{ "id": 5119085, "name": "RICHARD PEILE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SKELGAS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Peile v. Skelgas, Inc.", "decision_date": "1993-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 5-92-0040", "first_page": "500", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 500" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "129 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2713409 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/7/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 Ill. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2644378 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/408/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5315005 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256710 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 N.E. 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5484548 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/145/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 N.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 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"case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 U.S.C. \u00a71", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.E.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2769135 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/14/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 U.S. 501", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354212 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/330/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599375 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 191", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "S. Ill. U. L.J.", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "for an extensive history, criticism and recommendation for change as to forum non conveniens" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122414 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0338-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1706, "char_count": 54030, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7458913797364992e-07, "percentile": 0.7077690629839809 }, "sha256": "dab0615ebcbf0c08d8999c20a1ab1986829f2d777c2220dcc1f824c9a22fc940", "simhash": "1:b632d5b7ff970e88", "word_count": 9106 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:35:07.830210+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD PEILE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SKELGAS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MAAG\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is before us on a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(aXlX\u00fc) (134 111. 2d R. 306(aXlX\u00fc)) challenging the denial of a motion to transfer pursuant to the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens. The defendants, Skelgas, Inc., Skelgas Group, Inc., Phillips Petroleum Company, Phillips 66 Company, Phillips Pipe Line Company, and Shell Oil Company, contend that the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this cause from St. Clair County to Pike County. We granted the defendants\u2019 petition for leave to appeal and hereby affirm the order of the circuit court.\nI. PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nWe believe that in order to have an understanding of the posture in which this case is presented to us, we must first trace the procedural history.\nPlaintiffs originally filed an action arising out of the same occurrence in the circuit court of Madison County on April 19, 1988. At that time, the parties to the action were Skelgas Incorporated, York International Corporation, and Honeywell Incorporated. The complaint alleged that those defendants were liable in both negligence and strict liability for injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of an October 20, 1987, propane gas explosion at his residence in Pike County. A motion to transfer under the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens was filed by all defendants. The circuit court of Madison County, after considering the motions and plaintiffs\u2019 response, granted the transfer motion on July 28, 1988, and ordered the cause transferred to Pike County. The plaintiffs did not appeal the Madison County circuit court\u2019s order.\nAfter transfer, the plaintiffs added as additional defendants Skelgas Group, Inc., Shell Oil Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, Phillips 66 Company, and Phillips Pipe Line Company. Discovery proceeded in the Pike County action and the parties prepared for trial. Trial was set on July 9, 1990. On April 27, 1990, the Pike County action was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.\nOn December 14, 1990, the plaintiffs refiled this case in St. Clair County. In the refiled St. Clair County action, the parties are the same as those involved in the original action at the time of the voluntary dismissal, except neither York International Corporation nor Honeywell Incorporated is named as a defendant in the refiled action. It is the refiled action pending in St. Clair County which is the subject of this appeal.\nFollowing service, the defendants again filed timely intrastate forum non conveniens motions seeking the transfer of this action to Pike County.\nII. FACTS\nThe facts in this case are not in serious dispute. On October 20, 1987, the plaintiff, Richard Peile, was attempting to light a gas furnace that was served by propane gas. During the process of lighting the furnace, an explosion and fire occurred which resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff. In his deposition, the plaintiff stated that there was no smell of gas fumes prior to the explosion. The explosion and fire occurred at the plaintiffs\u2019 residence in Pike County.\nIn St. Clair County there is a pipeline-storage facility where propane gas is stored prior to delivery to various wholesalers and other customers. At this storage facility, an odorant is added to the propane gas to enable the customers using the gas to be able to detect its presence in the event of a gas leak. Most of the gas sold to the plaintiff had been stored in the St. Clair County storage and odorization facility. A small portion of the gas sold to the plaintiff may have originated with the Shell Oil facility in Madison County.\nAll parties agree that there are a number of witnesses in Pike County having knowledge of the facts leading up to and following the explosion and fire. These include both fact witnesses and medical witnesses. Some of these witnesses are employed by the defendant, Skelgas. Additionally, there are medical witnesses located in Springfield that have knowledge of the plaintiff\u2019s medical condition. While not specifically named, it is reasonable to assume that there are employees working at the storage and odorization facility in St. Clair County who would have knowledge regarding the operations conducted at that facility.\nIII. THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES\nAll current defendants are alleged to be sellers or suppliers of the propane gas in use at the time of the explosion and fire.