{ "id": 5107949, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT MOORE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moore", "decision_date": "1993-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-1306", "first_page": "1045", "last_page": "1057", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 1045" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2999088 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5799351 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686" }, { "page": "692-93" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405034 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3083469 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155800 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 900", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238211 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2434058 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344910 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3406785 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0421-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1027, "char_count": 25739, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.12982294956584e-08, "percentile": 0.32142047663782713 }, "sha256": "829acade5b6423dd2c3a14412e93bb127f268f2c45bd334d1d5dfe4264f198e8", "simhash": "1:d200ba68df9f85b3", "word_count": 4385 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:01.285518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT MOORE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE EGAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Robert Moore, was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of Edward McClain, and he was sentenced to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. He maintains that trial errors occurred which require that he be granted a new trial; he does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence.\nTyrone McClain (Tyrone) had been living at the apartment located at 1761 East 73rd Street in Chicago for approximately one week before the death of his brother Edward. Tyrone was staying with Edward and Edward\u2019s girl friend, Sheila West, to whom the apartment was rented.\nThe apartment had two entrances. The back door consisted of one rear wooden door, as well as burglar bars and an outer screen door. The burglar bars and the screen door were always kept locked.\nTyrone testified that he met the defendant three times, the last time the day Edward was shot, March 23, 1989. Edward introduced the defendant to Tyrone as \u201cRob.\u201d Tyrone knew the defendant only as \u201cRob\u201d and did not learn his last name. On the morning of March 23, 1989, Sheila West left the apartment along with her sister, Angel West, at approximately 11 a.m.\nAround 1 p.m., Tyrone was looking out the living room window and saw the defendant pull up in his Blazer vehicle. The defendant parked the car on the street and later knocked on the front door; Edward let him in. Edward accused the defendant of not returning a pistol that belonged to Edward. The defendant said that he had given the pistol to Sheila West. When Edward questioned him further, the defendant repeated that he had given the pistol to Sheila.\nEdward was sitting on the couch and again asked the defendant for his pistol. An exchange then took place between the defendant and Edward which we will discuss later when addressing the defendant\u2019s claims of trial error. After that exchange the defendant left.\nAt approximately 2:20 p.m., while Edward and Tyrone were eating and watching television, a knock came at the back door. Edward went to the door and said, \u201cWho is it?\u201d A man, whose voice Tyrone identified as that of the defendant, said, \u201cRob.\u201d Edward asked him what he wanted because, Edward said, the defendant had just left out the front door. After Edward opened the door, Tyrone heard three loud shots one after another. After Tyrone heard the shots, he remained sitting in the living room and then walked toward the kitchen, where he saw his brother lying on the floor. The rear wooden door was wide open, but the burglar bar and screen door were still closed.\nWhen Tyrone asked Edward who had shot him, Edward replied, \u201cRob.\u201d Since there was no phone in the apartment, Tyrone ran outside to get help and found a police car down the block. When the police officer arrived, Tyrone told her that \u201cRob\u201d had shot Edward.\nAt the time of trial Tyrone was serving a prison sentence for armed robbery; he had been convicted in December 1989. In October 1984 he had been sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment for burglary. In January 1983 he had been sentenced to 18 months\u2019 imprisonment for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. In 1980 he had been sentenced to two years\u2019 imprisonment for theft.\nP\u00f3lice officer Inovskis testified that at approximately 2:20 p.m. she arrived at the scene of the shooting. She asked Tyrone if Tyrone knew who the offender was, and Tyrone said it was \u201cRob.\u201d\nDr. Nancy Jones, an assistant medical examiner, testified that the victim had four shotgun wounds: a grazed wound on the anterior of the left thigh; a close-range wound on the back of the right upper arm from which wadding was recovered; a wound on the side of the right buttock; and multiple individual pellet wounds covering an area on the left back and buttock that extended for about 22 inches from the shoulder to the buttock. All the wounds were on the back side of the deceased. In Jones\u2019 opinion the gun was fired from a distance of less than a foot to two feet. Her toxicological analysis of the victim\u2019s blood revealed .29 micrograms of benzylecaline, the first breakdown product of cocaine. Benzylecaline can be recovered up to four hours or longer after the cocaine has been ingested.