{ "id": 5110800, "name": "MID-TOWN PETROLEUM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT M. GOWEN et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. v. Gowen", "decision_date": "1993-02-26", "docket_number": "No. 1-92-2849", "first_page": "63", "last_page": "71", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 63" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2773670 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3536601 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 1045", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 4946792 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/325/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2555717 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2714119 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3107706 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5411636 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 1148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1151" }, { "page": "1153" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3269884 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5638811 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/49/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "128" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415623 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "agreement entered into 12 years after employment began is enforceable where employee continued working for over four years; covenant was a \"quid pro quo of *** continued employment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "441 N.E.2d 927", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 1140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5454223 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/1140-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 863, "char_count": 19520, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5634999335798923e-07, "percentile": 0.6773228863922183 }, "sha256": "d6b6f67848ea07233c8e04ba93556f95267c8314f6db7b726c8ba3495b637c37", "simhash": "1:bbdff4e9d74a01a4", "word_count": 3160 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:01.285518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MID-TOWN PETROLEUM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT M. GOWEN et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COUSINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a preliminary hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion of plaintiff, Mid-Town Petroleum, Inc. (Mid-Town), for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant, Robert M. Gowen (Gowen), from soliciting, calling upon, diverting, or taking away any of the customers or accounts of Mid-Town. Plaintiff, Mid-Town, files this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)).\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff\u2019s request for preliminary injunction in that the trial court\u2019s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nWe affirm.\nBackground\nThe plaintiff, Mid-Town, is in the business of selling and distributing petroleum products. The defendant, Paulson Oil (Paulson), is in the same business. Gowen was a 15-year employee, as a sales representative with Mid-Town from 1977 to April 7, 1992, when he resigned. In August 1991 while employed by Mid-Town, Gowen signed an employment agreement in which he agreed, among other things, to refrain from soliciting business from customers at Mid-Town for a period of 18 months following termination of employment. Gowen was promoted to sales manager simultaneously with the signing of the August agreement. A written job description of Gowen\u2019s duties as sales manager provided, among other things, that he would report to the chief executive officer (CEO). On April 6, 1992, Gowen was informed by the CEO that he would no longer report to the CEO. He formally resigned from Mid-Town the next day. On April 27, 1992, Gowen commenced employment as a sales representative for Paulson. Admittedly, he immediately began to solicit business from some customers he had serviced at Mid-Town.\nOn May 11, 1992, plaintiff, Mid-Town, filed its verified complaint against defendants, Gowen and Paulson, for injunctive and other relief. On motion of plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed May 11, 1992, the trial court, on May 13, 1992, entered a temporary restraining order and set July 24, 1992, for hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. A hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was commenced and concluded on July 24, 1992. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would win on the merits concerning enforceability of the employment agreement. The court dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Only two witnesses, William Battersby, chief executive officer of Mid-Town, and the defendant, Robert M. Gowen, testified at the hearing.\nBattersby testified as follows.\nMid-Town is engaged in the business of distributing and selling lubricant oils, and he had served as president and chief executive officer since approximately May 1991.\nUpon his election as president and chief executive officer, he initiated a practice of requiring all employees to sign an employment agreement. No such practice existed prior to 1991.\nHe informed Gowen, as he had all other employees, that he, Go-wen, would have to sign the employment agreement or be discharged. Gowen initially refused to sign in July 1992. Then, on August 21, 1992, Gowen was also appointed sales manager, which was a new position at Mid-Town. At that time, Gowen signed the employment agreement,\nGowen received no consideration other than continuation of his employment in return for execution of the employment agreement.