{ "id": 5149375, "name": "MARIA MADEO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-LAND PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Madeo v. Tri-Land Properties, Inc.", "decision_date": "1992-12-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141448", "first_page": "288", "last_page": "294", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 288" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3236246 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650319 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0953-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905897 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/131/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2456306 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/39/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5219912 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/29/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596610 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472137 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5220305 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "330-31" }, { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330-31" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/228/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3589346 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3617773 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017" }, { "page": "1018" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/1012-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 14598, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5620792353916705e-07, "percentile": 0.6771074298154063 }, "sha256": "64306f620f40cb76e23c4e35755a5dcc25002b7637065aeeb4ca4606e583e759", "simhash": "1:abd8e6c448e9b5cf", "word_count": 2495 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:04.850958+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "INGLIS, P.J., and DOYLE, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "MARIA MADEO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-LAND PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Maria Madeo, filed this personal injury lawsuit against defendants, Tri-Land Properties, Inc. (Tri-Land), and G.B. Maintenance Service, Inc. (G.B. Maintenance). Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she suffered injuries after slipping on a patch of ice in a parking lot that defendant Tri-Land owned and defendant G.B. Maintenance plowed. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff also appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of defendants\u2019 motion to strike portions of plaintiff\u2019s witnesses\u2019 affidavits. We affirm.\nOn December 29, 1988, plaintiff\u2019s daughter, Marie Wagner, drove plaintiff to the Dominick\u2019s grocery store in Bloomingdale, Illinois. Ms. Wagner parked the car in the lot adjacent to the store. As plaintiff exited the passenger side of the car, she slipped and fell, breaking her arm and sustaining other injuries. In her complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendants negligently plowed the lot, causing an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice to form. According to plaintiff, defendants placed a pile of snow at the high point of the sloped lot. She claimed that when the snow melted during a thaw, the water flowed through the lot toward the drain. She then claimed that the water refroze once the temperature dropped below freezing, causing her to fall.\nDefendants moved for summary judgment. According to defendants, plaintiff failed to produce evidence that she slipped on an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow. In opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff presented her own deposition, the deposition of Ms. Wagner, and the deposition of Andrew Lago, who plaintiff claims is an expert in the field of snowplowing. She also presented the affidavits of Ms. Wagner and Mr. Lago. The trial court struck portions of Ms. Wagner\u2019s and Mr. Lago\u2019s affidavits on the ground that they violated Supreme Court Rule 191 (134 111. 2d R. 191). The trial court found that the remaining depositions and affidavits supplied by plaintiff created no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants.\nA property owner generally owes no duty to its customers to remove snow or ice that accumulates naturally on its premises. (Wells v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017.) However, where a property owner undertakes to remove ice or snow, it must exercise ordinary care in doing so. (Webb v. Morgan (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 378, 382.) A party who contracts with a property owner to remove snow or ice also owes the customers of that property owner a duty of reasonable care. (Crane v. Triangle Plaza, Inc. (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 325, 329; Eichler v. Plitt Theatres, Inc. (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 685, 691-92.) Therefore, both G.B. Maintenance and Tri-Land could be liable in this case for either creating an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow or aggravating a natural accumulation of ice or snow. Gilberg v. Toys \u201cR\u201d Us, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 554, 557.\nPlaintiff first claims that the trial court was in error for granting defendants\u2019 motion to strike portions of plaintiff\u2019s affidavits. Supreme Court Rule 191 provides:\n\u201cAffidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment *** shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense is based; *** shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence ***.\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 191.)\nThe trial court struck paragraphs 6 and 7 of Marie Wagner\u2019s affidavit where she stated:\n\u201c6. When the plowed snow melts, it flows toward the sewer.