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JEFF BOWEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of unlawful restraint. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1), 10 \u2014 3(a).) He was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment for each count of criminal sexual assault, with the terms to run consecutively, and one year\u2019s imprisonment on the unlawful restraint charge to run concurrently. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence arguing (1) the statutory provisions defining \u201cforce\u201d and \u201cconsent\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 12(d), 12 \u2014 17(a)) are unconstitutionally vague; (2) he was not proved guilty of criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial comments; (4) the trial court failed to consider all the evidence in determining his guilt; (5) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (6) his conviction for unlawful restraint should be reversed because it is an included offense of criminal sexual assault or, in the alternative, because the State failed to prove its elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and (7) the imposition of consecutive sentences was unconstitutional. We affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences for criminal sexual assault and vacate his conviction for unlawful restraint.\nOn September 19, 1991, defendant was indicted by a grand jury in Champaign County of two counts of criminal sexual assault and one count of unlawful restraint. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, pars. 12\u2014 13(a)(1), 10 \u2014 3(a).) Count I of the indictment alleged defendant committed sexual penetration by the use of force in that he placed his penis into the victim\u2019s vagina. Count II alleged defendant committed sexual penetration by the use of force in that he placed his fingers in the victim\u2019s vagina. Count III alleged defendant knowingly and without legal authority detained the victim by lying on top of her and refusing to allow her to rise. Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges. He admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim but claimed it was consensual.\nAt the time of the alleged incident, the victim was a fourth-year student at the University of Illinois. She lived in an apartment in Champaign, Illinois, with Janice Hartmann, Becky Levi, Tracy Betts, and Nicci Hears. It was a two-floor apartment with two bedrooms on the bottom floor and two on the top floor. The victim and Becky occupied the upstairs bedrooms.\nOn the weekend of May 4 and 5, 1991, Janice\u2019s brother, Ron, and two of his friends, defendant and John Bethard, played golf in Champaign and were going to spend the night at the victim\u2019s apartment. Becky, Janice, the victim, and the three men went out that evening as a group to a couple of bars. Later that evening, the victim left the group and went home alone. After she arrived at her apartment, she watched television with her roommate, Tracy, for about 10 minutes and then went upstairs to bed. She wore a pair of khaki shorts and a white T-shirt to bed.\nBecky, John, Janice, and the defendant returned to the apartment at approximately 2 or 2:30 a.m. The victim awoke when she heard them come home and went downstairs to see how they were. The victim testified she spoke briefly to Becky and Janice, and while she was downstairs, defendant put his arms around her and she pushed him away and returned upstairs to her bedroom. Janice did not see this happen because she was in her bedroom, and defendant denied doing it. After changing clothes, Becky, Janice, and John went upstairs to Becky\u2019s room to go out on the roof.\nThe victim was awakened again when she heard someone at her door. It was defendant asking her if he could get to the roof from her bedroom. She responded he could, but she was sleeping and he should go through Becky\u2019s room. She heard the door close and thought he had left. She testified defendant had not left but rather got onto her bed and straddled her. His legs were on either side of her body, and his arms were at her shoulders. He attempted to kiss her, and she tried to get away by moving her head. He pulled down the comforter and lifted up her shirt. He kissed one of her breasts and her stomach. She tried to push him away, but she could not move him. During this time, she repeatedly said to him \u201c \u2018What are you doing,\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018Please get out of my room. Stop.\u2019 \u201d She did not recall how loud she was saying this. He then went under her shorts and underwear and inserted his fingers into her vagina. She told him to \u201c \u2018Stop. Please stop,\u2019 \u201d and repeatedly told him \u201cno.\u201d She continually tried to push his hand away and eventually did so.\nHe then pulled her shorts and underwear down and forced his penis inside her vagina. While doing this, he told her \u201c[she] was so warm.\u201d She again told him \u201cno,\u201d and \u201c \u2018[she] [did not] want this to happen. This shouldn\u2019t happen.\u2019 \u201d She did not recall where his clothes were during this time or whether his clothes were on or just pulled away. She did state she did not assist him in taking his clothes off nor did she assist in taking her own shorts off. She also testified she did not scream because she could not believe what was happening, thought she could control the situation, and was scared.\nShe tried to push him away by the shoulder area, and when this was unsuccessful, she moved her hands down to his waist and tried to push. She was able to push his penis out of her. As she pushed him away, he told her to \u201cjack him off.\u201d He pushed her over on her side so they were facing each other and moved his arms around her body and rubbed his penis against her legs. He kept telling her to come closer and not go away. Eventually, she was able to push herself off the bed. When she got out of bed, her shorts and underwear were off, but her shirt was still on.\nShe went to her chest of drawers and put on some clean underwear. After she put her clothes on, she told defendant to put his clothes on and leave. His clothes were on the floor next to the bed. He asked her to take all her clothes off because he wanted to see what she looked like. She picked up his clothes and threw them at him and told him to put them on and leave. He put them on, and while she was walking toward the door, he tried to kiss her again. He was holding her and pushed her back on the bed. While he was attempting to kiss her, Janice opened the bedroom door for a split second and then closed it.\nJanice testified she went to the victim\u2019s bedroom to see if she wanted to come out. She stated when she opened the door she saw defendant \u201ckind of standing kind of crouched\u201d but could not see the victim clearly. WTien she saw defendant, she immediately closed the door. She testified neither person spoke to her. The victim stated she did not say anything to Janice because she did not have the opportunity and because they were already dressed. The door apparently startled defendant and she was able to get off the bed. The victim then opened the door and told defendant to leave.