{ "id": 5107913, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY KACZMAREK, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kaczmarek", "decision_date": "1993-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1-89-3182", "first_page": "1067", "last_page": "1082", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 1067" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156739 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 991", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661521 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0991-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3202119 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392468 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5449458 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3130376 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/108/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574337 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550782 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. 2d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5429856 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/64/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2895428 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5468971 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097208 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556-57" }, { "page": "556-57" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2648291 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236771 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556336 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5120578 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/312/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550912 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5378761 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/36/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3031235 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260410 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1318, "char_count": 37473, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.523092206672705e-08, "percentile": 0.5243792205645966 }, "sha256": "a7b662ed0eee186dca0dab2134eaeab498f2339cd358cff57bdbc5bdfcebf924", "simhash": "1:39ba2cef3fca2955", "word_count": 6284 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:01.285518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY KACZMAREK, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Henry Kaczmarek, was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1), residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3), home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 11), and armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 18 \u2014 1, 18 \u2014 2). He was sentenced to natural life in prison for the murder conviction. On appeal, defendant asserts that (1) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because no physical evidence was found in the apartment to link him to the crime; (2) he was not proven guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) he was not proven guilty of home invasion or residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court erred in denying defendant the opportunity to offer evidence that someone other than himself committed the offense; (5) the trial court erred in precluding defendant from introducing the remainder of his statement after the State introduced part of that statement; (6) he is entitled to a new trial because the State improperly argued that Ms. Nielson\u2019s blood matched the bloodstains found on his jacket and pants and impermissibly argued that the percentage of people having Ms. Nielson\u2019s blood type was less than 1%; (7) his due process right to a fair trial was denied by restricting his ability to impeach Ron Larry regarding his pending contempt charge; and (8) he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. We reverse and remand.\nMillie Nielson, who was 86 years old, lived on the first floor of a two-flat building at 3507 W. Diversey Avenue, Chicago. Dan Larry, his wife, Margaret Larry (now ex-wife), and Margaret\u2019s 19-year-old son, John Fisher, lived on the second floor. On April 25, 1987, Ms. Nielson\u2019s body was found beaten, strangled, and stabbed in her home.\nMargaret testified that she saw Ms. Nielson on April 24, 1987, around 4:40 p.m. At 6:15 p.m., Margaret and John went bowling, returning home about 10:40 p.m. Her ex-husband, Dan, was passed out on the couch from drinking. Defendant, who had been living with the Larrys for a month, was in the apartment, drinking beer and watching television. Margaret noticed that defendant was wearing light-colored jeans and a dark, quilted jacket, but did not notice any stains on his clothes. Before Margaret went to bed at 11 p.m., defendant helped her put Dan to bed.\nMargaret further testified that she was awakened at midnight by Dan\u2019s brother, Ron Larry, who was ringing the doorbell. When he asked if Dan was there, Margaret told him \u201cno,\u201d because she did not want him in her home.