{ "id": 5136879, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PATTEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Patten", "decision_date": "1992-12-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-91-0457", "first_page": "407", "last_page": "419", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 407" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1216-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2975074 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5535610 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5440293 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "806-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293444 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "2047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1255" }, { "page": "1255" }, { "page": "1255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "2067" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "689-90" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1078, "char_count": 28035, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.362814669531125e-08, "percentile": 0.48147208582430867 }, "sha256": "7a2c7b3e7ade4f2143e157adf6de211d4677c63daf4046c7356e15958e54fefd", "simhash": "1:8ae838da6f87ffdf", "word_count": 4628 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:37.771033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PATTEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant William Patten was found guilty of child abduction. The trial judge sentenced defendant to two years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and one year of supervised release. The issues defendant raises on appeal are: (1) that defense counsel\u2019s delay in amending his answer to discovery to include expert psychiatric testimony denied defendant effective assistance of counsel; and (2) that he was denied a fair trial when the judge failed to exercise his discretion and give a meaningful answer to a question asked by the jury during its deliberations.\nOn September 26, 1990, at approximately 7 p.m., 11-year-old K.H. and nine-year-old P.H. were playing on the front porch of a house at 1147 South Albany. P.H.\u2019s three-year-old sister was outside with them and their 13-year-old baby sitter M.R. had just gone inside to answer the telephone. The children both testified that a \u201creddish maroon\u201d car slowly drove by, stopped, and reversed back to the house. They testified that the man inside the car made a gesture for them to come toward the car. K.H. stated that she heard him say \u201ccome.\u201d P.H. testified that he heard the man say \u201ccome here.\u201d According to the children, K.H. started screaming and they both grabbed the three-year-old and ran inside the house. M.R. then called the police. At the police station, K.H. and P.H. both identified the defendant\u2019s car as the one that had been driven by the house. Additionally, K.H. identified the defendant in a lineup and again later she identified him in court as the man in the vehicle.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel showed the children a poster which had been distributed in front of the school and posted around the neighborhood prior to the day in question. The poster had a picture of defendant, a description of his car, his license number and warned kids to stay away from him because he was a \u201cvery bad man with children.\u201d Both K.H. and P.H. admitted that they had seen the poster before and knew what it said. K.H. testified she had seen a copy of the poster in her own house. Additionally, the children\u2019s parents had warned them to stay away from defendant.\nThe baby sitter, 13-year-old M.R., testified that she had gone inside to answer the telephone when she heard the other children screaming and running up the steps into the house. She called the police after they told her what had happened. She stated that she never gave defendant permission to put the children in his car. On cross-examination, M.R admitted that she had seen the poster warning them to stay away from defendant posted all around the neighborhood and that all the children were aware of it.\nK.H.\u2019s mother and P.H.\u2019s father both testified that neither they nor their spouses had ever given defendant permission to put the children in his car. Additionally, they both stated that their children had seen the poster prior to the incident. They also testified that they had expressly discussed it with their children and warned them about the person pictured on the poster.\nDetective James Butler testified that he interviewed each child separately and that both children identified defendant from a photo array as the man who had attempted to lure them into his car. He also stated that he was a witness to K.H.\u2019s lineup identification of defendant.\nOfficers Wayne Conley and Gerald Pustay testified that they were called to investigate the case at approximately 7:20 p.m. on September 26, 1990. They were informed by Detective Butler that K.H. had identified defendant as the person who had attempted to lure the children into his car. The officers proceeded to defendant\u2019s home, where they observed defendant\u2019s red Mustang in the driveway. They knocked on the door, but received no response. They then set up surveillance of the home. According to the officers, about 20 minutes later, defendant exited his house. The officers testified that when defendant saw them coming toward him he ran back up the driveway toward the back of his house. Officer Pustay overtook defendant and arrested him. Officer Conley took defendant\u2019s keys and drove his red Mustang to Area 2 headquarters.\nThe State then introduced the testimony of three witnesses for the limited purpose of showing defendant\u2019s modus operandi and intent. E.L., a 10-year-old girl, and B.M., a 10-year-old boy, testified that on May 27, 1990, at approximately 2:40 p.m., they were playing on the sidewalk on the corner of 114th and Whipple when defendant drove up in a red Mustang. According to E.L. and B.M., defendant opened the car door, reached out toward them and asked them for a kiss. The children stated that they ran from defendant. Detective Waliczek testified that he conducted a photo lineup first at E.L.