\nDefendant left immediately and proceeded to go through Becky\u2019s room to sit on the roof. After defendant was on the roof, the victim came into Becky\u2019s room. She told Becky defendant had just attacked her. Becky testified the victim looked frightened, and her hands were shaking. The victim stated she was really nervous, and she did not believe Becky understood what she was saying. She returned to her room and called her boyfriend. She then, called her next-door neighbors, Amy Glick and Mary Vehe, and went over to their apartment.\nAmy testified when the victim arrived at her apartment she was crying and was hysterical. The victim tried to tell Amy about the incident but was crying and was unable to do so. Amy asked her if she had been raped, and the victim responded she had. While at Amy\u2019s apartment, the victim called her apartment. Becky answered the phone, and she testified the victim was crying and said: \u201c \u2018Be careful. Be careful. Lock your door.\u2019 \u201d Becky and Janice then went to Amy and Mary\u2019s apartment. Becky testified the victim was very upset and crying. Janice, Becky, Mary, and Amy took the victim to Carle Hospital at approximately 4 a.m.\nAt the hospital, Janice stayed with the victim until a nurse asked her to leave. Janice testified the victim was \u201cdisoriented but not *** really hysterical.\u201d Approximately two hours after she arrived at the hospital, the victim was examined by Dr. William Welch. Dr. Welch testified the victim told him she had been sexually assaulted, and her vagina had been penetrated by a penis. She also told him this was nonconsensual sexual contact. He conducted a pelvic examination which revealed some mucus present within the vagina. The mucus did not contain any sperm. The doctor further stated he did not observe any signs of trauma, i.e., cuts, bruises, bleeding in the pelvic area, but testified this lack of physical evidence was not inconsistent with her claim of being sexually assaulted.\nOn cross-examination, he asserted he asked the victim if she had screamed, and she responded \u201c \u2018[y]ou would have thought I would have.\u2019 \u201d He described her demeanor as atypical of a sexual assault victim because she was not emotionally distraught. He also indicated he found no evidence of a struggle, nor did he find any bruises or red marks on her body indicating she had been held down. He further testified the hymenal ring was intact, nonperforated, but it was retracted enough so she could have been sexually active. On redirect, he stated the victim had not indicated to him there had been a struggle and asserted there would not always be signs of physical trauma in every sexual assault case.\nThe victim testified she did not report the incident to the officer who was present during her examination because she was scared and because Janice was in the room with her and Janice\u2019s brother was the defendant\u2019s friend. She reported the incident to the police 15 hours after the incident occurred.\nDefendant offered another version of the alleged incident. He testified after returning to the apartment from the bars he went upstairs to go to the roof. There were two doors upstairs. One was open, and he looked in and saw John, Janice, and Becky. Because he did not see the victim and he wanted to know if she wanted to go out on the roof, he knocked on the other door. He opened the door and asked the victim what she was doing and why she did not come out on the roof with everybody. The victim told him she was tired and had to study the next day. She started to talk to him more, and he sat down on the bed. He was sitting up by her head, and he reached his arm across the bed and gave her a kiss. He sat back up in bed, and then reached back down and French-kissed her. He stated the victim kissed him back and never said \u201cno.\u201d\nAfter they French-kissed again, he got up and shut the door. The victim had taken off the sheet and was lying on her side looking at him. He got back on the bed, and they began French-kissing again. He put his leg on hers, and her hand was rubbing his thigh. He took off his shirt and straddled her. Her legs were between his, and his hands were by her shoulders. He kissed her and then lifted her shirt and started kissing her stomach. He denied kissing one of her breasts and further denied the victim telling him \u201cno\u201d or to leave or stop.\nAfter kissing her stomach, he unbuttoned her shorts, and the victim said in a \u201cvery quiet, soft voice *** \u2018[n]o.\u2019 \u201d When she said \u201cno,\u201d he stopped and started kissing her again. He thought by saying \u201cno\u201d she meant \u201c[s]low down. You\u2019re going too fast. Take your time.\u201d He denied she told him to leave or tried to push him away. He kissed her stomach again and tried to take her pants down, but they would not come off because they were tight. At that point, the victim took her pants down to her ankles. Defendant removed them the rest of the way and then removed his. While he took off his pants, the victim spread her legs. He placed his fingers in her vagina, and then tried to place his penis in her vagina. When he started to do this, the victim said \u201cin a soft, quiet voice, \u2018[n]o.\u2019 \u201d He testified it was the same type of \u201cno\u201d as when he was trying to take her pants down. He interpreted it as meaning \u201cslow down, you\u2019re still going too fast here. Take your time.\u201d He stopped and began kissing her again. He moved down to kiss her stomach again and then placed his penis in her vagina. His penis slipped out, and he started to place it back in again when the victim said: \u201c \u2018No, I can\u2019t do this.\u2019 \u201d This time, he testified she said \u201cno\u201d in a different, stronger voice. He stopped and rolled over on his side. She got up and put some clothes on. As she started to dress, he told her: \u201c \u2018Don\u2019t put your clothes on. You have a nice looking body.\u2019 \u201d He then asked her to \u201c \u2018jack [him] off\u2019 \u201d and she told him no and to put his clothes on. After dressing, he put his arms around her and said: \u201c \u2018No problem. No big deal. Maybe I\u2019ll see you tomorrow.\u2019 \u201d He started to kiss her again, and someone knocked on the door and opened it. When she heard the knock, the victim immediately sat down. Janice was at the door and said \u201c \u2018[o]ops, excuse me\u2019 \u201d and closed the door. He told the victim he would see her tomorrow and left.\nHe went across the hall to Becky\u2019s room and went out on the roof. John was on the roof, and defendant told him he had \u201cparred\u201d the victim. \u201cParred\u201d is a slang term for intercourse. He told John she did not want to do it anymore, so he stopped and left. Ron Hartmann also testified defendant had told him, when playing golf the following day, he had \u201cparred\u201d the victim.\nBased on the evidence presented, the court found defendant guilty of both counts of criminal sexual assault and of unlawful restraint. The court denied defendant\u2019s post-trial motion and sentenced defendant. This appeal followed.