\nAround 2 a.m., defendant rang the front doorbell and asked if Dan was awake. After Margaret told defendant that he was asleep and she would not wake him, she locked the door and went back to bed. Margaret stated that defendant was not slurring his words, staggering, or swaying. She did not have trouble understanding him even though she did have trouble understanding him when he was drunk.\nWhen Margaret awoke at 7:15 a.m. on April 25, 1987, defendant was sleeping on the living room couch. He was wearing a short-sleeved yellow dress shirt and clean, dark jeans. Defendant awoke at 8 a.m. Although he did not stumble or sway, he looked nervous as he walked around the coffee table two or three times. Margaret stated that defendant always looked nervous after a night of drinking. Margaret left the house around 9 a.m.\nOn cross-examination, Margaret testified that she told the police on April 25, 1987, that no one had left the house the previous evening. She also did not tell the police that defendant was wearing different clothes on Saturday morning.\nJohn Fisher testified that he and defendant watched television until John went to bed about 11:30 p.m. or 12 a.m. on April 24, 1987. At that time, defendant was wearing his usual attire, which was light-colored blue jeans, a flannel shirt, and a blue quilted jacket. John did not notice any stains on defendant\u2019s clothes. Defendant left the apartment, returned about 30 minutes later, and asked if Dan was awake. When John replied \u201cno,\u201d defendant told him that he was going back out to find his car. John stated that he had no trouble understanding defendant even though he had trouble understanding him when he was drunk. John further testified that defendant did not stagger, sway, or have any problems walking.\nJohn stated that he awoke at 10 a.m. on April 25, 1987, when the police came to question him. Initially, he told the police that no one had left the house the previous evening. Around noon, after speaking with numerous police officers, John told them that defendant had left the house. John said that it was not unusual for defendant to go out and return late at night. John stated that he was a heavy sleeper and did not hear the doorbell during the night.\nRonald Sadlowski, Ms. Nielson\u2019s maintenance helper, testified that, at 9:45 a.m. on April 25, 1987, he noticed that Ms. Nielson\u2019s back pantry window was broken and the back storm door was open. He called the police.\nWhen Chicago police officer Ross Marsala responded to the call, he found Ms. Nielson\u2019s body lying face up on a bed in the rear bedroom. Marsala testified that bloodstains were on the floor and a bloodstained knife was on a small kitchen table. In the second bedroom, the dresser drawers were open, papers were scattered on the floor, and the bed\u2019s dust ruffle was bloodstained. In the front of the apartment, there was a small cabinet with open doors. Officer Marsala did not notice any signs of forced entry. The front door was locked with the keys still in the lock.\nDennis Yeneigh, a Chicago police crime lab officer, testified that he dusted for fingerprints, but found none suitable for lifting. On the broken pieces of glass near the back door, Yeneigh found fabric impressions, indicating that a cloth or gloves had been used. He also found fabric impressions on the door frame outside the rear bedroom.\nChicago police detective Jerome Bogucki testified that Ron Larry told him that he went to Dan\u2019s apartment around 1 a.m. to sleep on the second-floor back porch from where he saw defendant in the backyard carrying a bag. Around 1 a.m. on April 26, 1987, Detective Bogucki and his partner went with Ron to find defendant. When they found defendant sleeping in his car, the detectives approached the car, shined their flashlights, knocked on the window, identified themselves as police officers, and asked defendant to step out of the car. Bogucki noticed two small bloodstains on the sleeves of defendant\u2019s quilted jacket. Defendant was also wearing blue jeans and a plaid shirt. Bogucki did not notice any bloodstains on defendant\u2019s shirt, pants, or shoes. The detectives placed defendant under arrest, advised him of his Miranda rights, and took him to the police station. Bogucki stated that defendant did not appear to be drunk or smell of alcohol.\nAt the police station, defendant was cooperative and signed written consent forms to give a blood sample and to search his car. While searching the car, detectives found numerous bloodstained jewelry boxes, jewelry, a Marshall Field\u2019s bag containing serving plates and dishes, an alarm clock, a clock radio, a purse, a claw hammer, a glass cutter, a screwdriver, pliers, clothing, and jeans with bloodstains on both legs.\nDetective Robert Davie, the evidence technician who processed defendant\u2019s car, testified that he did not find any gloves or any blood in the trunk and none of the items had fingerprints suitable for comparison. Various evidence technicians testified that there were no fingerprints suitable for comparison found in Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment, on any of her possessions, or on the knife identified as the possible murder weapon. Ms. Nielson\u2019s family members viewed the property and identified numerous pieces of Ms. Nielson\u2019s jewelry, serving dishes, and alarm clock.