{ "id": 5135767, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BENOIT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Benoit", "decision_date": "1992-12-18", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-1157", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "191", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 185" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 1082", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3437693 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 972", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3217570 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278232 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256644 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570265 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5254889 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855687 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2543426 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3096881 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3334107 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5261524 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0872-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 767, "char_count": 14738, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.713418201025994e-08, "percentile": 0.4538698974341747 }, "sha256": "00c9e25d0249b05e2f8b1bca392e0613a2b03e1c713827ebdd77a10362b1496b", "simhash": "1:832cb2817fdd1df7", "word_count": 2374 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:37.771033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BENOIT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant John Benoit was found guilty of arson, aggravated arson, conspiracy to commit arson and conspiracy to commit aggravated arson. He was sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment on the aggravated arson charge. Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to suppress defendant\u2019s statement; (2) the prosecutor improperly referred to defendant\u2019s failure to testify; (3) the trial court gave an issues instruction for aggravated arson which misstated the law; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of other unrelated misconduct by defendant into evidence.\nBriefly stated, the incident giving rise to this case occurred on February 17, 1987, when Dorothy Stirgus\u2019 home at 7924 South Fair-field Avenue in Chicago, was set aflame by two Molotov cocktails that were thrown through her window. John Benoit, John Waitman, William English and Patrick Doyle were arrested for the crime. This appeal concerns only defendant Benoit.\nDefendant\u2019s first contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we disagree. A valid Miranda waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. (People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958.) In determining the validity of the Miranda waiver, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation. (People v. Lopez (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 872, 584 N.E.2d 462.) A reviewing court\u2019s analysis of a ruling on a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Lopez, 222 Ill. App. 3d 872, 584 N.E.2d 462.\nThe evidence adduced from the suppression hearing is as follows. Defendant was arrested at St. Lawrence High School. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights while still at the high school and was informed that he was being accused of aggravated arson. Defendant\u2019s father testified that as the police and defendant were entering the police car, he told Sergeant Lowe that he did not want his son speaking to anybody until his attorney was present. According to defendant\u2019s father, Lowe responded \u201cokay\u201d or \u201call right.\u201d Lowe testified that he could not recall whether this conversation occurred.\nThe officers and defendant then proceeded to the police station, with the defendant\u2019s father following in his own car. While driving to 11th and State Streets, Sergeant Lowe received a radio message from his commander to call his office. Lowe flagged defendant\u2019s father and told him to follow him to 79th and Western Avenue, where he was going to stop and make a phone call. Defendant\u2019s father then indicated that he was concerned about his wife and wanted to go home and check on her. Sergeant Lowe testified that he left the car in order to make the phone call but that O\u2019Meara and Gardner remained in the car with defendant. Defendant, however testified that the officers left him alone in the police car.\nAt 79th and California Avenue, the officers slowed down and pulled over. According to defendant, Officer O\u2019Meara asked, \u201cDoes this area look familiar?\u201d Defendant testified that he did not respond. He testified that he now knew the area to be the firebombing area. The officers, however, denied asking defendant whether the area looked familiar.\nDefendant testified that as they were driving to the station, O\u2019Meara said, \u201cYou\u2019re looking at 60 years. All your friends told on you ***. If you talk now we can get you probation.\u201d Defendant testified that he gave up hope and answered the officer\u2019s questions. Sergeant Lowe, on the other hand, testified that it was defendant who began talking about the case, asking who had been arrested, and how they found out about his involvement, at which time O\u2019Meara told defendant not to mention anything until they arrived at the station. Detectives O\u2019Meara and Gardner testified that they did not threaten defendant, try to coerce a statement, or make any promises to him. Detective Gardner admitted that he asked defendant why he was involved in this investigation and defendant did not answer him.\nDefendant testified that O\u2019Meara said, \u201cWe have your friends,\u201d and showed defendant a piece of paper with the names William English, Patrick Doyle, and John Whitman written on it. According to defendant, O\u2019Meara asked, \u201cWhat do you got to say?\u201d and defendant responded, \u201cI ain\u2019t saying nothing until I get a lawyer.\u201d The officers, however, testified (when the proofs were reopened nine months after the suppression hearing) that defendant did not make a request for an attorney.\nAt the station, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Warnick gave defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and signed a written waiver. Defendant then gave a handwritten statement in which he implicated himself in the firebombing. Defendant reviewed the statement, initialled any corrections, and signed it.\nDefendant contends that his Miranda waiver was unknowing, unintelligent and involuntary because the police falsely assured defendant\u2019s father, within defendant\u2019s hearing, that they would not interrogate defendant until he had an attorney but then proceeded to question him and coerce him into making a statement. Defendant also points out that he was 18 years old at the time of his arrest and he was a novice in the criminal justice system.\nDefendant relies on People v. Starling (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 671, 381 N.E.2d 817, wherein the appellate court, affirming the trial court, found that defendant\u2019s statement was not voluntarily given based on the fact that defendant was 18 years old, he was awakened at an early hour after only a few hours of sleep, had no prior experience with the criminal justice system, and defendant was told that the police already knew of his involvement in the crime.