\nThe defendants claim that extensive discovery was conducted in the original action and that all the witnesses deposed and five additional persons who are likely to be witnesses were shown to be residents of Pike County. Further, none of the original discovery, according to the defendants, revealed any potential witnesses who were residents of St. Clair County. The defendants state that numerous medical personnel who reside in Pike County treated the plaintiff and that physical therapy was given in Pike County. The plaintiff received additional medical services from physicians in Springfield, Illinois, and the plaintiffs have designated two Springfield, Illinois, physicians as experts. According to the defendants, there are no witnesses either factual or medical who reside in St. Clair County.\nFinally, the defendants claim that since the Madison County circuit court granted the original forum non conveniens motion, and given the fact that no appeal was taken from that order, the plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate the issue of whether Pike County is the most appropriate forum. For these reasons, the defendants seek the transfer of this case to Pike County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming that Pike County is the most appropriate forum.\nIn opposition, the plaintiffs claim that Pike County was merely the fortuitous location of this occurrence. Plaintiffs state that the original action filed in Madison County focused primarily on design defects in the furnace. Of the current defendants, only Skelgas was a party at the time of the transfer from Madison County to Pike County. In contrast, the present action focuses primarily on an alleged failure to properly odorize and test gas stored in a pipeline located in St. Clair County. Thus, the plaintiffs claim that the tortious act which precipitated the fire occurred in St. Clair County. For this reason, the plaintiffs claim that St. Clair County is the most appropriate forum and ask that the denial of the defendants\u2019 forum non conveniens motion be affirmed.\nIV\nIn addressing the issues raised in this case, we will discuss the forum non conveniens doctrine first from a traditional standpoint. Next, although not raised by any of the parties, we will consider the effect of section 2 \u2014 108 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 108) upon the forum jion conveniens doctrine. We do so in \u201cthe interest of justice and the previously unclear nature of the law.\u201d (Meyers v. Kissner (1992), 149 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 594 N.E.2d 336, 339.) In doing so, it will be necessary to discuss the concept of the venue at common law, the effect of section 2 \u2014 101 through 2 \u2014 108 of the Civil Practice Law (the venue statutes) upon common law venue principles, the history of section 2 \u2014 108, and finally its effect upon the forum non conveniens doctrine. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2\u2014 101 through 2-108.\nV. TRADITIONAL FORUM NON CONVENIENS ANALYSIS\nA. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN ILLINOIS\nThe doctrine o\u00ed forum non conveniens was first recognized by our supreme court in the case of Whitney v. Madden (1948), 400 Ill. 185, 79 N.E.2d 593. In Whitney, relying upon the then recently announced United States Supreme Court decision of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947), 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839, the supreme court held that if\n\u201crelief is sought in the local courts by a nonresident against a nonresident for a transaction which occurred outside the territorial boundaries of the State, for the purpose of frustrating the defendant, or if the bringing of the action unduly burdens the defendant or cause[s] him great and unnecessary inconvenience, or unnecessarily burdens the court, the trial court may, in its discretion, decline the jurisdiction of the case, even though it may have proper jurisdiction over all parties and the subject matter involved.\u201d Whitney, 400 Ill. at 189, 79 N.E.2d at 595.\nThe Whitney decision applied only to cases in which an alternative forum was available in another State. Under this circumstance, since an Illinois court could not transfer an action from Illinois to another State, the circuit court was required to decline jurisdiction of the action and dismiss the case. This motion seeking dismissal based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine has been referred to as an interstate forum non conveniens motion.\nLater cases developed the doctrine of interstate forum non conveniens in Illinois. Cotton v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 144, 152 N.E.2d 385, was a case arising under the Federal Employers Liability Act (45 U.S.C. \u00a71 et seq. (1988)). In the Cotton case, the plaintiff, a resident of Kentucky, was injured at the defendant\u2019s switchyards in Covington, Kentucky. His suit was filed in the city court of East St. Louis. The defendant filed a forum non conveniens motion seeking dismissal of the action. The forum non conveniens motion was denied by the trial court. On appeal the supreme court was again given an opportunity to discuss the applicability the doctrine in this State. The court applied a stringent test. It stated that the trial court must determine\n\u201cwhether the choice of forum was purely vexatious, or whether there is a relevant connection between the litigation and forum chosen.\u201d Cotton, 14 Ill. 2d at 168, 152 N.E.2d at 397.\nIn response to claims that the plaintiff was forum shopping when he brought his lawsuit in Illinois, the court responded by stating:\n\u201cIf it is \u2018shopping\u2019 for a plaintiff to bring a suit in a great metropolis where a large verdict is anticipated, why is it not also \u2018shopping\u2019 for a defendant to attempt to have the case dismissed on the ground that it should have been brought in a small community where the defendant anticipates a smaller verdict would result.\u201d (Cotton, 14 Ill. 2d at 174, 152 N.E.2d at 400.)\nThe court then held that the case had not been brought in the forum selected for the purpose of vexing or harassing the defendant, and the court accordingly affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of the forum non conveniens motion.\nThe vexation-and-harassment test announced in Cotton was short lived. In People ex rel. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Donovan (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 178, 180, 195 N.E.2d 634, 635, this test was formally abandoned. The court then announced that the appropriate factors to be considered in ruling on a forum non conveniens motion were those announced in Whitney and the other portions of the Cotton case that had not been overruled.\nThese factors were reiterated in Adkins v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 511, 301 N.E.2d 729:\n\u201cFactors to be considered in disposing of a motion to dismiss forum non conveniens include the relative capacities of the two courts to provide a fair trial, the relative inconvenience to witnesses and parties, and the burden placed upon the taxpayers and residents of the jurisdiction to which the cause of action is transported.\u201d 54 Ill. 2d at 514, 301 N.E.2d at 730.\nThe private-interest/public-interest factor test announced in Gulf Oil was formally approved in People ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977. The private-interest factors were identified as:\n(1) The relative ease of access to sources of proof.\n(2) The availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.\n(3) The cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses.\n(4) The possibility of a view of the premises if appropriate.\n(5) All other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.\nThe public-interest factors were identified as:\n(1) The administrative difficulties which result for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers.\n(2) Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of the community which have no relation to the litigation.\n(3) An interest in having localized controversies decided at home.\n(4) A desire to have a court apply law with which it is familiar rather than the law of a foreign jurisdiction.\n(See Giliberto, 74 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 383 N.E.2d at 985.) When applying this test, the trial court must balance the convenience of the parties and make an appropriate ruling based upon the facts and the factors set forth above. The court cautioned that a plaintiff enjoys a substantial right to select his forum, and that this choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the balance of convenience strongly favors the defendant. Giliberto, 74 Ill. 2d at 111, 383 N.E.2d at 985, citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839.\nThis deference is known as the unequal-balancing test. This is in keeping with the view expressed in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, section 84, Comment c, at 251-52, and Reporter\u2019s Note, at 255 (1971), which state that the plaintiff\u2019s right to select the forum is one of the two most important factors to be considered. See also Espinosa v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 111, 119, 427 N.E.2d 111, 118.\nThe right to select the forum is not always viewed, however, with the same deference. In Wieser v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 359, 456 N.E.2d 98, the supreme court stated:\n\u201cWhen the home forum is chosen, it is reasonable to assume that the choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign to the forum chosen, however, this assumption is much less reasonable and the plaintiff\u2019s choice deserves less deference.\u201d 98 Ill. 2d at 367, 456 N.E.2d at 102.\nThe Wieser court stated that if the selected forum had a \u201cconnection with the litigation such as the residence of the plaintiff, or the principal place of business of the defendant, or the situs of the accident, or the decedent\u2019s employment, it would have had an interest in providing a forum in which to resolve the dispute.\u201d (98 Ill. 2d at 371-72, 456 N.E.2d at 104.) Therefore, these factors constitute a set of criteria to consider in determining whether the case is at \u201chome\u201d in the forum selected. If any of these criteria are satisfied, the plaintiff\u2019s choice deserves greater deference and the case should normally remain in the forum selected by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694.\nThis was the status of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the State of Illinois until September of 1983. Our courts had only recognized the doctrine on an interstate basis, and no decision of our supreme court had ever recognized the authority of a trial court to transfer a case from one county to another based upon the forum non conveniens doctrine. This changed with the decision of Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601.\nIn Torres, our supreme court adopted the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens. Torres was a medical malpractice suit arising out of treatment rendered in Sangamon County. The plaintiffs filed suit in Cook County, and the defendants filed a motion to transfer the cause to Sangamon County based upon forum non conveniens. The motion to transfer was granted, and the plaintiffs then petitioned the supreme court directly for a writ of mandamus and prohibition or a supervisory order to compel the trial court to vacate its transfer order and retain venue in Cook County.\nThe court recognized that intrastate forum non conveniens had not previously been adopted in Illinois. It observed that 18 of our sister States had adopted intrastate forum non conveniens through legislative action. It was conceded that our courts were without statutory authorization to order an intrastate transfer under the forum non conveniens doctrine. Torres, 98 Ill. 2d at 347, 456 N.E.2d at 605.\nIn adopting intrastate forum non conveniens, the supreme court reasoned that since English common law had been adopted in Illinois, and since the English courts during the 1700\u2019s and 1800\u2019s had transferred cases from one venue to another based on principles similar to those found in the forum non conveniens doctrine, the doctrine was, therefore, part of the common law adopted by the State of Illinois. (Torres, 98 Ill. 2d at 347, 456 N.E.2d at 605.) The court found support for this position in the fact that the Oklahoma and Kansas Supreme Courts had reached similar conclusions. Torres, 98 Ill. 2d at 350, 456 N.E.2d at 607.\nWith the adoption of intrastate forum non conveniens, the supreme court instructed us that the factors to be taken into consideration in making the decision whether to grant or deny an intrastate motion were \u201cthe availability of an alternative forum, the access to sources of proof, the accessibility of witnesses, the relative advantages and obstacles to obtaining a fair trial, the congestion of the court dockets, and the convenience of the parties.\u201d (Torres, 98 Ill. 2d at 351.) The court cautioned that unless these factors strongly favored the defendant, the plaintiff should be allowed to exercise his choice of forum in conformity with the venue statutes.\nSince the decision in Torres, intrastate forum non conveniens motions have become common in the trial courts of this State. No less common are the interstate motions that are filed seeking dismissal. The decisions in the intrastate and interstate cases are cited interchangeably since the factors to be considered in both types of motions are similar. See Bland v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 217, 506 N.E.2d 1291; Washington v. Illinois Power Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 395, 581 N.E.2d 644.\nB. THE APPLICATION OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS\nTO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE\nThe trial court cited three reasons for denying defendants\u2019 motions to transfer the cause to Pike County, stating:\n(1) There is a significant connection between St. Clair County and this action for the reason that certain alleged acts of negligence were committed in St. Clair County by the defendants.\n(2) There may be a site in St. Clair County for the jury to view, while the site in Pike County is no longer present and available for view.\n(3) The status of the docket of the circuit court of St. Clair County would not prevent trial in an expeditious manner, and trial could be set within four months of the time of the parties announcing ready.\nThe sole issue to be decided is whether the circuit court of St. Clair County abused its discretion in denying defendants\u2019 motions to transfer this cause to Pike County based upon intrastate forum non conveniens.\nThe supreme court has consistently held that a trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on a forum non conveniens motion, and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion in weighing relevant considerations. (Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron, Inc. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 112, 497 N.E.2d 745.) The test is whether the relevant factors, viewed in their totality, strongly favor transfer to the forum suggested by defendant.\nWe consider first the relevant public-interest factors in the case before us. The defendants allege that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there is a significant connection between St. Clair County and the action. Defendants also contend that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the status of the trial court\u2019s docket would not prevent a trial from being conducted in St. Clair County in an expeditious manner. Defendants allege that the residents of St. Clair County have no interest in this case while the citizens of Pike County have a compelling interest in this litigation because the explosion and fire occurred in Pike County.\nAll defendants save one conduct business in St. Clair County. Merely conducting business, however, in St. Clair County does not affect the forum non conveniens issue because there must be some contact with St. Clair County in order for venue and jurisdiction to be proper. (See Bland, 116 HI. 2d at 226.) Nevertheless, the extent and type of business conducted is an appropriate consideration for the circuit court on a forum non conveniens motion.\nIn Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 101, 554 N.E.2d 209, actions were brought on behalf of the victims of a plane crash which occurred in Du Page County. The flight had originated in Cook County, which was \u201cthe last place the aircraft was on the ground, and the last place the plane was inspected, before the crash occurred.\u201d (Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 113-14, 554 N.E.2d at 215.) The supreme court ruled that Cook County\u2019s interest in the litigation was in ensuring the safety of flights that emanate from its airports, while Du Page County\u2019s interest was in protecting persons within its borders and in compensating victims of accidents that occur there.\nThis court also addressed a similar situation in Kemner v. Monsanto Co. (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 188, 576 N.E.2d 1146. The Kemner case arose out of a train derailment and subsequent chemical spill that occurred in Sturgeon, Missouri. The defendant had shipped from its plant in Sauget, Illinois, a railroad tank car which contained a small amount of dioxin which was spilled in Sturgeon when the train derailed.\nWe affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss premised on forum non conveniens. While the plaintiffs were all residents of the site of the occurrence in Missouri, the defendant had a plant in Sauget, Illinois, and many of the claims centered around the defendants\u2019 acts and omissions in its facility in Sauget. The location and importance of the defendant\u2019s plant, the plaintiffs\u2019 preference, the number of Illinois witnesses, and the convenience to out-of-State witnesses were enumerated as factors supporting the trial court\u2019s decision.\nIn the instant case, plaintiffs allege that defendants improperly odorized and tested the propane gas stored in defendant Phillips\u2019 storage and odorization facility located in St. Clair County. Plaintiffs further allege that the odorant should have been added to the propane at the pipeline facility. It is also the site where a Skelgas employee performed, or should have performed, a \u201csniff test\u201d for the odorant. The storage and odorization facility is alleged to have been the last place the propane gas was inspected for odorant before the explosion and fire occurred in Pike County. Certainly the residents of St. Clair County have an interest in ensuring the safety of propane gas stored and odorized in their county. It is also apparent that many of the claims in this case center around the defendants\u2019 alleged acts and omissions occurring at the storage and odorization facility. We, therefore, find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there is a significant connection between St. Clair County and the action. As St. Clair County has a significant connection with the litigation, it also has an interest in providing a forum to resolve the dispute. Wieser, 98 Ill. 2d at 371-72, 456 N.E.2d at 104; cf. Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694 (holding that the situs of the alleged tortious conduct is relevant in choosing the most appropriate forum).\nWith reference to the court-congestion factor, figures compiled by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts indicate that the average time for termination by jury verdict in major civil cases was 37.5 months in St. Clair County, as opposed to 36.5 months in Pike County. In Griffith, the supreme court ruled that the mere fact that the average time for termination by jury verdict was 21.4 months in DuPage County compared to 66.3 months in Cook County did not justify the transfer of the case from Cook County. Our supreme court has also recognized and acknowledged that a trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to assess the burdens on its own docket. (Boner v. Peabody Coal Co. (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 523, 568 N.E.2d 883.) Consequently, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by examining the status of its own docket and concluding that court congestion did not necessitate transferring the case to Pike County.\nLastly, we address the issue of the burden of jury duty to the citizens of a county. The key consideration in this regard is the unfairness of imposing jury duty upon residents of a county \u201cwith no connection to the litigation.\u201d (Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106, 554 N.E.2d at 215.) In Griffith the supreme court held that Cook County\u2019s interest in the resolution of the case did not impose any unfairness in imposing jury duty on the citizens of Cook County. Likewise, in the instant case, St. Clair County\u2019s significant connection and interest in the resolution of this case, as previously discussed, does not unfairly impose jury duty on St. Clair County citizens.\nNext, turning to the relevant private-interest factors, defendants raise a number of issues relating to the accessibility of witnesses in St. Clair County.\nThere is little doubt that there are a number of witnesses in Pike County having knowledge of the facts leading up to and following the explosion and fire. Defendants allege that at least 10 \u201ckey fact witnesses\u201d reside in Pike County. Two of the listed \u201ckey fact witnesses\u201d are the plaintiffs, two are Skelgas employees, and the other six are members of the Pittsfield fire department, the ambulance service, and employees of Watson Plumbing and Heating. A trial court is entitled to consider the likelihood that witnesses who may possess uncontested information will be called to testify at trial. (Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 110-11, 554 N.E.2d at 213.) It is questionable that all 10 of the \u201ckey fact witnesses\u201d shall be called to testify at trial, particularly the members of the fire department and ambulance service who responded to the explosion and fire. Likewise, it is doubtful that many of the medical witnesses who are located in Pike County or areas closer to Pike County than St. Clair County would be likely to appear and testify at trial whether the case is tried in Pike County or St. Clair County.