\nDr. Michael Chamblis, who performed the autopsy, testified that Ms. Nielson had multiple head and facial injuries, external bruises and abrasions to her jaw and neck resulting from multiple blunt blows, and lacerations and bruises to her arms, left thigh, right forearm, hands, right wrist, and right elbow. There were multiple bruises on Ms. Nielson\u2019s right breast, right front shoulder, upper left chest, and right clavicle. She also had internal injuries that indicated manual strangulation, including a fractured and hemorrhaged larynx, a hemorrhaged tongue, and a bite mark on Ms. Nielson\u2019s tongue. In addition, the undersurface of Ms. Nielson\u2019s scalp, skull, and brain were bruised from multiple blows to the head.\nBecause it is common for stab wounds to ooze blood after the infliction of the wound, Dr. Chamblis explained, it would not be unusual for the killer to have only a small amount of blood on his clothes despite the fact that Ms. Nielson lost a considerable amount of blood. In Dr. Chamblis\u2019 opinion, Ms. Nielson was on her back when stabbed in the legs. Several of the wounds were defense wounds. Dr. Chamblis concluded that Ms. Nielson died as a result of strangulation with contributing factors of blunt force injuries and multiple stab wounds. Dr. Chamblis also testified that Ms. Nielson could have died from blunt force injuries.\nPamela Fish, a serology expert, testified that she examined blood samples from defendant, Ms. Nielson, defendant\u2019s jeans and quilted jacket, and Ms. Nielson\u2019s kitchen floor. Fish determined that Ms. Nielson had Type A blood with the EAP-BA enzyme and defendant has Type B blood with EAP-CA enzyme. Their ESD, PGM, ADA, AK, hemoglobin, PEP A, and G-6PD enzymes were the same. The blood on defendant\u2019s jeans, defendant\u2019s quilted jacket, and Ms. Nielson\u2019s kitchen floor all tested positive for Type A blood. In addition, defendant\u2019s clothes had the same enzymes as both defendant and Ms. Nielson. There was an insufficient amount of blood on the knife and jewelry boxes from defendant\u2019s car trunk to be able to type the blood.\nOn cross-examination, the defense counsel questioned Fish about the frequency of Type A blood in the general population. Fish testified that 40% of the population had Type A blood. On redirect examination, she stated that 8 in every 1,000 people, or less than 1% of the population, have the ESD 2-1 with Type A blood.\nAfter the State rested its case, the trial court granted the State\u2019s motion in limine that defense counsel not be allowed to present evidence of similar crimes in his case in chief. Defense counsel argued that he wanted to present evidence of similar crimes against Louis Bergeron and Ruth Agapi that occurred within IV2 blocks of Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment during the 10 days prior to her murder.\nDefendant testified that he was a construction worker, had a ninth-grade education, was not married, had a speech problem, and started drinking when he was 10 or 11 years old. In April 1987, he lived with the Larrys for six weeks. He was not working at the time because he had been laid off the previous fall.\nAccording to defendant, he fought with Bob Hendrickson and Tom Szeszol three days before he was arrested. As a result, Bob and Tom were bleeding and defendant\u2019s knuckle was cut. Later that same night, defendant found a man trying to break into his car, so he hit him three or four times and then kneed him. As a result of that incident, the man bled.\nDefendant testified that he began drinking with Dan in the morning of April 24, 1987. They went to Tom\u2019s apartment, where he washed his laundry. Defendant wanted to soak a pair of jeans that had blood on them, but he did not have a chance to do so before Tom asked him to leave. Defendant testified that he put the bloodstained jeans in his car trunk, drove Dan home, and went to Mike\u2019s Tavern until 6:30 p.m. Defendant then went to the Larrys\u2019 apartment, where he and Dan drank a case of beer. Defendant denied helping Margaret put Dan to bed that night.\nDefendant stated that he left the Larrys\u2019 apartment at 11:45 p.m. to go to a tavern, where he had two drinks in 15 minutes. He then went to another tavern, where he had 12 drinks. At 2 a.m., he went back to the Larrys\u2019 apartment. Because he had to relieve himself, defendant parked his car in the alley behind the building. While in the alley, he heard a noise and went into the gangway. He saw a garbage bag next to the house, picked it up, and put it into the trunk of his car without looking in it. After relieving himself, defendant drove to the front of the building, parked, and went upstairs to see if Dan was awake.\nEven though he had a key to the apartment, defendant rang the doorbell. Margaret told him that Dan was still asleep, so defendant went back to the second tavern. After closing, he gave Liz Finuchi and Dan Funkhauser a ride home. Around 4:30 a.m., he returned to the Larrys\u2019 apartment, parked his car across the street, went upstairs, and went to sleep on the living room couch. He did not take off his clothes before going to sleep.