{ "id": 2435526, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM DUNCAN LAND, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Land", "decision_date": "1993-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140724", "first_page": "1066", "last_page": "1087", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 1066" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2595128 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2543391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1060" }, { "page": "1061" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5597251 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284029 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256443 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 1261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1265-66" }, { "page": "1266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596932 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374-75" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" }, { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1282-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252176 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 805", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219632 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814-15" }, { "page": "651-52" }, { "page": "3146" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "3147" }, { "page": "819" }, { "page": "655" }, { "page": "3148" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "3150" }, { "page": "821-22" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "3150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1018-21" }, { "page": "1021" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569177 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579-84" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 N.E.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1361-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187403 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1172" }, { "page": "1172" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291537 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 1022", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5201698 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1031" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/1022-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 N.E.2d 1367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1375" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 1057", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274364 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/1057-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5147141 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0044-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1557, "char_count": 51225, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0602151482524548e-07, "percentile": 0.5568928922110903 }, "sha256": "859e482200286e262ea25c8524e22a3a89e816645d72ea3ce3769b0629e9a2f6", "simhash": "1:ae9766663e24aee5", "word_count": 8615 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:49:44.998173+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM DUNCAN LAND, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 1991, a jury convicted defendant, William Land, of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(b)(1)) of his eight-year-old daughter, C.L. The trial court later sentenced him to three consecutive 20-year prison terms. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by admitting C.L.\u2019s hearsay statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115\u2014 10), (2) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two of the three convictions because C.L. testified at trial that the sexual conduct occurred only one time, (3) the trial court erred by not allowing defendant to introduce evidence that other persons had sexually abused C.L., and (4) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime charged.\nWe disagree with all of defendant\u2019s arguments and affirm.\nI. Background\nPrior to February 1990, defendant, his wife (Joyce Land), C.L. (born in May 1983), and their two sons lived together on Washington Street in Bloomington. In February 1990, the family moved to Olive Street in Bloomington. In August 1990, C.L. went to live in a foster home with Wilma and A1 McLaughlin for reasons that the trial court held were inadmissible and therefore not revealed at trial.\nStarting in February 1990, and at the request of C.L.\u2019s public school, C.L. visited weekly with Diana Quick, an outreach caseworker and counselor for McLean County center for human services. As a part of C.L.\u2019s therapy, Quick and C.L. kept a \u201cjournal about anything.\u201d Although C.L. could not write, Quick would write whatever C.L. wanted Quick to write in the journal.\nOn October 6, 1990, Quick and C.L. (then seven years old) discussed what should go in the journal during one of their weekly meetings. C.L. spoke about some books a friend had shown her about insects, noting that these books were \u201cgood books,\u201d unlike the books her father owned. When Quick asked her what she meant, C.L. responded that her father\u2019s books \u201cwere dirty books that had pictures of men and women with no clothing.\u201d She also told Quick that her father would show the pictures in the books to her and her brothers. C.L. further recalled that her father made her cry when he showed her the pictures, but he would tell her that there was nothing to cry about. C.L. added that he would eventually do \u201cbad stuff [to her], *** like sex.\u201d C.L. remembered that sometimes her mother held C.L.\u2019s arms when her father was doing this \u201cbad stuff\u201d to her and would tell her father to \u201cstop hurting her baby\u201d as she did so.\nBecause C.L. liked to draw, Quick gave C.L. some markers and paper to draw about these events as she talked about them. As she did so, Quick recalled that C.L. pounded the markers on the paper, breaking three of them. Quick also recalled that \u201c[s]he was crying, stammering, [and] repeating herself frequently.\u201d\nQuick then brought C.L. to speak with Detective Michael Fazio of the Bloomington police department. As Quick listened, Fazio asked C.L. if she knew why he wanted to speak with her. C.L. said that she did and told Fazio that her father hurt her by spanking her and having sex with her. C.L. told Fazio that defendant would show her \u201c \u2018dirty, filthy books,\u2019 \u201d which made her cry. Defendant would then spank her and tell her that \u201c \u2018this is what I do with mom and it\u2019s okay to do it with you[, too].\u2019 \u201d C.L. told Fazio that her father did these things both when they lived in the house they currently lived in (Olive Street) and when they lived in their previous house (Washington Street).