\nI. Constitutionality Of Definitions\nWe first address whether the statutory provisions defining force and consent are unconstitutionally vague. Criminal sexual assault is defined in section 12 \u2014 13(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:\n(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 13(a)(1).\n\u201cForce or threat of force\u201d is defined in section 12 \u2014 12(d) of the Code as follows:\n\u201c[T]he use of force or violence, or the threat of force or violence, including but not limited to the following situations:\n(1) when the accused threatens to use force or violence on the victim or on any other person, and the victim under the circumstances reasonably believed that the accused had the ability to execute that threat; or\n(2) when the accused has overcome the victim by use of superior strength or size, physical restraint or physical confinement.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(d).\nSection 12 \u2014 17(a) of the Code provides consent shall be a defense to any charge under section 12 \u2014 13 through section 12 \u2014 16 of the Code \u201cwhere force or threat of force is an element of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 17(a).) \u201cConsent\u201d is defined as:\n\u201c[A] freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration or sexual conduct in question. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused shall not constitute consent.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 17(a).\nDefendant claims these sections defining \u201cforce\u201d and \u201cconsent\u201d are unconstitutionally vague because a person of common intelligence could not determine what constitutes \u201cforce\u201d and what level of force renders an alleged victim\u2019s lack of resistance irrelevant. He further argues, under the broad terms of the statute, various acts in consensual sexual activity could subject a participant to prosecution.\nAll statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging the statute has the burden to clearly establish the alleged constitutional violation. (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 182, 188, 483 N.E.2d 517, 519.) A statute which does not involve first amendment rights is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is unlawful and provides standards to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 188, 483 N.E.2d at 520.) The determination of whether a statue is void for vagueness must be made in the factual context of the case. (Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 189, 483 N.E.2d at 520; People v. Wawczak (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 244, 249, 486 N.E.2d 911, 913.) A defendant may be prosecuted under a statute without violating his right of due process if his conduct falls squarely within the statute\u2019s proscription, even though the statute may be vague as applied to other conduct. (People v. Taylor (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 204, 211, 561 N.E.2d 667, 670; People v. Garrison (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 444, 454, 412 N.E.2d 483, 489.) To sustain a facial challenge, the challenger \u201c \u2018must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.\u2019 \u201d Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d at 211, 561 N.E.2d at 670, quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 489, 497, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 371, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193.\nThe question of whether the term \u201cforce\u201d is unconstitutionally vague was decided by the supreme court in People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 515 N.E.2d 45. There, the court addressed whether section 12 \u2014 13(a)(1) of the Code (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1)) was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to specifically identify the conduct it proscribed and to provide a standard for its enforcement. Specifically, defendants contended the definition of \u201cforce or threat of force\u201d did not set forth with specificity the nature of the force required for the commission of criminal sexual assault. In holding section 12 \u2014 13(a)(1) satisfied requirements of due process, the supreme court judged the statute was not vague as to what conduct it proscribed. Centering on the defendant\u2019s argument of what force was intended to be violative, the supreme court held \u201cthat a person of common intelligence and experience [could] distinguish, without difficulty, between sexual acts accomplished by force, as that term is meant in the statute, and for example, sexual activity between consenting adults.\u201d Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 50.\nLikewise, the definition of \u201cconsent\u201d appears sufficiently definite to meet the requirements of due process. The statutory definition of consent makes clear when consent has been given and that lack of verbal or physical resistance resulting from force does not constitute consent. We conclude a person of ordinary intelligence is afforded a reasonable opportunity to understand when consent has been freely given and when lack of resistance is the result of force, as that term is defined.\nIn the present case, the victim testified she did not consent to the sexual acts, and she actively resisted by trying to push defendant away and continually told him \u201cno,\u201d \u201cleave,\u201d and \u201cstop.\u201d These facts would present circumstances affording a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know the victim did not consent to have sexual relations, and he or she was committing sexual penetration by force, as defined by statute.\nII. Sufficiency Of The Evidence\nWe next address whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of both counts of criminal sexual assault. Defendant argues no rational trier of fact, after considering all the evidence, could find the State proved him guilty of criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. He initially contends a heightened degree of scrutiny must be applied since his guilt depends on the credibility of the victim. When the victim and defendant present conflicting versions of the alleged incident, defendant urges the victim\u2019s testimony must not be \u201cimprobable, unconvincing or contrary to human experience,\u201d and if it is, the conviction must be reversed. Defendant argues the State\u2019s evidence was \u201cimprobable, unconvincing and contrary to human experience\u201d because (1) the victim failed to cry out for help; (2) the victim had a motive to make a false claim against defendant because she had consensual sexual relations with him, was discovered, and had to explain his presence in her bedroom; (3) there was an absence of physical evidence of force; (4) the victim failed to promptly report the assault; (5) the victim failed to leave when she had the opportunity to do so; (6) the victim\u2019s account of the incident was \u201cfraught with inconsistencies\u201d; and (7) her story was \u201ccontrary to human experience.\u201d Defendant also argues the State failed to prove he had the requisite criminal intent to overcome the victim by force.