\nIn April 1992, Battersby told Gowen that he was going to change Gowen\u2019s responsibilities as sales manager so that, among other things, Gowen would no longer report to the CEO.\nThe salesmen would call Gowen on their car phones. Battersby felt it was taking too much time out of Gowen\u2019s selling. When informed of the change, Gowen mentioned that he thought it was in everyone\u2019s best interest that he leave Mid-Town\u2019s employment. Battersby thought Go-wen viewed it as a major change in his sales management position and just didn\u2019t want to face the salesmen. Battersby rejected an offer of Go-wen to stay on two weeks longer after resignation.\nMid-Town had six salesmen when the agreements were signed. Mid-Town now has four salesmen. Gowen has never been replaced as sales manager. The position of sales manager had not existed prior to August 1991. It was Battersby\u2019s idea to create the position.\nBattersby was 35 years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing. He had been employed at Mid-Town for approximately 12 years. He was hired by his father, Ray Battersby, who was his predecessor as president.\nGowen testified as follows.\nMid-Town had two salespersons already employed when he first started. He had 150 solid customers while employed with Mid-Town.\nAn employment agreement was presented to him in July by Battersby which he refused to sign. Battersby advised him that he would no longer work for Mid-Town if he refused to sign. Gowen again refused to sign in July.\nApproximately four weeks later, Battersby again requested that he sign the employment agreement, and he again refused. A few days later, sometime during late August 1991, Battersby informed him that Mid-Town needed a sales manager and he qualified for that position. Battersby said he had no idea what a sales manager did and instructed Gowen to prepare a job description outlining what he felt the job of sales manager would encompass. He did so and presented it to Battersby a day or two later. Battersby glanced at it, told him it was fine, and offered him the job.\nBattersby then asked him to sign the employment agreement. He signed. Gowen felt that the sales manager position was a window of opportunity for his career.\nOn April 6, 1992, Battersby informed him that there were going to be some changes taking place. He would no longer report to Battersby. He would no longer have responsibility for the salesmen. He would report to Ron Valacity, vice-president. The salesmen would report on a daily basis to Ron Valacity. He would be responsible only for the training of the salesmen, product training. The next day, he advised Battersby that this change was unacceptable and that he was resigning. Battersby told him he was doing them a favor. He received two weeks\u2019 vacation pay and a profit-sharing check for money he had accumulated.\nIn a letter to Mid-Town, written after his resignation, Gowen indicated that he signed the agreement in consideration of receiving the job as general sales manager. He worked for Keystone and sold lubricants for nine years before he began work for Mid-Town. He received no training when he went to work for Mid-Town. He wasn\u2019t assigned any existing accounts when he went to work for Mid-Town. He had no specific territory. His last salary at Mid-Town was around $32,000 annually or $635 weekly.\nThe agreement regarding the sales manager\u2019s position provides: reporting to the CEO, William Battersby. The agreement further provides that the newly created position of sales manager will start by splitting the areas of responsibilities between 80% personal sales (with a stronger concentration on larger accounts) and 20% sales management duties. Every six months the percentages are to be reviewed. Duties of the sales manager are set forth. The duties include: sales training; coordinating specific market penetration with telemarketing and CEO; positive motivation; semi-annual reviews to start of all sales personnel, and developing long- and short-term marketing plans.\nDuring the course of arguments, the trial court made the following comments:\n\u201cSounds to me like the oral agreement t\u00f3 promote Mr. Gowen was combined with and based on consideration that he sign the employment contract. In other words, there was one contract which was the contract to promote him combined with his signing the employment contract. That\u2019s what it sounds like to me. Another question comes. Did the reduction in the duties of Mr. Gowen \u2014 were they so substantial as to terminate the sales manager\u2019s job except for holding training sessions for sales persons? In other words, they didn\u2019t report to him. He no longer had his position where he reported to the chief officer and president, but to a vice president like all the other sales persons') and I\u2019d like to hear any arguments you might have against that.\nMr. Lupel: Sure, your honor. Two things. First, in order to find that the Court would have to disbelieve the plaintiff and believe the defendant, it was the plaintiff\u2019s testimony that this was not the case. That they were not signed contracts ***.\nTHE COURT: *** [Wje\u2019re talking about a conclusion of law as to whether or not they\u2019re combined contracts.\u201d\nAfter the testimony of the witnesses Battersby and Gowen, the following proceedings ensued:\n\u201cMr. Lupel: If the court please, the plaintiff has nothing further.\nMr. Gowen: Your honor, if I may, with plaintiff resting, I\u2019d like to submit a motion for directed verdict.\nTHE COURT: I want to know if you have any other witnesses?