\n7. Prior to December 29, 1988, there had been snow which was plowed, then the snow began to melt, and then the water froze.\u201d\nElsewhere in her affidavit, Ms. Wagner stated that the snow was plowed to the east end of the lot, that the lot was sloped, and that plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice on the slope.\nWe conclude that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ms. Wagner\u2019s deposition were conclusions in violation of Rule 191. Ms. Wagner stated no facts within her personal knowledge to support her statement that the snow from the snow bank melted and refroze prior to the date of the accident. As we discuss below, however, even if allowed to stand, these statements do not create a genuine issue of material fact.\nThe trial court also struck paragraphs 3 and 4 of Andrew Lago\u2019s affidavit where he stated:\n\u201c3. The parking lot in question was improperly plowed so that melting snow and water would have to cross the parking lot.\n4. That the melting snow and water would travel through the parking area after the snow was plowed to where it was plowed [sic].\u201d\nElsewhere in his affidavit, Mr. Lago stated that the snow was placed at the \u201cpitch of the lot.\u201d Once again, even if paragraphs 3 and 4 were allowed to stand, they do not create a genuine issue of material fact. These statements merely indicate that snow can melt and flow down an incline. As we discuss below, such evidence does not prove that the plaintiff\u2019s injuries resulted from an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow.\nPlaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment in defendants\u2019 favor. A trial court should only grant summary judgment when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141005(c); Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240.) Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, the court should construe the evidence \u201cstrictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.\u201d Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 240.\nIn Fitzsimons v. National Tea Co. (1961), 29 Ill. App. 2d 306, the plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice in the defendant\u2019s parking lot. As in this case, the defendant in Fitzsimons had plowed the snow: to the high end of a sloped parking lot. Subsequently, alternating periods of thawing and freezing occurred, causing melted snow to flow down the lot\u2019s incline and refreeze. In Fitzsimons, \u201cthe defendant\u2019s store manager admitted that ice accumulated in the path of that melting snow [and] that it was on some of this ice that the plaintiff fell.\u201d (29 Ill. App. 2d at 313.) The court in that case found that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant had negligently caused ice to accumulate unnaturally.\nIn this case, defendants nowhere admit that the ice that caused plaintiff to slip came from the pile of plowed snow at the east end of the lot. We must decide, therefore, whether plaintiff has produced any evidence that she slipped on ice that had accumulated unnaturally after defendants plowed the snow. Plaintiff supplied meteorological data which indicated that on December 26, 1988, between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m., the temperature climbed above freezing. The data also indicated that the temperature remained above freezing until between noon and 3 p.m. on December 27, 1988. The temperature reached a high of 39 degrees on December 27, 1988. Marie Wagner stated in her deposition that the lot slopes very slightly from east to west. She also stated that on December 29, 1988, the day of her mother\u2019s injury, there was a pile of snow on the east end of the lot. She stated that she \u201cassumes\u201d that melted snow would drip down into the parking lot.\nAndrew Lago stated in his deposition that when he viewed the lot a couple of months after the accident, the snow was piled up on the side of the lot farthest from the sewer. This corresponds with Ms. Wagner\u2019s testimony as to how the snow was piled on the day of the accident. Mr. Lago stated that in his opinion the snow should have been piled closer to the sewer so that it would not melt, flow across the lot, and refreeze. He did not know, however, where plaintiff actually fell in relation to the piles of snow. He also admitted that he did not know what caused her to fall.\nIt is possible in this case that plaintiff slipped on ice that formed when snow from the pile at the east end of the lot melted, flowed across the lot, and refroze. We hold, however, that plaintiff has not supplied any concrete evidence linking that snow pile to the ice that caused her to slip. Plaintiff presented no evidence that could lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the ice resulted from unnatural, rather than natural, conditions.\nIn Crane v. Triangle Plaza, Inc. (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330-31, we held that the plaintiff\u2019s assumptions about the cause of her injury could not constitute facts in opposition to summary judgment. In Crane, the plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice in the defendants\u2019 parking lot as she exited her car. The defendant in Crane had plowed the snow into a pile adjacent to where the plaintiff had parked her car. The plaintiff claimed that she was \u201c99 and 99/100% sure\u201d that she slipped on ice which had formed when the piled-up snow melted, collected in depressions in the defendant\u2019s lot, and refroze. We found that the plaintiff\u2019s belief as to how the ice formed did not constitute a sufficient \u201cfactual basis [for her] assertion that the ice was created by an unnatural accumulation of snow.