\nFazio asked C.L. to tell him about the last time she had sex with her father. C.L. told Fazio that it occurred in the front room at the Olive Street address. Defendant placed her on the couch, took off her clothes, and then put \u201cit\u201d inside of her, which badly hurt her. Her uncle then knocked on the front door. C.L.\u2019s mother came downstairs to answer the door, saw defendant having sex with C.L., and started hitting defendant, shouting \u201c \u2018[D]on\u2019t hurt my baby.\u2019 \u201d Defendant stopped, and C.L. and defendant then dressed.\nFazio asked C.L. to elaborate on what she meant by \u201chaving sex\u201d by using drawings of a naked, adult white male and a naked, white, female, grammar-school-age child, with front and back views. Because C.L. had said that defendant had hurt her, Fazio asked C.L. what defendant had hurt her with. C.L. circled the penis on the male drawing, calling it his \u201cdick.\u201d Fazio asked C.L. where he hurt her, and C.L. circled the vaginal area of the female, which she called her \u201ctutu.\u201d Fazio asked her if defendant touched her anywhere else. C.L. circled the breast on the female drawing, and said that defendant touched her breast with his breast when he lay on top of her.\nFazio asked her if defendant touched her anywhere else. C.L. pointed to the male\u2019s penis and then circled the female\u2019s buttocks, saying that he \u201c \u2018puts it in there,\u2019 \u201d clarifying that \u201cit\u201d meant defendant\u2019s penis. Using a ballpoint pen and its cap to demonstrate what \u201cin\u201d and \u201cout\u201d meant, C.L. demonstrated that when she said defendant \u201cput it in there,\u201d she meant that defendant penetrated her vagina and her anus with his penis.\nC.L. also told Fazio that defendant would kiss her on the lips. Fazio asked her if defendant ever put his penis in her mouth, to which she responded \u201cno.\u201d He also asked her if she remembered any dates, using holidays and birthdays as reminders, but C.L. could not remember any specific dates.\nAfter speaking to C.L., Fazio went to defendant\u2019s residence on Olive Street. After Fazio advised defendant of C.L.\u2019s accusations and his Miranda rights, defendant voluntarily accompanied Fazio to the Bloomington police station. Defendant accused Fazio of making up the accusations, claiming that Fazio merely wanted to harass his family. He denied keeping any pornographic books in his house or any books that contained pictures of naked men and women and challenged Fazio to search his house. Fazio took defendant up on his offer and asked defendant to sign a departmental form indicating that defendant consented to the search. Defendant did so. Fazio then placed him in a cell and returned to defendant\u2019s residence to search it.\nWhen he arrived at defendant\u2019s residence, Fazio met defendant\u2019s wife. He informed her that he had arrested defendant and told her that defendant had consented to a search. Fazio asked for her consent, which she gave by signing the consent form below defendant\u2019s name.\nFazio first searched defendant\u2019s bedroom because C.L. had told him that defendant kept his \u201cdirty books\u201d and magazines there. Fazio found two Penthouse magazines, a paperback book entitled \u201cSex in Later Life\u201d that described sex acts in text, and a small Copenhagen chewing tobacco can that contained a pipe-cleaner bent into a figure of a person masturbating. One Penthouse magazine also had two additional pages of pictures from another magazine showing men and women engaging in sex acts.\nFazio returned to the police station and confronted defendant with these items. Defendant then accused Fazio of planting the items in his home.\nA grand jury thereafter indicted defendant on three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 14). Two counts alleged sexual penetration involving defendant\u2019s penis and C.L.\u2019s vagina between January 3 and August 3, 1990, and the other count alleged sexual penetration involving defendant\u2019s penis and C.L.\u2019s anus.\nBefore trial, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10(b)(1) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115\u2014 10(b)(1)) to determine whether Fazio, Quick, and C.L.\u2019s foster mother, Wilma McLaughlin, could testify about hearsay statements made by C.L. regarding these accusations. Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin all testified at this hearing, and the court found these hearsay statements admissible.\nAt trial, Fazio and Quick both testified to the above facts. When C.L. testified, she became scared and initially testified that she could only remember one incident where her father gave her a \u201cFrench kiss\u201d on the mouth. Although she initially testified that she \u201cforgot\u201d about any other incident where defendant would touch her, the prosecutor reminded her of her conversation with Detective Fazio. Through leading questions, C.L. answered that defendant did touch her with his private parts. However, C.L. again stopped, saying that she \u201cforgot\u201d what had happened. When asked if she understood that \u201cit\u2019s important here today to talk about that and tell these people what happened,\u201d C.L. responded \u201cno.\u201d\nThe judge asked the jury to leave the courtroom for a moment and gave the prosecutor a chance to speak to C.L. on the record in the jury\u2019s absence. C.L. then admitted that she felt scared to talk in front of the jury about what had happened. When asked if she could be \u201cstrong enough\u201d to talk about it, she initially said \u201cno\u201d but eventually said that she would try. Before the jury returned, defense counsel raised the issue of C.L.\u2019s competency but did not object to her competency. Nonetheless, the court still formally ruled C.L. competent to testify.\nThe jury returned, and C.L. testified that defendant touched her \u201c[tjhis place, and the bottom in the back,\u201d using her hand to point to where she meant. However, when asked if she had words for those places, she responded, \u201cNo, I forgot.\u201d The prosecutor then asked her to circle the parts she meant on drawings of a naked male adult and a naked female child. C.L. circled the man\u2019s penis and the child\u2019s vagina. However, after further questioning, C.L. said that he did not put his penis \u201cinside\u201d of her, and that it stayed \u201coutside.\u201d\nThe prosecutor asked her if he touched her anywhere else. C.L. responded that he did not. Then the prosecutor showed her a drawing of the back view of a naked female child and asked C.L. if she knew what it was. C.L. responded it was her bottom. The prosecutor asked her if defendant had touched her there, and C.L. responded that he did with both his penis and his hand. Using the drawing, C.L. demonstrated that defendant had placed his penis along the fold between her buttocks. She said that he did not put his penis inside her, although she did admit that it hurt when he placed his penis there.