{ "id": 5119052, "name": "In re ESTATE OF ALICE BAKER, Deceased (Sharon Chapman, Ex'x of the Estate of Alice Baker, Petitioner, v. Leland Finnegan, Respondent-Appellee (John J. Wosik, Petitioner-Appellant))", "name_abbreviation": "Chapman v. Finnegan", "decision_date": "1993-03-29", "docket_number": "No. 3-92-0436", "first_page": "684", "last_page": "689", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 684" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5668490 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534027 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587495 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253049 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3458458 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 1390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293431 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 1005", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592935 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0458-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 572, "char_count": 10354, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.09074288111765e-08, "percentile": 0.5056941543696177 }, "sha256": "510af4d44a24e16ced7481449e68fd015da1f935bc8142894918719889450f0d", "simhash": "1:8b48f1fd35c85e83", "word_count": 1736 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:35:07.830210+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF ALICE BAKER, Deceased (Sharon Chapman, Ex\u2019x of the Estate of Alice Baker, Petitioner, v. Leland Finnegan, Respondent-Ap-pellee (John J. Wosik, Petitioner-Appellant))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BRESLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe decedent, Alice Baker, died testate on December 16, 1990. A petition to probate her will and for letters testamentary was filed on January 3, 1991. The executrix of the will filed a final report for the estate on July 17, 1991. Her final report included the payment of $8,000 in attorney fees to the attorney for the estate, John J. Wosik. Leland Finnegan, a residuary heir of the estate, filed objections to the final report contending that the fee taken by attorney Wosik was grossly excessive considering the complexity and size of the estate. Following a hearing on the objections to the final report, the trial court found that Wosik\u2019s fee was unreasonable and unjustified given such a simple estate case. The trial court further found that the time log filed by Wosik was not only \u201cludicrous but sanctionable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137.\u201d The court concluded that a reasonable attorney fee would have been $2,500. The court then awarded Wosik\u2019s $2,500 attorney fee to opposing counsel as a sanction. The trial court denied Wosik\u2019s motion to reconsider. He appeals the court\u2019s sanction order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.\nThe record shows that the decedent\u2019s will named Sharon Chapman as executrix of the will and requested that she employ John J. Wosik to represent her estate. The will named Leland Finnegan as alternate executor.\nShortly after the decedent\u2019s death, Finnegan went to the decedent\u2019s apartment thinking that he had been appointed executor of her estate. He obtained a key to the apartment and searched it. According to Finnegan, he did not return to the apartment after he left it that day. A couple of days later, Finnegan went to Wosik\u2019s law office and was informed by Wosik\u2019s secretary that he was not the estate\u2019s executor. About two weeks later, Finnegan gave the decedent\u2019s apartment key to Wosik\u2019s secretary.\nWosik testified at the hearing on the objections to the final report that around December 20, 1990, he talked to his secretary of 20 years on the telephone and directed her to perform certain preliminary work to open the Baker estate. The preliminary work involved establishing the heirship of the decedent, obtaining the necessary addresses of the heirs, and preparing a petition to admit the will to probate. Wo-sik\u2019s secretary prepared the petition to probate the will and for letters testamentary. Wosik explained that he was in Mexico from sometime prior to the decedent\u2019s death until the end of January 1991. He claimed that he was in contact with his secretary on the phone about the case. Wosik testified that phone company records showed that he had had nine phone conversations with his secretary while in Mexico. They were for a total of 87 minutes. He claimed that he made other calls, but they were not included in the phone company records because they were calls that he made to his secretary from Mexico.\nWosik filed his time log on September 3, 1991. It listed a total fee of $9,869.40, which represented 109.66 hours of work at $90 an hour. Wosik\u2019s time log included 23.75 hours for time billed while he was in Mexico. It also included 18.5 hours for time worked after the filing of the objections to the final report. At the conclusion of his time log, Wosik stated:\n\u201c[T]he above itemized time log consists of an accurate and correct time consumed by the undersigned legal office as an Attorney at Law required and necessary to fulfill the responsibilities of the Executor in the administration of the Estate of Alice Baker, Deceased, and that the same is reasonable as to this individual estate having unique, individual, unusual, and extraordinary conditions generated by the uncooperative conditions created by a beneficiary to fulfill the obligations of the Executor herein ***.\u201d\nWosik explained at the hearing that it was necessary to bill so many hours because there were 34 potential heirs who had to be given notice. Furthermore, Finnegan\u2019s entry into the decedent\u2019s apartment made it necessary to conduct an extensive inventory to determine if any assets were missing. Wosik admitted that there were no liens, no claims, no Federal estate tax, no contest to collect any assets and no court proceedings necessary to protect or sell any assets of the estate. Wosik further admitted that his final report failed to include $6,700 in interest income earned by the assets of the estate from the date of the decedent\u2019s death until the date of the filing of the final report.\nThe executrix\u2019s final report listed the total assets of the estate as $90,830. Wosik\u2019s fee amounted to over 8% of those assets.