\nAfter awaking at 8 a.m., defendant and Dan went to a tavern and then drove to Bill Brown\u2019s house so that he could repay a debt. Defendant testified that the first time he looked into the bloodstained garbage bag was at Bill\u2019s house. Defendant separated the items, and threw the bag, pillowcase, and worthless items into a dumpster. Bill gave defendant $60 for the silver spoons.\nDefendant then drove Dan home and went to a tavern for a few beers. He called Dan, who told him about the murder. Defendant then went to the Larrys\u2019, but no one was home, so he went back to the tavern. Later, he fell asleep in his car. He was awakened by the police, who arrested him and took him to the police station, where he was questioned.\nDefendant denied breaking into Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment, killing her, or stealing her property. He stated that he saw Ms. Nielson only once, did not know that she lived alone, and did not remember telling the police, \u201cmaybe I did it, but I don\u2019t remember.\u201d\nDetective Raymond Schalk testified that he questioned defendant on April 26, 1987, around 2:15 a.m. After telling defendant that Ron saw him walking through the backyard with a bag, that they recovered items from his car trunk, and that his jacket and jeans had blood on them, defendant responded, \u201cmaybe I did it. I don\u2019t remember.\u201d\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Richard Stevens testified that he interviewed defendant at 9 a.m. on April 26, 1987. When Stevens asked defendant if he was in Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment on April 24 or April 25, defendant replied that he could have been there. When Stevens asked him if he had killed Ms. Nielson, defendant responded that he could have, but did not remember.\nRon Larry, who had previous felony convictions, testified that he went to his brother\u2019s second-floor back porch around 1 a.m. on April 25, 1987, to sleep after drinking heavily. Ron did not pay attention to Ms. Nielson\u2019s back porch, which was on the first floor.\nAccording to Ron, he saw defendant walking through the back yard carrying a garbage bag about 2:30 a.m. Ron did not see defendant on Ms. Nielson\u2019s back porch nor did he hear any noise coming from Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment. Ron denied ringing the Larrys\u2019 doorbell or speaking to anyone in the Larrys\u2019 apartment that night. Ron further testified that he awoke at 7 a.m. and left. He did not notice anything unusual on the first-floor porch at that time.\nBecause he had a pending contempt charge for not complying with a defense subpoena in this case, Ron was appointed an attorney. When the defense counsel attempted to question whether Ron came to court voluntarily or because he had been arrested for noncompliance with the subpoena, Ron\u2019s counsel objected. Because the questioning involved a pending contempt case, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection.\nTom Szeszol testified that defendant came to his apartment on the afternoon of April 24, 1987. His ex-wife, Julia, was washing defendant\u2019s clothes. Tom wanted his friends to leave, so he gave defendant a clean set of clothes, which defendant was wearing when he left. Although Tom admitted getting into a fight with defendant, he stated that the fight was two weeks before defendant\u2019s arrest, not three days. Tom testified that his blood type was B positive.\nJulia Dillow, Tom\u2019s ex-wife, testified that she was doing defendant\u2019s laundry on April 24, 1987, while he was playing cards and drinking. She did not finish washing his clothes before he left. She stated that Tom gave defendant one of his flannel shirts and a pair of jeans to wear.\nElizabeth Finuchi testified that she had been drinking for four or five hours when she saw defendant at a tavern after 2 or 2:30 a.m. on April 25, 1987. Defendant bought her a drink and then drove her and a friend home around 4 a.m. Finuchi stated that she did not notice anything unusual about defendant or his clothes.\nDaniel Funkhauser testified that defendant gave him and Finuchi a ride at 4 a.m. on April 25, 1987. Funkhauser stated that he had been drinking for eight hours, did not notice anything unusual about defendant, nor did he notice any blood on defendant\u2019s clothing, coat, or hands.\nBill Brown testified that defendant and another man came to his home at 1:30 or 2 p.m. on April 25, 1987. Bill stated that defendant showed him some old coins, costume jewelry, work clothes, and silverware, which were in his car trunk. Bill testified that it was not unusual for defendant to have silverware in his trunk. After Bill gave defendant $20 or $30 for the coins and silverware, the two men left.\nPamela Hines, who previously lived with defendant, testified that defendant used a Marshall Field\u2019s bag as luggage when he moved out of her home. She also stated that the two clocks found in defendant\u2019s trunk were his and that defendant owned tools, including a glass cutter.