{ "id": 5135873, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN CAMPBELL et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Campbell", "decision_date": "1992-12-16", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-89-2484, 1-89-2485 cons.", "first_page": "179", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 179" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2549839 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228316 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2918841 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S. Ct. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596222 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "1866" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "1866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1025", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589223 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 1163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5210795 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "223-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574383 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203-05" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597251 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3277929 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 12855, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.201356490300649e-08, "percentile": 0.4760009174280045 }, "sha256": "dc08689683d761aa89cfb50bcfc77a2abc5803e13dc0c776307308a566dadee7", "simhash": "1:8fc23d056c409db7", "word_count": 2051 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:37.771033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN CAMPBELL et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Jerry Bogan and John Campbell were convicted by a jury of the robbery of Arthur Abrams and were sentenced to prison for 14 years and 6 years, respectively. On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in finding that the State had offered sufficient race-neutral explanations for its exercise of peremptory challenges in excluding African-Americans from the jury.\nWe affirm the convictions.\nDuring voir dire, the trial court questioned 19 prospective jurors before defendants joined in a motion based upon the United States Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, which found that racial or ethnic discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges denied a defendant due process.\nThe trial court had excused 7 of the 19 people for cause. Although the record is somewhat confused, it appears that the trial court completed voir dire with respect to the first panel of 13 and the State was apparently satisfied with the panel. Counsel for defendant Bogan exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude one of the prospective jurors; counsel for defendant Campbell exercised peremptory challenges to exclude two prospective jurors; and the State then exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror, K.C. Lee, an African-American. During the questioning, the State had used a peremptory challenge to excuse another African-American, Anthony Jones.\nAfter the Batson motion was made, this discussion followed:\n\u201cMS. FITZSIMMONS: The only remaining blacks on the venire panel, after the Court excused for cause Mr. Estes, over my objection, and Mr. Benson, who was not over my objection, he pretty clearly stated that he could not be fair, the only remaining blacks were Mr. Lee and Mr. Jones and those are the only two peremptories that the State has used at this point.\nTHE COURT: State, do you wish to give racially neutral reasons as to why Mr. Jones and Mr. Lee were excused?\u201d\nThe State then gave its reasons and the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion, finding no Batson violation.\nDefendants assert here that the trial court erred in its finding that the State gave racially neutral reasons for excluding the two African-American prospective jurors.\nWe are first concerned with the Batson process. Batson establishes a three-step analysis to determine whether the State used its peremptory challenges to remove venire members on the basis of race: (1) the defendant must demonstrate a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) after such showing the State must then come forward with a race-neutral explanation for challenging African-American jurors; (3) the trial court determines if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; People v. Hope (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 315, 321, 589 N.E.2d 503.\nTo make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, defendant must demonstrate that members of a racial group were removed from the venire by peremptory challenges and that the removal, in addition to other relevant circumstances, raises an inference of purposeful discrimination by the State in the selection of the jury. People v. Andrews (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 413, 424, 588 N.E.2d 1126.\nExamples of relevant circumstances include (1) a pattern of strikes against African-American veniremembers; (2) a disproportionate use of strikes against black veniremembers; (3) whether the excluded jurors were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; (4) the level of black representation in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) the prosecutorial questions and statements during voir dire and while exercising challenges; and (6) the races of defendant and victim or of defendant and witnesses. People v. Garrett (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 189, 203, 564 N.E.2d 784; People v. Coulter (1992), 230 Ill. App. 3d 209, 222, 594 N.E.2d 1163.\nEach step in Batson ought to be considered only upon the completion of the preceding step. (People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 451, 548 N.E.2d 1025.) The State argues that defendants have not fulfilled their burden as to \u201cStep One\u201d: establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendants contend that they were not required to do so, relying upon Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866, which found that \u201c[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.\u201d\nHowever, defendants\u2019 argument does not fully consider all of the implications of Hernandez. The Supreme Court stated that only where the prosecutor defends his use of peremptory strikes \u201cwithout any prompting or inquiry from the trial court,\u201d and the trial court then rules on whether there has been intentional discrimination, will the issue of defendants\u2019 prima facie showing become moot. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866; People v. Jackson (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 43, 582 N.E.2d 125, vacated on other grounds (1992),_U.S__, 121 L. Ed. 2d 5, 113 S. Ct. 32; Coulter, 230 Ill. App. 3d 209, 594 N.E.2d 1163.\nHere, the question that the trial court posed to the State, whether it wished to give racially neutral reasons as to why the two African-Americans were excused, is certainly \u201cprompting\u201d or \u201cinquiry\u201d as Hernandez contemplates. Such an inquiry improperly collapses the Batson process into a two-step rather than a three-step process. See Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 101; Coulter, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 223.