{
  "id": 5149659,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLAY SCOTT CLARK, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Clark",
  "decision_date": "1992-12-23",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-92-0048",
  "first_page": "546",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:04.850958+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "BARRY, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLAY SCOTT CLARK, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Clay Scott Clark, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 26 years of imprisonment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(a)). He filed a direct appeal and this court affirmed his conviction. (People v. Clark (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 210, 518 N.E.2d 763.) The defendant then filed a post-conviction petition, which the court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. The defendant appeals.\nThe defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on December 12, 1991. On December 20, 1991, a hearing was held in the defendant\u2019s absence. At that hearing, the State orally moved to dismiss the defendant\u2019s petition because it was patently without merit. The State supported its argument by referring to relevant case law. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court was improperly tainted by the State\u2019s premature motion to dismiss.\nThe defendant argues that the trial judge did not follow the proper procedure pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 122\u20141 et seq.). Specifically, he argues that the State was improperly allowed input into the trial judge\u2019s summary dismissal of the petition, and that the petition was dismissed pursuant to the State\u2019s oral motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the defendant argues that the dismissal must be reversed and the cause should be remanded for the appointment of counsel and further consideration under sections 122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6 of the Act. We agree. Therefore, we reverse and remand.\nThe State contends that People v. Mitchell (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 401, 578 N.E.2d 297, is controlling. We disagree. In Mitchell, this court recognized that neither the Post-Conviction Hearing Act nor case law states that premature filing of a motion to dismiss by the State per se contaminates the process and precludes the trial judge from independently determining whether a post-conviction petition has any merit. This court went on to note that the trial judge\u2019s finding showed an analysis of the petition which did not indicate reliance on the State\u2019s motion to dismiss. We believe that the State\u2019s reliance on Mitchell is misplaced.\nThe defendant supports his argument with the case of People v. Merritte (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 986, 589 N.E.2d 190. In Merritte, this court held that premature input by the State had tainted the trial court\u2019s independent decision on its dismissal of the defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition. The facts of Merritte show that the State argued its motion to dismiss at length before the court. Further, in Merritte, the trial court dismissed the defendant\u2019s petition \u201cbased on the reasons stated by counsel in his argument.\u201d We find Merritte controlling in this appeal.\nIn the instant case, like Merritte, the trial judge\u2019s dismissal of the post-conviction petition was tainted by the State\u2019s premature motion to dismiss. The State orally argued that the defendant\u2019s petition was patently without merit. Further, the State used case law to support its oral argument and supplemented its motion with copies of two cases. In a written order, the trial court dismissed the petition \u201cupon representations of the People in a review of the Court file[.]\u201d In accordance with Merritte, and based upon the court\u2019s written order, we find that the State\u2019s premature motion and oral argument clearly tainted the trial court\u2019s decision.\nConsequently, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Will County and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY, P.J., and STOUDER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Peter A. Carusona, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.",
      "Edward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
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    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLAY SCOTT CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-92-0048\nOpinion filed December 23, 1992.\nPeter A. Carusona, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nEdward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0546-01",
  "first_page_order": 566,
  "last_page_order": 568
}