on probation.\nOn cross-examination, the defendant stated he was telling the truth when he made the taped statement. The defendant admitted that the police did not beat him and were not mean. In fact, the defendant thought Denton was \u201cnice\u201d to him, and he thought the police were trying to explain \u201cthings\u201d to him.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State\u2019s Attorney stipulated that the defendant was in custody at 9:30 a.m., after his first inculpatory statement was made.\nSubsequently, the court entered an extensive order in which it held that the statements made by the defendant prior to being given his rights should be suppressed, but that the statement made by the defendant after he was given his rights was admissible since the statement was voluntary and since he had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. As noted previously, the defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated arson at a stipulated bench trial and was sentenced to concurrent six-year terms of incarceration in the juvenile division of the Department of Corrections for each count.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that his statements were not voluntary and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights for several reasons. The defendant contends that the defendant was in custody from the beginning of the interview and that his rights should have been given to him from the outset; thus, all of the defendant\u2019s statements should have been suppressed. Also, the defendant asserts that because the defendant\u2019s parents were not present during the interview, this factor, combined with the place of interrogation and with the defendant\u2019s subnormal mentality and young age, militated against the defendant\u2019s statements being voluntary and his waiver being knowing and intelligent.\nWe initially consider the defendant\u2019s implication (for he never argues this point outright) that his warned statement was tainted by his unwarned statements and, therefore, none of the defendant\u2019s statements were admissible. Miranda warnings are required when a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation. (People v. Acoff (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 208, 544 N.E.2d 96.) Without going into a litany of factors as to when the defendant was in custody in this case, suffice it to say that the State\u2019s Attorney stipulated that the defendant was in custody at 9:30 a.m., after he made his first inculpatory statement. The trial court agreed with the State\u2019s Attorney and determined that Miranda warnings were required at that point, and we agree. Therefore, we must consider whether the unwarned statements made after 9:30 a.m. tainted the defendant\u2019s subsequent warned statement.\nIn Oregon v. Elstad (1985), 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285, the Supreme Court considered this precise issue. In Oregon, the Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cFailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda\u2019s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.\u201d (Oregon, 470 U.S. at 307, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 231, 105 S. Ct. at 1292.)\nThe Supreme Court went on to state:\n\u201cIf errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect\u2019s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.\u201d Oregon, 470 U.S. at 309, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 232, 105 S. Ct. at 1293.\nWe note that Oregon specifically rejected the \u201ccat out of the bag\u201d argument first raised in United States v. Bayer (1947), 331 U.S. 532, 91 L. Ed. 1654, 67 S. Ct. 1394, and the \u201cfruit of the poison tree\u201d doctrine set out in Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407, as being applicable in the situation where there is no unlawful arrest, an uncoerced, unwarned confession and then a subsequent warned confession.\nThus, from the foregoing, it is clear that if the unwarned statements were voluntary, then the subsequent warned statement, if also voluntary, was admissible and was untainted by the previous unwarned statements.\nHere, the trial court found that the defendant\u2019s statements made between 9:30 a.m. and 10:50 a.m. should be suppressed because they were not preceded by the Miranda warnings. The court did not state that the unwarned statements were voluntary, but it is a reasonable inference that it believed so, as the court\u2019s only basis for excluding the statements was the failure to give the defendant his Miranda warnings. In addition, a review of the record reveals that the unwarned statements were voluntary.\nUnder Federal law, a statement is voluntary unless the confession is causally related to coercive police conduct. (Colorado v. Connelly (1986), 479 U.S. 157, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515.) In order for a statement to be voluntary under Illinois law, a defendant\u2019s mental ability, familiarity with the English language, age, education, and experience are among the factors to be considered. (People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.) In other words, the totality of the circumstances controls a court\u2019s determination. (Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.) Further, in the case of a juvenile, the parents\u2019 absence during questioning-does not automatically render the confession inadmissible, but this omission constitutes another factor to be considered in determining voluntariness. People v. Clements (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 482 N.E.2d 675.\nIn the case sub judice, it was clear that the defendant\u2019s mentality was in the low average range; however, this factor does not ipso facto make his confession involuntary, as the other factors involved revealed the defendant understood the meaning and the effect of his confession. (People v. Johnson (1991), 221 Ill. App. 3d 588, 584 N.E.2d 165.) From the transcription of the taped interview, it was clear from the defendant\u2019s responses to the questions asked that he understood. Additionally, the defendant had previous experience with the police as he was on probation for the commission of several burglaries. Similarly, the defendant was not questioned at the police station but was at the school the entire time, a nonthreatening atmosphere. The defendant was not unreasonably detained or physically restrained. The defendant made his inculpatory statements after 20 minutes of questioning, a relatively short time for an interrogation. Lastly, the defendant admitted that Officer Denton was \u201cnice\u201d to him. From the lack of coercive police conduct and from the totality of the circumstances, we find the defendant\u2019s unwarned statements were voluntary.\nWe next consider whether the warned statements were voluntary and whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights before he made this statement. Here, just as the unwarned statements were not coerced, neither were the warned statements. The police did not misrepresent any evidence or trick the defendant in any manner. The defendant was not placed in handcuffs, tied to his chair or physically restrained in any other manner. The same factors previously considered for the unwarned statements are applicable to the warned statement and will not be reiterated here. Thus, the defendant\u2019s warned statement was also voluntary.\nThe next consideration is whether the defendant\u2019s warned statement was made after he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is determined from the totality of the circumstances and is decided upon the facts of each case. (People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.) For a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, he must have the ability to understand the words in the warnings, and at a minimum, he must understand basically what those rights encompass and what their waiver will entail. (Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.) In reviewing a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress, due deference must be given to the trial court, as the court assessed the defendant\u2019s credibility and demeanor and the relevant facts, and a reviewing court will only overturn the court\u2019s decision if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Bernasco, 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.