\nInitially, we note courts no longer apply a different standard of review in sex offense cases, i.e., the victim\u2019s testimony be clear and convincing or substantially corroborated to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Wittenmyer (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 175, 190, 601 N.E.2d 735, 742; People v. Schott (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 188, 202, 582 N.E.2d 690, 697; People v. Pintos (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 286, 291, 549 N.E.2d 344, 346; People v. McDade (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 317, 326, 579 N.E.2d 1173, 1180.) Rather, the applicable standard of review, as in all cases involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d at 190, 601 N.E.2d at 742; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203, 582 N.E.2d at 697; People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277.) This standard was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, and adopted by our supreme court in Collins.\nWhile courts have continued to say a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 375, 586 N.E.2d 1261, 1266; Schott, 145 Ill. 2d at 203, 582 N.E.2d at 697; Pintos, 133 Ill. 2d at 291, 549 N.E.2d at 346; Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261, 478 N.E.2d at 276), this principle must be read in the context of the Jackson standard embraced in Collins, i.e., in reviewing the determination of the trier of fact, a court cannot substitute its assessment of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom for that of the trier of fact.\nWith this standard in mind, we conclude the court had sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts of criminal sexual assault. Defendant\u2019s argument is, essentially, an attack on the credibility of the victim\u2019s claim of criminal sexual assault. The resolution of factual disputes, however, and the assessment of witnesses\u2019 credibility are for the trier of fact, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d at 375, 586 N.E.2d at 1266; McDade, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 326, 579 N.E.2d at 1180; People v. Roy (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 166,185, 558 N.E.2d 1208,1221.\nThe victim explicitly testified she did not consent to defendant inserting his fingers into her vagina or to vaginal intercourse. She gave a detailed account of how defendant came into her room, straddled her, kissed her, and later inserted his fingers and then penis into her vagina. During this time, according to her testimony, she repeatedly told him \u201cno,\u201d \u201cstop,\u201d and \u201cto please leave,\u201d and continually tried to push him away. Other witnesses testified regarding the victim\u2019s actions following the assault and her demeanor. The court had the opportunity to listen to extensive cross-examination of the victim as well as other witnesses for the State. It also listened to defendant\u2019s testimony as to what transpired. The trial court, sitting as trier of fact, had the duty to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence and was free to disbelieve all or part of defendant\u2019s testimony if it so chose.\nViewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, there was clearly evidence to support each element of the charged offenses and to permit the judge to find these counts proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe also take this opportunity to specifically reject defendant\u2019s arguments as to why the victim\u2019s testimony was not credible. Merely because a victim does not cry out for help or try to escape at the slightest opportunity is not determinative on the issues of whether she was being forced to have sexual intercourse, or whether she consented to having sexual intercourse, especially if she was threatened or in fear of being harmed (People v. Leonhardt (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 314, 321, 527 N.E.2d 562, 567), overcome by the superior strength of the assailant, or paralyzed by fear. The significance of the failure to cry out or attempt to escape depends upon the circumstances of each case and are merely factors to be considered by the trier of fact in weighing the witnesses\u2019 testimony.\nSimilarly, the lack of medical evidence of physical injury does not establish the victim consented to have sexual intercourse. Physical injury or resistance is not necessary to prove a victim was forced to have sexual intercourse (People v. Shum (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 317, 356, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1198; Leonhardt, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 321-22, 527 N.E.2d at 567), and a victim need not subject herself to serious bodily harm by resisting in order to establish penetration was nonconsensual (People v. Geneva (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1027, 554 N.E.2d 556, 563).\nMoreover, we reject defendant\u2019s argument the victim\u2019s testimony was unbelievable because she failed to promptly report the incident. In fact, the evidence indicates she did promptly report the incident. Immediately after the assault, she told Becky defendant had attacked her. She then proceeded to tell her boyfriend and her two next-door neighbors. At that point, she was taken to the hospital, where she again indicated she had been sexually assaulted. Hours later, she reported the incident to the police. A victim\u2019s testimony cannot be rejected merely because she did not report the incident to the police immediately. A delay in reporting incidents of sexual assault may be reasonable where the victim\u2019s silence is attributed to fear, shame, guilt and embarrassment. (People v. Foley (1990), 206 Ill. App. 3d 709, 716, 565 N.E.2d 39, 43-44.) To fix a time limit in which a complaint must be made with the police in order for a victim\u2019s testimony to be deemed credible would place an unnecessary burden on the victim and trivialize defendant\u2019s actions.\nAs to defendant\u2019s allegation the victim\u2019s account was \u201cfraught with inconsistencies,\u201d we simply note minor inconsistencies in the testimony do not, of themselves, create a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s conviction. (People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342, 360, 478 N.E.2d 402, 410.) Regarding defendant\u2019s other assertions, the victim had a motive to testify falsely and her version of what transpired was \u201ccontrary to human experience,\u201d these \u2014 as other matters raised by defendant \u2014 were factors for the trial court to consider in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and in rendering its judgment.\nIII. Closing Arguments\nDefendant next alleges several statements in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument were improper and deprived him of a fair trial.\nA. Waiver\nThe State initially contends any issue as to these remarks is waived. The general rule is an error not objected to at trial and not raised in a post-trial motion is waived and may not be urged as a ground for reversal. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130; People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 195, 209, 561 N.E.2d 1, 7.) Since defendant did neither in this case, any issue about the remarks is waived. However, even if the claims of error had been properly preserved for review, we find them to be without merit.