{ "id": 5109593, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY LEE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lee", "decision_date": "1993-04-02", "docket_number": "No. 2-91-0101", "first_page": "29", "last_page": "36", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 29" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2607035 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606728 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254843 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2489729 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3519330 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0984-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3029726 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3443884 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3181869 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3477644 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2857055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633112 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983489 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3221895 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/82/0297-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 812, "char_count": 18452, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.392552054677732e-08, "percentile": 0.2756160687360537 }, "sha256": "fe2ea58668a79e3cbc751412ce98607f0080ef8ba4c31091a24497ce3014447c", "simhash": "1:bfd89cfd780b2b55", "word_count": 3003 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:01.285518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY LEE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Anthony Lee, was found guilty of robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 18 \u2014 1(a)) and unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 4\u2014 103(a)(1)). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent seven-year terms of imprisonment. Defendant appeals, contending that the State failed to prove defendant\u2019s guilt of either offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence showed only that defendant was merely present at the crime scene when two other individuals took the victim\u2019s money and automobile.\nThe victim, Andre Wallace, testified that he finished work at the Great Lakes Naval Base at 7 p.m. on October 4, 1990. Wallace then went to the apartment of Danielle, a friend, arriving between 7:30 and 8 o\u2019clock. Wallace was introduced to two females and two males, \u201cBlue\u201d and \u201cDaddy.\u201d Wallace identified defendant as \u201cDaddy\u201d and Mark Grashen as \u201cBlue.\u201d Wallace was told that defendant was Danielle\u2019s cousin.\nWallace played cards for approximately 21k to 3 hours. During the game, defendant asked Wallace for a ride to a girlfriend\u2019s house and offered Wallace $5 for gas. Wallace agreed, reached into his shirt pocket, and gave defendant $5 change from a $10 bill. Shortly before midnight Wallace stated that he had to be leaving. Wallace asked defendant if Grashen was coming along and defendant said, \u201cYes.\u201d Grashen climbed into the backseat of Wallace\u2019s car, and Wallace and defendant occupied the front seats with Wallace driving. Both defendant and Grashen directed Wallace to the Utica Street projects in Waukegan, where Wallace parked the car.\nGrashen exited the car and walked approximately 15 feet where he met another individual, named Eddie. When Wallace asked defendant if the Utica Street projects were the intended destination, defendant replied that Grashen was just talking to a friend for a second and that he would be right back. Shortly thereafter, defendant got out of the car and joined the others. Defendant then called Wallace requesting that he join the group and meet Eddie. Wallace exited the car and either Grashen or defendant introduced Wallace to Eddie. As Wallace proceeded to shake Eddie\u2019s hand, Grashen grabbed Wallace from behind, placed his arm in a choke hold around Wallace\u2019s neck, and said repeatedly, \u201cyou are going to go to sleep.\u201d Wallace then reached in his front shirt pocket, pulled out $13 and handed it toward Eddie. Eddie took the money from Wallace\u2019s hand. Defendant and Eddie were walking toward Wallace before Wallace lost consciousness.\nWhen Wallace regained consciousness, he found himself on the hood of his car. As he climbed off the hood, he noticed the three individuals talking on the driver\u2019s side of the vehicle. Defendant was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat with the keys in the ignition. Wallace pleaded with the group to return his identification because he needed it to get back to the naval base. Eddie and Grashen stated that they did not believe Wallace had given them everything that he had. Wallace then unbuttoned his shirt and pulled his pockets inside out to show that he had nothing else. Defendant then looked on the floor and seats for Wallace\u2019s identification. The group then stated that they had not seen Wallace\u2019s identification.\nWallace then attempted to get into the car to leave, but defendant made \u201ca motion like get back.\u201d Wallace testified that defendant did not touch Wallace, but \u201cwas motioning me as to get away.\u201d Grashen and Eddie also told Wallace \u201cpush along, push on, push on.\u201d As Wallace walked away, he noticed the driver\u2019s door close and Grashen climb into the backseat. Wallace walked until he was out of sight and then ran until he reached a pay phone.\nOn cross-examination, Wallace testified that defendant originally requested a ride only for defendant and that defendant never told Wallace the exact location of defendant\u2019s girlfriend\u2019s house. Wallace did not know if defendant saw how much money Wallace had while at Danielle\u2019s apartment. Wallace admitted that he never saw his vehicle leave the scene and never saw defendant driving it. Wallace stated that only Grashen and Eddie told Wallace that they believed Wallace had more money in his possession and that Wallace gave the $13 to Eddie, not to defendant. Wallace further testified that defendant never stopped any of Grashen\u2019s or Eddie\u2019s actions, nor did Wallace ever see defendant call the police.\nOfficer Trent Truby arrived a couple of minutes after Wallace phoned for help. Truby testified that he and Wallace drove to 565 South Utica, where Wallace said his car had been stolen. Truby and Wallace checked the parking lot, but could not locate the car. Truby then reported the information concerning Wallace\u2019s car to the Illinois State Police emergency network.\nTruby and Wallace then drove to Danielle\u2019s apartment, where Wallace had originally met defendant and Grashen. There was no answer at the door so Officer Truby and Wallace drove back to the naval base. Before finishing his work shift, Truby entered a description of Wallace\u2019s car into the law enforcement agency data system.