\nChicago police officer William Kaupert testified that there was blood on Ms. Nielson\u2019s kitchen floor, on the floor next to the rear bedroom, in the front bedroom, on a white box, on the door molding, on a table, and on two walls in the rear bedroom. Kaupert stated that there were glove impressions on the molding, no fingerprints suitable for comparison, and the window had been broken out, not in.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s request for an instruction on the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication.\nDuring closing arguments, the State remarked:\n\u201c[Pamela Fisher] pointed out to you *** that the blood of Millie Nielson matches that of the blood found on Henry Kaczmarek\u2019s jacket and Henry Kaczmarek\u2019s jeans.\n* * *\nShe also told you that less than one percent of the population has the same blood that matches that found on the defendant\u2019s clothes.\u201d\nIn its rebuttal argument, the State commented:\n\u201c[I]f you look at every other enzyme [other than GLO 1, where there was no reaction] and compare it with Millie Nielson\u2019s known blood standard, they all match up. They are all identical, and the reason they are identical is because when Millie Nielson was fighting this defendant, she was dropping blood on his clothes. That\u2019s why they are identical.\n* * *\nMillie Nielson has supplied us with the evidence to convict the defendant. Her blood is on his clothes.\u201d\nFollowing closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of murder, residential burglary, home invasion, and armed robbery. After denying defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial, the trial court sentenced him for murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1)) to natural life imprisonment without parole based on the brutal and heinous nature of the offense and on felony murder.\nDefendant asserts that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt since no physical evidence was found in the apartment to link him with the offense. Neither his fingerprints nor blood was found in Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment, and no blood was found on his boots. Defendant maintains that the amount of blood in Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment would indicate that the offender had a significant amount of blood on his clothes and on the bottom of his shoes. Instead, defendant argues, the two small bloodstains on his jacket were consistent with merely carrying the bloody garbage bag to the car and the bloodstains on his jeans were consistent with them being in the car trunk next to the bloody garbage bag. Furthermore, defendant contends, Ron\u2019s testimony is consistent with his explanation that he found the garbage bag in the backyard. Ron testified that he saw defendant carrying a garbage bag with his arms extended in front of him. Defendant states that he threw out the bloodstained garbage bag on the way to Bill\u2019s house the next day. The police did not find the garbage bag.\nMoreover, defendant argues, Ron never saw him go inside the apartment, come out of the apartment, on the porch, or any closer than 10 feet from the building. Defendant\u2019s theory of defense was that someone else, probably Ron, was the offender. Defendant states that Ron\u2019s testimony was inconsistent and he had the opportunity to commit the crime. In light of his testimony regarding how he found and carried the bag of items, getting bloodstains on his clothing, defendant concludes that the State\u2019s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWhen a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, it will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261.) No longer is the State required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. (People v. Pintos (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 286, 291; People v. Eyler (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 173, 191.) Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of other facts that tend to establish the guilt or innocence of the defendant. People v. Evans (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 77, 83.\nAlthough another jury could have analyzed the evidence differently, this jury could reasonably infer from all the evidence that defendant was guilty of murder even without physical evidence in the apartment that linked him to the offense. Defendant had the opportunity to kill Ms. Nielson. He was seen near her apartment carrying a garbage bag containing some of her property. Blood that is consistent with Ms. Nielson\u2019s blood was on defendant\u2019s jacket and jeans. Some of Ms. Nielson\u2019s property was found in defendant\u2019s car trunk. The evidence is not so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. Therefore, we affirm defendant\u2019s murder conviction.\nNext, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to offer evidence of similar crimes committed in close physical and temporal proximity to this offense and that those victims were prepared to testify that defendant was not the offender in those crimes.