\nCoupled with the fact that there are undoubtedly some employees working at the storage and odorization facility in St. Clair County who have knowledge of the operations at the facility, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by giving little weight to the location of the possible 10 \u201ckey fact witnesses\u201d and medical witnesses.\nPlaintiffs allege that St. Clair County is more convenient for out-of-State witnesses, citing the fact that Lambert International Airport is 25 miles from Belleville, and defendants allege that Pike County is the more convenient forum for out-of-State witnesses, noting that Quincy\u2019s airport is 30 miles from the Pike County courthouse. Without reaching the merits of this debate, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of this issue. Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 101, 554 N.E.2d 209; Boner v. Peabody Coal Co. (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 523, 568 N.E.2d 883.\nAnother private-interest factor to be taken into account is whether the jury would need to view a physical location. The trial court found that the storage and odorization facility in St. Clair County may be a site for the jury to view and noted that the plaintiffs\u2019 home in Pike County is no longer present and available for view. While plaintiffs allege that the viewing of the storage and odorization facility may be an aid to the jury, defendants contend that the storage and odorization facility is of no importance and can add no benefit to the jury viewing it. It is within a court\u2019s discretion to permit a jury to view the premises which are part of the subject matter of the litigation. (Springer v. City of Chicago (1891), 135 Ill. 552, 26 N.E. 514.) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s finding that the storage and odorization facility is part of the subject matter of this litigation and may be appropriate for a view.\nFinally, the defendants claim that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate the forum non conveniens issue since the Madison County circuit court ruled previously that the case should be transferred from Madison to Pike County. They express the further fear that if the plaintiffs are allowed to relitigate this issue, and if the case is again transferred to Pike County, another voluntary dismissal may occur with a subsequent refiling in a county other than Pike.\nAs to the relitigation claim, we simply hold that the propriety of the Madison County transfer order is not before us. Even if it were, the most that can be said of that transfer order is that under the facts before the court at that time, the Madison County court had discretion to grant or deny the motion. It chose to grant the motion. We, however, must review this case in light of the facts before the St. Clair County circuit court at the time it denied the motion.\nThe claim that the plaintiffs may voluntarily dismiss again if this case is transferred to Pike County is without merit. If another voluntary dismissal is taken, the dismissal would be with prejudice. Flesner v. Youngs Development Co. (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 252, 582 N.E.2d 720.\nWe have viewed and considered all the factors, both private and public, and find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer.\nVI\nWe will now discuss the concept of venue at common law, the changes made by our venue statutes, and the history and construction of section 2 \u2014 108 of the Civil Practice Law.\nA. VENUE AT COMMON LAW\n\u201cVenue is the place of trial of an action, the geographical location in which the action or proceeding should be brought to trial.\u201d (36 Ill. L. & Prac. Venue \u00a71, at 2 (1958).) At common law, for purposes of venue, all causes of action were classified as either transitory or local. A transitory action followed the defendant and was not localized to a particular county. A local action typically involved real estate and could only be brought in the county where the property was located. (United Biscuit Co. v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc. (1950), 407 Ill. 488, 502, 95 N.E.2d 439, 446.) At common law a transitory action could be brought in any county where the defendant was found. Our venue statutes have greatly modified these common law rules.\nB. VENUE UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE\nSection 2 \u2014 101 through section 2 \u2014 108 of the Civil Practice Law sets forth the general venue provisions enacted by our legislature. HI. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 101 through 2 \u2014 108.\nThese sections identify the proper place or places for actions to be filed and tried, provide for the transfer of venue and the fixing of costs of transfer if an improper venue is selected, and contain waiver provisions if a defendant fails to timely object to the venue selected. Our supreme court has recognized that the task of fixing venue is traditionally a legislative function. Chappelle v. Sorenson (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 472, 143 N.E.2d 18; Mapes v. Hulcher (1936), 363 Ill. 227, 2 N.E.2d 63.\nSince it is the plaintiff who commences the action, it is the plaintiff who has the right and obligation to select a proper forum.\nIf an improper venue is selected, a timely motion to transfer must be granted as a matter of right. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2\u2014 104.) A plaintiff who files an action in an improper venue without probable cause and in bad faith may be liable for the defendant\u2019s attorney fees in addition to the costs of transfer. If the costs of transfer are not timely paid, the action may even be dismissed. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2-107.\nEven under the venue statutes, certain actions remain as local actions and must be brought in a particular county. (See e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2 \u2014 103(b), (c).) No longer do we have truly transitory actions as we did at common law. While in certain actions there may be more than one county where venue is proper, the statutes limit the plaintiff to the particular forums that are provided. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2-101, 2-102, 2-103.\nThe purpose of the venue statutes is to ensure that the case is brought in a convenient forum, a forum convenient to the defendant or the witnesses or both. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 321, 368 N.E.2d 88.\nBefore the adoption of intrastate forum non conveniens in Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601, a plaintiff who filed his action in compliance with the venue statutes could be confident that the case would be tried in the forum selected. With the adoption of intrastate forum non conveniens, a trial court is required to disregard the legislative determination of convenience that was recognized in Mosele and consider the criteria identified in the private-interest/public-interest factors test to determine whether, in that judge\u2019s opinion, some other forum might be more convenient. Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694.\nUnder this analysis of convenience, compliance with the venue statutes is entitled to little or no weight since the doctrine presupposes that venue is proper in the forum selected but that some other forum where venue is also proper is more appropriate for the trial. Bunich v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 538, 478 N.E.2d 1362.