{
  "id": 2436105,
  "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM E. SCHLOSSER, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY L. SCHLOSSER, Respondent-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Schlosser",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:44.998173+00:00",
  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM E. SCHLOSSER, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY L. SCHLOSSER, Respondent-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe marriage of petitioner William E. Schlosser and respondent Mary L. Schlosser was dissolved by the circuit court of Putnam County on September 14, 1988. The matter proceeded to a phase II hearing for maintenance and distribution of marital property on October 16, 1990, and judgment was entered thereon on January 24, 1992. William filed a post-trial motion for a rehearing and other relief. On February 14, 1992, the court denied the relief requested, but entered an order clarifying certain aspects of the January 24 order. William appeals from the orders entered on January 24 and February 14, 1992. We affirm.\nWilliam initially takes exception with the circuit court\u2019s distribution of marital assets and debts. By statute, the division of marital property must be in \u201cjust proportions\u201d after consideration of all relevant factors. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 503(d).) \u201cJust proportions\u201d does not mean mathematical equality, and there is no requirement that the trial court recite the specific factors the court relied upon in reaching its distribution decision. We have repeatedly stated that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in apportioning marital property, and that the court\u2019s property distribution may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. An \u201cabuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable man could take the view adopted by the trial court.\u201d In re Marriage of Eidson (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 907, 911, 601 N.E.2d 298, 301.\nIn this case, the court\u2019s phase II order, as modified, provides for William\u2019s payment to Mary of $300 per month for three years for a total of $10,800 as maintenance in gross and a lump sum property award of $7,000. The lump sum payment, according to the January 24 order, represented Mary\u2019s share of marital property consisting of William\u2019s \u201c50% interest in a tenant farming operation, his *** 50% partnership interest in the cattle that he has been grooming on behalf of a certain witness that testified in Court, and various marital and household furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances which are still located in the marital home where [William] resides.\u201d William posits that testimony at the phase II hearing established that the parties actually had a negative net worth of $21,000, consisting of marital assets worth $12,000, less an outstanding farm debt to which the parties stipulated in the amount of $33,000. Thus, he argues, the court\u2019s award to Mary of 58% of the marital assets and none of the marital debts is inequitable.\nIn fact, the value of the marital estate, particularly the value of William\u2019s farming interests, was a matter of considerable dispute in the trial court. Mary introduced evidence tending to establish that William owned a 50% partnership interest in certain cattle, which William denied. There was also contradictory evidence on the profitability of the farming operation at the time of the dissolution of marriage in 1988. William\u2019s tax returns were admitted into evidence and tend to support Mary\u2019s contention that William\u2019s claimed debts as of July 1988 were inflated or \u201cpaper deductions\u201d which did not translate into actual marital indebtedness. The factual issues presented by the parties\u2019 conflicting testimony were resolved by the trial court for reasons expressed in its order of February 14, 1992, denying William\u2019s motion for post-judgment relief. There, the court concluded, \u201cThe motion is *** denied, based on the evidence and the court\u2019s conclusion that the plaintiff was not a credible witness when testifying about his financial condition.\u201d\nThe credibility of witnesses is particularly within the purview of the trier of fact. Where, as here, disputed evidence may be resolved on the basis of witness credibility, this court should be loathe to disturb the trial court\u2019s factual finding. It is apparent to us that the trial court in this case did not find credible evidence of marital indebtedness. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding entitling Mary to a lump sum property award of $7,000 without assigning her any part of William\u2019s claimed indebtedness from the farm operation is so unreasonable as to be an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the court\u2019s property distribution order.\nNext, William charges error in the trial court\u2019s award of maintenance to Mary. An award of maintenance is governed by section 504 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504). The factors to be considered are whether the spouse seeking an award:\n\u201c(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to [her], to provide for [her] reasonable needs, and\n(2) is unable to support [herself] through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home, or\n(3) is otherwise without sufficient income.