\nDuring the cross-examination of Officer Bogucki, defendant was precluded from introducing evidence that two people severely beat and robbed Louis Bergeron, who was 86 years old, on April 16, 1987. Then, prior to defendant\u2019s case, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s motion in limine, precluding defendant from introducing any evidence of crimes against Louis Bergeron or Ruth Agapi.\nDefense counsel stated that he intended to call both persons in his case in chief. Bergeron would testify that he lived IV2 blocks from Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment; he was robbed and beaten at his home on April 16, 1987; and the two offenders were wearing gloves. After giving a description of the two people, Bergeron would testify that defendant was not one of the offenders.\nAgapi, who lived almost directly across the street from Ms. Nielson, would testify that approximately one week before Ms. Nielson\u2019s murder, she heard noises on her back porch. After continuing to hear noises, she saw a gloved man standing on her previously locked porch. Agapi did not open the door and the man left. Agapi would have testified that defendant was not the man she confronted.\nDefendant argues that those two offenses had many similarities to this offense. They were close in time and they both occurred on Diversey Avenue within IV2 blocks of Ms. Nielson\u2019s apartment. The offenders in the Bergeron and Agapi incidents wore gloves as did the offender in this case. Bergeron was an elderly person beaten and left for dead. In the Agapi case, the offender got in a locked door without signs of forced entry. Defendant concludes that he must be given a new trial because the jury was precluded from hearing this relevant exculpatory evidence.\nDefendant relies on People v. Watson (1966), 36 Ill. 2d 228, which is factually distinguishable. That defendant, who was charged with attempted forgery by delivery of a forged check, was precluded from introducing evidence that a similar check was forged and cashed after he had been taken into custody. (Watson, 36 Ill. 2d at 231.) The reviewing court ruled that the jury should have been allowed to infer that the defendant did not sign or attempt to deliver either check, thereby exonerating him from the offense charged. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d at 231.\nDefendant then cites cases that involve the admission of other crimes evidence against a defendant. See People v. Richardson (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 322; People v. Nitti (1924), 312 Ill. 73; People v. Lewis (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 389.\nA defendant must be allowed to offer competent evidence that he was not the perpetrator of the offense. (Watson, 36 Ill. 2d at 232.) To do that, the defendant may present evidence that is not too speculative or too remote in time. (People v. Morgan (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 410, 441.) The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bruce (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 356, 365.\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring the evidence of the other two offenses. They were not similar enough to this crime to be relevant. Even though they were close in time and proximity, the types of offenses were different. Not only were they different from this offense, but they were different from each other. Bergeron was a male, who was not killed or stabbed, and no windows were broken. Agapi was not even attacked. Moreover, there is no evidence that suggests that the same person was involved in the Bergeron and Agapi offenses.\nNext, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in precluding him from introducing the remainder of his custodial statement after the State introduced part of that statement. By relating only defendant\u2019s statement that he may have committed the offense, but did not remember, defendant argues that the State falsely insinuated that he never previously told the police about finding the garbage bag in the backyard. Defendant maintains that the entire statement was necessary to give the jury adequate information to determine the weight of the statement, if any; to rebut the State\u2019s theory; and to make sure that the jury was not misled.\nOn cross-examination, the State asked defendant whether he told the police when he was arrested, \u201cmaybe I did it, but I don\u2019t remember.\u201d Defendant replied that he did not recall saying that to the police.\nDuring the State\u2019s rebuttal case, Officer Raymond Schalk testified that on April 26, 1987, defendant denied committing the offense, but later told him, \u201cmaybe I did it, I don\u2019t remember.\u201d On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if defendant told him more. The court sustained the State\u2019s objection.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Stevens testified that defendant told him that he could have killed Millie Nielson but he did not remember. In its closing argument, the State repeatedly commented that defendant admitted he could have killed Ms. Nielson but did not remember.