\nB. Applicable Legal Principles\nProsecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and improper remarks will not merit reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice to defendant, considering the context of the language used, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant\u2019s right to a fair and impartial trial. (People v. Thompkins (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 401, 445, 521 N.E.2d 38, 57.) Further, statements of counsel and argument based upon facts and circumstances proved, or upon legitimate inference drawn from them, do not exceed the bounds of proper debate. (Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 347, 512 N.E.2d at 1194.) \u201cIt is not improper for the prosecuting attorney to reflect unfavorably on the defendant, or to comment on his actions, if based upon competent and pertinent evidence.\u201d (People v. Miller (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 84, 109, 148 N.E.2d 455, 468-69.) A defendant may not claim prejudice from a prosecutor\u2019s comments when those comments were invited by defendant\u2019s argument. People v. Richardson (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 322, 356, 528 N.E.2d 612, 625.\nAlthough the prosecutor may not argue matters unsupported by the evidence, a trial court is presumed to recognize and disregard improper arguments presented to it (Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 361, 528 N.E.2d at 627) and consider only competent evidence in ruling on the merits of the case (People v. Crum (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 473, 487, 539 N.E.2d 196, 204-05). Moreover, this was a bench trial, and a trial judge is presumed to know the law, and such presumption is rebutted only when the record affirmatively shows the contrary. People v. Sosa (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 828, 836, 552 N.E.2d 1298,1303.\nC. Analysis\nDefendant first objects to the following remarks as misstatements of the State\u2019s burden of proof: \u201cforce [could] be defined in terms of proceeding without the victim\u2019s consent,\u201d and defendant \u201cnever received an affirmative verbal response to anything he was doing.\u201d He argues these misstatements regarding the element of force led the court to believe it was sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt that the victim said \u201cno\u201d before penetration.\nAs to force and consent in closing argument, the State asserted section 12 \u2014 12(d) of the Code defined \u201cforce,\u201d and subsection (d)(2) of the definition applied in this case: \u201c[W]hen the accused has overcome the victim by use of superior strength or size, physical restraint or physical confinement.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(d)(2).) The prosecutor then noted the disparity in size between the victim and defendant and stated: \u201cYour Honor, force as used in this case is defined by physical stature, and I believe that was clearly present. And force can also be defined in terms of proceeding without the victim\u2019s consent. That\u2019s also present here.\u201d\nTaken as a whole, this statement cannot be seen as suggesting either (1) defendant could be found guilty without proof of force, or (2) lack of consent alone was sufficient to find defendant guilty. The prosecutor was arguing \u201cforce,\u201d as defined in the statute, was shown in this case because defendant overcame the victim by his physical strength and size, but also lack of \u201cconsent\u201d was proved by the evidence. Since defendant raised the question of consent to rebut the evidence of force, the State had the burden of proof on the issue of consent as well as force. It is within the proper scope of argument for the prosecutor to argue the evidence refuted defendant\u2019s claim that the victim consented. Moreover, while force and consent are distinct concepts, the supreme court has noted consent is not irrelevant in determining whether the offense was committed.\n\u201cAlthough the definition of criminal sexual assault under section 12 \u2014 13(a)(1) does not refer to either compulsion or consent, this does not mean that consent of the victim is irrelevant in determining whether there was an offense. In common understanding, if it is said that one was forced to perform an act, it follows that the person\u2019s act was nonconsensual; and if one freely consents to the performance of an act upon oneself, clearly that person has not been forced. Thus, although the prosecution is not required to prove nonconsent formally, it is obvious that if the prosecution shows that there was an act of sexual penetration by force, that evidence demonstrates that the act was nonconsensual. To prove the element of force is implicitly to show nonconsent. Too, if force is established it would be redundant to require a separate showing of nonconsent as part of the prosecution\u2019s case in chief.\u201d Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 274, 515 N.E.2d at 50.\nSimilarly, with respect to defendant\u2019s complaint on the prosecutor arguing \u201cdefendant\u2019s own testimony indicates that he never received an affirmative verbal response to anything he was doing,\u201d we find this was not an attempt to misstate the burden of proof. During closing argument, defense counsel argued defendant had not forced the victim to have intercourse, but rather he had consensual sex with her. In rebuttal, the prosecutor stressed it was not consensual sex, and defendant\u2019s own testimony showed he had not received an affirmative verbal response to any of his acts. Because the victim never said yes, the prosecutor argued the defendant\u2019s sexual acts upon the victim were not shown to be consensual. The State had the burden of proving lack of consent on the facts of this case, and the prosecutor\u2019s comments were a permissible response to defendant\u2019s argument and not an attempt to misstate the burden of proof.\nDefendant\u2019s second objection is to the prosecutor\u2019s statement the court should reject the defendant\u2019s \u201cno meant yes\u201d theory of the case because he never argued \u201cno meant yes.\u201d The victim testified she told defendant \u201cno.\u201d Defendant admitted the victim said \u201cno,\u201d but testified he interpreted it to mean \u201cslow down.\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s characterization of defendant\u2019s argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence presented, and it was appropriate for the prosecution to urge the court to reject the defendant\u2019s version of the incident, i.e., \u201cno\u201d meant \u201cslow down\u201d rather than \u201cno, I don\u2019t want to have sex with you.\u201d Moreover, any mischaracterization that may have occurred would not have resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant and warrant reversal.\nDefendant\u2019s third complaint is the prosecutor misled the court when she argued: \u201c[tjhere [were] no injuries to the victim, but the consent law protects victims in a way by suggesting that the lack of physical evidence does not allow the Court to find consent is being given. The burden of proof is not on the victim to fight an attacker off.