{ "id": 5310961, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earl Miller, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Miller", "decision_date": "1974-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 73-267", "first_page": "275", "last_page": "282", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 275" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "221 N.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill.App.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2578029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/75/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill.App.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Ill.App.3d 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2916684 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/4/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill.App.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5297364 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/63/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 Ill. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2583560 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/365/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.E. 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5015412 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/301/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill.App.3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2527632 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill.App.3d 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2671337 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.App.3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5397625 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2888588 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 N.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2479662 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320487 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5332878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill.App.3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2679328 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1021" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 N.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2878788 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0530-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 697, "char_count": 15879, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1576920121597823 }, "sha256": "af4593488986a41b6fc4863a6ae8b8570a6e23c4ec5cff3e6d65ce3d8cb4e9e9", "simhash": "1:038e50fd23e53179", "word_count": 2679 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:16.970085+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earl Miller, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Earl Miller, from a judgment entered, on a jury verdict, by the circuit court of Jackson County against him for the offense of deceptive practice and the imposition of a sentence of one year with the department of corrections.\nThe information charging the defendant with deceptive practice only alleged that he had been involved with the delivery of 1 check, a check for $99.17 drawn on the Carterville State and Savings Bank. This check was designated as people\u2019s exhibit no. 2. Due to the fact that we are confronted with issues involving the admissibility of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence it becomes necessary to examine the evidence presented in the trial court.\nThe State\u2019s first witness, Herbert Odum, testified that he and his .son, Ronald Odum, were partners in a Lafayette Radio Store located in Carbondale, that he saw the defendant in the store, around 3 P.M. (on February 8, 1973), witii a young man represented to be defendant\u2019s son-in-law, that he did not wait on the defendant, but did examine a check (People\u2019s exhibit 1), which was accepted in return for a \u201cWalkie-Talkie\u201d, that pursuant to his son\u2019s request the defendant supplied his social security number and the defendant\u2019s \u201cson-in-law\u201d supplied his driver\u2019s license number which were written on the check, and that the defendant left the store with the \u201cWalkie-Talkie,\u201d which was eventually returned by the police. The witness further testified that the check (people\u2019s exhibit 1) was presented for payment and that it was subsequently returned with a notation that no such account existed, that about 5:30 P.M. (February 8, 1974) the defendant called the store on the telephone and talked to the witness\u2019 wife, Rosemary Odum, \u201csaying that he was going to send his son-in-law back in,\u201d that tire young man, purported to be defendant\u2019s \u201cson-in-law,\u201d returned to the store with a check with defendant\u2019s signature on it; that either the witness\u2019 son or wife handled this transaction, that he saw his wife fill in \u201cLafayette\u201d on that check (people\u2019s exhibit 2), that the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2) was tendered in exchange for another \u201cWalkie-Talkie,\u201d and that no payment was received as the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2) was also returned marked no such account. On cross-examination the witness stated that his wife filled in the words \u201cLafayette Radio\u201d and he was \u201cpretty sure\u201d that she filled in the amount of the second check, and that the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2) was signed with the defendant\u2019s name before it was brought into the store; however, he stated that he did not \u201cknow for a fact\u201d that the defendant signed the second check (people\u2019s exhibit 2).\nThe next witness called by tire State, Rosemary Odum, testified that she helped her husband at Lafayette Radio, that she saw the defendant and a younger boy enter the store on February 8, 1973, around 4 P.M. and buy a walkie-talkie, that payment for the walkie-talkie was in the form of a check (people\u2019s exhibit 1), that she saw the defendant hand over the check (people\u2019s exhibit 1), that she received a telephone call from the defendant, who said he would send the \u201cboy\u201d in to pick up another walkie-talkie, that the defendant said \u201che would sign the check and send the boy for it,\u201d and that she filled out the words \u201cLafayette Radio\u201d and the amount on the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2), which was signed when she received it. On cross-examination the witness testified that she was not positive that the person she had talked to on the telephone was the defendant, that she did not fill in the words \u201cLafayette Radio,\u201d but that she did fill in the amounts on the second check (people\u2019s exhibit 2), that she did not see the defendant put his name on the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2), and that she did not see the first check signed (people\u2019s exhibit 1).