\nC.L. then testified that this conduct happened only once. The prosecutor asked her if she remembered telling Detective Fazio, Diana Quick, and her foster mother that it had happened more than once, and C.L. responded that she did. However, as she testified, she said that she could only remember it happening once. She also testified that it happened only when they lived on Washington Street. The prosecutor then questioned her about the dirty pictures. After explaining that her father would show her the pictures and that she told him that she did not like looking at them, she froze up again when asked how her father would respond or react after that.\nC.L. also testified that her mother did not know about what defendant would do to her, although she then admitted that her mother walked in on them once. When asked what her mother did when she walked in, C.L. changed her reply to, \u201cNo, she didn\u2019t. *** No, she didn\u2019t say anything because she wasn\u2019t there, either.\u201d Thereafter, C.L. again became unresponsive until the prosecutor asked C.L., \u201cDo you think things happened to you that you *** can\u2019t tell us today?\u201d C.L. responded, \u201cYes.\u201d She also said that the things she told her foster mother, her foster father, Detective Fazio, and Diana Quick did happen.\nC.L. was equally uncooperative on cross-examination. However, she did again testify that defendant touched her with his penis only once. Defense counsel also asked her if she got mad when her father would punish her. C.L. responded that she did, but when asked if she ever made up any stories about her father because she was mad at him, she said she did not.\nC.L.\u2019s foster mother, Wilma McLaughlin, testified that she had two daughters of her own, the youngest of whom shared a bedroom with C.L. She characterized C.L. as someone who could remember things well, but only when her memories were triggered by certain events. When those reminders happened, C.L. would tell what she remembers without much hesitation.\nMcLaughlin testified that C.L.\u2019s telling her about what defendant had done to her was one such instance of C.L. suddenly revealing memories in great detail. The same day that C.L. told Quick about what defendant had done, C.L. also told McLaughlin\u2019s youngest daughter. The daughter immediately came to McLaughlin saying \u201c \u2018Mom, [C.L.] was telling [me] something I think she needs to tell you.\u2019 \u201d McLaughlin then testified to the following:\n\u201c[C.L.] came down, and *** told me how her dad had been on top of her and her mother had come in and had taken a hold of [C.L.j\u2019s arm while her dad was on top of her. They were on a bed, and [C.L.] was on her back, *** her father was on top of her, and her mother came in and took a hold of her. She demonstrated this [while] [w]e were in the kitchen[.] [S]he held her arms up *** and demonstrated to me how she was held[.] [S]he said her arms were over her head and she was leaning backwards over the bed ***. And I asked her if her mother was holding her, and she said [her mother] was trying to pull her out from under him. *** [T]he same night[,] when I was putting her to bed[,] I asked her where she lived when her dad did this to her[.] ***\n*** I asked her if she lived on West Olive or on West Washington, and she said both. And I said, \u2018You mean he did it two times?\u2019 \u201d And she said, \u2018He did it lots of times at both houses.\u2019 \u201d\nMcLaughlin added later that C.L. said that her mother was yelling \u201c \u2018What are you doing to my baby\u2019 or *** \u2018Stop doing that to my baby.\u2019 \u201d She added that C.L. never told her anything more specific, such as whether sexual penetration had occurred, and McLaughlin did not ask for further specifics.\nDefendant testified that he never had any sexual contact with C.L. He claimed that they had a normal, close, loving relationship, and that sometimes she would kiss him \u201cout of the blue\u201d just to tell him that she loved him. He added that she had called him her \u201cpony\u201d because he gave her rides on his shoulders. He did not understand why she made the allegations that she had. He added that he rarely punished her, only making her sit down for a half hour to an hour as the most severe punishment. He claimed that he never spanked her or physically punished her.\nRegarding the pornographic magazines, defendant claimed that he did not know the books were under his mattress when he signed the consent form. However, he admitted that he had found them there a few days before he was arrested as he looked for the soap opera digest that he kept under his mattress (even though he testified earlier that he could not read). He said that he saw the cover of a pornographic book but did not look inside. When shown the book at trial, he said, \u201cI think it was this one, [but] I\u2019m not for sure.\u201d\nDefendant claimed that the magazines and book belonged to his wife\u2019s brother, Robert Arnold. Defendant explained, \u201cHe comes around [to my house] drunk, and he\u2019s got them with him in this little red bag. And he leaves them. I tell him not to leave them, you know. I don\u2019t want them around there. But he gets drunk, and he does that.\u201d Defendant added that he did not want them in his house because \u201cI just don\u2019t believe in that kind of filth.\u201d\nDefendant also testified that he willingly spoke to Fazio and consented to the search of his house because he did not remember that the magazines were under his mattress. He claimed that he had a memory disorder that caused him to unexplainably forget things \u201cevery couple days.\u201d He also denied accusing Fazio of planting the magazines and book in his bedroom, and claimed instead that, in a fit of anger, he merely told Fazio that he would sue Fazio if Fazio did not let him go.\nDefendant\u2019s wife corroborated defendant\u2019s claim that her brother had left the pornographic material at their house when he was drunk. She testified that she had found them in her house and put them between the mattress and box springs of her bed. Although she claimed that she disliked pornography because it exploits women, she did not throw the magazine and book away because \u201c[t]hey were [my brother\u2019s] property and I figured he\u2019d be back and want them.\u201d She claimed also that her children had never seen the book or magazine because they could not go in her bedroom.\nMrs. Land also added that she never caught defendant molesting C.L., nor did she ever find him on top of her. She added that she and defendant had a good relationship. Indeed, she claimed that she \u2014 not defendant \u2014 mostly disciplined C.L., and that C.L. would go to defendant to get things when she would refuse. They also went on family outings frequently.