\nSheila West testified that she had lived at the apartment at 1761 East 63rd Place for approximately five years. In January 1989 the defendant sold Edward an ounce of cocaine for $40. Because Edward did not have the money, he gave the defendant a pistol for security. Later in the month, Edward paid the defendant, but the defendant never returned the pistol.\nOn the morning of March 23, Sheila and her sister Angel left the apartment. Between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. Sheila returned home and found that Edward had been shot. She had a conversation with Angel during the following evening; Angel told her that she had seen the defendant get into the Blazer. Sheila knew the defendant only as \u201cRob.\u201d She did not tell the police what Angel had told her because she did not know it was important.\nLaranda \u201cAngel\u201d West was a sophomore in high school at the time of trial. She testified that she met the defendant through her friend named Annette, the defendant\u2019s former girl friend. Angel had seen the defendant 50 or 60 times in the previous year. On the morning of March 23 Angel had been living with her sister at the apartment for a week.\nAt approximately 11 a.m., Angel and Sheila left the apartment to visit a friend and to make a telephone call. After two hours at the friend\u2019s house, Angel left to visit her friend Annette, who lived in the same courtyard building that Sheila lived in. When there was no response at Annette\u2019s apartment, Angel went down the walkway to visit Gwen\u2019s apartment, another friend in the building.\nAs she approached Gwen\u2019s apartment, Angel heard four shots. After hearing the shots, Angel \u201cran to the alley and looked down.\u201d She saw the defendant getting into a Blazer; he was carrying a shotgun. On the following day she told her sister that she had seen Rob getting into the Blazer carrying a shotgun.\nOn cross-examination, Angel recalled an interview at the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office on February 26, 1990; the defendant\u2019s attorney, two prosecutors and Detective Kelly were present. Angel denied telling the defendant\u2019s attorney that she did not hear gunshots on the day of the killing. She first said that she did not report that she had seen the defendant carrying a shotgun until February 26, 1990. She did not tell Gwen anything about her observations even though Gwen asked her if she had heard the shots.\nThe defense was an alibi. Willie Jones, who lived next door to the defendant, testified that he saw the defendant in the backyard of 5409 Shields from approximately 1 p.m. until 4:30 p.m. Carmen Sta-tum testified that she had been checking on the defendant \u201cevery ten minutes or every hour\u201d before 4 p.m. Mary Moore, the defendant\u2019s sister, testified that the defendant spent the afternoon washing cars in the backyard and that at approximately 4 p.m. she went for a drive in the defendant\u2019s Blazer.\nThe defendant testified that he had worked for Watkins Motor Line for approximately three weeks before he was arrested. He was a high school graduate and had also graduated from the Washburn Trade School as an auto mechanic. He first met Edward in January 1989. He sold Edward cocaine and was holding Edward\u2019s gun as collateral.\nThe defendant was living at 77th and Stewart between January and March 1989, although he frequently visited his parents\u2019 home at 5409 Shields. The only time he ever saw Tyrone was on the day of the shooting. The defendant went to the apartment in order to help Edward move. He went to the apartment in his black Bronco; he did not own a Blazer.\nWhen he arrived at the apartment on March 23, he entered through the front door. He knocked on the door and was asked who was there. He replied, \u201cRobert.\u201d Edward also knew him by the name \u201cGuy.\u201d Edward asked him about the gun. He did not yell at Edward; he was not angry at Edward. He did not help Edward move that day because Edward was unhappy with him about the gun. He told Edward that he had given the gun to Sheila. He left the apartment through the front door and went to his mother\u2019s house. He never returned to Edward\u2019s apartment that day. He did not shoot Edward. He got to his mother\u2019s house at approximately 1:15 p.m. or 1:30 p.m. and proceeded to wash two cars for the rest of the afternoon.\nOn cross-examination he testified that Edward paid him back the $40 for the cocaine. The gun had been stolen from the defendant\u2019s car. He felt bad about the fact that the gun had been stolen. He lied to Edward when he told him that he had given the gun to Sheila.\nThe defendant\u2019s attorney, Barry Sheppard, was permitted to testify on behalf of the defendant. He testified that on February 26, 1990, he questioned Angel West in the presence of two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys. He \u201casked [Angel West] if on March 23, 1989, before she saw Robert Moore get into a car, she heard gunshot noises.\u201d He testified that Angel told him that she did not hear gunshot noises.\nOn cross-examination he testified that he did not bring a court reporter despite the trial judge\u2019s suggestion that he do so. He looked for a court reporter but could not find one available. He wrote out what Angel West told him. He did not show what he had written to Angel. He did not ask Angel to sign any statement that he had written down.\nIn rebuttal the State established that the defendant had been terminated from Watkins Motor Line after three days because he did not show up for work.