{
  "id": 5311694,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Stufflebean, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stufflebean",
  "decision_date": "1974-12-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 74-4",
  "first_page": "1065",
  "last_page": "1069",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 1065"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "264 N.E.2d 502",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "131 Ill.App.2d 604",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2906065
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/131/0604-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "299 N.E.2d 585",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "12 Ill.App.3d 576",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2850804
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/12/0576-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "186 N.E.2d 349",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "26 Ill.2d 403",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        5357049
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/26/0403-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "260 N.E.2d 58",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "125 Ill.App.2d 168",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        1577231
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-2d/125/0168-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "293 N.E.2d 341",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "343"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "10 Ill.App.3d 74",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        5396072
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "77"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/10/0074-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "699"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "47 Ill.2d 510",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        2903225
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "517"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-2d/47/0510-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 613,
    "char_count": 10750,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.727,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.1667864234034425e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5853296852441976
    },
    "sha256": "cb242cd9f64e3be5e09c00ce2efd6bfd59d748105add4621d309de4efd2b16e7",
    "simhash": "1:f846f233bad485d0",
    "word_count": 1797
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:53:16.970085+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Stufflebean, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr.:.JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Thomas Edward Stufflebean, from a judgment of conviction entered, on a jury verdict of guilty, by the circuit corut of Madison County for the offense of robbery and the imposition of a sentence of not less than 2 years nor more than 6 years in the penitentiary.\nIn the instant appeal the defendant does not contend that he .was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, rather he contends that it \u201ccannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury\u2019s knowledge of the defendant\u2019s prior conviction did not contribute to its verdict.\u201d Nevertheless, a brief summary of the evidence presented at the defendant\u2019s trial is necessary before evaluation of the defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant\u2019s 1967 Missouri conviction for theft from a person and in allowing reference to it by the State in closing argument.\n. A- review of the uncontroverted facts reveals that the defendant requested the bartender at Hook\u2019s Tavern to call for a Yellow Cab around 11 P.M. on May 17, 1973; John Fausz was dispatched to pick up the de^ fendarit; after a number of interveriing stops the cab arrived at 1206 Grand in Madison; after Fausz and defendant entered the building at that address, through the basement, the defendant tied and gagged Fausz; the defendant then drove away in the cab Fausz had been operating; Mr. Fausz untied himself and notified the police; and the defendant was arrested near the County Road and McKinley Bridge where he had driven to meet another, man who had driven to that location in a Ford F\u00e1irlane.\nThe defendant attempted to explain his conduct by testifying that he knew Fausz, by his nickname \u201cFuzzy,\u201d and that the two of them used to hang around together; he and Fausz met on the afternoon of May 17, 1973, and Fausz proposed a \u201cdeal\u201d to the defendant; under this \u201cdeal\u201d the defendant was to caff Fausz that night and have Fausz pick him up in, Fausz\u2019s. cab, they were to go to 1206 Grand where the defendant wpuld tie up Fausz and take Fausz\u2019s cab, Fausz would get the insurance money for the cab and pay the defendant $460 the following morning; and the events of the evening of May 17, 1973, were the culmination of;this \u201cdeal.\u201d' ' ' ' '\nFausz denied that he knew the defend\u00e1nt arid further deified that he had- prpp\u201eosed .or agreed :to the.plan.outlined by the defendant. Edward Goclan, a Madison police officer, testified that when he requested the defendant to produce some identification the defendant said his name was Fausz and pulled out a' Wallet with identification in the name of Fausz. The defendant was searched and a wallet with the name of Thomas Stufflebean was found. Officer Goclan testified that $15 or $16 in change was found in one of the defendant\u2019s pockets. He also testified that the police report was in error in that it did not reflect that Fausz\u2019s wallet was taken from the defendant at the time of the arrest. Charles Mize, a Venice police officer, testified that he had been called to assist in the arrest. Officer Mize stated that he patted down the defendant and felt two wallets in the defendant\u2019s back pockets. He also stated that the defendant pulled a wallet out of his pocket and gave it to Officer Goclan, whereupon Officer Goclan asked the defendant \u201cAre you Mr. Fausz?\u201d The defendant denied that he was in possession of Fausz\u2019s wallet and testified that the police added a wallet similar to that identified as Fausz\u2019s wallet to what the defendant removed from his pockets at the police station. The defendant also denied that he had identified himself as Fausz at the time of his apprehension.\nAfter the defendant\u2019s testimony the State\u2019s Attorney presented to the court in chambers \u201ca verified and authenticated copy\u201d of two prior convictions from Missouri, one for theft from the person, the other for assault with intent to kill with malice. The trial court allowed the theft conviction to be introduced, but refused to allow the assault conviction. The defendant objected on the grounds that the theft conviction was \u201cancient\u201d and that it would only serve to inflame the jury and prejudice the defendant. A cautionary instruction was given admonishing the jury to consider the defendant\u2019s prior conviction \u201conly insofar as it may affect his credibility as a witness.