{
  "id": 5310496,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Hoye Wood, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wood",
  "decision_date": "1974-11-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 12316",
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  "provenance": {
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Hoye Wood, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant was indicted, tried and found guilty in a bench trial of three counts of aggravated battery and one count of disorderly conduct. After a lengthy presentence hearing, defendant was sentenced to 2 years\u2019 probation, subject to certain conditions and fined $500. Defendant appeals from his conviction. It is urged on appeal that the trial court erroneously found that defendant\u2019s belief that it was necessary to use deadly force calculated to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself was unreasonable, and that defendant\u2019s guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not agree.\nThe altercation that gave rise to this cause took place outside Mary\u2019s Tavern located in Clinton, Illinois, where defendant beat and kicked Columbus DuBois, a 78-year-old black male. The incident started inside the tavern when DuBois was verbaHy harassed by defendant. Defendant and Ms two companions were ordered to leave the tavern by the proprietress. They refused to go. Defendant persisted in harassing DuBois by demeaning Ms race. Finally, defendant approached DuBois, and the latter turned and pulled an open pocket knife. The proprietress took DuBois. by the arm and told him to leave in order to avoid any serious trouble. He put his knife away and left the premises. Thereafter, defendant and Ms confederates were ordered to leave which they did.\nOnce outside, defendant accosted. DuBois by striking him in the face with his fist. He then kicked at DuBois\u2019 head, once the latter was down. After DuBois had been beaten into unconsciousness, defendant and the other two individuals drove away in a pickup truck. The police found DuBois unconscious and bleeding from Ms face and head, and a knife was found under Ms body. DuBois sustained a permanent eye injury as the result of the incident, as well as other assorted cuts and abrasions.\nMr. DuBois was approximately 5'2\" tall, having a small frame. Defendant stood 6'2W' tall and weighed approximately 245 lbs.\nDefendant was subsequently indicted on one count of attempted murder, five counts of aggravated battery, and one count of disorderly conduct.\nAt trial, the State called Joyce McGarry, the proprietress of the tavern. She .related that defendant started an argument with DuBois which had racial overtones and that DuBois became hostile when defendant persisted in harassing him. She testified that after clearing DuBois and defendant out of the tavern, she observed defendant and DuBois standing outside and continuing their argument. She saw defendant hit DuBois in the face. She ran outside and observed defendant kicking DuBois in the head several times, and each time cursing, \u201cYou nigger, son-of-a-bitch, you nigger.\u201d Mrs. McGarry stated she did not observe a knife in DuBois\u2019 hand when viewing him through the window. She had seen him put away what appeared to be a knife as he left the tavern.\nNext, Doug Cox was called by the State. He testified that on the night in question, he was returning from a show when he heard a commotion going on in front of Mary\u2019s Tavern. He viewed defendant kicking DuBois wMIe he lay on the sidewalk. He had not seen a knife in DuBois\u2019 hand. He watched defendant and defendant\u2019s two companions drive away in a truck. He went over to DuBois and found that he was bleeding profusely. Cox stated that he did see a knife lying on the pavement next to DuBois. The knife was open. Cox testified that the knife was the same one Mrs. McGarry had identified as being one DuBois had when he was in the tavern.\nThe State called DuBois as the final occurrence witness. He corroborated Mrs. McGarry\u2019s testimony. He stated that defendant began harassing and directing racial slurs at him while he was at the bar in Mary\u2019s Tavern. DuBois admitted taking a knife out in the bar when he thought defendant and his two companions were \u201ccorraling\u201d him. However, he stated he closed the knife and put it in his pocket as he left the premises. Once outside, DuBois stated that he was struck in the face by defendant\u2019s fist and then defendant kicked him while he was on the pavement.\nDuBois stated that as a result of the beating he sustained indicated damage to his eye. This conclusion was corroborated in the testimony of Dr. Robert S. Bailer, an eye surgeon and ophthalmologist who treated DuBois for his eye condition.\nAfter Dr. BaUer\u2019s testimony, the State called several other witnesses and then rested. Thereafter, the defendant offered a motion for a finding of not guilty as to all counts of the indictment. The motion was granted as to Counts IV and V, both charging defendant with aggravated battery.\nDefendant\u2019s case consisted of the testimony of two witnesses: William Fair, a co-defendant, and defendant, who testified on his own behalf. The thrust of the defendant\u2019s case-in-chief was that defendant acted in self-defense and was forced to use force reasonably calculated to prevent DuBois from inflicting great bodily harm upon the person of defendant.\nFair\u2019s testimony was at odds with the testimony elicited from the State\u2019s witnesses. He, in effect, testified that it was DuBois who started the argument which occurred in Mary\u2019s Tavern, and it was DuBois who interjected the element of deadly force into the argument by the threatening use of a knife. According to Fair, defendant acted in self-defense.\nDefendant testified that the entire incident began over a misunderstanding. He submitted that he had stated to DuBois, \u201cNice meeting you, Columbus, I got a lot of negro friends.\u201d According to defendant, DuBois thought he had said \u201cnigger.\u201d Defendant said he immediately apologized for the misunderstanding.\nConcerning the altercation that occurred outside the tavern, defendant contended that DuBois waited outside, and when defendant went outside, DuBois pulled a knife and said he was going to cut defendant up. DuBois. aHegedly began to swing at defendant with the knife. Defendant stated his natural instinct was to swing at DuBois in self-defense. He stated his blow hit DuBois in the eye. Once DuBois was on the ground, he stated he kicked the knife out of DuBois\u2019 hand. Wood st\u00e1ted that he and his two companions fled because they were in a strange town and feared that the authorities would be unsympathetic because \u201cthey had hit an old man.\u201d\n. On cross-examination, defendant stated that he kicked the knife out of DuBois\u2019 hand so that it could not be used on him as he walked away. Defendant was asked whether he was afraid of a man the size of DuBois, and defendant replied, \u201cI am not afraid of anyone.\u201d Thereafter, the defense rested.