\u2019s home and then shortly thereafter at B.M.\u2019s home. Both children identified defendant as the man who attempted to kiss them. Waliczek also stated that the children identified defendant in a physical lineup.\nDefendant called his mother, father, and brother on his behalf. His father testified that defendant was at home at 7 p.m. on September 26, 1990, and at approximately 2:40 p.m. on May 27, 1990. He also stated that he had seen the posters around the neighborhood alleging that his son was a child molester and he had tom down at least 35 of them. Defendant\u2019s brother also testified that defendant was at home at 7 p.m. on September 26, 1990, and at 2:40 p.m. on May 27, 1990. Defendant\u2019s mother also testified that defendant was home at the time of the alleged occurrence on September 26,1990.\nFinally, defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that on the night of the incident he was sick and went to the drugstore to purchase some medication at approximately 6:30 p.m. He testified that the route he followed did not take him within the vicinity of 1147 South Albany. According to defendant, he returned home at approximately 6:45 p.m. He testified that he took the medicine and lay down. He then got up several hours later and went out to get some fresh air. According to defendant, as he was walking down his driveway, he noticed a car parked down the block. At that same moment he heard a telephone ring and turned to run back into the house to answer the phone. He stated that he was about to open the door when the police told him to \u201chalt.\u201d He testified that he had never seen K.H. or P.H. prior to seeing them at the police station that night. He further stated that he was at home on May 27, 1990, at 2:40 p.m. and that he had never seen B.M. or E.L. before.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of both counts of child abduction. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment. Both motions were denied.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that trial counsel\u2019s delay in amending his answer to discovery to include expert psychiatric testimony denied him the effective assistance of counsel.\nPrior to trial, defendant filed his answer to the State\u2019s pretrial discovery request. Defendant asserted that he would present an alibi defense at trial and would establish that he was at home at 3521 West 105th Place with his parents and his brother. He stated in his answer that he intended to call \u201cany physicians who have examined and treated the defendant.\u201d He did not list, however, any expert psychiatric witnesses.\nOn January 8, 1991, just before the trial began, defense counsel asked the court for an opportunity during the course' of the trial to have a psychiatrist examine defendant and then testify. The prosecutor objected, arguing that defendant had asserted alibi as a defense. In addition, the prosecutor objected because the State\u2019s expert would not have time to examine defendant. The trial judge reserved his ruling until \u201cthe appropriate time.\u201d At the start of the second day of trial on January 9, 1991, defense counsel again requested defendant be examined by a psychiatrist. Over the State\u2019s objections, the trial judge allowed defendant to be examined by a psychiatrist during the lunch recess.\nAfter lunch and before the jury was called back, defense counsel made an offer of proof in regards to the psychiatric testimony. Defense counsel offered that Dr. Paul Lawler, a specialist in psychiatry for 20 years, would testify that he had examined defendant and defendant\u2019s mother, father, and brother, and had reviewed the reports of the court\u2019s psychiatrist. He would further testify that, in his opinion, defendant has some psychosis, some degree of retardation, and a diminished level of intelligence. He also would state that defendant was a loner who had difficulty dealing with people, but that, in his opinion, defendant had no sexual dysfunction related to young children and is no danger to himself or to others.\nThe State objected to Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony on three grounds. First, the prosecutor asserted that it was not indicated that Dr. Lawler would testify that defendant\u2019s diminished level of intelligence and slight retardation mean that defendant did not know right from wrong. Second, the prosecutor argued that since defendant was asserting an alibi defense and not an insanity defense, the doctor\u2019s testimony was irrelevant. Finally, the prosecutor maintained that the State had not received sufficient notice and, therefore, could not rebut Lawler\u2019s testimony. The trial judge denied defendant\u2019s motion to amend his list of witnesses and refused to allow Dr. Lawler to testify on the ground that defendant had not offered any satisfactory explanation as to why Dr. Lawler\u2019s name was not furnished earlier than on the second day of trial and just one witness away from the State resting its case.\nDefendant contends that trial counsel\u2019s delay in amending his answer to discovery to include the name of Dr. Lawler, a psychiatrist, as a potential defense witness was ineffective assistance of counsel. According to defendant\u2019s argument, if the jury had heard Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s mental retardation and diminished mental capacity, it would have found that defendant did not possess an unlawful purpose as required by the child abduction statute and the outcome of the trial would have been different. Defendant reasons that without Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony, however, it was impossible for the jury to have found in defendant\u2019s favor. \u201cChild abduction\u201d is defined in section 10 \u2014 5(b)(10) as follows:\n\u201c(b) A person commits child abduction when he or she:\n* * *\n(10) Intentionally lures or attempts to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, *** without the consent of the parent or lawful custodian of the child for other than a lawful purpose.