\nMr. Gowen: I have nothing further.\nTHE COURT: Okay, for the record, I\u2019m combining the motion for directed verdict and the closing arguments.\u201d\nAt the very conclusion of all proceedings, the court ruled:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay. It is my decision that I can\u2019t say there\u2019s likelihood that plaintiff will win on the merits as to the enforceability of the employment agreement. And so, I am going to dissolve the TRO.\u201d\nPlaintiff brings this interlocutory appeal.\nOpinion\nAlthough phrased in the negative, the sole finding which the trial court expressed in its decision at the conclusion of the hearing was that it was unlikely the plaintiff would prevail on the merits of the case. This is one of the issues on which a party seeking an injunction must carry the burden of persuasion.\nWe now consider whether or not the trial court\u2019s denial of the plaintiff\u2019s request for a preliminary injunction was against the manifest weight of the evidence thereby abusing discretion.\nA party seeking a preliminary injunction must carry the burden of persuasion on four issues: (1) that there is no adequate remedy at law and there will be irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury to him will be immediate, certain, and great if the injunction is denied while the loss or inconvenience to the defendant is comparatively small and insignificant if granted; (3) there is a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the case; and (4) there would be no injurious effect upon the general public. (Hayden\u2019s Sport Center, Inc. v. Johnson (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1144, 441 N.E.2d 927, 931; Office Electronics, Inc. v. Grafic Forms, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 395, 398, 372 N.E.2d 125, 128; McCormick v. Empire Accounts Service, Inc. (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417, 364 N.E.2d 420, 421.) The trial court is vested with a large measure of discretion to grant or refuse to grant a preliminary injunction and its determination will not be overturned on review absent a showing of the abuse of discretion. (Shorr Paper Products, Inc. v. Frary (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502, 392 N.E.2d 1148, 1151; Office Electronics, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 398, 372 N.E.2d at 128.) A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted with the utmost care. Shorr Paper Products, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 505, 392 N.E.2d at 1153; Office Electronics, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 398, 372 N.E.2d at 128.\nThe sole role of an appellate court in addressing the grant or refusal to grant an interlocutory decree in an action for injunctive relief is restricted to a determination of whether the trial judge correctly exercised his broad discretionary powers. (Wessel Co. v. Busa (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 686, 690, 329 N.E.2d 414, 416-17.) Thus, a court of review looks to the sufficiency of the evidence not to determine controverted rights or to decide the merits of the case, but only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Baal v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500, 422 N.E.2d 1166, 1171; Armour & Co. v. United American Food, Processors, Inc. (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 132, 135, 345 N.E.2d 795, 798.\nA post-employment restrictive covenant will be enforced if the terms are reasonable. Millard Maintenance Service Co. v. Bernero (1990), 207 Ill. App. 3d 736, 744, 566 N.E.2d 379, 384.\nIllinois courts have signaled support for the rule that continued employment for a substantial period beyond the threat of discharge is sufficient consideration for a restrictive covenant. (Office Electronics, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 399 (agreement entered into 12 years after employment began is enforceable where employee continued working for over four years; covenant was a \u201cquid pro quo of *** continued employment\u201d); Smithereen Co. v. Renfroe (1945), 325 Ill. App. 229, 243-44, 59 N.E.2d 545 (agreement entered into three years after employment began is enforceable because agreement was made \u201cin consideration of the employment of defendant by the plaintiff\u201d and defendant in fact \u201ccontinued in the employ of plaintiff\u201d for five more years).) Although not directly addressing the issue of consideration, other Illinois courts have enforced restrictive covenants entered into after employment began where the employee continued in the job for a substantial period. Cockerill v. Wilson (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 179, 281 N.E.2d 648; Canfield v. Spear (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 49, 254 N.E.2d 433; Shorr Paper Products, 74 Ill. App. 3d 498, 392 N.E.2d 1148.\nThe defendant contends that the evidence fails to establish sufficient consideration to support the covenant in the employment agreement. We agree.\nThe facts addressed establish that Gowen had been in plaintiff\u2019s employment since 1977. None of plaintiff\u2019s employees had been asked to sign an employment agreement prior to July 1991. Gowen refused to sign the agreement in July 1991, although Battersby told him that he would be terminated if he didn\u2019t sign. Battersby then offered him the sales manager\u2019s position, which provided that he would report to Battersby, the CEO, among other duties. He did not sign the employment agreement until the sales manager position was offered and agreement reached as to the description of the sales manager position.