\nBased on the above evidence, the jury convicted defendant of all three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nII. Analysis\nA. Hearsay Statements Admitted Pursuant to Section 115 \u2014 10\nBecause of the problems C.L. experienced testifying at trial, defendant\u2019s convictions depended in large part on the hearsay statements made by C.L. to Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin. Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting these statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 10). That section states the following:\n\u201c(a) In a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child under the age of 13, including but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections 12 \u2014 13 through 12 \u2014 16 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:\n(1) testimony by such child of an out[-]of[-]court statement made by such child that he or she complained of such act to another; and\n(2) testimony of an out[-]of[-]court statement made by such child describing any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child.\n(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:\n(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability; and\n(2) The child either:\n(A) Testifies at the proceeding; or\n(B) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 115 \u2014 10(a), (b).\nFor clarity, we will detail the testimony presented at the section 115 \u2014 10(b)(1) hearing because the trial court must determine whether the time, content, and circumstances provided sufficient safeguards of reliability based solely on the testimony presented at that hearing. See People v. Back (1992), 239 Ill. App. 3d 44, 47-51.\n1. Testimony Presented at the Section 115 \u2014 10 Hearing\nAt the hearing, the State called Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin, who all testified that C.L. had told them that defendant had molested her. The State first called Fazio, who testified that he had previously talked to C.L. twice before about two other men who had molested her. On October 6, 1990, Quick reported to Fazio that C.L. had told Quick about her father also molesting her. Fazio thus spoke to C.L. that afternoon in an interview room at the Bloomington police station.\nWhile Quick sat and listened to their conversation, C.L. told Fazio that she knew why she was there, and started telling Fazio that three men, including her father, had molested her. Regarding her father, C.L. said that he had engaged in sex with her, which she said had \u201c \u2018hurt\u2019 \u201d her. C.L. also said that her father had shown her dirty, filthy books that made her cry. When she cried, her father spanked her.\nFazio added that he asked C.L. what she meant by \u201chaving sex,\u201d and C.L. told him about an incident that occurred on their couch in their home on Olive Street in Bloomington. While her father was \u201c \u2018doing it,\u2019 \u201d her Uncle Donnie knocked on the door. Her mother came down to answer the door and caught defendant having sex with C.L. Her mother started hitting her father and tried to pull C.L. out from under him. They then stood up, dressed, and answered the door.\nFazio continued that he used anatomically correct drawings of a naked male adult and a naked female child to help C.L. identify body parts and what she considered as \u201chaving sex.\u201d C.L. circled the male penis, which she called a \u201cdick,\u201d and circled her vaginal area, saying that her father put his dick \u201c \u2018inside\u2019 \u201d her \u201c \u2018tutu.\u2019 \u201d Fazio asked her if any other contact occurred. She said it did, and circled the breasts on the female child drawing. She then circled the breasts of the male drawing, explaining, \u201c \u2018Well, that happens when he lays on me.\u2019 \u201d She also circled the mouth, saying that her father kissed her. Because she also had told Fazio that another of the men who had molested her had placed his penis in her mouth, he asked her if her father had done so, as well. She responded that her father had not.\nFazio initially did not remember her complaining about anal sex. However, after rereading his report, Fazio added that C.L. also demonstrated on the drawings and told him that her father had placed his penis in her anus, and that it also hurt.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to prove that C.L. had confused her father with the other men who had molested her. Fazio testified that C.L. had since told him that a total of six men had molested her, including her father and her older brother. However, Fazio testified that he had opened the interview with a question asking C.L. if she knew why she was there and she responded, \u201c \u2018Because of what I told Diane.\u2019 \u201d When Fazio asked what she told Diane, C.L. responded \u201c \u2018Dad has sex with me.\u2019 \u201d\nRegarding C.L.\u2019s demeanor during the interview, defense counsel asked Fazio if she appeared emotionally distressed in any way. Fazio did not respond, and defense counsel followed up by asking if C.L. cried or asked for help from Quick, to which Fazio responded that she did not. Instead, Fazio testified that when C.L. remembered an incident, she appeared very sure of what she had said.\nFazio testified that C.L. could not specify any dates. He had estimated the dates on his report from the time periods in which she lived at the locations at which she claimed the sex had occurred.\nFazio concluded by clarifying that he generally conducted nonleading interviews in which he would let the child control the interview. If the child left certain things unaddressed or unclear, he would then ask for clarification, as he did with C.L., when he asked her what she meant when she said that her father had sex with her.\nQuick testified to her background counseling troubled children and about what C.L. had told her about defendant. Quick testified that she began working with C.L.\u2019s entire family and meeting with C.L. individually at the end of February 1990. Regarding C.L., teachers had reported that she frequently talked about blood and violence, wet her pants in school, and drew sexually explicit pictures with exaggerated bodily parts, including pictures with babies in her stomach.\nQuick met with C.L. weekly from February 1990 to October 1990. She described the October 6, 1990, meeting with C.L. in which C.L. first told Quick about her father\u2019s molesting her. The subject came up during a conversation about their \u201cjournal-about-anything.\u201d As they spoke about some \u201cgood\u201d pictures of insects that a friend of hers had shown her, C.L. noted how they differed from the \u201cbad\u201d pictures her father showed her. C.L. added that her father had sex with her after showing her the pictures, that it occurred at nighttime at their Washington Street address, and that her mother had held C.L.