\nThe State then called Ronald Odum, who testified that he was a partner in tire Lafayette Store, that the defendant came into the store with a younger boy about 10 A.M., looked at walkie-talkies, and returned abut 1 or 2 P.M. and purchased a walkie-talkie, that the defendant filled in all portions of the check (people\u2019s exhibit 1), that he believed that the defendant removed a single check from his pocket, that the only identification that the defendant had was his social security card which' he, the witness, \u201ctook down\u201d together with the number from the driver\u2019s license of the younger man who accompanied the defendant, that the defendant left the store with the merchandise, and that he, the witness, was not present when the second set was sold. On cross-examination the witness testified that he watched the defendant fill out the check (people\u2019s exhibit 1), that the witness had selected the defendant\u2019s picture from a group of photographs shown to him by the police, and that he had nothing to do with the second check.\nThe last State\u2019s witness was Lloyd C. Henderson, a vice-president of the Carterville State and Savings Bank. He identified people\u2019s exhibits one and two as counter checks from his bank. He testified that the checks were presented for payment but were not honored because the account number on the checks did not exist and the checking account record revealed no depositor by the name of Earl Miller. On cross-examination the witness testified that he did not know who signed the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2).\nThe State rested, and the trial court recessed. When the court reconvened the State moved to reopen the case to admit people\u2019s exhibits nos. 1 and 2 into evidence. The defense objected, but was overruled. The defense objected to exhibit no. 1, as not being \u201cof a probative nature as to whether or not the second check (which was of the amount charged in the information) was illegally and criminally issued and passed by this defendant.\u201d No objection was made to people\u2019s exhibit no. 2. The trial court overruled the defense counsel\u2019s objection to people\u2019s exhibit no. 1 and submitted both exhibits (people\u2019s exhibits 1 and 2) into evidence. The State than again rested.\nThereafter defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no proof that the defendant issued the check (people\u2019s exhibit 2) described in the information. Defense counsel further alleged that it was improper to use the first check (people\u2019s exhibit 1) as a vehicle of tying the defendant to the second check (people\u2019s exhibit 2). After the State\u2019s argument in rebuttal, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant rested without presenting any evidence.\nIn this appeal defendant raised three issues: first, that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take people\u2019s exhibits nos. 1 and 2 into the jury room, secondly, that people\u2019s exhibit no. 1 was erroneously admitted, and lastly, that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case. Due to the interrelationship of these contentions we will address ourselves first to the admissibility of people\u2019s exhibit no. 1.\nThe defendant contends that people\u2019s exhibit no. 1 evidenced the commission of another crime and, therefore, its relevancy \u201cwas completely outweighed by the prejudicial effect it had on the jury in view of the State\u2019s total failure to present any direct and concrete evidence linking the defendant with the alleged passage of the second check.\u201d The defendant cites two cases, People v. Cage, 34 Ill.2d 530, 216 N.E.2d 805, and People v. Spencer, 7 Ill.App.3d 1017, 288 N.E.2d 612, in support of the above proposition. In each of the cited cases the respective court made three determinations: (1) that as a general rule evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove that a defendant committed the crime for which he is being tried, (2) that such evidence may, however, be admitted when its relevancy in placing the defendant in proximity to the time and place, aiding or establishing identity, or tending to prove design, motive or knowledge is so closely connected to the main issue as to justify admission, and (3) due to the facts there present the probative value was minimal in establishing any of the elements which would remove it from the exclusionary rule. As stated in People v. Spencer, 7 Ill.App.3d 1017, 1021, 288 N.E.2d 612, 615:\n\u201cThe facts of each case must be examined to determine whether the evidence * * * is sufficiently relevant to prove the accused guilty of the offense for which he is being tried.\u201d\nOur review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that people\u2019s exhibit no. 1 is so closely connected to the main issue as to outweigh its prejudicial effect and justify its admission into evidence. In the instant case the evidence of another crime, people\u2019s exhibit no. 1, placed the defendant in the proximity to the time (February 8, 1973) and place (the Lafayette Radio Store) of the crime for which he was being tried, aided in establishing the identity of the defendant by (1) comparison of the handwriting on the two checks (people\u2019s exhibits 1 and. 2) and (2) connecting the defendant with the party who passed the second check (people\u2019s exhibit 2), and tended to show defendant\u2019s knowledge of the delivery of the second check (people\u2019s exhibit 2) by the fact that the checks were (1) both signed in defendant\u2019s name, (2) consecutively numbered, (3) drawn on the same numbered account at the same bank, and (4) passed at the same location. We, therefore, hold that people\u2019s exhibit no. 1 was properly admitted into evidence by the trial court.