{ "id": 5120743, "name": "CATHY BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRACE MILLER, d/b/a Miller's Metropole, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Baker v. Miller", "decision_date": "1993-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 4-92-0533", "first_page": "44", "last_page": "50", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 44" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3489841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/129/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3019066 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 985", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3595086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1286-87" }, { "page": "1288" }, { "page": "1287" }, { "page": "1288" }, { "page": "1288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477924 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961-62" }, { "page": "963" }, { "page": "961-62" }, { "page": "963" }, { "page": "962-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0953-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 636, "char_count": 14372, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.30198285691559623 }, "sha256": "3e40e3eacf9e8a3af9c5525584d76d032dba0fc9979bc7cc193412596e2a8bbe", "simhash": "1:afc39d9b7d1d95da", "word_count": 2378 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:35:07.830210+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CATHY BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRACE MILLER, d/b/a Miller\u2019s Metropole, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nArticle I, section 17, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Constitution) states as follows:\n\u201cAll persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.\nThese rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and provide additional remedies for their violation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a717.\nThe Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 101 et seq.) sets forth prohibitions against various types of discrimination, including that set forth above, and creates an Hlinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 101), the powers of which include hearing and deciding claims of violations of the Act. Section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act states:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 111(C).\nOn March 17, 1992, plaintiff Cathy Baker filed a two-count civil complaint in the circuit court of McLean County against defendants Grace Miller, d/b/a Miller\u2019s Metropole, and Richard Yeast alleging defendants terminated her employment at Miller\u2019s Metropole on the basis she was a female, in violation of article I, section 17, of the Constitution. Count I charged Miller as the operator of the business, and count II charged Yeast as Miller\u2019s agent who actually discharged her. On defendants\u2019 motion pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615), the circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on June 2, 1992, determining the language of section 2 \u2014 101(BX1X&) of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 101(BXlXa)) \u201cis a reasonable exemption as set forth in [sjection 17 of [ajrticle I of the Constitution of the State of Illinois and that when such an exemption is adopted by the General Assembly, no person falling within the exempt category can make a claim grounded upon the constitutional provisions stated in [a]rticle I, [s]ection 17.\u201d Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.\nOne of defendants\u2019 contentions in support of the dismissal of the complaint is that plaintiff has no cause of action under the cited constitutional provision because it merely bars discrimination in \u201chiring and promotion practices\u201d and plaintiff\u2019s alleged discharge does not involve \u201chiring\u201d or \u201cpromotions.\u201d The various districts of the appellate court are in disagreement on that question. (Compare Ritzheimer v. Insurance Counselors, Inc. (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 953, 527 N.E.2d 1281; Thakkar v. Wilson Enterprises, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 878, 458 N.E.2d 985; Greenholdt v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 748, 438 N.E.2d 245.) As we affirm for other reasons, we need not rehash this issue.\nArticle 2 of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, pars. 2 \u2014 101 through 2 \u2014 105) concerns discrimination in employment but limits those who are subject to prohibitions of the Act as \u201cemployers,\u201d with exceptions not involved here, to those who employ \u201c15 or more employees within Illinois during 20 or more calendar weeks within the calendar year of or preceding the alleged violation\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 101(BXlXa))- The parties are in agreement that if defendant Miller was an employer within the meaning of section 2\u2014 101(B)(1)(a) of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2\u2014 101(B)(1)(a)), section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act, which speaks of courts\u2019 lack of jurisdiction over cases concerning an \u201calleged civil rights violation\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 111(C)), would deny plaintiff the right to proceed in the circuit court. Dilley v. Americana Healthcare Corp. (1984), 129 Ill. App. 3d 537, 472 N.E.2d 596; see Thakkar, 120 Ill. App. 3d 878, 458 N.E.2d 985.