\u2019s arms as she told C.L.\u2019s father to \u201cstop hurting her baby.\u201d She also told Quick that her uncle had knocked on the door, whereupon they stopped and pulled up their pants. However, C.L. did not use more specific terms than \u201csex,\u201d and Quick did not ask her to specify what she meant.\nQuick indicated that C.L. spoke in an \u201cechoic\u201d manner when describing these things, meaning that C.L. would repeat, \u201c \u2018he did bad stuff, he did bad stuff, he did bad stuff,\u2019 echoing her pattern of speech.\u201d Quick observed from this behavior and what C.L. said that C.L. felt scared to talk about it. She also related that as C.L. drew a picture about it, she broke three markers by pounding them against the paper.\nQuick returned C.L. to her foster home, reported C.L.\u2019s allegations to an Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) social worker, and later brought C.L. to the police station to speak with Fazio. Quick then corroborated some of Fazio\u2019s testimony regarding what C.L. had told Fazio, particularly that C.L. had demonstrated what her father did by circling bodily parts on anatomical drawings.\nHowever, instead of stating \u2014 as Fazio did \u2014 that C.L. appeared sure as she spoke, Quick testified that C.L. \u201cappeared nervous and had trouble standing still.\u201d Quick said that C.L. also spoke in a echoic manner when talking to Fazio. Quick also testified that C.L. gave long, extensive, and descriptive answers to Fazio\u2019s questions, and did not limit her answers to \u201cyes\u201d or \u201cno.\u201d\nMcLaughlin also testified at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. Similar to her testimony at trial described earlier, she testified that C.L. first told her about her father\u2019s molesting her on October 6, the same day C.L. spoke to Fazio and Quick. C.L. first told McLaughlin\u2019s daughter, who said to McLaughlin that C.L. \u201c \u2018told me something that I think she needs to tell you about her mom holding her.\u2019 \u201d\nMcLaughlin testified that C.L. then told McLaughlin about her father\u2019s molesting her, and that the molesting had occurred at both her home on Washington Street and her home on Olive Street. McLaughlin then asked C.L. if it had happened twice, and C.L. responded, \u201c \u2018No, he did it lots of times at both houses.\u2019 \u201d McLaughlin also testified that C.L. told her about the specific incident when her mother had tried to pull C.L. out from under her father as he \u201c \u2018was doing bad things to me.\u2019 \u201d McLaughlin added that C.L. did not use any terms more specific than \u201chaving sex,\u201d and that she tried not to ask C.L. for more specific details, even though C.L. had spoken about details in \u201cstreet terms\u201d when describing what other men had done to her.\nAbout a month later, C.L. again talked to McLaughlin about C.L.\u2019s father\u2019s molesting her. As it rained outside, C.L. spoke about a time when she ran with her father to the house of a family friend. McLaughlin asked C.L. if the person to whose house they ran had ever done anything to her, and C.L. responded that he had not done anything to her, unlike father, who had done bad things to her.\nMcLaughlin added that C.L. sometimes thereafter added clarifying details to what happened, such as that her mother said, \u201cStop hurting my baby,\u201d as she pulled on C.L.\u2019s arms. McLaughlin also testified about how certain things or events would trigger C.L.\u2019s memory, whereupon she would elaborate in great detail about what she remembered, likening it to a \u201cflood of memorfies].\u201d\nAt the end of the hearing, defense counsel emphasized two factors in arguing that the time, content, and circumstances of C.L.\u2019s statements did not provide sufficient safeguards of reliability. First, defense counsel argued that no inference should arise from C.L.\u2019s vocabulary. Although defense counsel acknowledged that a seven-year-old using sexually explicit language can indicate that her allegations are true, here C.L.\u2019s vocabulary instead came from the fact that other men \u2014 who had pleaded guilty at the time of this hearing to molesting C.L. \u2014 had molested C.L.\nSecond, defense counsel also emphasized the difference between Fazio\u2019s and Quick\u2019s descriptions of C.L.\u2019s demeanor at the initial police station interview. Defense counsel admitted that this difference did not negate that C.L. actually said the words that comprised the allegations, but argued that it did negate the reliability of her allegations.\nBased on the above evidence, the trial court found that the time, circumstances and content of what C.L. had told Fazio, Quick and McLaughlin all indicated the reliability of those statements. The trial court therefore held them all admissible under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code.\n2. Analysis\na. Standard of Review\nIn People v. Deavers (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1069, 580 N.E.2d 1367, 1375, this court held that a trial court\u2019s determination that out-of-court statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code were admissible would not be overruled unless that decision was \u201ccontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Similarly, the Fifth District Appellate Court held that this standard of review applies to section 115 \u2014 10 cases. (People v. McMillan (1992), 231 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1031, 597 N.E.2d 923, 928.) However, since Deavers and McMillan, the supreme court has stated that the standard of review of a trial court\u2019s decision to admit hearsay statements under section 115 \u2014 10 does not differ from the standard of review generally applied to a trial court\u2019s decision on the admissibility of any evidence. (People v. Zwart (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 37, 44, 600 N.E.2d 1169, 1172.) In Zwart, the supreme court characterized a trial court\u2019s finding pursuant to section 115 \u2014 10 as an ordinary evidentiary question and further stated that \u201cquestions regarding the admissibility of evidence lie within the discretion of the circuit court. A reviewing court may overturn a trial court\u2019s determination only when the record clearly demonstrates that the court abused its discretion.\u201d (Zwart, 151 Ill. 2d at 44, 600 N.E.2d at 1172.) Thus, we decline to apply the standard of review set forth in Deavers and McMillan and instead will apply the supreme court\u2019s standard set forth in Zwart.