\u201d (228 Ill. App. 3d at 330.) Summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiffs had failed to show any \u201cnexus,\u201d other than \u201ccomplete speculation\u201d between the defendants\u2019 piles of snow and the ice where the plaintiff slipped. 228 Ill. App. 3d at 330-31.\nIn Zide v. Jewel Tea Co. (1963), 39 Ill. App. 2d 217, the plaintiff also slipped on a patch of ice in the defendant\u2019s parking lot. The lot in that case was sloped slightly downward, with the defendant\u2019s store located at the top of the slope. On the day of the accident, the high temperature was 11 degrees Fahrenheit and a light snow had fallen. The plaintiff argued that the salt which defendant placed near the entrance of the store caused snow to melt, flow toward the drain at the low end of the lot, and refreeze by the plaintiff\u2019s car. The court found that the plaintiff\u2019s theory of the case was far too speculative. The plaintiff had not provided evidence that the salt by the entrance to the store produced or could have produced the ice that had formed by the plaintiff\u2019s car. 39 Ill. App. 2d at 225-26.\nWebb v. Morgan (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 378, 381, illustrates the type of evidence that plaintiff would need to produce in order to defeat defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. In Webb, the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the runoff from the piles of plowed snow on the defendant\u2019s lot would likely accumulate in the spot where the plaintiff slipped. The jury, therefore, could reasonably infer that the piles of plowed snow caused the plaintiff\u2019s fall. The plaintiff here might also have defeated summary judgment by producing evidence that the ice where plaintiff slipped formed a sheet extending from the snow pile to the place where she fell. Instead, however, Ms. Wagner stated that her mother fell on a two-foot by three-foot patch of ice.\nPlaintiff in this case failed even to present evidence that the piles of snow defendants placed at the east edge of the parking lot could have caused ice to form in the parking lot. Plaintiff has supplied meteorological data which indicated that the temperature was slightly above freezing from the evening of December 26, 1988, until about midday on December 27, 1988. There was also evidence that G.B. Maintenance plowed the lot sometime on December 27. However, there is no evidence that it plowed the lot prior to when the temperature fell below freezing.\nFurthermore, plaintiff\u2019s expert failed to provide any evidence that plaintiff slipped on an unnatural accumulation of ice or snow. Mr. Lago stated that he visited the lot a couple of months after the accident. There is evidence that the snow on the day of his visit was piled similarly to the way in which it was plowed on the day of the accident. There is no evidence, however, that the weather conditions on the day of Mr. Lago\u2019s visit were similar to the weather conditions on the day of the accident. Nor did Mr. Lago state that the snow piles he observed appeared to cause an accumulation of ice in the parking lot. Plaintiff also failed to provide expert testimony concerning the steepness of the grade in the lot. Other than stating, in essence, that \u201cwater flows downhill,\u201d plaintiff provided no evidence as to how the grade in the lot could have caused water from the snow bank to reach the spot where plaintiff slipped.\nAlthough plaintiff need not prove her case in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, she must \u201cpresent some facts to show that the ice was unnatural or caused by defendant.\u201d (Crane, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 332; Gilberg v. Toys \u201cR\u201d Us, Inc. (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 554, 558.) She must either show a direct link between defendants\u2019 snow piles and the ice that caused her to slip, or she must provide circumstantial evidence through an expert. (See Wells v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1018.) It is not enough that the plaintiff invites speculation as to the cause of the ice. (Byrne v. Catholic Bishop (1971), 131 Ill. App. 2d 356, 359.) Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.\nThe only defendant to file a brief in this case was G.B. Maintenance. Tri-Land failed to file a brief. However, as a property owner, Tri-Land has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from its property. (Burke v. City of Chicago (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 953, 956; McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill. App. 3d 544, 548.) Since plaintiff has not presented facts which would show that an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow caused her injuries, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Tri-Land\u2019s favor.\nThe order of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS, P.J., and DOYLE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore J. Ansani, of Ansani & Ansani, of Park Ridge, for appellant.", "Peter J. Crowley, of Crowley, Ross & DeMeo, Terence R. Selby and Michael J. Ortyl, both of French, Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C., and Francis A. Spina, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, all of Chicago, for appellee G.B. Maintenance Service, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARIA MADEO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRI-LAND PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141448\nOpinion filed December 29, 1992.\nTheodore J. Ansani, of Ansani & Ansani, of Park Ridge, for appellant.\nPeter J. Crowley, of Crowley, Ross & DeMeo, Terence R. Selby and Michael J. Ortyl, both of French, Kezelis & Kominiarek, P.C., and Francis A. Spina, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, all of Chicago, for appellee G.B. Maintenance Service, Inc." }, "file_name": "0288-01", "first_page_order": 308, "last_page_order": 314 }