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing on the objections to the final report, the trial court noted that even with the original difficulty with Finnegan, it would be hard to imagine a more simple estate case. The court found that attorney Wosik\u2019s time log was \u201cludicrous\u201d and \u201csanctionable.\u201d The court further found that Wosik was only entitled to $2,500 in attorney fees. The court, however, reduced those fees to zero as a sanction, and instead awarded the opposing law firm $2,133 in attorney fees and $390.40 in deposition costs. The court further ordered that opposing counsel\u2019s fees and deposition costs be paid from the estate.\nOn appeal, Wosik argues that the probate court erred in imposing sanctions without first conducting a hearing on that issue. He further argues that the court was required to make specific factual findings supporting its order of sanctions. He points out that the court, in deciding to impose sanctions, did not identify any statement in his time log that was untrue. Therefore, he argues, the probate court\u2019s order did not fall under the criteria for imposing sanctions contemplated by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (134 111. R. 2d 137).\nA trial court\u2019s decision regarding whether to impose sanctions is entitled to considerable deference, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 458, 551 N.E.2d 1319.) However, the predicate to such deference is that the trial court make an informed and reasoned decision. (In re Estate of Smith (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 559 N.E.2d 571.) For that reason, it has been noted that a hearing ought to be held to give the parties involved an opportunity to present any evidence needed to substantiate or rebut the claim for sanctions, and an opportunity to argue their positions. (In re Estate of Smith (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 559 N.E.2d 571.) Furthermore, a trial court\u2019s decision on sanctions must clearly set forth the factual basis for the result reached in order to be afforded deferential treatment. Bertuli v. Gaull (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 603, 574 N.E.2d 1390.\nIn the present case, the record shows that the probate court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of sanctions imposed under Rule 137. We hold that a trial court must allow for an eviden-tiary hearing before imposing sanctions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the cause for a hearing on whether sanctions are appropriate here.\nAdditionally, we note that Rule 137 provides in part that the signature of an attorney on a paper constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the paper and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact. (134 111. 2d R. 137.) Because the rule is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed and accordingly each of its requirements must be specifically proved. (Mancuso v. Beach (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589.) Rule 137 is not meant to punish losing parties who fail to adequately support their legal positions. (Grab v. Keller (1991), 224 Ill. App. 3d 1, 586 N.E.2d 361.) A party requesting attorney fees under Rule 137 has the burden of showing both that statements in the pleading were untrue and that they were made without reasonable cause. (Couri v. Korn (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 848, 560 N.E.2d 379.) The standard for evaluating an attorney\u2019s conduct is one of reasonableness under the circumstances existing at the time of the filing of the paper. (Monahan v. Village of Hinsdale (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 985, 569 N.E.2d 1182.) Moreover, the facts, circumstances, motive, intent, or purpose of the pleader may be material in determining whether the allegations were made with reasonable cause. Wollschlagerv. Sundstrand Corp. (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 347, 493 N.E.2d 107.\nHere, we note that on remand of this cause for a hearing on the sanctions issue, the trial court should apply the above-mentioned standards and principles in determining whether sanctions are warranted. We further note that the \u201ctime log\u201d filed by attorney Wosik in support of his claim for fees is a \u201cpaper\u201d within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 137. We also note that Wosik\u2019s conduct in submitting the time log would only be sanctionable if the court could point to some specific false statement contained in that paper. In that regard, Wosik represented that his time log consisted of \u201can accurate and correct time consumed by the undersigned legal office as an Attorney At Law.\u201d The probate court, however, found only that the time log submitted by attorney Wosik was \u201cludicrous\u201d and \u201csanction-able,\u201d and that Wosik billed for time while he was not in the United States. The court did not make any specific factual findings that anything in the time log amounted to a false statement or a fraud upon the court. Furthermore, the court did not conduct a hearing at which the question of sanctions was at issue.\nAccordingly, we hold that the cause must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nSLATER and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BRESLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Louis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru (Louis E. Olivero, of counsel), and John J. Wosik, pro se, of Henry, for appellant.", "John R. Pusey, of Vonachen, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, of Peoria (Thomas H. Trager, of counsel), for appellee.", "Eric S. Swartz, of Swengel & Swartz, of Henry, for Sharon L. Chapman." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF ALICE BAKER, Deceased (Sharon Chapman, Ex\u2019x of the Estate of Alice Baker, Petitioner, v. Leland Finnegan, Respondent-Ap-pellee (John J. Wosik, Petitioner-Appellant)).\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u201492\u20140436\nOpinion filed March 29, 1993.\nLouis E. Olivero & Associates, of Peru (Louis E. Olivero, of counsel), and John J. Wosik, pro se, of Henry, for appellant.\nJohn R. Pusey, of Vonachen, Lawless, Trager & Slevin, of Peoria (Thomas H. Trager, of counsel), for appellee.\nEric S. Swartz, of Swengel & Swartz, of Henry, for Sharon L. Chapman." }, "file_name": "0684-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 707 }