\nb. Section 115 \u2014 10 Hearsay\nAdmitting hearsay statements denies a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant, thereby implicating the defendant\u2019s right to confront the witnesses against him. (See People v. West (1992), 234 Ill. App. 3d 578, 585-88, 598 N.E.2d 1356, 1361-63; People v. Coleman (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 579-84, 563 N.E.2d 1010, 1018-21.) Therefore, the standards regarding the right to confrontation provide guidance on how to interpret the requirement of section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code that the trial court find that the time, content, and circumstances of the hearsay statements provide sufficient safeguards of reliability.\nIn Idaho v. Wright (1990), 497 U.S. 805, 814-15, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 651-52, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3146, the United States Supreme Court held that incriminating hearsay statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse must meet two requirements before they are admissible: (1) in the usual case, the prosecution must either produce the declarant or demonstrate the declarant\u2019s unavailability; and (2) the statement must bear adequate \u201cindicia of reliability.\u201d Such \u201cindicia of reliability\u201d can come from the statement\u2019s fitting into one of the firmly established hearsay rules or by \u201ca showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.\u201d Wright, 497 U.S. at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 110 S. Ct. at 3147.\nThe Court concluded that \u201cthe relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.\u201d (Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 655, 110 S. Ct. at 3148.) In particular, a court should not consider corroborating evidence when evaluating the facial reliability of the hearsay statements, but should solely evaluate the circumstances when the child-declarant made the statements. (Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 656, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.) The Court listed some factors to consider when determining the reliability of such hearsay statements, including, but not limited to, (1) spontaneity and consistent repetition, (2) the mental state of declarant, (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age, and (4) lack of motive to fabricate. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 656, 110 S. Ct. at 3150.\nIn Coleman, this court held the following regarding Wright\u2019s impact on section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code:\n\u201c[T]he required finding [under section 115 \u2014 10(b)(1)] that the statement provides \u2018sufficient safeguards of reliability\u2019 must be understood to be of a comparable nature with a finding that the circumstances of the statement render the declarant \u2018particularly worthy of belief\u2019 and, in reaching this decision, the court must consider only those circumstances which surround the making of the statement.\u201d Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 584, 563 N.E.2d at 1021.\nIn this case, defendant argues that the timing and content of the statements did not provide sufficient safeguards of reliability such that C.L.\u2019s statements are particularly worthy of belief. Regarding the timing, defendant emphasizes both that C.L. made her allegations after eight months in a foster home and that C.L. did not mention her father\u2019s molesting her when she had previously reported that two other men had molested her. Regarding the content, defendant emphasizes that C.L. did not provide much specific information, nor could she provide any specific dates, even when asked to use holidays and birthdays for comparison. Indeed, Fazio admitted that he had compiled the dates in the charges based only upon when C.L. lived at the two addresses at which she claimed her father molested her. Defendant does not argue on appeal (as defense counsel argued at the hearing) that the purportedly inconsistent accounts of C.L.\u2019s demeanor at the October 6, 1990, police station interview make her statement unreliable.\nThe State initially responds that defendant has waived any challenge to McLaughlin\u2019s testimony. At the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing, defense counsel concluded her closing remarks by stating the following:\n\u201cWith regard to the foster mother, [Wilma McLaughlin,] I don\u2019t have any reason to question the reliability of statements made to her, and I think in fact they are reliable.\u201d\nWe agree that defendant has thus waived any challenge to McLaughlin\u2019s testimony.\nThe State also argues that the defendant improperly raises on appeal different theories (as described above) concerning the unreliability of C.L.\u2019s statements than the theories defense counsel argued at the section 115 \u2014 10 hearing. We agree that doing so deprived the trial court of the opportunity to specifically address each of the claimed discrepancies, and thereby deprives us of the trial court\u2019s insight from its inherently better vantage point. Nonetheless, the testimony at the hearing revealed all these discrepancies. The trial court thus knew of them and tacitly rejected them by holding that the time, content, and circumstances provided sufficient safeguards of reliability. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in so holding.\nRegarding the timing, the purported eight-month delay in C.L.\u2019s reporting of her father\u2019s actions does not inherently undermine the reliability of C.L.\u2019s statement, especially in light of the fact that defendant was her father. (See People v. Booker (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 542, 552-54, 585 N.E.2d 1274, 1282-83 (hearsay statements reliable despite four-year delay, holding that \u201c[promptness in reporting the abuse is not an element of section 115 \u2014 10\u201d).) First, the delay, if any, was at most eight months. C.L.\u2019s family moved to Olive Street in February 1990, and C.L. told Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin that the molesting occurred at both addresses in October 1990; therefore, the Olive Street incidents must have happened within eight months of C.L.\u2019s first reporting them. On the other end of the spectrum, the shortest possible delay was two months, the time between C.L.\u2019s moving to a foster home and her reporting the incidents.\nSecond, the jury knew of the delay and could fully assess its impact on C.L.\u2019s credibility. The delay is an objective fact, the importance and impact of which do not depend on whether the statements come in through direct testimony or indirect hearsay testimony.\nThird, the fact that defendant is C.L.\u2019s father fully explains the delay. As opposed to a situation where a neighbor or a baby-sitter allegedly molests a child-victim, a child-victim\u2019s father ordinarily holds such an important and revered position in a child\u2019s life that the child victim of sex abuse rarely realizes that anything \u201cbad\u201d has happened; or, if the victim does realize it, a child\u2019s reporting that a parent has sexually abused him or her must be extraordinarily difficult and traumatic, given the almost certain family disruption that will surely follow. Accordingly, we do not find it surprising that C.L. first revealed such abuse in casual conversation with her counselor a few months after being separated from her family and placed in foster care.