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 10 \u2014 5(b)(10).)\nThe State counters that defense counsel gave defendant the best assistance possible by presenting a solid alibi defense. Alternatively, if failure to list the psychiatrist as a potential witness rendered counsel\u2019s performance substandard, the State maintains that this \u201cdefect\u201d would not have altered the outcome of the trial.\nIn order for a defendant to establish on appeal that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show (1) that his attorney\u2019s performance \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness,\u201d and (2) that, as a result of counsel\u2019s substandard performance, he was deprived \u201cof a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255.) In order for a defendant to show that he did not receive a fair trial, he must show more than just that his counsel\u2019s errors or omissions \u201chad some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2067.) He must show that, but for defense counsel\u2019s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 525, 473 N.E.2d at 1255, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) \u201cA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) Obviously, therefore, this does not mean a defendant is entitled to perfect representation, but he is entitled to counsel who will subject the prosecution\u2019s case to \u201cmeaningful adversarial testing.\u201d United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 659, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047; People v. Williams (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 800, 811, 576 N.E.2d 68, 75; People v. Barfield (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 190, 197-98, 543 N.E.2d 812, 816.\nIn addition, in order to avoid the \u201cdistorting effects of hindsight,\u201d there is a \u201cstrong presumption\u201d that defense counsel\u2019s performance \u201c[fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.) In explaining this \u201chighly deferential\u201d standard, the Strickland Court observed:\n\u201cIt is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel\u2019s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel\u2019s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. *** There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. [Citation].\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66.)\nThe Strickland Court reasoned that if courts engaged in greater scrutiny of defense counsel\u2019s performance, \u201c[cjriminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel\u2019s unsuccessful defense.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 526, 473 N.E.2d at 1255.\nAfter reviewing the record, we cannot say that counsel\u2019s failure to amend his answer to the State\u2019s pretrial discovery to include Dr. Lawler\u2019s name was ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant\u2019s defense at the time he answered discovery and throughout trial was alibi. Defendant obviously told his attorney that \u201che did not do it.\u201d At trial, he testified that he was at home at the time of the incident. Additionally, his mother, father, and brother all corroborated his story that he was at home at 7 p.m. on September 26, 1990. Moreover, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined every witness and discredited their testimony as best he could by bringing out the fact that, prior to identifying defendant as the perpetrator, both the children and the police were aware of posters with defendant\u2019s picture, license number, and description of his car which had been distributed throughout the neighborhood and which accused him of being a child molester.\nClearly, Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony that defendant had a diminished level of intelligence and slight retardation is irrelevant to whether or not defendant was at home at the time of the incident. Defense counsel\u2019s alibi defense was supported not only by the defendant\u2019s testimony, but also by three other witnesses. Counsel acted as a vigorous advocate for defendant and, as illustrated by his cross-examinations of the State\u2019s witnesses, subjected the prosecution\u2019s case to \u201cmeaningful adversarial testing.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s assertion that without Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony it was impossible for the jury to find him not guilty is simply not true. There was more than sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to have acquitted defendant based on his alibi defense. As the Strickland Court foresaw would occur in numerous cases when it established that judicial scrutiny of defense counsel\u2019s performance must be \u201chighly deferential,\u201d defendant here, with the distorting effects of hindsight as a guide, has succumbed to the temptation to second-guess his counsel\u2019s unsuccessful defense and concluded, all too easily, that the failure to present Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony was unreasonable. (See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66.) There is no basis, however, for this conclusion. This is exactly the reason why there is a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s representation fell \u201cwithin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.\u201d Clearly, Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony would not have hurt defendant\u2019s case, but we cannot say that failure to present it, in light of the circumstances, was incompetent representation.\nAssuming arguendo that defense counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, we do not believe it prejudiced defendant and deprived him \u201cof a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u201d First, defendant\u2019s defense was alibi and not insanity. Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony that defendant had a diminished level of intelligence and slight retardation is irrelevant to whether he attempted to lure the children into his vehicle. Second, Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony went to defendant\u2019s mental capacity and not his mental state at the time of the incident. Defendant\u2019s offer of proof as to what Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony would be did not indicate that he would state that defendant\u2019s mental capacity precluded him from being able to formulate the unlawful intent required under the child abduction statute or that he did not know right from wrong. We believe it highly speculative to conclude that the absence of Dr. Lawler\u2019s testimony had an effect on the judgment. See People v. Nevitt (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 423, 460-61, 553 N.E.2d 368, 383-84 (defense counsel\u2019s failure to properly list witness on defendant\u2019s answer to State\u2019s discovery not ineffective assistance where testimony would not have affected the outcome of the trial).\nAdditionally, defendant asserts that the question the jury asked the judge during deliberations clearly demonstrated that the jury wanted to find defendant not guilty. During the course of its deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the trial judge:\n\u201cIs there a technical reason why character witnesses for Mr. Patten were not brought in by the defense, or was that simply the defendant\u2019s choice \u2014 overlooked?\u201d\nAfter discussing possible responses with defense counsel and the prosecutor, the trial judge sent back the following answer:\n\u201cPlease review your instructions. The court cannot answer your question. At the conclusion of the trial you may talk to the attorneys if you so desire.\u201d\nWe do not agree with defendant that the jury\u2019s question to the judge during deliberations presumptively establishes that it was searching for a way to acquit defendant. We cannot say that the jury\u2019s question to the judge during deliberations as to why defendant did not present any character witnesses establishes a reasonable probability that had it heard Dr. Lawler\u2019s expert psychiatric opinion its conclusion would have been different. We believe it more likely that the jury\u2019s inquiry shows that it was looking for a way to mitigate what defendant had done. Mitigation, however, is irrelevant to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. At best, Lawler\u2019s testimony would have allowed the jury to acquit defendant based on compassion or sympathy for him. Under the law, however, a jury is not permitted to decide a case based on such factors. \u201cA defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed.\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) Therefore, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of Dr. Lawler to testify.\nDefendant\u2019s second argument on appeal is that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge failed to exercise his discretion and give a meaningful answer to the question asked by the jury during its deliberations. Defendant contends that the statement \u201c[t]he court cannot answer your question\u201d clearly illustrates that \u201cthe judge was laboring under the erroneous belief that he was without discretion\u201d to answer the jury\u2019s question. Defendant also argues that the jury\u2019s question clearly evidenced its confusion as to defendant\u2019s burden of proof and that referring the jurors to their instructions was \u201cmeaningless\u201d because the instructions undoubtedly \u201chad already been examined and explained to them.\u201d Defendant asserts that \u201c[h]ad the instructions been adequate, there would have been no confusion and hence no question.\u201d\nAccording to the record, after the question from the jury was received, the trial judge called defense counsel and the prosecutor into chambers and asked for their comments on possible responses. Defense counsel asked that the judge respond to the question by telling the jury that \u201ccharacter witnesses are not admissible in this type of offense.\u201d He stated that throughout the trial whenever he asked a witness about whether defendant got along with his neighbors or others in the community, the judge sustained the prosecutor\u2019s objections. Therefore, he argued that the court would not allow character witnesses to testify. He contended that the jurors\u2019 question indicated that they feared that defendant did not present character witnesses because he could not get any such witnesses and \u201cthat\u2019s not the truth at all.\u201d\nThe prosecutor maintained that the judge\u2019s prior rulings were proper and that the State would rely upon them. He asserted that defendant had no character witnesses because he listed none in his answer to discovery. Additionally, he argued that when defense counsel asked questions to witnesses concerning character and reputation, he did not lay the proper foundation.\nThe trial judge concluded that the defendant did not call character witnesses because he did not list or even suggest them in his answer to discovery. The judge determined that the jury was asking \u201cwhy the defense presented certain evidence, and did not present other evidence.\u201d Therefore, the judge concluded that he could not directly answer the jurors\u2019 question. The judge decided to recommend to the jurors that they review the instructions. He stated that \u201c[t]he instructions will tell the jury that the burden of proof is on the State, and the *** defendant is not required to prove his innocence.\u201d\nA trial judge has discretion to answer or refrain from answering a question from the jury and his decision, whatever it may be, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38-39, 554 N.E.2d 174, 179.) However, a judge has a duty to give additional instruction \u201c \u2018where clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, and the jurors are manifestly confused.