{
  "id": 5119925,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALCOLM CEMOND, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cemond",
  "decision_date": "1992-12-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 1-88-1692",
  "first_page": "1022",
  "last_page": "1026",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 1022"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "588 N.E.2d 983",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "999"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:35:07.830210+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALCOLM CEMOND, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE RIZZI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Malcolm Cemond, was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16) in a jury trial and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged other criminal conduct; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to question prospective jurors whether they would find children to be more believable and sympathetic witnesses than adults; and (3) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury using Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d). We affirm.\nOn June 29, 1986, nine-year-old N.J., her 13-year-old sister K.W., and their 13-year-old cousin R.M. stopped at defendant\u2019s apartment on their way home from church. When they arrived, defendant was with EN., a six-year-old boy whom he was tutoring. Defendant offered to take the three girls and F.N. to lunch to celebrate F.N.\u2019s birthday. Defendant telephoned N.J. and K.W.\u2019s mother to ask for permission to take the children to lunch. After receiving her consent, defendant, his friend David, N.J., K.W., R.M. and F.N. drove to McDonald\u2019s and ate lunch. After lunch, the group went to the beach. On the way home from the beach, defendant\u2019s automobile broke down. David, K.W. and R.M. took a Chicago Transit Authority bus to defendant\u2019s home to get David\u2019s automobile while defendant, N.J. and F.N. remained with the disabled vehicle. After David, K.W. and R.M. had left, N.J. testified that the following events occurred:\n\u201cQ. What happened next?\nA. And then [defendant], he gave me some Kool-Aid. And I was eating it. And then he grabbed my wrist, and pulled me\u2014 at first, he \u2014 he unzipped his pants. And he covered up his\u2014 his\u2014\nQ. He uncovered what?\nA. He covered up his penis.\nQ. Did you see his penis?\nA. Yes.\nQ. You say he grabbed you by the wrist? What did he do?\nA. He pulled me on top of his penis.\nQ. Which direction were you facing?\nA. Face to face.\nQ. And what happened next?\nA. And then he went under my shirt and felt on my chest and my back.\nQ. He was using his hands to do that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And after he did that, what did he do next?\nA. And then he started \u2014 he was smiling and making moans.\nQ. Did you feel his penis?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Where was it?\nA. Between my legs.\nQ. Did you still have your short pants on?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And did he do anything else?\nA. And then he squeezed me \u2014 he squeezed me. And then his hands was on my butt when he was squeezing me.\nQ. When his hands were on your butt, did he do anything with his hands?\nA. He was moving me up and down.\nQ. And when he was doing that, you said he was making a noise. What noise was he making?\nA. Moan noise.\n* * *\nQ. After \u2014 as [defendant] was doing the things to you, what happened next?\nA. And then the \u2014 my sister (K.W.) and them drove up. And they blowed the horn.\n* * *\nQ. And you said they hit the horn. What happened next?\nA. And then [defendant] pushed me off of him. And then I ran out and told [K.W.].\nQ. Before you got away from [defendant], were you trying to get away from him.\nA. Yes.\nQ. And what happened?\nA. I was pushed \u2014 I was pushing him away from me, but he had me too tight.\nQ. How was he holding you?\nA. He was holding me like real tight. He was squeezing me with his hands.\n* * *\nQ. And what did you do when you got away from [defendant]?\nA. I went to tell [K.W.].\n* * *\nQ. And did you tell [K.W.]?\nA. I told her that [defendant] was feelin\u2019 all over me.\u201d\nN.J.\u2019s testimony was substantially corroborated by F.N. and K.W. Upon returning home, N.J. and K.W. told their mother that defendant had tried to rape N.J. Defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 16) and unlawful restraint (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 10 \u2014 3). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to seven years\u2019 imprisonment. This appeal followed.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged other criminal conduct. At trial, N.J. and K.W. each testified over defense counsel\u2019s objections that defendant told them that the police asked him to find some young girls to go to the prison and have sex \"with inmates for money. While N.J. and K.W.\u2019s testimony about defendant\u2019s solicitation of the girls was irrelevant to the crime charged, we find that any error made by the trial court with respect to this testimony is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to question prospective jurors whether they would find children to be more believable and sympathetic witnesses than adults. The scope and extent of voir dire examination of prospective jurors, including permitting a party to supplement the examination \"with its own questions, rests within the discretion of the trial court. (134 111. 2d R. 234.) A reviewing court will find that the trial court abused its discretion while conducting voir dire only when the questions and procedures employed by the trial court fail to create reasonable assurances that any prejudice or bias of potential jurors will be discovered. (People v. Williams (1991), 147 111. 2d 173, 218, 588 N.E.2d 983, 999.) After reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to question prospective jurors about their attitudes toward the credibility of children witnesses.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury using IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07. IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07, which was submitted to the jury over defendant\u2019s objection, states:\n\u201cYou have before you evidence that the defendant made statements relating to the offense charged in the information. It is for you to determine what weight should be given to the statements. In determining the weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s statements to the girls here about having sex with inmates for money do not relate to the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. We find, however, that any error caused by submitting this instruction to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the lack of prejudice caused to defendant and the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Defendant further argues that IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.14, rather than IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.06 \u2014 3.07, should have been submitted to the jury to instruct them about the context in which defendant\u2019s statements may be considered. Defense counsel, however, failed to tender IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.14 to the trial court at the instruction conference. Moreover, we fail to see how the outcome of this trial would have been different had this instruction been submitted to the jury. We, therefore, conclude that any error made by the trial court with respect to jury instructions is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTULLY and CERDA, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE RIZZI"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Maria Harrigan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Elizabeth Sklarsky, and Anne C. Scrivner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALCOLM CEMOND, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 88\u20141692\nOpinion filed December 30, 1992.\nRehearing denied April 2, 1993.\nMaria Harrigan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Elizabeth Sklarsky, and Anne C. Scrivner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1022-01",
  "first_page_order": 1040,
  "last_page_order": 1044
}