\u201d\nThe defense counsel, in closing argument stated:\n\u201c* 6 * Now Mr. Tron\u00e9 [State\u2019s Attorney] has given you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a look at this man\u2019s unfortunate past and his trauma of 1967, a conviction for purse snatching, to which Mr. Stufflebean pleaded guilty.\nMR. TRONE: Objection, Your Honor. I don\u2019t think that was the record\u2014\nMR. WEBER: That\u2019s what it was. It was theft from a person, but it was purse snatching. Now let me ask you a question, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what relevance other than titillating, other than trying to inflame your passion, other than trying to prejudice you against this man, does a \u201967 to \u201973 \u2014 does a seven or eight year old purse snatching record does have in this case? What does it have? Well, it has all the requirements of a true confession sensational attempt to drag you right over the issues of this case. That\u2019s what it\u2019s brought in for, and I submit that\u2019s the only reason it\u2019s all brought in for, because if \u2014 credibility\u2014although it\u2019s not a perjury conviction \u2014 a similar type of taking from people that Mr. Tron\u00e9 wants you to \u2014 why did he bring that it? . * \u00b0 *\u201d\nSubsequently, the State, in closing argument, stated:\n\u201c* \u25a0 * * But he [defendant] isn\u2019t the smartest guy in the world, in the first place. The smart guys don\u2019t get involved in this stupid stuff. And particular \u2014 after having been mixed up once before.\nMR. WEBER: I object.\nMR. TRONE: Purse snatching. If you\u2019ll recall, the Court advised you that it was Theft from the person, and the sentence for that theft from the person was a two year sentence. Does that sound like simple purse snatching?\nMR. WEBER: I have made an objection.to Mr. Trone\u2019s characterization of him having been caught once before. I think it\u2019s inflammatory and being precisely the kind of issue that he\u2019s trotting out to obscure the facts in this case. I\u2019d like a ruling.on that point.\nTHE COURT: As to it being inflammatory?\nMR. WEBER: Sure.\nMR. TRONE: Your Honor, he brought up himself\u2014\nMR. WEBER: And being improper argument.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. TRONE: He brought \u2014 there was nothing said in Court or any reference to purse snatching, nor was there any testimony to that. That was theft of the person, which there was a two year sentence given. * * *\u201d\nInitially, we must determine whether the defendant\u2019s prior conviction for theft was properly admitted. The guidelines for-the admission of previous convictions were established in the landmark case of People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695. Therein our supreme court held proof of prior convictions for purposes of impeachment was to be governed by Rule 609 adopted by the Committe on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Under the general rule, the credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence of a prior conviction, except a plea of nolo contendere, if such crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 609 also provides that evidence of conviction is not admissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.\nSince the defendant\u2019s previous conviction for theft from a person was punishable by a sentence of 2 years, involved dishonesty, and transpired within the requisite 10-year period, the only issue before us is whether its probative value was \u201csubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d According to the Advisory Committee\u2019s comments to Rule 609, set forth at length in Montgomery, the trial court is given \u201croom for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case.\u201d 47 Ill.2d 510, 517, 268 N.E.2d 695, 699.\nOur review of the record in the instant case reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Evaluation of the nature of the prior conviction, the proximity of' the prior conviction, the subsequent career of the defendant, and the similarity between the previous, offense and the one charged, leads us to the conclusion that the ruling of the trial court concerning the admission of the defendant\u2019s prior conviction satisfies the standards set forth in Montgomery and is not \u201csubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d\nWe also find no merit in the defendant\u2019s argument that references to such conviction in the State\u2019s closing argument constituted reversible error. The State is permitted, in closing argument, to comment upon the credibility of the defendant as a witness. (People v. Hurley, 10 Ill.App.3d 74, 77, 293 N.E.2d 341, 343.) A previous conviction is within the scope of the State\u2019s commentary on the credibility of the witness, provided evidence of such conviction has been properly admitted. (See People v. Jones, 125 Ill.App.2d 168, 260 N.E.2d 58.) When the defense counsel attempts to minimize the effect of the defendant\u2019s prior conviction in his closing argument, the State may, of course, respond directly to such remarks provided it does not transcend the scope of the comments, advanced by the defense counsel. In any event, in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt, we .cannot say that the State\u2019s closing argument, much of which was in direct response to the closing argument .of the defense counsel,, constituted reversible error. See People v. Stahl, 26 Ill.2d 403, 186 N.E.2d 349; People v. Bellamy, 12 Ill.App.3d 576, 299 N.E.2d 585; People v. Fox, 131 Ill.App.2d 604, 264 N.E.2d 502.\nHaving found the defendant\u2019s only contentions without merit, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court of Madison County.\nAffirmed.\nG. MORAN and CARTER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr.:.JUSTICE EBERSPACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Robert Farrell, of Mt. Vernon, and Steven Clark, of Chicago, both of State Appellate Defenders Office, for appellant.",
      "Nicholas \u25a0 G. Byron, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Raymond F. Buckley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Stufflebean, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 74-4;\nFifth District\nDecember 24, 1974.\nRobert Farrell, of Mt. Vernon, and Steven Clark, of Chicago, both of State Appellate Defenders Office, for appellant.\nNicholas \u25a0 G. Byron, State\u2019s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Raymond F. Buckley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1065-01",
  "first_page_order": 1089,
  "last_page_order": 1093
}