\u201d We find this was not a misstatement of the law. Defendant argues this statement misled the court because the court was allowed to find the lack of physical evidence was due to a lack of physical resistance due to consent, not as a result of force. As we previously noted, courts have held medical evidence of physical injury is not necessary to prove the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse, and a lack of medical evidence of physical injury does not establish she consented to having sexual intercourse. Leonhardt, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 321-22, 527 N.E.2d at 567; Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 356, 512 N.E.2d at 1198.\nViewed in the context they were made, the prosecutor\u2019s statements were not improper; nor can it be said they caused substantial prejudice to the defendant as to constitute reversible error.\nIV. Alleged Failure To Consider Certain Evidence\nDefendant next contends he was denied a fair trial because the court disregarded evidence critical to his defense which related to events occurring prior to and after the alleged sexual assaults. He argues this evidence was critical to his defense because his guilt depended upon the credibility of the victim, and the victim\u2019s credibility, as well as his own, could be tested by comparing their testimony regarding these events with other witnesses\u2019 testimony.\nA trial judge sitting as a trier of fact must consider all matters in the record before deciding the case, and where the record affirmatively shows the trial judge did not consider the crux of the defense when entering judgment, the defendant did not receive a fair trial. (See People v. Bowie (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 177, 180, 343 N.E.2d 713, 715.) Twice during the court\u2019s statements it expressly asserted it had considered all the evidence presented and the various versions of the incident in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses. Our reading of the record discloses the trial judge fairly considered the question of credibility based on all the evidence presented and rendered a verdict after considering all the evidence. The court made the following comments in rendering its verdict:\n\u201cWell, first of all, there\u2019s been a lot of evidence and a fair amount of argument about things that took place during that day and evening before the events in [the victim\u2019s] room and some evidence and some argument about things that all transpired after the events that took place in [the victim\u2019s] room; and I certainly don\u2019t find that any of that has any real bearing on determining what really happened in the room for a very brief period of time in the early morning hours. It is a matter of the credibility and the believability of the primary actors here who have testified, both [the victim] and Mr. Bowen. And again it boils down to that issue concerning a very, very brief few minutes of time in the room that evening and not anything that may have transpired before or after these brief few moments.\nThe law provides what force is and what force may be in the context of the charges here and what consent is and what consent isn\u2019t. Evaluating all of the testimony that has been presented to me here today and evaluating the versions that have been told, having viewed the witnesses and attempted to apply all the criteria for evaluating the testimony of witnesses around their believability, I do find that the State has proven the charges of criminal sexual assault and unlawful restraint beyond a reasonable doubt; and accordingly, I find the defendant guilty.\n* * *\n*** I said I believe on all the evidence the State has proven those charges beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d\nAlthough the court explained the focus of the trial was on what transpired in the victim\u2019s bedroom and not what happened before or after, these statements do not demonstrate the court disregarded any evidence. Irrespective of whether the court believed defendant\u2019s account of the events prior to and after the sexual assault, it could still find the victim\u2019s recollection of the events occurring in her bedroom to be more credible. Therefore, we find defendant\u2019s argument unpersuasive.\nV. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel\nDefendant also maintains he was deprived of a fair trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues counsel made errors relating to the issues of force and consent in that counsel failed to (1) correct the State\u2019s allegedly erroneous argument that \u201cforce\u201d could be defined as \u201clack of consent,\u201d or to identify the issue of whether the State had proved defendant intended to overcome the victim by force; (2) correct the State\u2019s alleged misstatement concerning its burden of proof on the affirmative defense of consent, i.e., the State had to show the victim\u2019s lack of resistance was the result of the use of force or threat of force, and its alleged claim that \u201chaving intercourse after the alleged victim verbally said \u2018no\u2019 without first receiving a verbal \u2018yes' constituted criminal sexual assault\u201d; and (3) elicit testimony from Becky Levi that she thought the victim was kidding when the victim told her she had been attacked by defendant.\nTo establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove \u201cthat despite a strong presumption of counsel\u2019s professional competence, counsel\u2019s allegedly unprofessional acts or omissions in fact were 'outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,\u2019 \u201d (People v. Stewart (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 107, 118, 565 N.E.2d 968, 973, quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066) and \u201cthere [was] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different\u201d (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068). Both prongs of the test must be satisfied before defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, 511, 578 N.E.2d 952, 956, cert. denied (1992), 503 U.S. 942, 117 L. Ed. 2d 630, 112 S. Ct. 1489.\nDefendant\u2019s first two allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel center on counsel\u2019s failure to object to or correct alleged misstatements of law made by the prosecutor during closing argument. As we previously discussed, viewing these statements in the context in which they were made and under the law relating to consent and force, the statements were within the range of proper argument and not misstatements of the law. Therefore, trial counsel had no reason to object. Moreover, we find unpersuasive defendant\u2019s argument that counsel failed to identify or raise the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the element of force. During closing argument, counsel attacked the reliability of the victim\u2019s testimony and attempted to demonstrate this testimony was inconsistent with defendant having used force on her. Defense counsel further argued the State had not proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but rather contended that consensual intercourse occurred. Obviously defense counsel identified and made an issue of whether force was used against the victim.