{ "id": 5308216, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Harden, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harden", "decision_date": "1974-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 74-186", "first_page": "304", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 304" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "230 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2860045 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 N.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379341 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill.App.3d 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5393611 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill.App.3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345725 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 U.S. 89", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728831 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/379/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2780750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.E. 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5252376 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/342/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2883509 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857618 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill.App.3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2508421 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 N.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938325 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill.App.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1594813 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/109/0391-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 9152, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47126261029117916 }, "sha256": "93f03accffb34acceae18bb1636f2715f172cfc7b70ff3b54455826a57f818f0", "simhash": "1:0e7355b8ec4d8601", "word_count": 1535 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:16.970085+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Harden, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Harry Harden, from a judgment entered on a jury verdict by the circuit court of Jasper County, convicting him of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\nThe defendant, through his retained counsel, waived arraignment and requested a jury trial. The record before us discloses that no issue as to the lack of probable cause was raised in the trial court. During the direct examination of the State\u2019s first witness, Trooper Harry Sutton, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cA. I was sitting at the intersection. There was a man and woman drove up.\nMR. HELLMAN: Objection, your Honor. May we approach the bench.\nTHE COURT: Yes, sir.\n(Conference between Court and Counsel before the bench but out of the hearing of the Jury):\nMR. HELLMAN: I believe the State is leading the witness. She is preparing the witness to testify to some hearsay testimony. It\u2019s apparent that the persons who made the statements which he is about to testify to are not present in open court. They are unsworn statements and I will not have the right to cross examine them.\nTHE COURT: You objected to the \u2014\nMR. HELLMAN: My objection is that I believe this testimony is about to be that these two persons told him that Mr. Harden, the defendant was operating a motor vehicle and in some sort of irregular manner. I believe that is highly prejudiical and is not justified in terms of what might be proved.\nTHE COURT: This testimony is admitted in exception to the hearsay rule in that the purpose is to show that the officer was alerted as to the condition of the defendant and for that purpose only. It won\u2019t be necessary, I take it, Mrs. Fehrenbacher, to have an extended conversation?\nMRS. FEHRENBACHER: No.\nTHE COURT: It\u2019s only to show the fact that the officer was notified. For that reason, the witness will be allowed to testify as to what was told him by the person or persons in the other car. (The following in Court room before jury)\nTHE COURT: Would you repeat the last question, please.\nREPORTER: Again, calling your attention to the date and the time of 6:30 P.M. did anything out of the ordinary occur at that time?\nTHE COURT: You may answer the question \u2014 overruled.\nMR. SUTTON: A man and woman drove up to my unit and advised me that there was a man driving a yellow pick up truck, forcing cars off the road between St. Marie and Junction 49 and 33. And the driver pointed out the truck to me as belonging to the defendant, Mr. Harden.\u201d\nThe defendant first asserts that the foregoing evidence was \u201cviolative of the hearsay rule\u201d and that since the evidence is not \u201coverwhelming\u201d or \u201cample\u201d against the defendant \u201c* * * justice and fairness would appear to be better served by a reversal with remand for a new trial, excluding the prejudicial testimony.\u201d The State\u2019s reply to this assertion is simply that \u201cthe statement was not hearsay and therefore properly admitted.\u201d\nThe main thrust of the State\u2019s argument is that the statement was \u201coffered not to establish the fact in the statement, but to show the reason for the conduct of the witness,\u201d i.e., \u201cto show that a statement had .been made to put him on notice.\u201d It is interesting to note, however, that the following quotation from People v. Rice, 109 Ill.App.2d 391, 395, 248 N.E.2d 745, 747, is cited by the State;\n\u201c \u2018The test of admissibility of evidence is whether it fairly tends to prove the particular offense charged and any circumstances may be put in evidence which tends to make the proposition at issue either more or less probable.