\nThe State called three rebuttal witnesses. All had previously testified, and they basically reiterated their initial testimony.\nAfter closing arguments, the court found Fair not guilty as to all counts, and found defendant not guilty as to Count I and guilty as to Counts II, III, VI and VII.\nThe court specifically found that DuBois suffered severe and permanent injuries constituting great bodily harm. Furthermore, the court found that under the circumstances, defendant used excessive force. The court stated:\n\u201cNow, taking Mr. Wood\u2019s theory of self-defense in its most favorable aspect to him, this Court feels that he was justified in the first hitting if Mr. DeBois struck at him as some of the evidence indicates, but his right to self-defense stopped there in this Court\u2019s opinion because self-defense under the Illinois law does not permit him to pursue it against an elderly man laying on the ground semi-conscious and bleeding. The force that was used then was not justified as a matter of self-defense, Mr. Wood could have protected himself in a number of ways after the initial blow. * *\nThe court then went on to find:\n\u201cTaking that in its most favorable aspect, the Court considers the first blow Mr. Wood struck may have been justified in self-defense but not the other blows. He pursued it with unjustifiable force and unreasonable force thereafter and therefore at that point he was the aggressor and he could have withdrawn.\nThe evidence of Joyce McGarry is most credible. She had the best opportunity to observe, and she is least interested in the outcome of the case. Her testimony is believable.\nBecause the testimony was that the injuries were severe and permanent and, possibly, even the extent of which are not known at this time, they constitute great bodily harm. Therefore, the other Counts II, III and VI, this Court feels, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAs to Count VII this is a disorderly conduct charge, and I think it was proven, also, beyond reasonable doubt.\nThat will be the finding of the Court.\u201d\nDefendant urges that the trial court misperceived the law of justifiable use of force when it separated the altercation into two parts, to wit: the initial blow by defendant to Mr. D\u00faBois, and the subsequent ticking by defendant to DuBois\u2019 body. Defendant argues that a person is justified in the use of force to defend against the unlawful use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, and that he is not required to retreat while he reasonably believes the aggressor is still armed and has the capacity to renew the attack.\nSection 7 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code states:\n\u2022 \u201cUse of Force in Defense of Person.] A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably beheves that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other\u2019s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably ' beheves that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another; or the commission of a forcible felony.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, 7 \u2014 1. \u2022\nThe critical language found in the statute is that a person who resorts to the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm must do so only if \u201che reasonably believes that such force is necessary \u00ae 0 (Emphasis supplied.) Whether an individuals befief is reasonable raises a question of fact. (People v. Brumbeloe, 97 Ill.App.2d 370, 240 N.E.2d 150; People v. Taylor, 3 Ill.App.2d 734, 279 N.E.2d 143.) A finding by the trial court' as to whether or not defendant\u2019s belief was reasonable w\u00fcl not be reversed unless-it is clear that the finding was erroneous.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court determined that defendant\u2019s conduct was unwarranted under the circumstances and patently unreasonable. The trial court correctly ruled that an individual\u2019s belief must be reasonable as to when to resort to force, and the force used must be commensurate with the force encountered. Defendant was found to have used excessive force, and this finding will stand.\nNext, defendant contends that the State failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the State did not overcome the defense of self-defense.\nIt is true that self-defense is an affirmative defense which must be rebutted by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Brown, 19 Ill.App.3d 757, 312 N.E.2d 789.) However, the testimony of but one credible witness is enough to convict a defendant. People v. Novotny, 41 Ill.2d 401, 244 N.E.2d 182.\nThere were two eyewitnesses \u2014 Joyce McGarry and the. victim\u2014 who testified that defendant used excessive force; and their testimony was corroborated as to the various details by,the testimony given by Mr. Cox. Essentially, the court was confronted with a clear-cut question of credibility. The testimony of the State\u2019s occurrence witnesses was totally at odds with the testimony given by Fair and defendant. The court resolved these conflicts in favor of the State. We wiH not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of credibility unless proof was so unsatisfactory as to warrant a reasonable doubt of guilt. People v. Reese, 54 Ill.2d 51, 294 N.E.2d 288.\nWe note sua sponte that the trial court\u2019s judgments of convictions were in error. Defendant was found guilty on three counts of aggravated battery and one count of disorderly conduct, and subsequently thereto judgments of conviction were entered on all counts. The trial court may not enter judgment on more than one offense arising from the same transaction, even if only one sentence is imposed. (People v. Lilly, 56 Ill.2d 493, 309 N.E.2d 1.) Accordingly, the judgment of conviction as to two of the three counts of aggravated battery and the one count of disorderly conduct must be vacated.\nThe circuit court\u2019s judgment of conviction as to a single count of aggravated battery is affirmed; the judgments on aH other counts are vacated and this cause is remanded for the issuance of an amended mittimus.\nJudgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with directions.\nTRAPP, P. J\u201e and SIMKINS, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lawrence E. Johnson and Associates, of Champaign (L. Keith Hays, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Robert G. Gammage, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Kenneth E. Baughman, of counsel, assisted by Douglas Gift, Charles Gustafson, and Bruce Gammage, Senior Law Students), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Hoye Wood, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 12316;\nFourth District\nNovember 27, 1974.\nLawrence E. Johnson and Associates, of Champaign (L. Keith Hays, of counsel), for appellant.\nRobert G. Gammage, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Kenneth E. Baughman, of counsel, assisted by Douglas Gift, Charles Gustafson, and Bruce Gammage, Senior Law Students), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0015-01",
  "first_page_order": 39,
  "last_page_order": 45
}