\nThere is, however, one section of the venue statutes which has never been considered by our supreme court in its enunciation of the forum non conveniens doctrine. Section 2 \u2014 108 provides:\n\u201cPlace of trial. All actions shall be tried in the county in which they are commenced, except as otherwise provided by law.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 108.\nThis statute appears to legislatively mandate a trial in the forum chosen by the plaintiff if that forum was chosen in compliance with the venue statutes. We will now discuss the history and construction of section 2 \u2014 108.\nC. THE HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 2-108\nThe original statute from which section 2 \u2014 108 was derived was adopted during Illinois territorial days. On February 3, 1809, the Congress of the United States passed the \u201cAct Establishing the Territory of Illinois.\u201d (See 26 Stat. 514 (1809).) Section 4 of the \u201cAct Establishing the Territory of Illinois\u201d adopted those portions of an \u201cOrdinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio\u201d relating to legislative authority. Ordinance of 1787, Act of Congress (July 13, 1787) (U.S. Rev. Stat. 2d ed. 1787, at 13) (hereinafter referred to as the Northwest Ordinance).\nUnder the applicable portions of the Northwest Ordinance, the governor and judges of the Territory enjoyed legislative authority pending the election of a Territorial Legislature. (Northwest Ordinance, par. 5.) Pursuant to such authority, the governor and judges of the Illinois Territory passed on July 20, 1809, \u201cAn Act Concerning the General Court.\u201d Laws of the Territory of Illinois (July 20, 1809) (Bulletin of the Illinois State Historical Library (vol. 1, June 1906), \u201cLaws of the Territory of Illinois 1809-1811\u201d) (hereinafter referred to as the Original General Court Act).\nSection 1 of the Original General Court Act provided:\n\u201cBe it enacted by the governor and judges of the Illinois Territory and it is hereby enacted by authority of same; that there shall annually be held four terms of the general court, two of which shall be held in the town of Kaskaskia, in the County of Randolph, on the second Mondays of April and September, and two shall be held in Cahokia, in the County of St. Clair, on the fourth Mondays in April and September.\u201d\nSection 3 of the Original General Court Act is the legislative provision from which section 2 \u2014 108 was derived. It provided:\n\u201cAll suits and process of a civil and criminal nature shall be tried and determined in the county in which such suit or process originated.\u201d\nBy 1812, a General Assembly had been elected in the Territory of Illinois, and pursuant to the authority of the Northwest Ordinance which still governed, the Hlinois Territorial Legislature passed a statute declaring what laws were in force in the Illinois Territory. (See \u201cAn Act Declaring What Laws are in Force in the Hlinois Territory\u201d (Laws of the Territory of Hlinois, first session of the Legislative Counsel and House of Representatives (December 13, 1812)).) Section 2 of this act provided as follows:\n\u201cThat all the laws passed by the governor and judges of the Territory of Hlinois which remain unrepealed by them are declared to be in full force and effect within this Territory, and so to remain until altered or repealed by the Legislature.\u201d\nAt the time that this statute was passed, the governor and judges had not altered or repealed section 3 of the Original General Court Act. In December of 1813, the Territorial Legislature mandated the transfer of those cases pending in Cahokia to Kaskaskia for disposition. This was accomplished by the passage of an \u201cAct Regulating the General Court.\u201d Laws of the Territory of Hlinois, second session of the Legislative Counsel and House of Representatives (December 10, 1813) (hereinafter referred to as the General Court Act of 1813).\nSection 41 of the General Court Act of 1813 declared that the general court at Cahokia would continue to operate until November 1 of 1814 at which point the papers, books, and proceedings at Cahokia would be transferred to Kaskaskia for disposition. In December of 1814, the Territorial Legislature recognized that by virtue of this transfer, the mandates of section 3 of the Original General Court Act would be violated. This conflict was eliminated by the passage of \u201cAct Establishing a Supreme Court for the Illinois Territory.\u201d (Laws of the Hlinois Territory, third session of the Legislative Counsel and House of Representatives (December 13,1814).) Section 7 of this act provided:\n\u201cAll suits shall be tried in the county in which they originate, unless in cases that are or may be otherwise specially provided for by law, and in all cases except those hereinafter mentioned, one of the judges shall be sufficient to constitute a court.\u201d\nA careful reading of this section demonstrates that the legislature had modified the language from that which was contained in section 3 of the Original General Court Act of 1809. In particular, the phrase \u201cunless in cases that are or may be otherwise specially provided for by law\u201d was added. This was necessary because of the transfer of all the business at the Cahokia court to Kaskaskia effective November 1, 1814. By adding the clause \u201cunless in cases that are or may be otherwise specially provided for by law,\u201d the Territorial Legislature harmonized the two statutes.\nIn 1818, Illinois was admitted to the Union. Thereafter, the State legislature amended the statute in question on several occasions. In 1829, the legislature passed an \u201cAct Regulating the Supreme and Circuit Courts.\u201d (Laws of the State of Illinois (January 19, 1829).) Section 21 of this statute provided:\n\u201cAll suits brought in said circuit court shall be tried in the county in which they originated, unless in cases that are or may be specially provided for by law.\u201d\nHere the legislature had simply added the words \u201ccircuit court\u201d to the statute. Thereafter, in 1874 the statute was again amended to provide:\n\u201cAll suits shall be tried in the counties in which they are instituted, except as otherwise provided by law.\u201d \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to circuit courts, and the superior court of Cook County,\u201d section 25, Statutes of Illinois, General Laws of the State, approved February 16, 1874, in force July 1, 1874 (Rev. Stat., ch. 37, sec. 42 (Hurd 1874)).\nHere the words \u201ccircuit court\u201d were deleted; the word \u201coriginated\u201d was changed to \u201cinstituted\u201d; and the phrase \u201cunless in cases that are or may be otherwise specially provided for by law\u201d was changed to \u201cexcept as otherwise provided by law.\u201d By deleting \u201coriginated\u201d and substituting \u201cinstituted,\u201d the legislature clarified the meaning of the statute. Under the version passed in 1874, it was clear that the legislature was mandating that the trial be held in the county in which the case was filed or instituted unless some provision of the law provided otherwise. At present, section 2 \u2014 108 is identical to the statute passed in 1874 with only two exceptions. The word \u201csuits\u201d has been changed to \u201cactions,\u201d and the word \u201cinstituted\u201d has been changed to \u201ccommenced.