\nIn Jackson, our supreme court clearly stated its policy with regard to the three-step Batson process and expressed its frustration with the trial courts of our State in failing to follow its mandate. Furthermore, the Jackson court condemned the procedure established by the trial court that required the State to explain the nonracial character of each peremptory challenge at the time of the exercise of the challenge. (Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 99.) Such a procedure ignores the first-step requirement that the trial court find a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.\nCoulter similarly distinguishes Hernandez and holds that the trial judge\u2019s requirement that the State provide its explanation at the time of the exercise of the peremptory challenge is sufficient to ensure that the first step in the Batson process is not moot. However, in Coulter, the record provides other \u201crelevant circumstances\u201d which establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. Coulter, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 223-24.\nSince the issue is not moot, we now examine whether defendants properly established a prima facie showing of discrimination. Defense counsel\u2019s only evidence of discrimination was that the State\u2019s two peremptory challenges were both made to African-American veniremembers. One of the two challenged veniremembers had apparently been tendered to defendants and was the victim of a backstrike.\nWe find that defendants\u2019 statement, without more, fails to make the requisite showing of \u201crelevant circumstances\u201d which would indicate that racial discrimination was the motivation for the exercise of the challenge. See People v. Garrett (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 189, 203-05, 564 N.E.2d 784; People v. Beviel (1992), 250 Ill. App. 3d 361, 364.\nGenerally, a statement of the mere number of African-American veniremembers peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d at 203; People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, 413-14, 539 N.E.2d 1172; Beviel, No. 1\u201489\u20141800, slip op. at 4; People v. Lyles (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 370, 374, 576 N.E.2d 396.\nIn Garrett, the defendant failed to establish other relevant circumstances leading to the inference of purposeful discrimination required for a prima facie showing. The court explained, inter alia: (1) the mere fact that some African-American veniremembers are challenged and others accepted by the State, without more, does not constitute a pattern of improper challenges; (2) nor was there a showing that the State challenged black veniremembers disproportionately as compared to white members, or that the level of black representation in the venire exceeded that in the jury; (3) nor were prosecutors\u2019 statements or questions during voir dire cited which would imply purposeful racial discrimination. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d at 204.\nIn Beviel, this court similarly found that the defendant failed to offer any relevant evidence other than the fact that three blacks were challenged and only one black male remained on the jury. Beviel, No. 1 \u2014 89\u20141800, slip op. at 6.\nIn the present case, defendants offered even less evidence of discrimination than did the defendants in Garrett and Beviel. Defendants here offer no facts other than simply stating that the State used its only two peremptory challenges to excuse two blacks.\nAll we are able to glean from the record is that the trial court excused seven persons for cause before defendants made their Batson motion. While the record establishes that defense counsel identified Jeffery Estes and Robert Benson as two African-Americans whom the court excused for cause, counsel did not identify the racial composition of the other excused veniremembers, the entire venire or the jury so that we may properly determine if a disproportionate number of African-Americans were excused, if a discriminatory pattern was established or if the level of African-American representation in the venire exceeded that of the jury.\nAlso, defense counsel failed to provide any other relevant evidence of racial discrimination, for example, that the two excused African-Americans were heterogeneous in every respect except for race; that the State made statements or asked questions during voir dire that would imply racial discrimination; or that white veniremembers with similar histories were accepted as jurors. Further, defendants offer no evidence or argument that the race of the defendants, the victim or the witnesses somehow implied racial discrimination.\nWhile the trial court is silent as to whether defendants made a proper prima facie showing, we find that they failed to carry their burden in making such a showing.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the defendants\u2019 convictions are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTULLY and CERDA, JJ., concur.\nIn Jackson, the supreme court stated: \u201cWe have previously cautioned trial courts against collapsing what ought to be a methodical Batson hearing procedure into an undifferentiated review of defense and State contentions. [Citations.] It appears we must now caution trial courts against a procedure whereby the first step in the Batson analysis is omitted altogether.\u201d Jackson, 145 Ill. 2d at 98.\nEven if we were to find that defendants made a proper prima facie showing, we find that the trial court\u2019s acceptance of the State\u2019s explanations was proper and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find race-neutral the State\u2019s reasons for excluding Anthony Jones: that Mr. Jones was trying to \u201cstare down\u201d the prosecutor by giving him the \u201cevil eye\u201d and that he wore a T-shirt bearing the name of an establishment known among police officers as one where narcotics are suspected of being used. The prosecutor stated that if defendant frequented such an establishment, it suggested little respect for the law. The trial court commented that \u201cthe record is clear that there are numerous reasons in the State\u2019s mind\u201d why Mr. Jones should have been excluded.\nWe also find race-neutral the State\u2019s explanation for its use of a peremptory challenge against K.C. Lee: that the State understood Mr. Lee to be unemployed (not a very cogent reason, but not necessarily racial), and that the State had, at one point, tendered Mr. Lee to defendants, and thus had been ready to accept him. The trial court recognized that the State backstruck Mr. Lee only after defendants exercised their own peremptory strikes and accepted the State\u2019s explanation as race-neutral. We find that the record discloses no evidence that the State was racially motivated in exercising either of these peremptory challenges.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (R.H.R. Silvertrust, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Michael J. Pugh, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN CAMPBELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1 \u2014 89\u20142484, 1\u201489\u20142485 cons.\nOpinion filed December 16, 1992.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (R.H.R. Silvertrust, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellants.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Michael J. Pugh, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0179-01", "first_page_order": 197, "last_page_order": 202 }