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Julie Rosner, who was present at the interview of Angel West by Barry Sheppard, testified that when Sheppard asked Angel if she had heard gunshots, Angel replied that she had heard gunshots. Rosner did not take notes of the conversation between Sheppard and Angel.\nDetective John Segers testified that he had a conversation with the defendant on the day after the shooting. The defendant told him that he and Edward had had an argument. He also told Segers that he had left Edward\u2019s apartment between 2 and 3 p.m.\nBy stipulation it was established that on September 26, 1988, the defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor theft and sentenced to one year\u2019s probation.\nThe defendant\u2019s principal claims of error center on testimony of Tyrone that, in the dispute over Edward\u2019s gun, Edward told the defendant that he could receive the death penalty for the killing of a man on Jeffrey Avenue. The defendant maintains that prejudice occurred during the State\u2019s opening statement in which the prosecutor referred to the evidence, during the testimony of Tyrone, during the cross-examination of the defendant and during the State\u2019s closing argument in which the prosecutor again referred to the evidence. The State contends that the defendant waived argument on this point by failing to object to the opening statement or the examination of Tyrone.\nThe problem with the State\u2019s contention that the defendant waived any right to claim error in the introduction of evidence of the deceased\u2019s statement about another killing lies in the defendant\u2019s alternative claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to make appropriate objections. We agree with the State that the defendant waived the claim of error, but we deem it appropriate to address the issue.\nDuring the opening statement the prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would show that Edward told the defendant that he could get the death penalty for killing a person on Jeffrey Avenue. No objection was made to that statement.\nDuring the direct examination of Tyrone the following occurred:\n\u201cQ. Okay. And what did he say after he wanted his pistol back then?\nA. Robert Moore said, T ain\u2019t got it. Sheila came and got the pistol.\u2019 Then my brother said, \u2018Yeah. Well, I\u2019ll fix you dirty mother fuckers fucking with me.\u2019\n* * *\nA. And then Rob said, T told you, man, I gave the pistol to her.\u2019 My brother said, \u2018That\u2019s all right. You know you can get the death penalty for killing that mother fucker on Jeffrey.\u2019 \u201d\nAlthough the defendant\u2019s attorney did not object to that statement, the trial judge immediately issued his first limiting instruction to the jury:\n\u201cThe jury may consider this alleged statement by Edward McClain only as it may affect Robert Moore\u2019s state of mind and not for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. That is, whether there was a shooting on Jeffrey and who may have done it is not a matter of proof and is not at issue. The defendant has never been arrested or charged with any shooting on Jeffrey.\u201d\nAfter the judge\u2019s statement, Tyrone continued:\n\u201cSo then my brother started talking to him [the defendant] again. Then he mentioned about the same thing again. And Rob started looking the other way, like, you know, he didn\u2019t even hear the statement. And then he [the defendant] got up and left.\u201d\nOn cross-examination the defendant\u2019s attorney asked Tyrone if the defendant acted as though he had not heard Edward\u2019s threat. Tyrone responded that the defendant acted as though he did not hear when Edward told him that he \u201ccould get the death penalty for killing the ladyf\u2019s] husband on Jeffrey.\u201d\nOn redirect examination, Tyrone said that the defendant and Edward were arguing about the pistol. Tyrone also said that the defendant and Edward were not friendly when discussing the other shooting on Jeffrey. At this time, the judge issued his second limiting instruction:\n\u201cAgain, jurors, with the caution that this remark, or this statement about some shooting on Jeffrey is not meant to prove anything as to whether there was a shooting; who did the shooting. The defendant, again I remind you, has never been arrested or charged for any such shooting on Jeffrey, if a shooting existed. And that testimony regarding a shooting on Jeffrey is just to be considered by you, if you choose, as it might reflect the defendant, Mr. Moore\u2019sf,] state of mind and for no other reason.\u201d\nThe defendant testified that he and Edward discussed the gun, but the defendant did not yell at Edward; he was not angry with him. During cross-examination, the following occurred:\n\u201cQ. Did Edward \u2014 are you saying Edward never said to you that you could get the death penalty for killing that mother fucker on Jeffrey Street?\nA. No.\nQ. Never said anything about that. He never mentioned Jeffrey Street?\nA. No.\nQ. Or the death penalty?\nA. No.\nQ. Or killing anybody else?\n[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Objection.\u201d\nThe judge ruled that \u201canybody else\u201d would be stricken. The judge then gave his third limiting instruction:\n\u201cSome admonitions and qualifications as I gave the jurors earlier will stand. Any reference to some killing on Jeffrey Street can only be considered by the jury as they may choose in terms of the defendant Moore\u2019s state of mind.\nThey cannot consider any statement with respect to some killing on Jeffrey for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. And, once again the defendant, Mr. Moore, has never been arrested or charged for any possible killing on Jeffrey.