\nRegarding the fact that C.L. did not mention her father when she reported the two other men, the jury could not assess the impact of this testimony because evidence of C.L.\u2019s prior sexual activity \u2014 including the fact that others had sexually molested her \u2014 is inadmissible under the rape-shield statute. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115\u2014 7.) However, we do not find that this discrepancy inherently undermines the reliability of C.L.\u2019s statements. We refuse to hold that child victims must report all incidents of sexual abuse at the same time or forever be barred from having the courts consider their subsequent allegations reliable or \u201cparticularly worthy of belief.\u201d Although a court should consider this factor\u2019s impact in the overall assessment of the reliability of a child-victim\u2019s allegations, this factor does not automatically render the statements inadmissible under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code. Here, the trial court did not find that this factor undermined the reliability of C.L.\u2019s statement. We do not consider that decision an abuse of discretion.\nRegarding the purported lack of specific details or dates in C.L.\u2019s allegations, we disagree that these discrepancies exist. C.L. described to Fazio that defendant inserted his penis in her vagina and her anus by circling those body parts on anatomical drawings and saying defendant hurt her by putting his penis \u201cinside\u201d her. Although more details might have further bolstered the reliability of C.L.\u2019s statements, the details C.L. provided did make the statements sufficiently reliable.\nFurthermore, because C.L. told Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin that her father had sex with her at both her Olive Street and Washington Street residences, she did mark two time frames in which the events occurred. The State charged defendant only with two counts of vaginal sex based on these two time frames, even though C.L. vaguely told McLaughlin that defendant \u201cdid it lots of times at both houses.\u201d Thus, the lack of specific dates helped defendant more than it harmed him in that, first, their absence did not undermine the reliability of C.L.\u2019s statements at all, and, second, their absence limited the State to merely two charges of vaginal sex and one charge of anal sex.\nFinally, these purported discrepancies did not outweigh the other clear indicia of reliability, including but not limited to the following: C.L. appreciated the importance of the allegations; C.L. appeared disturbed to reveal this information, especially when talking initially to Quick; C.L. greatly trusted the people to whom she spoke; Fazio generally did not ask leading questions except to clarify details; C.L. described what happened without much prompting; and C.L. limited her allegations to anal and vaginal sex, even when specifically asked if defendant had inserted his penis in her mouth as other men had done. We also find her description of the one event that she did describe in detail \u2014 where her mother caught her father molesting her, started hitting her father, grabbed C.L.\u2019s arms to pull C.L. out from under him, and shouted, \u201cStop hurting my baby\u201d \u2014 especially vivid and facially reliable. These factors, dealing with the time, content, and circumstances of C.L.\u2019s allegations, support the trial court\u2019s determination that the hearsay statements made by C.L. to Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin provided sufficient safeguards of reliability. Therefore, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting those statements under section 115 \u2014 10 of the Code.\nB. Insufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Two of Defendant\u2019s Convictions\nDefendant next argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of two of the three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault because C.L. testified at trial that \u201che only did it one time\u201d at their Washington Street address, and denied that she told Fazio or anyone else that it happened more than once. We disagree.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has recently stated the following standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence:\n\u201cWhen faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court applies the reasonable doubt standard as set forth in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261[, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277]. This standard, derived from Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, does not require the court to \u201c \u2018ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) [Citation.] [Instead], the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261[, 478 N.E.2d at 277; citation].) *** The standard gives \u2018full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.\u2019 (Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789[; citation].)\u201d (People v. Campbell (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374-75, 586 N.E.2d 1261,1265-66.)\nTherefore, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d at 375, 586 N.E.2d at 1266; People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277.\nAlthough defendant correctly points out that C.L. repeatedly testified at trial that \u201che did it only one time,\u201d defendant has selectively quoted from portions of C.L.\u2019s testimony. As outlined above, C.L. had a very difficult time testifying. (At one point while on the witness stand, she turned her back to the courtroom, and the prosecutor needed to ask her to turn around.) In addition, C.L. retracted her statement that she told Fazio that it only happened once, and testified that the things she had told Fazio \u2014 -as well as the things she had told her foster parents and Quick \u2014 did happen. C.L. also testified at trial that she did not make up stories about her father because she was mad at him. C.L.\u2019s foster mother testified that C.L. could remember things well, but only when her memories were triggered by certain events. Finally, the jury witnessed C.L.\u2019s demeanor at trial, and could weigh her testimony along with the testimony of Fazio, Quick, and McLaughlin, who all testified that C.L. told them that defendant engaged in both vaginal sex and anal sex with her several times at both houses. Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence at trial sufficiently supported all three of the jury\u2019s verdicts.\nC. Evidence That Other Men Had Molested C.L.