\u201d\nAs pointed out above, the phrase \u201cotherwise provided by law\u201d found its origins in a need to harmonize the Original General Court Act which was adopted in 1809 with the General Court Act which was passed in 1813. Since the General Court Act of 1813 had transferred the cases from CahoMa to Kaskaskia, the legislature needed to amend section 3 of the Original General Court Act to account for this legislative transfer.\nWe must now determine the meaning of the phrase \u201cexcept as otherwise provided by law\u201d in section 2 \u2014 108.\nD. MEANING OF \u201cPROVIDED BY LAW\u201d\nThe phrase \u201cprovided by law\u201d is frequently found in statutes and constitutional provisions in this State and other States. Various authorities have had occasion to construe this phrase and have declared that where the phrase \u201cprovided by law\u201d is used in a statute or in a constitutional provision, it refers to a legislative act and not to the common law.\n1. \u201cProvided by law. This phrase when used in a constitution or statute generally means prescribed or provided by some statute.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1102 (5th ed. 1979).\n2. \u201cAs provided by law\u201d means that an act by the general assembly via the law-making process is envisioned when this phrase is used. Quinn v. Donnewald (1985), 107 Ill. 2d 179, 483 N.E.2d 216; County of Kane v. Carlson (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 814, 489 N.E.2d 467, affd on other grounds (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 186, 507 N.E.2d 482; Oak Park Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Village of Oak Park (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 200, 204, 296 N.E.2d 344, 347.\n3. See numerous provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, wherein the constitutional commentary accompanying those sections containing the phrase \u201cprovided by law\u201d or \u201crequired by law\u201d states that it is a legislative function of the General Assembly that is addressed when \u201cprovided by law\u201d or \u201crequired by law\u201d is used. E.g., Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., art. VI, \u00a72, Constitutional Commentary, at 392; art. VIII, \u00a72, Constitutional Commentary, at 138-39; art. IX, \u00a74, Constitutional Commentary, at 176 (Smith-Hurd 1971).\n4. From other jurisdictions, see the following: Pace v. Pace Brothers Co. (1936), 91 Utah 132, 147, 59 P.2d 1, 8, wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that \u201cexcept as provided by law\u201d did not refer to the \u201cgeneral law,\u201d rather the phrase seems to \u201csmack of the flavor of something done by the Legislature\u201d; and Manchin v. Browning (1982), 170 W. Va. 779, 785, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915, wherein it was held that \u201cprovided by law\u201d means prescribed or provided by statute.\nThe foregoing analysis of section 2 \u2014 108 indicates to us that the legislature of the State of Hlinois has mandated that the trial of a case is to be held in the county in which the case is filed, unless some statutory provision mandates or permits the case to be transferred elsewhere. We are not alone in this interpretation of section 2 \u2014 108. The only other court ever to construe this statute in terms of a forum, non conveniens analysis was a pre-Torres decision entitled Precision Components, Inc. v. Estate of Kuntz (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 309, 445 N.E.2d 449. In Precision the court stated: \u201cIn general, unless suit is filed in the wrong venue, the action must be tried in the county in which it is commenced.\u201d (Precision, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 445 N.E.2d at 450.) Shortly after the Precision case was decided, our supreme court, without mention of section 2 \u2014 108, decided the case of Torres and adopted the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens.\nE. THE EFFECT OF SECTION 2-108 UPON THE DOCTRINE\nOF INTRASTATE FORUM NON CONVENIENS\nIn construing section 2 \u2014 108, we must be guided by the teachings of our supreme court. In Torres, the court instructed us that there is no statutory authority in the State of Illinois for the adoption of intrastate forum non conveniens. The supreme court also declared that the sole authority for the adoption of intrastate forum non conveniens in Illinois was the fact that English common law was in effect in this State.\nIn Hlinois, common law is in force solely by virtue of a legislative act. Our supreme court has stated:\n\u201c \u2018The common law of England, so far as the same is applicable, and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of British parliament, made in aid of, and to supply the defects of the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First\u2019 (with certain specified exceptions), \u2018and which are of a general nature, and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until repealed by legislative authority.\u2019 [Quoting \u201csec. 1, ch. 28, R.S. of this State.\u201d] This statute, without the exceptions, was passed by the general convention of the colony of Virginia, May, 1776, [citation] and in its present form was carried into the legislation of the Indiana Territory, by the act of September 7th, 1807, [citation] was in force in the Territory of Hlinois [citation] and was re-enacted by the first State legislature, by act of February 4th, 1819, [citation] and has been retained in the same form in each succeeding revision of the statute.\u201d Bulpit v. Matthews (1893), 145 Ill. 345, 350, 34 N.E. 525, 526.\nThis same statute is still in force today and is found in section 1 of \u201cAn Act to revise the law in relation to the common law\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 1, par. 801).\nGiven the fact that intrastate forum non conveniens is a product of the adoption of common law, and given the fact that the Hlinois legislature is the entity that was responsible for the adoption of common law, the legislature, therefore, is free to modify the common law in any respect it sees fit. This has been often recognized by the courts of this State. People v. Gersch (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 384, 553 N.E.2d 281; People v. Davis (1953), 1 Ill. 2d 597,116 N.E.2d 372.\nWe are aware of the general rule which requires statutes in derogation of the common law to be strictly construed. This rule does not apply to section 2 \u2014 108 or any of the other provisions of our Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 106).\nVirtually our entire code of civil procedure is in derogation of the common law. Certainly our venue statutes abolish the common law concept that a transitoiy action can be brought wherever the defendant is found. Instead, a plaintiff is directed by statute to bring his action in one of the specified venues. We believe it is fair to conclude that the legislature intended that if the venue statutes were complied with, a suit would not be susceptible to a court-fashioned rule of convenience that ignores the legislative determination of convenience found in our venue statutes. To make this clear, our legislature has adopted section 2 \u2014 108 as the law of this State. Any other conclusion would render section 2\u2014 108 a useless and meaningless statute.