\nHe continued employment from the end of August 1991 to April 6, 1992. The day before he formerly resigned, Battersby, among other things, told Gowen that he would no longer be reporting as sales manager to the CEO. At the time Gowen resigned, Battersby told him that he was doing them a favor. No sales manager position existed at MidTown before 1991, and none has existed since April 6,1992.\nDuring the course of arguments, the trial court commented:\n\u201cSounds to me like the oral agreement to promote Mr. Gowen was combined with and based on consideration that he sign the employment contract. *** Another question comes. Did the reduction in the duties of Mr. Gowen \u2014 were they so substantial as to terminate the sales manager\u2019s job except for holding training sessions for sales persons?\u201d\nThe defendant cited the Millard case before the trial court and argues its holding on appeal. (Millard, 207 Ill. App. 3d 736, 566 N.E.2d 379.) In Millard, the employee, Bernero, worked for Millard from September 1980 through January 26, 1989. He had no previous work experience in the field. He signed three post-employment agreements dated September 30, 1980, January 1, 1981, and November 21, 1985. After the third agreement, he continued employment until January 26, 1989. Continued employment for a substantial period was sufficient consideration. (Millard, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 566 N.E.2d at 384.) In Millard, we note that the trial court issued a preliminary injunction based on a post-employment contract and the trial court\u2019s decision was affirmed.\nHere, Gowen\u2019s continued post-contract employment was approximately seven months. We note, here, that Gowen\u2019s continued post-contract employment was comparatively insubstantial.\nIn McRand, defendants did not sign employment agreements when plaintiff hired them, but continued to be employed for eight years and nine years, respectively, after signing an original covenant and were employed for two years after signing the covenant before resigning. (McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 486 N.E.2d 1306.) In McRand, the appeals court stated: \u201cWe therefore find that sufficient consideration exists ***.\u201d McRand, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 486 N.E.2d at 1314.\nThe principles of McRand were applied in the recent case of Corron & Black of Illinois, Inc. v. Magner (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 151, 494 N.E.2d 785. In Corroon, the court wrote: \u201c[ajpplying these principles [of McRand] to the instant case, we conclude that, as a matter of law, sufficient' consideration exists ***. The record shows that Magner signed the agreement on September 24, 1979, and resigned on June 30, 1984. Thus, plaintiff gave to Magner four years of continued employment in exchange for signing the agreement.\u201d Corroon, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 163, 494 N.E.2d at 791-92.\nAgain, when measured with facts which support the holding in Corroon, the time period Gowen worked after the agreement is insubstantial. The time period Gowen worked before the agreement is substantial.\nIn this case, the trial court had to weigh the testimony regarding the offer, acceptance and reduction of the sales manager position. We believe the facts are sufficient to support a finding by the trial court that Gowen would not have continued employment without the offer to become sales manager.\nAbsent adequate consideration, a covenant, though otherwise reasonable, is not enforceable in equity. (Millard, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 744, 566 N.E.2d at 384.) Whether Gowen received adequate consideration is a question of fact in this case. Both fact and credibility issues were before the court. In a trial before the court without a jury, the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are still to be determined by the trier of fact. Unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence, the findings will not be disturbed. Bauske v. City of Des Plaines (1957), 13 Ill. 2d 169, 181,148 N.E.2d 584, 591.\nFinally, plaintiff strongly argues that any consideration is sufficient to support a contract. This argument is the bedrock of contract law. However, while a peppercorn can be considered sufficient consideration to support a contract in a court of law, a peppercorn may be insufficient consideration in a court of equity to support a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Equity is defined as follows:\n\u201cJustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of common law. *** The term \u2018equity\u2019 denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 540 (6th ed. 1990).\nWe hold that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff\u2019s motion for preliminary injunction and did not thereby abuse its discretion.\nAffirmed.\nGORDON, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COUSINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Katz, Randall & Weinberg, of Chicago (Warren Lupel and Charles E. Alexander, of counsel), for appellant.", "Ernest L. Gowen & Associates, Ltd., of Oak Forest (Ernest L. Gowen, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MID-TOWN PETROLEUM, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT M. GOWEN et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20142849\nOpinion filed February 26, 1993.\nKatz, Randall & Weinberg, of Chicago (Warren Lupel and Charles E. Alexander, of counsel), for appellant.\nErnest L. Gowen & Associates, Ltd., of Oak Forest (Ernest L. Gowen, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0063-01", "first_page_order": 81, "last_page_order": 89 }