\u2019 \u201d (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179, quoting People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1138, 425 N.E.2d 1313, 1316.) Additionally, \u201c \u2018[w]here a jury has raised an explicit question on a point of law arising from the facts over which there is doubt or confusion, the court should attempt to clarify the question in the minds of the jury members\u2019 \u201d (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179, quoting People v. Jackson (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 461, 479), even if the proper instructions were originally given to the jury. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179; People v. Morris (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 401 N.E.2d 284, 286.\nOn the other hand, a judge properly exercises his discretion and refuses to answer a jury\u2019s question where the given instructions \u201csufficiently explain the relevant law\u201d (People v. Shannon (1990), 206 Ill. App. 3d 310, 317, 564 N.E.2d 198, 203) in \u201cclear and in common language which the jury could understand.\u201d (People v. Petty (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 207, 213, 513 N.E.2d 486, 490.) Obviously, the judge is not required to answer a question from the jury if it involves \u201cramifications the judge could not properly go into\u201d (People v. Walker (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 681, 686, 338 N.E.2d 449, 453) or if the answer would not be useful to the jury. (People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 771, 774, 353 N.E.2d 79, 82; Walker, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 686, 338 N.E.2d at 453.) It is reversible error, however, if a trial judge refuses to answer a jury question \u201cin the erroneous belief that [he] has no discretion\u201d to respond to the inquiry. People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 565, 310 N.E.2d 166, 169.\nWe first address defendant\u2019s contention that the second sentence in the trial judge\u2019s response to the jury\u2019s question shows that \u201cthe judge was laboring under the erroneous belief\u201d that he did not have the authority to answer the jury\u2019s question. The exchange between the trial judge and both counsel when determining how to respond to the jury\u2019s question clearly illustrates that the trial judge understood that he had the discretion to answer or refrain from answering the jury\u2019s question. The judge determined, in effect, that the jury was asking about defense trial strategy and properly concluded that he could not answer the jury\u2019s question. He determined that it would be best to focus the jury\u2019s attention upon the instructions which would inform the jury that the State bears the burden of proving defendant\u2019s guilt and that the defendant does not have to prove his innocence. A more specific response to the jury\u2019s question would not have assisted the jury in its deliberations and, in fact, would have involved \u201cramifications the judge could not properly go into.\u201d (Walker, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 686, 338 N.E.2d at 453.) Therefore, the judge\u2019s response was the product of a valid exercise of discretion and not based upon the mistaken belief that he had no discretion.\nDefendant also asserts that the jury\u2019s question clearly evidenced its misunderstanding of defendant\u2019s burden in a criminal case. Therefore, the trial judge\u2019s response that the jury should review the instructions was \u201cmeaningless\u201d because the instructions were obviously inadequate; otherwise, \u201cthere would have been no confusion and hence no question.\u201d If we understand defendant\u2019s argument correctly, if the instructions were adequate, then the jury would not have been confused; however, since the jury was confused, the instructions must have been inadequate. At the instruction conference, however, defense counsel did not object to the instructions. The jury received Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.03 (2d ed. 1981) on the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. The instructions fully informed the jurors of the relevant law and were written in clear and in common language that they could understand. Numerous cases have held that a response to a jury question which refers the jurors back to clear instructions is a valid exercise of discretion. (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 554 N.E.2d at 179-80; People v. Salazar (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 899, 912-13, 570 N.E.2d 802, 811; People v. Palmer (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 800, 806-07, 444 N.E.2d 678, 683; People v. Tostado (1981), 92 Ill. App. 3d 837, 839, 416 N.E.2d 353, 355; People v. Charles (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 485, 488-89, 360 N.E.2d 1214, 1216-17; Walker, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 685-86, 338 N.E.2d at 452-53.) Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to answer the jury\u2019s question and instead referring it to the jury instructions.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019CONNOR and MANNING, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Murray M. Coffey and Karen E. Tietz, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Jane Mahoney, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Theresa Harney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PATTEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 91\u20140457\nOpinion filed December 28, 1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Murray M. Coffey and Karen E. Tietz, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Jane Mahoney, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb and Theresa Harney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0407-01", "first_page_order": 425, "last_page_order": 437 }