\u2019 \u201d\nWe agree with the test espoused by the court in People v. Rice, in fact, we quoted People v. Peter, 55 Ill.2d 443, 303 N.E.2d 398, 408, for an identical proposition in People v. Rogers, 23 Ill.App.3d 115, 318 N.E.2d 715. Therein we held that the evidence in question was relevant since it tended to prove the proposition in issue (whether the defendant committed the offense charged) more probable than its non-existence. We are compelled to reach a contrary conclusion in the instant case.\nIf we assume ad arguendo that the proffered evidence was introduced solely to show notice on the part of the arresting officer, such evidence was irrelevant, since what motivated the arresting officer to place the defendant under surveillance was not in issue, and evidence concerning the officer\u2019s motivation had no probative value with respect to the defendant\u2019s guilt of the offense charged. Probative value, i.e., relevancy, attaches to such evidence only when it is proffered in an attempt to establish the truth of the matter asserted therein.\nIf, on the other hand, we assume that this evidence was proffered in an attempt to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein, it should have been excluded as hearsay when objection was raised by the defense counsel. (People v. McKee, 39 Ill.2d 265, 235 N.E.2d 625.) The essential feature of the hearsay rule is not that all statements made out of the presence of the defendant are inadmissible but rather that all testimony is inadmissible which does not give the defendant an opportunity for cross-examination of the party whose assertions are offered. (People v. Cook, 33 Ill.2d 363, 211 N.E.2d 374.) In People v. Colegrove, 342 Ill. 430, 438, 174 N.E. 536, 539, our supreme court stated:\n\u201cDeclarations out of court or statements of any kind by a third person against the accused, made in his absence and without his knowledge, are inadmissible as evidence against him.\u201d\nSee also People v. Smuk, 12 Ill.2d 360, 365, 146 N.E.2d 32.\nIn the instant case the admission of Trooper Sutton\u2019s testimony concerning what he was told by unnamed motorists, used for the alleged purpose of showing \u201cnotice,\u201d bore too heavily upon defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence to allow its admission. Although other competent evidence was presented to establish the degree, or extent, of defendant\u2019s intoxication, the source of the only evidence of defendant\u2019s abnormal driving was this incompetent hearsay evidence which was admitted over objection. Furthermore, the trial court failed to admonish the jury as to the limited purpose for which such evidence was to be admitted. Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that the jury\u2019s finding was based in part on incompetent evidence which was so prejudicial to the defendant as to deny him his right to a fair and impartial trial. We believe that justice will be better served in a new trial, free from such error, and we remand the case for that purpose. While \u201cnotice\u201d may be shown to explain the reason for the conduct of the witness, it is not necessary that the details of the report and language of the informant be disclosed, particularly when those details or language would describe criminal acts.\nHaving thus decided, we need consider only one additional issue, the defendant\u2019s contention that since no probable cause for the arrest was established the case should be reversed without remand. Section 107 \u2014 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stati, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 2) provides, in part, that:\n\u201cA peace officer may arrest a person when:\n# #\n(c) He has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed an offense.\u201d\nThis same element of probable cause is one of constitutional dimension which must be demonstrated from the attending circumstances of the case as reasonably existing in the mind of the arresting officer at the moment his arrest of the accused is effectuated. (Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 85 S.Ct. 223.) As stated in People v. Brooks, 13 Ill.App.3d 1003, 1006, 301 N.E.2d 496, 498:\n\u201cThis belief may be founded on hearsay evidence and on factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable, prudent men, not legal technicians, operate. The question of whether probable cause exists depends on the facts of each individual case. See People v. Colbert, 10 Ill.App.3d 758, 760, [295 N.E.2d 225] (1973), and cases cited therein.\u201d\nAn officer is justified in regarding information as reasonably reliable in making an arrest if the information is independently corroborated (Beck v. State of Ohio; People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill.2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499) by the officer\u2019s independent observations (People v. Cummings, 38 Ill.2d 11, 230 N.E.2d 187). Having carefully considered the record of the instant case, it is our conclusion that the factual circumstances which presented themselves to the arresting officer were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the offense for which he was charged, prior to the effectuation of his arrest.\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment entered by the circuit court of Jasper County and remand this cause for a new trial consistent with the opinions expressed herein.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCREBS and CARTER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert L. Douglas, of Robinson, for appellant.", "Patricia H. Fehrenbacher, of Newton, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry Harden, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 74-186;\nFifth District\nNovember 20, 1974.\nRobert L. Douglas, of Robinson, for appellant.\nPatricia H. Fehrenbacher, of Newton, for the People." }, "file_name": "0304-01", "first_page_order": 328, "last_page_order": 332 }