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erroneously excluded all evidence that other men had molested C.L. The court based this ruling on the rape-shield statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 7). Defendant attempts to distinguish this case from the ordinary case where a defendant might try to admit evidence of prior sexual activity by arguing that defendant here did not seek to introduce this evidence to show the victim\u2019s consent. Instead, defendant argues that the evidence was relevant to whether C.L. had confused defendant with another person. Defendant thus argues that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s ruling contravened the purpose of the rape[-]shield statute and violated defendant\u2019s constitutional right to present a defense.\u201d\nIn pertinent part, the rape-shield statute provides the following:\n\u201cIn prosecutions for *** criminal sexual assault, *** the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence concerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 115-7(a).)\nThe statute does not limit its protection to evidence of consent, but instead clearly bars the admission of prior sexual activity \u2014 except the prior sexual activity between the accused and the alleged victim \u2014 for any reason. (See People v. Sandoval (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 159, 170-71, 552 N.E.2d 726, 731; People v. Bell (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1004, 577 N.E.2d 1228, 1242.) We therefore reject defendant\u2019s attempt to narrowly construe the rape-shield statute as limited to prohibiting using the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity as evidence of consent.\nDefendant also argues that excluding this evidence denied him his constitutional right to confrontation. (U.S. Const., amend. VI.) Initially, we question the likelihood that C.L. could have confused her own father with the other men who molested her. Moreover, defendant did not make an offer of proof by asking C.L. on the record (but away from the jury) whether she could have confused defendant with other men. Despite C.L.\u2019s trouble testifying, she might have dispelled any doubt over this purported confusion, especially outside the presence of the jurors, whose presence likely contributed significantly to C.L.\u2019s discomfort on the witness stand.\nDefendant\u2019s posture on appeal is to ask this court to reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial in the hope that C.L. at the new trial might reveal some confusion over whether her father sexually assaulted her, as did some other men. However, offers of proof are designed to eliminate such speculation and not only to give the trial court the opportunity to better understand the nature of the proffered evidence \u2014 and thereby reevaluate its prior ruling \u2014 but also to give courts of review the opportunity to see precisely the nature of the evidence the appellant complains the trial court improperly excluded. By failing to present an offer of proof on this point, defendant has waived this argument on appeal. In so holding, we are mindful of People v. Andrews (1992), 146 Ill. 2d 413, 420-21, 588 N.E.2d 1126, 1131, where the supreme court addressed the defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court wrongly excluded his proffered evidence and wrote the following:\n\u201cIt is well recognized that the key to saving for review an error in the exclusion of evidence is an adequate offer of proof in the trial court. [Citations.] The purpose of an offer of proof is to disclose to the trial judge and opposing counsel the nature of the offered evidence and to enable a reviewing court to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was proper. [Citation.] The failure to make an adequate offer of proof results in a waiver of the issue on appeal.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nBecause of defendant\u2019s failure to make an offer of proof at trial, this court cannot know the nature of the evidence defendant claims the trial court wrongly excluded. We decline to speculate what an offer of proof might have revealed; thus, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court erred in depriving defendant of the opportunity to show the jury C.L.\u2019s alleged confusion or uncertainty about who sexually assaulted her.\nDefendant also argued at the trial level that he was concerned that the State would present a closing argument that C.L., a child of tender years, would have no other way to be acquainted with sexual terminology and experiences other than to have engaged in such acts with defendant. Defendant argued that such an argument by the State would mislead the jury because the court and parties knew that the other three men had pleaded guilty to sex offenses involving C.L.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s request to reveal C.L.\u2019s sexual involvement with these other three men, the trial court acknowledged the defendant\u2019s concerns regarding possible argument by the State about C.L.\u2019s knowledge of sexual experiences and terminology. The court stated the following:\n\u201cIf the State attempts to *** assert that the complaining witness wouldn\u2019t have *** knowledge of this, wouldn\u2019t use this terminology in some other fashion but for the defendant\u2019s activities, then it seems to me that the State has taken unfair advantage of the defendant, and at that point I\u2019m going to have to look very carefully. [So] I\u2019m trying to *** warn both of you ahead of time [about the State\u2019s doing so.]\u201d\nWe believe the trial court appropriately handled this aspect of defendant\u2019s argument, and our review of the State\u2019s closing argument reveals that the argument the defendant was concerned about was never made. We also note that defendant never even raised this issue in his post-trial motion.\nD. Jury Instruction on Mental State\nDefendant next argues that his conviction must be reversed because the jury instructions for criminal sexual assault did not include a mental state. However, defendant waived this issue for review because he failed to object at trial or in his post-trial motion. We also find that the instructions given do not constitute plain error. (See People v. Smith (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1060, 568 N.E.2d 482, 493.) We have previously ruled that a mental state instruction is not required when instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Smith, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 568 N.E.2d at 493; People v. Burton (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 116, 122, 558 N.E.2d 1369, 1374.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM DUNCAN LAND, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140724\nOpinion filed March 4,1993.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1066-01", "first_page_order": 1086, "last_page_order": 1107 }