{ "id": 5149877, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY W. REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reddick", "decision_date": "1992-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201491\u20140287", "first_page": "320", "last_page": "325", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 320" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "456 U.S. 152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184490 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" }, { "page": "827-28" }, { "page": "1592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189" }, { "page": "1189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549914 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377-78" }, { "page": "377-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597287 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543128 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567042 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "307-08" }, { "page": "316-17" }, { "page": "316" }, { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 1175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 10622, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15575772950469313 }, "sha256": "4a2eb52b1910528175f9024e242d0b4784bec4873c0491bba03db65e8773d8d7", "simhash": "1:8fb6148e37870fc1", "word_count": 1686 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:04.850958+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHAPMAN, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY W. REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jerry W. Reddick, appeals from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County denying his post-conviction petition.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the cause must be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing to determine whether the State used unreliable testimony at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing, denying him due process, where defendant\u2019s daughter, M.R., recanted her testimony against him. We affirm.\nIn September 1986, defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against his daughter, P.R., a child under the age of 13. On November 7, 1986, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. As a factor in aggravation, the State presented defendant\u2019s other daughter, M.R., who testified that defendant had kissed and manually penetrated her vagina numerous times and attempted vaginal penetration with his penis more than once. The State also presented two of M.R.\u2019s friends who testified that defendant kissed them and touched their breasts while they were overnight guests of M.R. The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent 25-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant appealed the convictions and sentences, and this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment in an unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (134 Ill. 2d R. 23) on August 19, 1988. (People v. Reddick (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 1175, 544 N.E.2d 1354.) On October 12, 1989, M.R. signed an affidavit recanting the testimony at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing. On December 13, 1989, defendant filed a motion to reduce sentence. In that motion defendant asserted his sentence was excessive because it was based on M.R.\u2019s recanted testimony and did not consider defendant\u2019s rehabilitation while incarcerated. On December 21, 1988, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and was appointed post-conviction counsel. On February 27, 1990, defendant requested that his post-conviction counsel withdraw and that new counsel be appointed. The court appointed new counsel on July 9, 1990. On March 12, 1991, counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. The amended petition stated that defendant was denied due process and equal protection under the United States and Illinois Constitutions because of trial errors. Defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses defendant requested and failed to properly cross-examine the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant also alleged that his constitutional rights were violated because (1) the trial court allowed the State to amend the information on the day of defendant\u2019s trial; (2) defendant was convicted of two Class X felonies arising out of the same crime; (3) the court allowed inflammatory testimony at trial and evidenced hostility toward defendant and defense counsel; (4) the court allowed a victim impact statement at sentencing; (5) defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential was not considered; and (6) appellate counsel was ineffective by not consulting defendant before submitting the brief to this court. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s petition on March 12, 1991. On March 14, 1991, defendant wrote a letter to the court stating that important information concerning his petition had not been offered, namely, M.R.\u2019s affidavit recanting her previous testimony, which was attached to defendant\u2019s motion to reduce sentence. On March 19, 1991, defendant refiled the motion for reduction of sentence, reminding the court of the existence of M.R.\u2019s affidavit. On April 8, 1991, the trial court entered an order denying defendant\u2019s petition for post-conviction relief, noting that any inflammatory testimony was not prejudicial error but not specifically addressing M.R.\u2019s retraction. Defendant now appeals that order, claiming that the trial court failed to consider M.R.\u2019s affidavit.\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122\u20141 et seq.) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of constitutional rights occurred in their trials. (People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 307, 544 N.E.2d 276, 277; People v. Silagy (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 357, 507 N.E.2d 830.) A post-conviction proceeding is not an appeal per se but a collateral attack upon a final judgment and, in the scope of post-conviction review, is limited to issues which have not been and could not have been previously adjudicated. (Owens, 129 Ill. 2d at 307-08, 544 N.E.2d at 277.) To be entitled to post-conviction relief, defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of Federal or State constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment under attack. (People v. Enoch (1991), 146 Ill. 2d 44, 50, 585 N.E.2d 115, 118.) Although recantation of testimony can be addressed in a post-conviction petition, defendant in the present case failed to make any reference to M.R.