\nDefendant argues that the State misled the jury into thinking that \u201ctoday\u201d at trial two years after he was arrested, he invented the story that he found the bag, two years after he was arrested. In questioning defendant during the trial, the State repeatedly asked, \u201c[t]o-day you remember picking] up the bag,\u201d \u201c[tjoday you remember putting] it in the trunk.\u201d Later, the State argued in closing argument \u201c[although the defendant told detectives one day after the murder that he didn\u2019t remember, today he remembers, two years later he remembers.\u201d\nDefendant relies on People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 545, 556, where the court ruled that the failure to allow the defendant to bring forth his entire statement was prejudicial because further details about the conversation could have affected the jury\u2019s belief about the defendant\u2019s truthfulness during the conversation. The State was allowed to introduce selected, unrecorded verbal statements made by the defendant, including a statement that there were two men with guns in her house and that she ran from the house in a panic. In that case defense counsel was precluded from bringing out the entire content of the statement, including what else defendant had said about the two men. (Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 556-57.) Without the entire conversation, the jury could have been misled into thinking that the defendant said nothing more. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 556-57.\nDefendant also cites People v. Klinkhammer (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 747, 749, where the court held that a jury should be entitled to hear defendant\u2019s entire statement in order to determine the amount of credence it should give any inconsistency. A State witness had made a tape-recorded statement to police implicating himself and the defendant. (Klinkhammer, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 748.) At trial, during cross-examination, the defendant used portions of the taped statement to impeach the witness by exposing contradictions in his testimony. (Klinkhammer, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 749.) During redirect examination, the trial court allowed the State to introduce the entire statement into evidence. (Klinkhammer, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 748.) The reviewing court ruled that the trial court properly allowed the State to introduce the full statement. Klinkhammer, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 749.\nIn addition, defendant cites People v. Hartness (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 129, 141, where the appellate court held that the trial court erred in limiting the defendant\u2019s further examination of the witness since the unexplained testimony could be susceptible to misconstruction.\nThe State responds that defendant\u2019s entire statement was introduced when he testified at trial; that the defense counsel\u2019s attempt to re-cross-examine Detective Schalk on rebuttal was improper because it was out of the scope of the redirect examination; and that the defense counsel failed to ask the proper questions on cross-examination. Consequently, the State concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the re-cross-examination to the scope of the redirect examination.\nIt is well established that if one party introduces part of an utterance or writing, the opposing party may introduce the remainder or as much as is required to place that part originally offered in proper context so that a correct and true meaning is conveyed to the jury. (Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 543, 556.) Once a conversation is related by a witness, the opposing party has the right to bring out all of the conversation on cross-examination. (Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d at 556.) Furthermore, if a witness has been impeached by proof that he has made prior inconsistent statements, he may bring out all of the prior statements to qualify or explain the inconsistency and rehabilitate the witness. People v. Harris (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 113, 142.\nThe trial court erred by not allowing defendant to present his entire statement. Without hearing defendant\u2019s entire statement, the jury could have been misled into thinking that the first time defendant stated that he found the garbage bag in the backyard was at trial instead of at the time he was arrested. Furthermore, the prosecutor\u2019s urging the jury to consider his statement substantively made it all the more important that the full context of his statement be given. Since the jury\u2019s assessment of his credibility was crucial, the error was prejudicial. Although the evidence linking defendant to the murder was sufficient for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there was not such overwhelming evidence of guilt so as to find the error harmless. (People v. Enis (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 264, 298.) Consequently, we reverse defendant\u2019s murder conviction and remand this cause for a new trial.