\nSimilarly, counsel\u2019s failure to elicit certain testimony from Becky Levi does not render counsel\u2019s representation objectively unreasonable. In all other respects, counsel\u2019s representation appears competent. He engaged in effective presentation of evidence and vigorous cross-examination of witnesses. He delivered a strong closing argument attacking the credibility of the victim\u2019s testimony by illustrating how her behavior before, after, and during the charged sexual assault could be regarded as inconsistent with the behavior to be expected of someone who had been sexually assaulted. He addressed the issues of consent, the lack of the use of force, and the State\u2019s burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He filed an extensive post-trial motion.\nThe failure to inquire of this one witness about a statement she made does not render defense counsel\u2019s representation objectively unreasonable. Although the statement would have been a factor to consider in assessment of the victim\u2019s testimony, testimony of Becky\u2019s initial impression of the complaint would not have been determinative. Defendants are not entitled to perfect counsel, but rather competent counsel, and the law does not require a perfect trial, but rather a fair one. (Lutwak v. United States (1953), 344 U.S. 604, 619, 97 L. Ed. 593, 605, 73 S. Ct. 481, 490; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 311, 385 N.E.2d 649, 660.) We conclude defendant received a fair trial and counsel was not derelict in the performance of his duties so as to render his representation incompetent.\nMoreover, defendant has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. There was sufficient evidence for the court to find defendant guilty, and we find the result would not have been different \u201cbut for\u201d the alleged errors. Defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness claim, therefore, must be rejected.\nVI. Unlawful Restraint\nDefendant next argues his conviction for unlawful restraint must be reversed because the State failed to prove its elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, he argues the conviction must be reversed because unlawful restraint is an included offense of criminal sexual assault.\nIn deciding this issue, it is necessary to identify the exact conduct underlying the charge in the indictment under which defendant was convicted. Count III alleged defendant committed the offense of unlawful restraint \u201cin that the said defendant knowingly and without legal authority, detained [the victim], in that he laid down on top of her and refused to allow her to rise.\u201d (Emphasis added.) There are multiple instances of conduct which could possibly support a charge of unlawful restraint in this case. It appears, however, the specific instance of conduct to which the charge was directed was the act of detention occurring during the criminal sexual assaults. It was during the criminal sexual assaults that defendant was \u201con top of her.\u201d Since it was this conduct defendant was convicted of, it must now be determined whether this unlawful restraint conviction can stand.\nUnlawful restraint is committed when a defendant \u201cknowingly without legal authority detains another.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 10 \u2014 3(a).) The gist of unlawful restraint is the detention of a person by some conduct which prevents him from moving from one place to another. (People v. Kittle (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 951, 956, 489 N.E.2d 481, 484.) The detention must be wilful, against the victim\u2019s consent, and prevent movement from one place to another. (People v. Satterthwaite (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 483, 485, 391 N.E.2d 162, 164.) Actual or physical force is not a necessary element of unlawful restraint as long as an individual\u2019s freedom of locomotion is impaired. People v. Cohoon (1942), 315 Ill. App. 259, 261, 42 N.E.2d 969, 970; People v. Warner (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 433, 436, 424 N.E.2d 747, 749; Kittle, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 956, 489 N.E.2d at 485.\nThe supreme court has also recognized, however, prejudice results to a defendant when more than one offense is carved from the same physical act, and with regard to multiple acts, prejudice exists if a defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, included offenses. (People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844.) As this court has found, when a defendant has been convicted of both unlawful restraint and criminal sexual assault, the conviction of unlawful restraint must be vacated. People v. Yeast (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 84, 91.\nThe unlawful restraint charged in the indictment was that which the legislature addressed in the criminal sexual assault statute and is conduct inherent in every case of criminal sexual assault by force. As the restraint charged was not independent of the sexual assault, it cannot be punished as such. Defendant\u2019s conviction for unlawful restraint must therefore be vacated. See Yeast, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 91, 93; see also Leonhardt, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 527 N.E.2d at 567; People v. Sperow (1988), 170 Ill. App. 3d 800, 814, 525 N.E.2d 223, 233; People v. Kuykendall (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 708, 710, 439 N.E.2d 521, 523 (holding that unlawful restraint could not even be an included offense); cf. People v. Paulick (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870-71, 529 N.E.2d 28, 30; People v. Bergin (1992), 227 Ill. App. 3d 32, 43-44, 590 N.E.2d 939, 947-48.\nVII. Consecutive Sentences\nThe court sentenced defendant, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(a)), to a consecutive term of four years\u2019 imprisonment for each criminal sexual assault. Defendant argues the imposition of consecutive sentences was a violation of both due process and double jeopardy. He contends section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a), as applied to require consecutive sentences here, violates due process because it is not reasonably related to the legislative intent of deterring and punishing multiple acts of sexual assault. He argues the commission of sexual assault inherently involves multiple acts of contact between the victim and defendant. \u201c[A]s a precursor to insertion of his penis,\u201d defendant placed his fingers in the vagina of the victim. He contends that this act is such a \u201cpredictable and common occurrence\u201d he would not have known he was committing an offense and would not have been deterred from committing the second act of penetration. Therefore, according to defendant, the legislative intent of the statute is not furthered by imposing a consecutive sentence for a \u201cpreparatory act.