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(a).)\nThe statute further provides that maintenance may be \u201cin gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time,\u201d and from the income or property of the paying spouse after consideration of \u201call relevant factors.\u201d The statute then recites a seven-item, nonexclusive list of relevant factors bearing on the issue of spousal maintenance. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(b).\nWilliam contends that the only factor considered by the trial court in this case was Mary\u2019s inability to support herself through appropriate employment. Were this true, we would agree that the court erred; however, our review of the record supports Mary\u2019s position that, although not recited in its January 24 order, the court also considered substantial evidence that she lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs or was without sufficient income. Thus, we find no merit to William\u2019s argument that the court\u2019s award of maintenance was unauthorized in this case.\nWilliam\u2019s argument in the alternative is that the court erred in making the maintenance award nonmodifiable. In its phase II order of January 24, the court characterized its sum-certain maintenance award both as \u201cnonmodifiable\u201d and as \u201crehabilitative maintenance.\u201d However, in its February 14, 1992, \u201cclarification\u201d of the January 24 order, the court specifically stated that the award was \u201cin gross.\u201d By definition, an award of maintenance in gross is a fixed sum in the nature of a property settlement and is nonmodifiable. (In re Marriage of Freeman (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 290, 297, 478 N.E.2d 326, 329.) In Freeman, the court interpreted the legislative intent of section 504(b)\u2019s reference to maintenance in gross. The court stated:\n\u201cIf maintenance in gross were no different than periodic maintenance, the amendment stating that maintenance may be in gross would have added nothing to the meaning of section 504(b). We believe this requires us to give the phrase \u2018maintenance in gross\u2019 the meaning which \u2018alimony in gross\u2019 has traditionally had in Illinois, a nonmodifiable sum certain to be received by the former spouse regardless of changes in circumstances. Walters v. Walters (1951), 409 Ill. 298[, 99 N.E.2d 342].\u201d (106 Ill. 2d at 298.)\nMaintenance in gross is not an inflexible device and may be paid in periodic installments and made terminable upon express conditions.\nIn this case, after considering evidence of the duration of the marriage, the standard of living during the marriage, tax consequences of the property division and other relevant factors as required by section 504, the court awarded Mary a nonmodifiable maintenance award in the sum of $10,800 payable in monthly installments of $300 over a period of three years. The court did not attach any conditions for termination of payments before the three-year period expires. Thus, it is apparent that the court intended its award to be \u201cmaintenance in gross,\u201d rather than \u201crehabilitative,\u201d as clarified in the court\u2019s order of February 14. Because the legislature has specifically authorized such awards (see Freeman, 106 Ill. 2d 290, 478 N.E.2d 326) and the record establishes that the court gave due consideration to relevant factors in rendering its decision, we find no error in the court\u2019s decision to award Mary \u201cmaintenance in gross\u201d payable periodically and in the amount as specified in the January 24 order.\nLastly, William argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of his own inability to pay maintenance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 504(bX6)). Again, however, our review of the record on appeal does not support William\u2019s position that the court\u2019s determination was contrary to the evidence. The tax returns submitted for 1986 through 1989 indicate a steady increase in William\u2019s income following his 1987, predissolution bankruptcy proceedings. As aforesaid, the court did not find credible William\u2019s claims of indebtedness. In our opinion, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting William\u2019s position that maintenance should not be awarded based on his inability to pay.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the orders of the circuit court of Putnam County.\nAffirmed.\nSTOUDER and SLATER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE BARRY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Carl F. Reardon, of Reardon, Orr & Dvorak, Ltd., of East Peoria, for appellant.",
      "\u2022 Lisa M. Olivero, of Peru, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF WILLIAM E. SCHLOSSER, Petitioner-Appellant, and MARY L. SCHLOSSER, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201492\u20140213\nOpinion filed January 26,1993.\nCarl F. Reardon, of Reardon, Orr & Dvorak, Ltd., of East Peoria, for appellant.\n\u2022 Lisa M. Olivero, of Peru, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0049-01",
  "first_page_order": 69,
  "last_page_order": 74
}