{ "id": 5139467, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANLEY ROUNDTREE et at., Defendants-Appellees (Dawn R. Hedden, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Roundtree", "decision_date": "1993-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0152", "first_page": "963", "last_page": "967", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 963" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283-84" }, { "page": "283-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2555420 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553951 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126241 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254905 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "1401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 9016, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.60167783687625e-08, "percentile": 0.2886540875549115 }, "sha256": "91b7dc1472e9d54304120f961dcaf287ac7964e2cad56e8f3999e41f368392b6", "simhash": "1:3b8610c917dc9984", "word_count": 1449 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:58:37.771033+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANLEY ROUNDTREE et at., Defendants-Appellees (Dawn R. Hedden, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals from the Champaign County circuit court\u2019s grant of defendants\u2019 motion to suppress evidence seized during an automobile stop. It argues reasonable and articulable facts existed to justify the officers\u2019 stop of the suspect vehicle. We disagree and affirm.\nOn November 2, 1991, City of Champaign police officer Rob Morris was on routine traffic patrol with his partner, Officer Tom Walton. They drove a marked police vehicle and were in uniform. While on patrol they found themselves behind the vehicle in which defendants Stanley Roundtree, Toby Huber, and Dawn Hedden were travelling. According to Morris\u2019 testimony at the suppression hearing, Huber, the backseat passenger, looked back toward the squad car several times and appeared very nervous. Morris responded to Huber\u2019s actions by radioing his dispatcher and requesting information through the Metropolitan Computer-Assisted Dispatch (METCAD) about the license plate and registration of the suspect vehicle.\nAfter following the suspect for approximately four blocks, the dispatcher responded the information received from METCAD was returned as \u201cno record on file.\u201d The officers then stopped the vehicle to investigate whether it was properly owned and registered. Hedden was the driver and Roundtree was the passenger in the front seat.\nA brief search of the vehicle occurred after the officers noted several furtive gestures by Huber within the vehicle. Huber reportedly had tried to reach over and into a bag located to his left within the vehicle. Officer Morris saw a weapon within the bag, drew his service revolver and confiscated the bag.\nMorris conceded that before they stopped the vehicle they had not observed the occupants in the vehicle break any laws or municipal ordinances. Their sole reason for stopping the vehicle was the information received from METCAD indicating no record on file regarding the registration of the suspect vehicle.\nMorris testified he frequently checked registrations and driver\u2019s license of vehicles in the performance of his duties on traffic patrol. He performed these checks by requesting information from METCAD through his police dispatcher. Morris indicated problems often occur with the speed in which this information is relayed to him and sometimes the system goes down. However, he opined it was an effective tool which was reasonably relied on by him in the course of his professional responsibilities to evaluate whether to arrest or issue traffic citations to individuals.\nMorris also indicated the system has been reliable and accurate in obtaining information about the status of an individual\u2019s license plate or registration. When asked what \u201cno record on file\u201d indicated, Morris replied:\n\u201cIt could mean several things. It could mean that the plates are very new, and it has not gone through the system yet. It could mean that the plates are very old, and has \u2014 the system has purged them. We found plates that are very old with stolen stickers pasted or taped on, and various other problems.\u201d\nMorris also relied on the information received from METCAD to determine whether the individual had paid for registration, the vehicle was stolen, whether warrants or other information concerning the owner of the vehicle existed, and the status of the owner\u2019s driver\u2019s license. He relied on this information to decide whether to issue someone a citation for having no valid registration. During cross-examination, Morris indicated the message \u201cno record on file\u201d would not be used if the license plate was registered to a different vehicle than that on which it was displayed.\nThe trial judge granted defendants\u2019 motion to suppress evidence seized from the vehicle during the traffic stop, stating:\n\u201cThe heart of the difficulty in analysis is a dearth of facts presented from which the Court could conclude that the officer could reasonably infer from the circumstances presented, that an offense was involved. *** Failing to be entered into the computer is not an offense in the State. The officer himself explained that having no record on file could mean several things that bear no relation to unlawful conduct. *** The record is devoid of circumstances that from which the officer might infer that a status of \u2018no record on file\u2019 with METCAD is a circumstance permitting an inference relating to criminal conduct.\u201d\nThe State contends the testimony at the suppression hearing established reasonable and articulable facts to justify the arresting officers\u2019 stop of defendants\u2019 vehicle.\nSection 107 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 authorizes law enforcement officers to detain a person in a public place for a reasonable period when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances the person is committing or is about to commit an offense. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 107 \u2014 14.\nOfficers may stop a vehicle and detain the driver only where there is at a minimum articulable and reasonable suspicion the driver is unlicensed, the vehicle is unlicensed or unregistered, or the vehicle or the driver is otherwise subject to seizure for violating the law. Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401.\nA trial judge\u2019s suppression ruling will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Brown (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 116, 125, 554 N.E.2d 216, 220; People v. Neal (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 216, 218, 486 N.E.2d 898, 899; People v. Gorman (1991), 207 Ill. App. 3d 461, 468, 565 N.E.2d 1349, 1353.) The trial judge\u2019s conclusion in this case that the officers did not have a legitimate basis to stop defendants is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nA motion to suppress evidence may be properly granted where the action which forms the basis for the stop is susceptible of innocent explanation. In People v. Swisher (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 125, 129-30, 565 N.E.2d 281, 283-84, this court concluded the suppression order was consistent with the manifest weight of the evidence where the basis for the stop was that one of the patrolling officers saw the person in the car parked in a parking lot duck down and get back up when the officers\u2019 vehicle passed.\nThis court reasoned the trial court may look at the circumstances in their entirety and even acts which might be characterized as innocent behavior, if viewed separately, could provide reasonable suspicion when viewing the entire circumstances. In upholding the circuit judge\u2019s conclusion that suppression was proper, the court noted the officers had not relied on added circumstances such as that the defendant\u2019s vehicle was parked in a high-crime area, it was late at night, or any other basis to view the vehicle as suspicious. Swisher, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 129-30, 565 N.E.2d at 283-84.\nSimilarly, the officers in this case were drawn to defendants\u2019 vehicle only because the backseat passenger was nervously looking back at the officers\u2019 vehicle. This reaction may be brought about simply by the unexpected appearance of an officer\u2019s vehicle. Nor did Huber\u2019s action suggest the driver of defendants\u2019 vehicle was about to engage in unlawful activity. The officers\u2019 reason for stopping defendants\u2019 vehicle was based only on the report from METCAD that there was \u201cno record on file.\u201d Morris testified this response does not represent illegal activity by the vehicle\u2019s owner on all occasions. The trial court concluded the record was barren of anything that explained what the METCAD dispatch meant and how the officers used it in their daily work.\nConsidering the circumstances surrounding the stop of defendants\u2019 vehicle, we conclude the trial judge\u2019s suppression of the evidence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The officers did not articulate why this METCAD message gave them a reasonable basis to conclude illegal activity was occurring, and the officers presented no added factors demonstrating a reasonable basis for concluding illegal activity was being, or was about to be, committed.\nThe message was no indication the vehicle was stolen, and almost no indication the vehicle was unregistered, as the vehicle did have license plates. We do not suggest a police officer could never articulate a reason to stop a vehicle under the circumstances of this case. We hold only the trial court\u2019s determination the officers failed to do so here was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas and David P. Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STANLEY ROUNDTREE et at., Defendants-Appellees (Dawn R. Hedden, Defendant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 92\u20140152\nOpinion filed February 4, 1993.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and David P. Bergschneider, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0963-01", "first_page_order": 981, "last_page_order": 985 }