\nHere, a recitation of Officer Denton\u2019s conscientious advising of the defendant of his rights reveals that the defendant did understand the rights he was waiving. The advisement by Officer Denton was as follows:\n\u201cDENTON \u2014 *** Nickey, for the record, I\u2019m going to be reading to you a uh a statement of Miranda Rights. Uh, it\u2019s a legal form that we use in [the] police department as part of an investigation. But, first, let me ask, are you aware that you are not under arrest?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Do you understand that you can get up and walk out of this room any time you want to?\nGIACOMO-Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 And that you\u2019re not in handcuffs currently and you\u2019re here because you want to be here. Is that right?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Uh, let me read the statement to this and anything you don\u2019t understand, just ask me. OK? First of all, you have the right to remain silent. Do you understand that? That means you don\u2019t have to talk to me if you don\u2019t want to. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Secondly, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 Do you understand what court is?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Not very.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Uh, court is when uh people gather before a judge and they listen to uh testimony or what people have to say about a potential criminal act. Something that...that another person has done wrong. Uh, do you understand that?\nGIACOMO-Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 So, you...you tell me what you think a court is.\nGIACOMO \u2014 It\u2019s where people go to see what happens to them.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Do you know what a judge is?\nGIACOMO \u2014 They tell uh that tells uh...I don\u2019t know it too good. Tell uh what happens, what\u2019s going to happen to you and stuff.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Uh, have you ever been before a judge before, or have you ever seen a judge or talked to a judge?\nGIACOMO-Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. And where was that.\nGIACOMO \u2014 In uh Chester.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Do you remember the judge\u2019s name?\nGIACOMO \u2014 No, sir.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. But, you do now understand what a...what court is?\nGIACOMO-Yeah.\nDENTON \u2014 And what court of law is?\nBREWER \u2014 And you realize what you say can be used and this testimony can be used against you in that court before a judge.\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 In other words, what we say today, what you tell me today, I will go to a judge and tell him what you said. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Uh-huh.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Third thing is, you have the right to talk to a lawyer. Do you know what a lawyer is?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 What is a lawyer?\nGIACOMO \u2014 It\u2019s a guy that can help you get out of trouble.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. And you have a right to not only talk to a lawyer, but you have a right to have a lawyer here with you today. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. While you\u2019re being questioned. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO-Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Fourthly, if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any question if you wish. Do you know what that means? It means if you want a lawyer, we can get one for you and he can come here and listen to what you have to say today. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO-Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. Do you understand that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes sir.\nDENTON \u2014 In other words, you don\u2019t have to talk to me. You\u2019re shaking your head yes, but...does that mean yes?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yeah.\nDENTON-OK.\nBREWER \u2014 And that\u2019s at any time you may answer a question or two and then you may decide not to answer a question, and you have that right at any time to...to say, T don\u2019t want to say any more.\u2019\nGIACOMO \u2014 OK.\nBREWER \u2014 OK. And you\u2019re aware of that?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes sir.\nDENTON \u2014 A waiver of the rights means that when you voluntarily agree to talk to me without a lawyer present and you\u2019ll answer whatever questions you want to ask or answer and you have a right not to answer any questions you don\u2019t want to answer. But you agree to go ahead and talk with me, is that what you would like to do?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Can you read and write?\nGIACOMO \u2014 A little bit.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Uh, I\u2019m going to give you the form I\u2019m reading on, but on the bottom of this form it says \u2018Waiver of Rights. I read the above statement of my rights and I understand each of those rights \u2014 those five points I read to you. Having those rights in mind, I waive them and willfully make a statement.\u2019 Now, it\u2019s my understanding that you do wish to continue talking with me. Is that correct?\nGIACOMO \u2014 Yes.\nDENTON \u2014 OK. Uh, I will ask you to look over the form that I am reading to you and I will also ask if you need any assistance with reading that you ask Mr. Brewer and maybe he can help explain a word or whatever. But you look that over and see if that\u2019s about what I read to you on the tape.\nBREWER \u2014 Why don\u2019t you read that out to me.\nGIACOMO \u2014 You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford...if you cannot afford to hear a lawyer...hire a lawyer...hire a lawyer, one will be pointed to re...repress?...\nBREWER \u2014 Represent.\nGIACOMO \u2014 Represent you before any questions if you wish...\nBREWER \u2014 Now you know what represent...that means he will act in your...\nDENTON \u2014 Talk for you.\nBREWER \u2014 Talk for you.\nGIACOMO \u2014 You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any systems.\nBREWER \u2014 That\u2019s statements.\nGIACOMO \u2014 Statements.\nBREWER \u2014 OK. Now you\u2019ve read those through and we went through them. Is there anything you don\u2019t understand about those?\nGIACOMO \u2014 No, sir.\u201d\nFrom this extensive explanation of the defendant\u2019s rights to him, it was clear the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, when considered with all the other factors previously enumerated. Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find that the court\u2019s denial of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Perry County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LEWIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Gene Gross, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pinckneyville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Johannah B. Weber, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NICKEY Z. GIACOMO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201491\u20140787\nOpinion filed January 25, 1993.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and E. Joyce Randolph, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nGene Gross, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pinckneyville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Johannah B. Weber, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0247-01", "first_page_order": 267, "last_page_order": 279 }