\u201d\nBoth the defendant and the State now argue over the applicability of the exception to the general rule barring evidence of other crimes, which provides that other crimes are admissible to establish motive. We do not believe that the rule governing admission of other crimes is precisely applicable, because the evidence does not establish that the defendant did, in fact, commit another crime. Indeed, the rule governing admission of other crimes requires that it must be established that a crime actually took place and that the defendant committed the crime or participated in its commission. (People v. Miller (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 421, 370 N.E.2d 1155.) While proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s participation is not required (People v. Scott (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 620, 301 N.E.2d 118), the proof must be more than such that creates mere suspicion. See People v. Nearn (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 480, 533 N.E.2d 509.\nThere is no evidence that another killing took place, let alone any evidence that the defendant participated in it. Nonetheless, we have determined that the evidence was admissible. Proof of motive is always admissible even though not required. (People v. Smith (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 40, 565 N.E.2d 900.) And proof of motive may take many forms \u2014 for example, evidence showing hate, revenge, greed, fear, even love \u2014 and is not restricted to proof of other crimes.\nIn this case the evidence was admitted to create the inference that Edward was claiming knowledge of facts which might incriminate the defendant; that Edward was threatening to disclose those facts unless his gun was returned to him; and that the defendant killed Edward to silence him. That the State did not show the defendant actually killed someone else may control the weight of the evidence, but not its admissibility. The trial judge correctly noted that the evidence was not admitted to show the truth of Edward\u2019s accusation but rather to show that the accusation might have affected the defendant\u2019s state of mind. (Cf. People v. Albanese (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 54, 464 N.E.2d 206.) As the judge cautioned, the fact finders were free to decide, first of all, whether Edward actually made such an accusation and, second, what weight was to be given to it.\nWe conclude, therefore, that no error occurred during the State\u2019s opening statement, when Tyrone testified to the threat by the defendant, when the defendant was cross-examined about the threat and when the State argued that the threat was the motive for the killing. Since the evidence was properly admitted, the defendant\u2019s attorney was not ineffective for failing to object to it. (People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 430 N.E.2d 1346.) Before we leave this point we express strong approval of the course of action taken by the trial judge in giving cautionary instructions in the absence of any objection by the defendant\u2019s attorney. As the supreme court has noted, a judge is more than a presiding officer or an umpire. He is responsible for the justice of the judgment he enters. (Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457, 308 N.E.2d 611.) A trial judge should interject himself into proceedings with caution, but there are instances where justice requires that the judge do so. This case presented such an instance.\nDuring the cross-examination of Angel West, the defendant\u2019s attorney brought out that the defendant had attempted to have sex with her but that she had rebuffed him. The defendant now maintains that that cross-examination by his attorney represented reversible ineffective assistance of counsel.\nThe bench mark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether defense counsel\u2019s conduct \u201cso undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.\u201d (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692-93, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064.) To succeed on such a claim, moreover, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged actions might be considered sound trial strategy. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.) We judge that the defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that the defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Angel West was trial strategy.\nAngel West was an important witness against the defendant. If the defendant\u2019s attorney could show that she was motivated to testify against him because he had been unduly aggressive in an attempt to have sexual relations with her, the strain on her credibility in the eyes of the jury would be more than a fair exchange for any unfavorable impression the jury might have of the defendant that the evidence might have created. It should be emphasized that the evidence did not establish an attempt to rape Angel. In the defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s closing argument he emphasized that Angel West might have been motivated to testify against the defendant because of the incident in which he attempted to have sexual relations with her. Apparently he did not so convince the jury, but the mere fact that a tactic was unsuccessful does not establish incompetence. (People v. Potthast (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 714, 579 N.E.2d 1027.) The cross-examination of Angel West did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.