\u201d Defendant also requests this court to reconsider our decision in People v. Ewald (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 7, 568 N.E.2d 451, in light of the second district\u2019s decision in People v. Bole (1991), 223 Ill. App. 3d 247, 585 N.E.2d 135, appeal allowed (1992), 144 Ill. 2d 636.\nA. Due Process\nAs a general rule the legislature, under the State\u2019s police power, has the discretion to prescribe penalties for defined offenses, to declare and define conduct constituting a crime and to determine the nature and extent of punishment for it. (People v. Walcher (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 455, 458, 515 N.E.2d 319, 321.) This authority is limited by the due process requirement that the classification of a crime and the penalty provided be reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to public health, safety and general welfare. (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1305; Walcher, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 458, 515 N.E.2d at 321.) A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging it has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation. (People v. Hamm (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 201, 208-09, 595 N.E.2d 540, 543; Bales, 108 Ill. 2d at 188, 483 N.E.2d at 519.) Since section 5 \u2014 8\u20144 of the Unified Code does not impinge upon a fundamental right of liberty, it will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d at 216, 595 N.E.2d at 546; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368, 489 N.E.2d 1374, 1382.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20144 of the Unified Code was amended, effective July 1, 1988, to provide when a defendant was convicted of a violation of section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 of the Code, the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively. (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 1030, \u00a73, eff. July 1, 1988 (1988 IIll. Laws 200, 203).) In Wittenmyer (151 Ill. 2d at 195-96, 601 N.E.2d at 744-45), the supreme court held:\n\u201cAfter carefully reviewing the plain language of this section, we believe that the legislature has provided for two exceptions to the general rule that a trial court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. First, if one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, the legislature has mandated that the trial court impose consecutive sentences. Second, if the defendant was convicted of a violation of section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code, the legislature had mandated that the trial court must impose consecutive sentences. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(a). * * *\n[The] legislative history clearly indicates to us that the legislature intended to have two separate and distinct exceptions to the general rule that the court shall not enter consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective \u2014 one, if the defendant was convicted of a Class X or Class 1 felony and inflicted severe bodily injury, or two, if the defendant was convicted of a violation of section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nGiven this interpretation of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code, defendant\u2019s argument must fail. While defendant refers to inserting his fingers in the victim\u2019s vagina as a mere \u201cpreparatory act,\u201d the fact remains this act is a separate penetration and an independent violation of section 12 \u2014 13 of the Code. Consecutive sentences, therefore, were mandatory. The imposition of consecutive sentences in this instance is rationally related to the legislative intent of deterring further assaults. As the supreme court has noted \u201c[sexual assault] is unlike other offenses: with each act, the victim\u2019s psychological constitution and most intimate part of her being [is being] violently invaded.\u201d (People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 78, 533 N.E.2d 802, 805.) \u201cTo the victim, each [sexual assault] [is] \u2018readily divisible and intensely personal; each offense is an offense against a person.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) (Segara, 126 Ill. 2d at 77, 533 N.E.2d at 805, quoting Pruitt v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 559, 565, 382 N.E.2d 150, 154.) Here, defendant committed two violations of the Code and must receive consecutive sentences for each \u2014 without any violation of due process.\nMoreover, the supreme court\u2019s interpretation of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code in Wittenmyer supports our decision in Ewald and is contrary to Bole. (See also People v. Glass (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 916, 930 (where this court reaffirmed our position in Ewald).) We therefore continue to adhere to our position in Ewald.\nB. Double Jeopardy\nDefendant also argues the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case violates principles of double jeopardy because he is being punished twice for what he believes was one offense. In McDade, this court held a defendant\u2019s double jeopardy rights were not implicated where he was convicted of two separate acts of sexual penetration, i.e., inserting his penis into the victim\u2019s vagina and inserting his penis into the victim\u2019s anus. (McDade, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 330, 579 N.E.2d at 1182-83.) In the present case, count I of the indictment alleged defendant placed his penis in the victim\u2019s vagina, and count II of the indictment alleged defendant placed his fingers in the victim\u2019s vagina. Clearly, two separate acts of sexual penetration occurred, and the State proved these two separate acts of criminal sexual assault. Consequently, defendant\u2019s double jeopardy rights are not implicated. See McDade, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 329-30, 579 N.E.2d at 1182-83; Foley, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 717-18, 565 N.E.2d at 44-45.\nA remand for resentencing on the criminal sexual assault counts is not required because the record reveals no indication the defendant\u2019s sentences for criminal sexual assault were influenced by the sentence for unlawful restraint. (See Geneva, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1029, 554 N.E.2d at 564.) Accordingly, the judgments for criminal sexual assault are affirmed; the conviction for unlawful restraint is vacated.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part.\nLUND and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gundlach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle & Roessler (James E. DeFranco, of counsel), and Harriet H. Hamilton, of Cook, Shevlin, Keefe, Ysursa, Brauer & Bartholomew (Bruce N. Cook, of counsel), both of Belleville, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFF BOWEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201492\u20140206\nOpinion filed February 18,1993.\nGundlach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle & Roessler (James E. DeFranco, of counsel), and Harriet H. Hamilton, of Cook, Shevlin, Keefe, Ysursa, Brauer & Bartholomew (Bruce N. Cook, of counsel), both of Belleville, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0608-01", "first_page_order": 628, "last_page_order": 651 }