\nThe situation here is different. The trial court was faced with conflicting testimony, and after observing the demeanor of the witnesses, found the officers more credible. The resolution of conflicting testimony at a suppression hearing is the responsibility of the trial judge. (People v. Clark (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 96, 440 N.E.2d 869.) Where the evidence is merely conflicting, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Spivey (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 584, 568 N.E.2d 327.) We find no reason to disturb the trial court\u2019s determination. Despite defendant\u2019s inexperience with the criminal justice system, defendant was an adult and fully capable of understanding his rights and the effect of waiving them. Based on the facts presented here, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nNor do we find that defendant invoked his right to counsel. When the right to counsel is invoked, all interrogation must cease, and it may not resume outside counsel\u2019s presence unless the defendant initiates further communication with the police. (Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880.) Here, it was not until nine months after the suppression hearing, when the proofs were reopened, that the officers testified that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel while he was being transported to the police station. However, permitting the State to reopen its case to present additional proof rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with on review except in cases of clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Cross (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 85, 237 N.E.2d 437.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision allowing the State to reopen its case nor do we find the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDefendant next maintains that even if defendant did not invoke his right to counsel, defendant\u2019s father invoked the right to counsel for the defendant. We are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument. Even if defendant\u2019s father did tell the officers not to question defendant until he obtained counsel, defendant was an adult and it was defendant\u2019s obligation to exercise his right to counsel. (People v. Watson (1991), 223 Ill. App. 3d 143, 583 N.E.2d 1180.) Although defendant relies on People v. Spivey (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 584, 586 N.E.2d 327, and People v. Starling (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 671, 381 N.E.2d 817, these cases are distinguishable. In Spivey, the court found that not only defendant\u2019s mother, but also defendant, stated that defendant did not want to answer any questions until he retained an attorney. The court found that because defendant had nodded affirmatively, to his father\u2019s warning that he consult with an attorney before answering any questions, defendant\u2019s response to his father\u2019s statement could be interpreted as a request for counsel.\nThe next contention raised by defendant is that the prosecutor made comments which improperly drew attention to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. A defendant has a constitutional right not to testify on his own behalf and it is improper for the prosecutor to refer directly or indirectly on defendant\u2019s failure to testify. (People v. Arman (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 115, 545 N.E.2d 658.) The appropriate test for determining whether a defendant\u2019s right to remain silent has been violated is whether the reference was intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to defendant\u2019s failure to testify. People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 78, 552 N.E.2d 743.\nThe first comment defendant takes issue with is as follows:\n\u201cDid you hear any testimony from this chair about anything that happened in any police car with him in it? Did you hear that? Did you hear any testimony from that witness stand about that statement [the defendant\u2019s statement to the police] not being true? Did anybody get up and say, the statement is a lie, the statement was beaten from this guy?\u201d\nWhile this comment was indeed improper, defense counsel objected to the comment and the objection was sustained. Defendant also complains of the prosecutor\u2019s statement that the jury heard no testimony regarding the time the assistant State\u2019s Attorney interrogated defendant and the comment that the uncontradicted testimony was that defendant was not forced to sign anything. While these comments were of questionable propriety, they are of a more general nature than the first comment. Furthermore, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming, particularly in light of defendant\u2019s confession. See People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill. 2d 103, 588 N.E.2d 1044.\nDefendant next maintains that the issues instruction for aggravated arson misstated the law. The instruction given to the jury, which was virtually identical to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 15.04 (3d ed. 1992), states:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of aggravated arson, the State must prove the following propositions: First: That defendant *** in the course of committing an arson, knowingly damages, partially or totally, any building; and Second: That when the defendant *** did so he knew or should have known that one or more persons were present therein ***.\u201d\nDefendant points out that according to the aggravated arson statute, a person commits aggravated arson when he \u201cknows or reasonably should know that one or more persons are present therein.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 20 \u2014 1.1) Although we agree with defendant that the word \u201creasonably\u201d should have been included in the jury instruction, the absence of this word certainly does not require reversal in this case. An error in instructions will be considered harmless if it is demonstrated that the result would not have been different if the proper instruction had been given. (People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 176, 529 N.E.2d 972.) The instruction as tendered actually imposed a higher standard on the State to prove the defendant\u2019s knowledge that one or more persons were present in the building he damaged. In light of the fact that the jury found that defendant \u201cshould have known\u201d that the premises were occupied, then it logically follows this same evidence would establish that defendant \u201creasonably should have known\u201d the premises were occupied.\nThe final contention raised by defendant is that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude portions of his statement which amounted to evidence of other, unrelated misconduct. In the statement, defendant related that he went with Waitman and Doyle to Jill Jacque\u2019s house. They were told by Jacque\u2019s brother that she had gone to Taco Bell. Soon thereafter, defendant, Waitman, Doyle and English saw Jacque crossing the street near the Taco Bell. Jacque was crying and asked defendants for a ride. According to defendant\u2019s statement, the defendants \u201cjoked with her and said [they would] leave her in a black neighborhood.\u201d Jacque was crying and she went knocking on the door of a house. Defendant then got Jacque back in the car and took her home. Defendant\u2019s statement then set forth defendant\u2019s participation in the offense from purchasing gasoline, to returning to John Whitman\u2019s home, where he filled a pop bottle with gasoline and later threw a brick through the victim\u2019s window.\nWhat defendant contends is that the portion of the statement referring to Jill Jacque, particularly the part about dropping her off in a black neighborhood, was irrelevant and prejudicial. We agree with the trial court\u2019s decision not to redact that part of defendant\u2019s statement referring to leaving Jacque in a black neighborhood. This statement was clearly relevant to show defendant\u2019s motive for attacking the victim\u2019s home. See People v. Williams (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 597, 610, 475 N.E.2d 1082 (\u201cThe racist references establish a possible motive for defendant\u2019s commission of the crime and will not be rendered inadmissible simply because they are prejudicial\u201d).\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLORENZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur.\nJustice Lorenz concurred in this opinion prior to his retirement.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Leslie Wallin, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Marie Quinlivan Czech, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BENOIT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20141157\nOpinion filed December 18, 1992.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Leslie Wallin, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Marie Quinlivan Czech, and Carol L. Gaines, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 203, "last_page_order": 209 }