\nBefore the trial began, the defendant\u2019s attorney spoke to the judge about interviewing Angel West. The judge suggested that the defendant\u2019s attorney bring a court reporter in the event there would be a dispute about what she told the defendant\u2019s attorney and someone would have to testify for the defense. The defendant\u2019s attorney interviewed Angel without a court reporter. He later told the judge that there was no court reporter available at that time. He interviewed her in the presence of two assistant State\u2019s Attorneys and a detective. After Angel testified, the defendant\u2019s attorney told the judge that he was prepared to testify that he had asked Angel at the interview whether she had heard gunshots and that she had said, \u201cNo, I did not.\u201d The judge permitted the defendant\u2019s attorney to testify. The attorney then testified and impeached Angel.\nWhile an attorney is not incompetent to be a witness, the right of an attorney to be a witness in a case in which he is representing a party is allowed only when the court, in its discretion, deems it necessary. Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Pittway Corp. (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 481, 442 N.E.2d 574.\nThe defendant\u2019s claim of error is not that the attorney did testify, but rather that the defendant\u2019s attorney did not withdraw before giving testimony. Rule 5 \u2014 102(a) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (107 Ill. 2d R. 5 \u2014 102(a)) provides that an attorney may testify without withdrawing from the case when withdrawal would \u201cwork a substantial hardship on the client.\u201d Implicit in the defendant\u2019s argument is the assumption that the judge would have granted the defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s motion to withdraw. This is an assumption of very doubtful validity. As a practical matter, withdrawal by the defendant\u2019s attorney in the midst of trial and substitution by another attorney fully prepared to represent the defendant would be most improbable. We have serious doubts that the trial judge would have permitted the defendant\u2019s attorney to withdraw; and a denial of a motion to withdraw would have been justified. For these reasons, we conclude that the defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s failure to withdraw, or to seek leave to withdraw, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.\nThe defendant\u2019s last assignment of error concerns the State\u2019s closing argument. In addition to the State\u2019s reference to Edward\u2019s statement concerning the killing on Jeffrey Avenue, which we have already discussed, the defendant maintains that the prosecutor attempted to define the term \u201creasonable doubt\u201d; the prosecutor commented on Angel West\u2019s life experience which, the defendant maintains, was not based on the evidence; and the prosecutor made a passing reference to Ted Bundy. (We take judicial notice that Ted Bundy was accused of the murders of several young women. He was convicted of killing some of them and was executed.)\nWe do not agree that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks amounted to an attempt to define \u201creasonable doubt,\u201d and we do not agree that the prosecutor\u2019s reference to Angel West\u2019s life experience was not based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. We judge that the prosecutor\u2019s reference to Ted Bundy was, in part at least, made in response to an argument by the defendant\u2019s attorney. In the defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s closing argument he said this:\n\u201cAnd you look [the defendant] in the eyes. He is a nice looking, young man. And he is honest, and he has got a sweet smile. And he has got a nice mother and a good family. And that is the type of people who are worthy of reasonable doubt.\u201d\nThe prosecutor answered that argument thus:\n\u201cHe is sitting there and he says smile and he smiles. A lot of murderers are very charming people. So is Ted Bundy. That\u2019s how he got all those girls to come to him and kill them.\n* * *\nA lot of killing, nice faces and pleasing personalities. What a person looks like has nothing to do with it. Don\u2019t think about that. Think about the evidence.\u201d\nIn our judgment the prosecutor\u2019s response was a proper response to the defendant\u2019s argument. At least we cannot say that it is clear that the reference to Ted Bundy was improper. The prosecutor made i^o attempt to compare the multiple killings Bundy had committed with the assassination of Edward; and no one can dispute the truth of what the prosecutor said. The reference to Bundy was, of course, a hard blow, but we cannot say that it was an unfair one.\nIn addition, we do not believe that the jury\u2019s verdict would have been any different if the remark about Ted Bundy had not been made. No possible reason why Tyrone and Angel West would falsely implicate the defendant has been suggested. Tyrone\u2019s testimony was corroborated to a significant degree by the defendant himself. He admitted to a disagreement with Edward about the gun; and he admitted to lying to Edward about what had happened to the gun.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcNAMARA, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE EGAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark W. Solock and Patrick G. Reardon, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Margaret J. Faustmann, and Fabio Valentini, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20141306\nOpinion filed March 19, 1993.\nMark W. Solock and Patrick G. Reardon, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Margaret J. Faustmann, and Fabio Valentini, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1045-01", "first_page_order": 1065, "last_page_order": 1077 }