\u2019s affidavit in either the text of his amended petition or in his testimony at the evidentiary hearing. The affidavit itself was not presented as evidence in the hearing. Instead, defendant wrote a letter to the trial court two days after the hearing to implore the trial court to consider M.R.\u2019s recantation before entering judgment on the matter. The court entered an order that did not specifically address M.R.\u2019s affidavit, and defendant filed this appeal arguing that he is entitled to another hearing.\nThe State argues that the issue was waived since defendant failed to present the affidavit in his amended petition. The law is clear with regard to waiver of claims in post-conviction petitions: \u201cAny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122\u20143.) Defendant acknowledges his failure to raise the issue of M.R.\u2019s affidavit in either his original or amended petition but asserts that this court should consider the issue as plain error affecting his substantial rights under Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Our supreme court has repeatedly stated, however, that the plain error rule may not be invoked when a defendant collaterally attacks his conviction or sentence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122\u20141 et seq.). (People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 316-17, 544 N.E.2d 276, 281; People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 367, 377-78, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1189.) The United States Supreme Court and our supreme court have observed that once the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are reviewed and affirmed on direct appeal, the State has a legitimate interest in preserving the finality of that affirmance. A post-conviction remedy, by its very nature, threatens the State\u2019s interest in finality by allowing a defendant to launch a collateral attack upon his criminal conviction and sentence. (United, States v. Frady (1982), 456 U.S. 152, 164, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816, 827-28, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592; People v. Owens (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 303, 316, 544 N.E.2d 276, 281; People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 367, 377-78, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1189.) Application of the waiver rule is not an absolute bar to review of procedurally defaulted claims, however, and where fundamental fairness requires, the rule of waiver will not be applied in post-conviction proceedings. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d at 317, 544 N.E.2d at 281.\nIn analyzing the cases aforementioned, we find them applicable to the facts of this case, however, and hold that defendant waived the issue by not presenting it in the petition.\nThe question now becomes whether fundamental fairness requires us to consider defendant\u2019s argument that he was prejudiced and that his constitutional rights were substantially denied at his sentencing hearing because the State presented a witness who testified that defendant sexually assaulted her but recanted that testimony several years later. We conclude the answer to that question is no. M.R. was not the complaining witness at defendant\u2019s trial. Defendant was tried on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against RR. M.R. did not testify at defendant\u2019s trial but was one of three witnesses at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing who stated they had been sexually assaulted by defendant. There was absolutely no indication that P.R., the victim on whose behalf the charges were filed, was not truthful at trial or later recanted her testimony. Nor have the other two witnesses at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing recanted their testimony. This court finds that such evidence supports the trial court\u2019s imposition of defendant\u2019s sentence. Defendant was convicted of two Class X felonies. The law provides that the sentence for a Class X felony \u201cshall be not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(3).) In sentencing defendant to concurrent terms of 25 years, the trial court emphasized the jury\u2019s finding of guilt and society\u2019s interest in protecting itself from people who commit sexual acts on children. There was no direct reference to M.R.\u2019s testimony or whether it influenced the court to impose a longer sentence. After reading the trial court\u2019s comments in their entirety, however, we determine that the trial court focused more on the trial testimony than on the testimony heard at the sentencing hearing. Even if M.R.\u2019s testimony was false, we do not find it likely that the trial court would have reached a different result without her testimony. Such a conclusion defeats defendant\u2019s argument that he is entitled to another evidentiary hearing to determine the significance of M.R.\u2019s affidavit recanting her previous testimony. Defendant has failed to affirmatively show that any prejudice resulted from M.R.\u2019s now-questionable testimony at his sentencing hearing. This court, therefore, finds that it would not be fundamentally unfair to deny defendant another evidentiary hearing on the waived issue.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCHAPMAN, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Robert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Debra A. Buchman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY W. REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201491\u20140287\nOpinion filed December 31, 1992.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Janet Gandy Fowler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nRobert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Debra A. Buchman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0320-01", "first_page_order": 340, "last_page_order": 345 }