\nPlaintiff points out that unlike in Dilley and Thakkar, she alleged in count I of her complaint that, at times pertinent, defendant Miller employed fewer than 15 persons. Plaintiff contends that she has no recovery under the Act and thus is not prevented by the terms of section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act from suing at law. Her position is supported by Ritzheimer. That court reversed the dismissal of a count of a complaint by a plaintiff against her employer, who employed fewer than 15 employees, claiming she was discharged because of her gender in violation of article I, section 17, of the Constitution. The basis of the decision was that, as the plaintiff had no remedy under the Act, she was not prevented from suing in the circuit court under the constitutional provision.\nThe Ritzheimer analysis begins with consideration of section 1\u2014 103(D) of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 103(D)), which sets forth that the phrase \u201c \u2018[c]ivil rights violation\u2019 includes and shall be limited to only those specific acts\u201d which are set forth in certain described sections of the Act. One such section is section 2 \u2014 102(A) of the Act, which prohibits discrimination by \u201cemployers\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 102(A)). Thus, as that defendant employed fewer than 15 people, that court concluded the alleged discrimination involved there was not a civil rights violation within the meaning of section 2 \u2014 102(A) or any other section of the Act. As that was so, section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act, which prohibited court proceedings for an \u201calleged civil rights violation\u201d (El. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 68, par. 8\u2014 111(C)), did not prevent a circuit court action for that type of a violation of article I, section 17, of the Constitution. Ritzheimer, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 961-62, 527 N.E.2d at 1286-87.\nThe Ritzheimer court deemed the foregoing statutory language so clear that no further interpretation was necessary. However, if such was necessary, that court concluded that the drafters of article I, section 17, of the Constitution would not have intended that the plaintiff there be left without remedy. That court recognized that article I, section 17, speaks of the legislature providing for \u201creasonable exemptions\u201d and that the record of proceedings at the constitutional convention indicated a discussion by delegates that exemptions for small employers would be reasonable. However, the Ritzheimer court concluded that no such exemptions had been granted by the legislature. The court then stated:\n\u201cNothing in the Illinois Human Rights Act suggests that small employers should be left to discriminate as they wish. Rather - than excuse any class of employers from its obligations under article I, section 17, of the Constitution, what the Act does instead is simply to impose greater restrictions on and provide additional remedies for claims of discrimination against employers of a certain size.\u201d Ritzheimer, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 527 N.E.2d at 1288.\nThe Ritzheimer analysis is that (1) the wording of the Act clearly requires that employers not covered by the \u201c15 or more employees\u201d provision of section 2 \u2014 lOl(BXlXa) of the Act (El. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2 \u2014 101(BXlXa)) are subject to suit under article I, section 17, of the Constitution; and (2) in any event, this is a logical construction to give to the statutory scheme. We respectfully disagree with both conclusions. Our major point of disagreement is that we deem the construction given to the Act is most unlikely to have been intended by the legislature. We also find sufficient ambiguity in the Act to permit us to consider legislative intent.\nWe cannot agree with the Ritzheimer opinion that under that court\u2019s interpretation of the Act, it \u201cimpose[s] greater restriction on and provide[s] additional remedies for claims of discrimination against employers of a certain size\u201d while leaving the smaller employers to what the Ritzheimer court seemingly regarded as the less onerous consequences of suits at law under article I, section 17, of the Constitution (Ritzheimer, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 961-62, 527 N.E.2d at 1287). Rather, we conclude Ritzheimer would place far greater burdens on the smaller employer. Charges brought under the Act must be filed within 180 days of the alleged violation. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 7A \u2014 102(A).) Statutes of limitations concerning suits at law are much longer. Before action can be brought under the Act, investigations are made as to whether substantial evidence exists to support the charge (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 7A \u2014 102(D)) and the expertise of the Commission is available to help effectuate a settlement (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 7A \u2014 103). The smaller employer with fewer than 15 employees would have none of these protections.\nMost employers would, undoubtedly, prefer to have a proceeding brought against them for discrimination tried before an agency whose policies would likely be consistent than subject themselves to the vagaries of a jury. Under the Act, only \u201cactual damages\u201d may be awarded. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 8A \u2014 104(B).) The smaller employers, who trader Ritzheimer could be sued at law, would be exposed to possible award of punitive damages. We know of no analogous legislation in the field of employment which would place greater burdens of the nature involved here upon smaller employers than upon larger employers.