\nIf section 2 \u2014 108 means what it says and if we and the court in Precision are correct, then all actions must be tried in the county in which they are filed unless some statute mandates or permits the transfer of the case to a different county. The first instance in which such a statute mandated a transfer was in 1813 when the Illinois Territorial Legislature transferred the cases from Cahokia to Kaskaskia. Other statutes today similarly provide for a transfer. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, pars. 2-106, 2-1001.\nHowever, we need not decide today whether the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens has been abrogated by statute. We believe that is a decision best left to our supreme court.\nIn Welsh v. James (1950), 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872, our supreme court applied a common law rule in reaching its decision. At the time of the Welsh decision, there was in force a statute that changed the common law rule (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, ch. 3, par. 167). However, no party cited the statute to the court. This resulted in a decision that did not consider the statutory law in effect at that time. Later, in Bradley v. Fox (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699, the issue arose again, and on that occasion the statutory authority was made known to the court. With this background the court ruled as follows:\n\u201cThus, inasmuch as the authorities relied upon in the Welsh case did not at the time constitute the law, *** it is incumbent upon this court to consider the issue anew, and evolve a proper rationale.\u201d Bradley, 7 Ill. 2d at 112,129 N.E.2d at 703.\nDespite the fact that we have called on the supreme court to clarify this issue, we believe that it is proper to rule at this time and we so hold that if a plaintiff complies with the venue statute, given the mandate of section 2 \u2014 108 the plaintiff\u2019s choice of forum is entitled to great deference and should only be disturbed for the most compelling reasons. We, therefore, affirm the circuit court\u2019s denial of the defendants\u2019 motion for this independent, and additional, reason.\nSince this is a matter of first impression and a matter of great importance, we would be inclined to grant an application for a certificate of importance if requested. Supreme Court Rule 316 (134 Ill. 2d R. 316).\nCONCLUSION\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court denying the defendants\u2019 intrastate forum non conveniens motion is affirmed, and the cause is remanded.\nAffirmed and remanded.\nGOLDENHERSH, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MAAG" }, { "text": "JUSTICE LEWIS,\nspecially concurring:\nMany attorneys and circuit judges do not realize the considerable amount of time that an appellate judge spends ruling on various motions and petitions. One of the most common petitions and probably the most time-consuming petition to the appellate courts is the petition for leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 306(aXlX\u00fc) (134 HI. 2d R. 306(aXlX\u00fc)) from an order entered as to forum non conveniens.\nThe battle over the forum is also very costly and time consuming for the circuit courts and the litigants. I will leave the research, as to what the cost is to the taxpayers and the litigants, to some enterprising law professor or student. Suffice it to say that any time an appeal can be taken before trial of a cause there has to be a delay in the litigation that costs all the parties and the taxpayers. See McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 191 (1989) (for an extensive history, criticism and recommendation for change as to forum non conveniens).\nWhat the appellate courts are confronted with in these appeals are reviews of the trial judge\u2019s decision as to whether witnesses have better access to the forum from Lambert International Airport in St. Louis than they have from some regional or local airport. In this case we had to decide if St. Clair County can try the case as quickly as Pike County and whether the trial judge erred in deciding that the jury might be helped by viewing the pipeline-storage facility. The battle over the forum results in a battle over minutiae.\nJustice Joseph Goldenhersh was clairvoyant when he wrote in his dissent in the Torres case:\n\u201cI need not lengthen this dissent by pointing out the confusion which the utter disregard of the venue statutes evidenced by this opinion will cause in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction. To destroy in one stroke the stability created by a long history of deference to legislative governance of venue is an unfortunate mistake which should be immediately corrected.\u201d Torres v. Walsh (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 338, 355, 456 N.E.2d 601, 609 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).\nWe now find out that somehow the intent of the legislature, as expressed in section 2 \u2014 108, has been overlooked by the courts this past decade. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 108 (now 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 -108 (West 1992)).) The majority opinion allows the supreme court of Llinois to rectify this oversight, if it so desires.\nIt is not our intent to be presumptuous or disrespectful toward the supreme court. The section 2 \u2014 108 discussion in the majority opinion obviously can be ignored by the court if it so chooses. Perhaps, however, the supreme court is looking for a way out of the quagmire of forum non conveniens and has not had a good reason or opportunity to reconsider the doctrine. The issue is now respectfully tendered to the proper forum.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE LEWIS," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ian P. Cooper, of Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellants Phillips Petroleum Company, Phillips 66 Company, and Phillips Pipe Line Company.", "Robert W. Wilson and Adrian P. Sulser, both of Evans & Dixon, of Edwardsville, for appellants Skelgas, Inc., and Skelgas Group, Inc.", "James Michael Cox, of Coburn, Croft & Putzell, of Belleville, and Shell Oil Company, of Houston, Texas (Randall J. Heldt, of counsel), for appellant Shell Oil Company.", "Sandor Korein, Robert S. Bogard, and Michael B. Marker, all of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Glass & Bogard, of East St. Louis, for ap-pellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD PEILE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SKELGAS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 92\u20140040\nOpinion filed March 25, 1993.\nLEWIS, J., specially concurring.\nIan P. Cooper, of Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellants Phillips Petroleum Company, Phillips 66 Company, and Phillips Pipe Line Company.\nRobert W. Wilson and Adrian P. Sulser, both of Evans & Dixon, of Edwardsville, for appellants Skelgas, Inc., and Skelgas Group, Inc.\nJames Michael Cox, of Coburn, Croft & Putzell, of Belleville, and Shell Oil Company, of Houston, Texas (Randall J. Heldt, of counsel), for appellant Shell Oil Company.\nSandor Korein, Robert S. Bogard, and Michael B. Marker, all of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Glass & Bogard, of East St. Louis, for ap-pellees." }, "file_name": "0500-01", "first_page_order": 518, "last_page_order": 540 }