{ "id": 5108881, "name": "HEIDI HASSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN WENGLINSKI, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Hassell v. Wenglinski", "decision_date": "1993-03-05", "docket_number": "No. 1-92-1846", "first_page": "398", "last_page": "402", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 398" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "598 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499648 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3517278 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5556686 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638849 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193584 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0542-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 478, "char_count": 8505, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4735834918070758e-07, "percentile": 0.6597380773937014 }, "sha256": "872c2ffcc46d480052be9c38aaf4226cfdf6cb97f98dee08df33844f9160b121", "simhash": "1:9b351a3e3b84909c", "word_count": 1428 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:01.285518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HEIDI HASSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN WENGLINSKI, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Heidi Hassell filed a multiple-count complaint for injuries caused by two dogs owned by defendant John Wenglinski. Count I of the complaint alleged that plaintiff was entitled to recover under the Animal Control Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 8, par. 351 et seq.) Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings as to count I of the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, made a finding of appealability under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and plaintiff timely appealed.\nPlaintiff was an employee of defendant. Her position required her to care for defendant\u2019s mother in defendant\u2019s home. On the day of the alleged injury, plaintiff reported for work at defendant\u2019s home as usual. At the time of plaintiff\u2019s alleged injury she was walking defendant\u2019s dogs because she had agreed to do so as a favor to defendant. Her complaint alleged that as she was holding on to the dogs\u2019 leashes, the dogs suddenly pulled her forward, causing her to trip and fall, resulting in bodily injury.\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether a person having control over an animal may maintain a cause of action under the Animal Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 8, par. 357 et seq.) against the animal\u2019s legal owner for injuries sustained while the person has such control.\nSection 16 of the Animal Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 8, par. 366), entitled \u201cLiability of owner of dog attacking or injuring person,\u201d provides as follows:\n\u201cIf a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.\u201d\nSection 2.16 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 8, par. 352.16) defines the term \u201cowner\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Owner\u2019 means any person having a right of property in a dog or other animal, or who keeps or harbors a dog or other animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian, or who knowingly permits a dog or other domestic animal to remain on or about any premises occupied by him.\u201d\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff was walking the dogs as a favor to defendant and thus had the animals in her care and custody at the time of her mishap, bringing her \"within the definition of \u201cowner\u201d under the Animal Control Act.\nAs the law has developed in this State, a person who is in the status of an \u201cowner\u201d as that term is defined in section 2.16 of the Animal Control Act, set forth above, has no cause of action under the Act if such person is injured by the animal he or she \u201cowns\u201d or controls.\nIn Harris v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 542, 519 N.E.2d 917, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the Animal Control Act. It found that \u201cthe legislature intended only to provide coverage under the statute for plaintiffs who, by virtue of their relationship to the owner of the dog or other animal or the lack of any such relationship, may not have any way of knowing or avoiding the risk that the animal poses to them.\u201d (Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 547, 519 N.E.2d at 919.) In Harris the plaintiff had rented a horse from defendant\u2019s stable and sustained injuries when he fell off the horse. Defendant presented evidence that plaintiff signed and understood an exculpatory agreement. In denying recovery under the Animal Control Act, the supreme court held that by voluntarily entering into a relationship with the defendant whereby plaintiff took control of defendant\u2019s animal, plaintiff had taken himself out of the category of persons the legislature intended to protect.\nIn Clark v. Rogers (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 591, 484 N.E.2d 867, the appellate court considered a situation where a plaintiff had voluntarily entered into a relationship with the defendant animal owner whereby plaintiff was employed to train defendant\u2019s horses. While performing that activity, plaintiff was injured by one of defendant\u2019s horses. In denying recovery under the Animal Control Act, the court held that plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury by accepting the employment to train defendant\u2019s horses and assuming control of the animals. It further found that the legislature, by adopting the Animal Control Act, did not intend to abrogate the defense of assumption of risk in cases arising under the Act. See also Vanderlei v. Heideman (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 158, 403 N.E.2d 756 (licensed horseshoer assumed the risk of being kicked by a horse he was shoeing).\nThese policy considerations came together in Wilcoxen v. Paige (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 541, 528 N.E.2d 1104. In Wilcoxen, plaintiff owned and operated a dog board and grooming business. She agreed to board defendant\u2019s dog for a fee. While defendant\u2019s dog was in plaintiff\u2019s care, it attacked and seriously injured her. In affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of recovery to plaintiff under the Animal Control Act, the appellate court said, \u201cplaintiff voluntarily accepted responsibility for controlling the defendant\u2019s dog, placing herself within the definition of an \u2018owner\u2019 under the Act. The trial court therefore correctly ruled that she could not recover from the dog\u2019s legal owner, when her injuries resulted from her own failure to control the dog.\u201d Wilcoxen, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 543, 528 N.E.2d at 1106.\nPlaintiff in the case at bar argues that Wilcoxen was incorrectly decided, or, in the alternative, should be limited to its specific fact pattern involving a dog groomer hired to service the animal. However, neither the legislative history of the Animal Control Act nor the reasoning of the Wilcoxen decision persuades us that it was incorrectly decided or that its rationale should be limited to cases in which the plaintiff and defendant have entered into a contractual relationship involving the animal causing the injury.\nIn Ennen v. White (1992), 232 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 598 N.E.2d 416, plaintiff voluntarily mounted defendant\u2019s horse named Coke on defendant\u2019s property and was injured when the horse threw her from its back. Excerpts from the pleadings set forth in the Ennen opinion do not establish a contractual relationship between the parties like that existing in Harris, Clark, Vanderlei and Wilcoxen. Ennen sued defendant White under the Animal Control Act to recover for her injuries. The appellate court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of this claim, stating:\n\u201cThe Act was not designed to protect [plaintiff] from the injuries she incurred after voluntarily mounting Coke. ***\n* * *\n*** [P]laintiff in this case assumed control over Coke by mounting the horse. * * *\n*** Once the rider mounts the horse, the rider is no longer a bystander or observer but is someone who has asserted dominion over the animal and is an active partner with the animal in recreational activity. The rider assumes control and responsibility for the horse. While a cause of action may be stated under other theories of liability, there is none under the Act.\u201d Enr\u00eden, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1065-66, 598 N.E.2d at 418-19.\nPlaintiff also contends that she should not be considered an \u201cowner\u201d under the statute because she had only brief control over the dogs. Nothing in the Act, however, requires a person to exercise care or custody of an animal for a set period of time in order to meet the definition of \u2018 \u2018owner. \u2019 \u2019\nPlaintiff Hassell admits in her complaint that she was an employee of defendant although her duties did not normally include exercise of his dogs. She further acknowledges that the dogs were in her custody at the time of her injury. She had an existing relationship with defendant; she voluntarily assumed care and custody of the dogs as a favor to defendant; and she was injured while exercising that control.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Wilcoxen and Ennen decisions properly interpret the definition of \u201cowner\u201d in the Animal Control Act. Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling that plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the theory alleged in count I of her complaint, and its decision is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMURRAY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel L. Starkman, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Williams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (Edward R. Moor, Ginamarie A. Gaudio, Barry L. Kroll, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HEIDI HASSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN WENGLINSKI, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201492\u20141846\nOpinion filed March 5, 1993.\nDaniel L. Starkman, of Chicago, for appellant.\nWilliams & Montgomery, Ltd., of Chicago (Edward R. Moor, Ginamarie A. Gaudio, Barry L. Kroll, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0398-01", "first_page_order": 418, "last_page_order": 422 }