\nThe Ritzheimer opinion also concluded that \u201c[njothing in the [Act] suggests that small employers should be left to discriminate as they wish.\u201d (Ritzheimer, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 527 N.E.2d at 1288.) That opinion conceded, as does plaintiff here, that under article I, section 17, of the Constitution, the legislature may have had the power to limit or eliminate claims for gender discrimination, i.e., create an exemption from liability from that provision for very small employers, but concluded the legislature had not done so. (Ritzheimer, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 962-63, 527 N.E.2d at 1288.) We conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of the statutory scheme intended here was that the definitional provision of section 2 \u2014 101(B)(1) of the Act was intended to create such a \u201creasonable exemption.\u201d\nAs we have indicated, we agree that we can formulate a legislative intent which differs from the wording of the Act only if we find ambiguity in pertinent portions of the Act. We find that ambiguity exists in the use of the phrase \u201calleged civil rights violations\u201d in section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act in connection with the beginning language of section 1 \u2014 103 of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 103), which gives rise to section 1 \u2014 103(D) of the Act, which limits the use of the phrase \u201ccivil rights violation\u201d to acts specifically set forth in the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1-103(D)). Section 1-103 of the Act begins as follows: \u201cGeneral Definitions. When used in this Act, unless the context requires otherwise, the term.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 103.) That section then lists definitions for various subsections, including subsection (D), involving \u201cCivil Rights Violationfs].\u201d (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 1 \u2014 103(D).) Thus, the phrase \u201calleged civil rights violation\u201d appearing in section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act, which prohibits circuit court proceedings on such grounds, does not necessarily have the restricted meaning set forth in section 1 \u2014 103(D) of the Act.\nIn addition to the unusual posture in which small employers would be placed in regard to charges of employment discrimination under plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the Act, we must consider the ramifications of that interpretation upon other provisions in the overall structure of the Act. As we have indicated, the parties do not dispute that under article I, section 17, of the Constitution, the General Assembly may create \u201creasonable exemptions\u201d from the rights created thereby. The General Assembly has not done so expressly. The Act makes certain express \u201cexemptions\u201d from coverage of the Act but not from coverage of the article. For instance, under article 2 of the Act, concerning \u201cEmployment\u201d (see 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, pars. 2 \u2014 101 through 2 \u2014 105), section 2 \u2014 104 of the Act makes exemptions for activity concerning (1) bona fide qualifications; (2) veterans; (3) unfavorable military discharge; (4) ability tests; (5) merit and retirement systems; (6) training and apprenticeship programs; (7) police and firefighter retirement; (8) police and firefighter/paramedic appointment; and (9) citizenship status. (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 68, par. 2\u2014 104.) Presumably, these exemptions were placed in the Act so that employers would not be bothered by claims that the activities set forth in those categories were actionable. However, if plaintiff\u2019s theory is accepted, the effect of those provisions would be merely to subject those employers to actions at law in those areas rather than administrative proceedings.\nThus, the only reasonable construction we can give to the interplay between sections 8 \u2014 111(C) and 2 \u2014 104 of the Act is that the General Assembly intended that the conduct described in section 2\u2014 104 of the Act was intended to constitute \u201creasonable exemption\u201d from article I, section 17, of the Constitution. Similarly, the relationship between section 8 \u2014 111(C) of the Act and section 2 \u2014 101(B)(lXa) of the Act creating the \u201c15 or more employees\u201d requirement in order to be defined as an \u201cemployer\u201d is such that we can only conclude the legislature also intended that those employing fewer than the required number of employees be in the category of a \u201creasonable exemption\u201d from the requirements of article I, section 17, of the Constitution.\nThe foregoing analysis conforms with that of the circuit court. We agree with the circuit court. Accordingly, we affirm the order of dismissal.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN, P.J., and COOK, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary G. Johnson, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "Rex L. Reu, of Bloomington, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CATHY BAKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GRACE MILLER, d/b/a Miller\u2019s Metropole, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 92\u20140533\nOpinion filed March 18, 1993.\nGary G. Johnson, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nRex L. Reu, of Bloomington, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0044-01", "first_page_order": 62, "last_page_order": 68 }