\nThe defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict was directly premised upon the inadmissibility of people\u2019s exhibit no. 1. Having already determined the admissibility of people\u2019s exhibit no. 1, we will address ourselves to the issue of whether the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. In People v. Bernette, 30 Ill.2d 359, 367, 197 N.E.2d 436, 441, our supreme court stated:\n\u201c# # # a conviction may be sustained upon circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence, (People v. Russell, 17 Ill.2d 328, [161 N.E.2d 309]) it being necessary only that the proof of circumstances must be of a conclusive nature and tenancy leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion and producing a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed tire crime. (People v. Magnafichi, 9 Ill.2d 169, [137 N.E.2d 256]; People v. Grizzel, 382 Ill. 11, [46 N.E.2d 78].) The jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in tire chain of circumstances relied upon to establish guilt, but it is sufficient if all the evidence, taken together, satisfies the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused\u2019s guilt.\u201d\nThe foregoing was quoted and relied upon in People v. Marino, 44 Ill.2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770. See also People v. Helm, 10 Ill.App.3d 643, 295 N.E.2d 78; People v. Holt, 7 Ill.App.3d 646, 288 N.E.2d 245.\nFrom our review of the entire record, which includes people\u2019s exhibits nos. 1 and 2, we find that the circumstantial evidence presented in the trial court was of a sufficiently conclusive nature and tendancy to sustain a verdict of guilty. It is within the peculiar province of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the facts and unless that decision is so contrary to the evidence \u2014 so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory so that we have reasonable doubt \u2014 the decision of the jury will not be disturbed. (People v. Smith, 5 Ill.App.3d 648, 283 N.E.2d 727.) .Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nThe final contention to which the defendant directs our attention concerns the propriety of the jury taking exhibits nos. 1 and 2 into the jury room during their deliberations. The defendant concedes that a jury in a criminal trial is competent to make handwriting comparisons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 51, par. 50; People v. Clark, 301 Ill. 428, 134 N.E. 95); however, he contends that it is reversible error to allow the jury to engage in a handwriting comparison for the first time in the jury room (People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015; People v. McElroy, 63 Ill.App.2d 403, 211 N.E.2d 444; People v. Harter, 4 Ill.App.3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10).\nIn People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 6 N.E.2d 1015, our supreme court held that it was prejudicial error to allow the jury to take exemplars of handwriting into the jury room for comparison. In White the exemplars were taken to the jury room over the objection of defense counsel. It is interesting to note, however, that the supreme court in White refused to entertain the defendant\u2019s claim that interrogation of the jurors, by a witness, after a demonstration was improper on appeal since the defendant had not \u201cproperly preserved the alleged error for review.\u201d (People v. White, 365 Ill. 499, 511.) In People v. McElroy, 63 Ill.App.2d 403, 211 N.E.2d 444, the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to permit the jury to take exhibits into the jury room. In People v. Harter, 4 Ill.App.3d 772, 282 N.E.2d 10, the appellate court was confronted with the defendant\u2019s allegation that his trial counsel was incompetent. The corut concluded that the defendant was deprived of substantial rights and should be granted a new trial. Thereafter the court noted that there were other trial errors which taken alone would not be grounds for reversal. It was subsequent to this qualifying statement that the court held that it was error to allow samples of handwriting to be taken to the jury room.\nThe defendant has not called our attention to any case which has reversed on the ground that an exhibit was improperly taken into the jury room where the defense counsel has not objected to the introduced exhibits being taken to the jury room in the trial court. On the other hand, tire State cites People v. Allen, 17 Ill.2d 55, 160 N.E.2d 818, for the proposition that a defendant must object at the proper time to preserve for review questions conceminug the taking of physical evidence into the jury room. In People v. Allen, our supreme court stated:\n\u201cDefendant objected at the trial to taking the screw driver into the jury room but raised no objection to sending the other exhibits in with the jury. The alleged error in taking in the other exhibits is therefore waived.\u201d (17 Ill.App.2d 55, 62, 160 N.E.2d 818, 823.)\nSee also People v. Dixon, 75 Ill.App.2d 77, 221 N.E.2d 35.\nIn the instant case there was no objection to the taking of people\u2019s exhibits into the jury room, in fact, reference was made to this possibility in the closing argument and a \u201cword of warning\u201d was added about the jury\u2019s examination of the two exhibits: Failure to properly preserve the alleged error for review precludes the defendant from raising this issue on appeal.\nIn accordance with' the foregoing conclusions we affirm the judgment entered by the circuit court of Jackson County against the defendant for deceptive practice.\nJudgment affirmed.\nG. MORAN, P. J., and CARTER, J., concur.\nSubsequently, the testimony regarding the telephone conversation between the witness\u2019s wife and the defendant was objected to, and sustained, as hearsay. At that time, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard \u201canything that was heard between the wife of the witness and the defendant.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert E. Farrell and Michael J. Rosborough, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Howard L. Hood, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro, and John T. Bowman and Gary T. Miller, Senior Law Students, of Carbondale, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Earl Miller, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 73-267;\nFifth District\nNovember 20, 1974.\nRobert E. Farrell and Michael J. Rosborough, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nHoward L. Hood, State\u2019s Attorney, of Murphysboro, and John T. Bowman and Gary T. Miller, Senior Law Students, of Carbondale, for the People." }, "file_name": "0275-01", "first_page_order": 299, "last_page_order": 306 }