\nOn October 5, Waukegan Detective Donald Meadie was assigned to the Wallace case. Meadie testified that he received a phone call from the Chicago police department on October 6. Meadie was informed that Grashen and defendant were being held in custody in connection with the Wallace case. Wallace\u2019s car was also at the Chicago police department. Meadie and another officer then drove to the Chicago police department station, picked up defendant and Grashen and Wallace\u2019s car and brought them back to Waukegan.\nThe State rested following Detective Meadie\u2019s testimony. After defendant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict was denied, defendant was found guilty of robbery and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.\nDefendant appeals, contending that the State failed to prove his guilt of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends that he was merely present when Wallace\u2019s money and automobile were taken by Grashen and Eddie. Moreover, defendant contends that he was not seen driving or possessing Wallace\u2019s car. Therefore, defendant argues, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was accountable for the offenses of robbery and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.\nThe trier of fact is not required to search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence and then raise them to the status of reasonable doubt. (People v. Ware (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 297, 302.) Nor must each link in the circumstances relied upon to establish guilt individually constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 365, 374.) Conflicting evidence alone will not justify the reversal of a conviction; rather, reviewing courts will set aside a guilty finding only if the evidence is palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt about the accused\u2019s guilt. People v. Palmer (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 703, 709.\nWe note initially that defendant is correct in stating that a person\u2019s mere presence at the crime scene, even with knowledge that a crime has been committed, is insufficient to establish accountability for the crime. (People v. Nugara (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 482, 487; People v. Perruquet (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 1063.) Section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cA person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:\n* * *\n(c) Either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).)\nThe State\u2019s proof must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that whatever conduct facilitated the later offense was with the intent that such offense be committed. {People v. Ware (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 297, 306.) Moreover, proof that a person was present at the commission of a crime without disapproving or opposing the crime may be considered along with other circumstances, such as the fact that defendant later maintained a close affiliation with his or her companions (People v. Grice (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 718) and failed to report the crime (People v. Bailey (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 399; People v. Watson (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 315). Indeed, a person\u2019s assistance prior to or during the commission of the crime which amounts to accountability can be inferred from the conduct which occurs after the event. People v. Young (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 984, 994.\nDefendant contends that the evidence did not establish sufficiently that he should be held legally accountable for the conduct of Grashen and Eddie. Defendant contends that, when viewed in a circumspect manner, the facts presented at trial do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to aid, facilitate, or participate in the crimes for which he was charged. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) Defendant contends that it was Grashen who directed Wallace to the Utica Street projects where Wallace was eventually robbed. Although defendant admits that defendant also gave directions to Wallace, defendant argues that there is no indication that his doing so was part of some preconceived plan to set Wallace up. Defendant asserts that although Grashen may have had a hidden agenda prior to leaving Danielle\u2019s apartment, this should not be imputed to defendant. Defendant contends that, for all he knew, Grashen simply wished to meet someone at the Utica Street projects and defendant innocently helped Wallace to find that location. Defendant contends that the events which ensued upon reaching the Utica Street projects \u201cabysmally failed to show any nexus between the crimes and the defendant.\u201d\nAdditionally, defendant maintains that his actions at the scene did not evince any knowledge of Grashen\u2019s apparent robbery attempt. Defendant contends that his movement towards Wallace before Wallace lost consciousness could easily be attributed to defendant\u2019s surprise at Grashen\u2019s actions in choking Wallace, coupled with a \u201chalf-hearted attempt to aid Wallace,\u201d who evidently was about to black out. Defendant asserts that it is mere speculation to charge defendant with knowledge or intent to participate in Grashen\u2019s ill-conceived plan.\nDefendant also points to the period following Wallace\u2019s regaining consciousness on the hood of the car. Wallace climbed off the hood and noticed the group talking. Defendant points out that Wallace, upon noticing that his identification holder was missing, asked the group if they would return it. Defendant stresses that, in response, Grashen and Eddie, but not defendant, thereupon approached Wallace and told him they did not believe that Wallace had given them everything. Defendant contends that rather than press Wallace for more property as Grashen and Eddie had done, defendant remained in the driver\u2019s seat of Wallace\u2019s car and looked on the floor and seats for the identification card. Defendant also relies on the fact that when Wallace attempted to reapproach the car, defendant made a motion to Wallace \u201cto like get back.\u201d Defendant asserts that, while his signal to Wallace to \u201cget back\u201d certainly raises a question regarding his participation in the offense, it can be easily said that this action was designed to prevent Wallace from further harm. According to defendant, defendant\u2019s actions served as a warning to Wallace that it would be in Wallace\u2019s best interest simply to walk away while he still was able to do so.\nIn summary, defendant contends that, looking at the entire sequence of events, defendant\u2019s actions constituted mere acquiescence in Grashen\u2019s and Eddie\u2019s conduct, which is not a crime. People v. Nugara (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 482, 487; People v. Jones (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 937, 964.