\nNext, defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the State improperly argued that Ms. Nielson\u2019s blood matched the bloodstains found on his clothes and impermissibly argued that the percentage of people having Ms. Nielson\u2019s blood type was less than 1%. Defendant waived the issue because he did not object to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument.\nDefendant then asserts that his sixth amendment and due process rights to a fair trial were denied by restricting his ability to impeach Ron Larry regarding his pending contempt charge. Defendant argues that it was critical to show that Ron had a motive to lie because (1) defendant\u2019s theory was that Ron implicated defendant to the police because Ron was the offender and (2) Ron had a pending contempt charge for failing to appear at the trial pursuant to a defense subpoena. When defendant attempted to question Ron about the circumstances of the contempt charge, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection.\nThe State responds that the trial court properly precluded defendant from questioning Ron about his pending contempt charge because the charge had no significance to Ron\u2019s motive, bias or interest to lie. Furthermore, the State explains, the trial court prohibited any questions about Ron\u2019s pending charge so that he would not be forced to incriminate himself.\nA defendant may question a witness on any matter where it would reasonably tend to indicate that his testimony might be influenced by an interest, bias, or motive to testify falsely. (People v. Triplett (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475.) That evidence must not be remote or uncertain, but must give rise to the inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony. (People v. Foley (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1015.) The accused has the right to question a witness concerning any matter that explains, modifies, or discredits what he said on direct examination. People v. Barr (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 50, 51.\nThe trial court did not err by prohibiting the defense counsel from inquiring into Ron\u2019s pending contempt charge. Ron\u2019s testimony at trial was essentially the same as his initial statement to the police the day after Ms. Nielson\u2019s murder. Since the contempt charge did not arise until after the trial began, it was irrelevant to any motive, bias or interest to lie. The trial court properly barred that question so that Ron would not be forced to incriminate himself.\nNext, defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. We disagree.\nUnder Illinois law, a person in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct unless the condition is so extreme that it suspends his power of reason and renders him incapable of forming a specific intent that is an element of the offense. (People v. Hillenbrand (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 537, 555; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6 \u2014 4(a).) Merely being intoxicated is insufficient to create a defense. People v. Feagans (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997.\nThere was no evidence presented that defendant was intoxicated and not in control of his actions. Instead, there was significant testimony that defendant was not intoxicated the night Ms. Nielson was killed. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to tender the voluntary intoxication defense instruction.\nThe defendant asserts that he was not proven guilty of residential burglary, home invasion and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Although guilty verdicts were returned against defendant for the offenses of residential burglary, home invasion, and armed robbery, no sentence was imposed on those verdicts. The final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence, and in the absence of the imposition of a sentence, an appeal cannot be entertained. (People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23, 51.) The notice of appeal in the record only appeals from the murder conviction and sentence.\nFor this reason, the residential burglary, home invasion, and armed robbery convictions are not before this court. The appeals for these convictions are therefore dismissed.\nBased on the foregoing, the murder conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nTULLY, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Dennis M. Cooley, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Howard D. Weisman, and Christine Cook, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HENRY KACZMAREK, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20143182\nOpinion filed March 31, 1993.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Debra R. Salinger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, and Dennis M. Cooley, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Howard D. Weisman, and Christine Cook, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1067-01", "first_page_order": 1087, "last_page_order": 1102 }