\nDefendant relies heavily on Jones, attempting to distinguish its facts from those in this case. It is true that Jones involved evidence which more clearly supports an accountability theory than do the facts here. The defendant in Jones agreed to act as a police lookout, followed the victim upstairs and remained out of sight, was aware friends intended to murder the victim, took food from the victim\u2019s bicycle after the murder, and failed to report the crime to anyone. However, merely because defendant\u2019s accountability may not be as obvious as that of the defendant in Jones, it does not automatically follow that defendant cannot be held guilty under an accountability theory under the facts presented here.\nTo the contrary, we believe that, in viewing the continual sequence of events, defendant\u2019s participation rose to a level above mere presence at the crime scene and constituted more than mere acquiescence in Grashen\u2019s and Eddie\u2019s actions. Even if the jury did not believe defendant actively participated in the physical attack on Wallace or the physical taking of Wallace\u2019s vehicle, there was sufficient evidence which, if believed by the jury, established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was accountable for these offenses.\nThe evidence showed that defendant was at the scene of the crime while Wallace was being robbed. According to Wallace, defendant was facing Wallace while the robbery took place and did nothing to aid Wallace against his assailants. Defendant also paid Wallace for the ride and gave him directions to the Utica Street projects where Wallace was robbed and his car was stolen. While defendant argues that his paying Wallace for the ride was evidence of defendant\u2019s good intentions, such payment could also be inferred as a ploy to get Wallace to an out-of-the-way place in order to rob him and steal his car.\nRegarding defendant\u2019s contentions that his actions were mere \u201cacquiescence,\u201d we note that when Wallace regained consciousness on the hood of his car, defendant was sitting in the driver\u2019s seat of the car with the keys in the ignition. Although defendant helped Wallace to look for Wallace\u2019s identification card, this was not enough to exonerate defendant from the crimes. Additionally, although defendant\u2019s gesture to Wallace to \u201cget back\u201d when Wallace reapproached the car may have been for Wallace\u2019s protection, the jury could also infer that such action was designed to keep Wallace from entering his own car in order to facilitate it being stolen.\nWhile it is true that one\u2019s mere presence at a crime scene is not enough to sustain a conviction under section 5 \u2014 2(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961, one may be found guilty of aiding or abetting without actively participating in the overt act. (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61.) A person\u2019s accountability for a crime may be inferred from his conduct after the event. (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 62.) The factors which may sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting a crime when one does not participate in the overt act are: presence at the crime scene without disapproving or opposing the crime, maintaining a close affiliation with companions after the perpetration of the crime, and failure to report the offense to the police. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 62; People v. Scherzer (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 624, 639.\nThe evidence here supports all three factors allowing for a conviction of defendant on an accountability theory. Wallace testified that defendant was present at the crime scene and did not oppose the robbery or confiscation of Wallace\u2019s car. Wallace testified that defendant did not attempt to intervene at all to prevent Wallace from being injured. Wallace also testified that defendant did not leave the area when Grashen was knocking Wallace unconscious, nor did defendant stop any of Grashen\u2019s or Eddie\u2019s actions.\nThe second factor, which requires defendant to maintain close affiliation with the perpetrators, was also satisfied. When Wallace awakened on the hood of his car, he saw defendant in the driver\u2019s seat. Defendant remained with the two other perpetrators and continued to sit in the driver\u2019s seat of the car during the time between when Wallace woke up and when Wallace eventually left the area. Later, defendant was arrested in Chicago, where Grashen was also arrested and where Wallace\u2019s car was recovered. Defendant correctly points out that the State failed to bring in the arresting officers to testify, nor did the State establish the exact locations in Chicago where defendant, Grashen, and the automobile were found. Nevertheless, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was still with the perpetrators of the crime. Defendant had not returned to or remained in Waukegan but was in Chicago, where Grashen and the stolen vehicle were found.\nThe third and final factor to support a convictionu\u00f1der an accountability theory, whether defendant made an attempt to contact the police or anyone else about the crime, was also satisfied. No evidence was given which would establish that defendant contacted the police about the crimes in question. The only testimony offered on this subject was given by Wallace, who testified that he did not see defendant call the police. It is well settled that, in determining whether accountability has been established, the trier of fact may consider a defendant\u2019s failure to report the incident to or confide in anyone about it. People v. Green (1988), 179 Ill. App. 3d 1, 16.\nWe believe that all of the evidence, as set forth above, provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of robbery and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, under an accountability theory.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOODWARD and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE UNVERZAGT" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David W. Devinger, of Woodstock, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Daniel J. Walsh, of Johnson, Frank, Frederick & Walsh, of Urbana (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY LEE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20140101\nOpinion filed April 2, 1993.\nG. Joseph Weller and Steven E. Wiltgen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, and David W. Devinger, of Woodstock, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan, and Daniel J. Walsh, of Johnson, Frank, Frederick & Walsh, of Urbana (William L. Browers, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0029-01", "first_page_order": 47, "last_page_order": 54 }